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A review of early christian life and language

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THE NEW TESTAMENT CANON OF DIDYMUS THE BLIND

BY

BART D. EHRMAN

Historical investigations into the formation of the New Testament canon have paid inadequate attention to the status of the canon in Alexandria during the fourth century. In large part this inadequacy is due to the presumed stature of Athanasius's thirty-ninth Paschal letter (A.D. 367). In this famous correspondence, the bishop lists as canonical the twenty-seven books that later became universally accepted by the Christian church. Not infrequently, scholars have assumed that this letter depicts a fixation of the NT canon in Alexandria during Athanasius's lifetime. The position taken by C. R. Gregory can be cited as representative:

> We find in the list [of Athanasius] our whole New Testament. The notable advance upon Eusebius is, that now not a single one of these books remains as a disputed book. They are all on one level. Now that may be merely the Alexandrian view of the case. In Caesarea doubts may still prevail, or in other churches. But for Alexandria the case is clear ... The process for choosing books has come to an end.[1]

Those who concur with Gregory's position sometimes observe a limited disagreement in Alexandria over the precise contours of the canon; occasionally a Latin commentary, presumed to be a translation of Didymus's work on the Catholic epistles, is quoted to show that he, at least, rejected 2 Peter.[2] But even this noteworthy case is dismissed as an exception to what is otherwise assumed— that the Alexandrian church of the latter part of the fourth century had struck a general agreement concerning the extent of the NT canon.

It is precisely this historical judgment that requires further attention. Was the letter of Athanasius *descriptive* or *prescriptive* of the status of the canon in fourth-century Alexandria?[3] If descriptive, it was probably the academic and ecclesiastical prestige of the Alexandrian church that influenced the ultimate acceptance of the current twenty-seven book canon. If prescriptive, the bishop's personal influence would have led to the final fixation of the New Testament.

One way to determine the status of the canon in Alexandria is to ascertain the view of the canon held by a contemporary of Athanasius. This the following study sets out to do by examining the writings of Didymus (d. 398), the blind monk appointed by Athanasius as head of the famed Alexandrian catechetical school.[4] Such an endeavor has become possible only within recent years, since the publication of over 2000 pages of papyrus mss. of Didymus's commentaries on the Old Testament, discovered in 1941 in a grotto near Toura, Egypt.[5] These commentaries on Genesis, Job, Psalms, Ecclesiastes, and Zechariah[6] can be studied profitably to determine the concept, function, and extent of Didymus's NT canon. The purpose of this article is to undertake such a study so as to ascertain whether one can still speak of a fixed NT canon in the Alexandrian church of the late fourth century.

Limitations and Method

Any attempt to ascertain Didymus's NT canon on the basis of these newly discovered commentaries encounters serious limitations. In them, Didymus refers to the canonical status of early Christian writings only on occasion; never does he follow Athanasius in listing the books he considered canonical. This circumstance renders the discernment of his canon difficult, though not impossible. That Didymus viewed any given book as canonical can be determined in one of three ways. The first is the most obvious: sometimes Didymus classifies a book as divinely authored (D. *Job* 18:9; 41:5), or as part of the divine Scriptures (D. *Gen.* 70:14) of either the Old or New Testament (D. *Gen.* 156:1-11). Any book so classified clearly belongs to his canon.

The second way of determining Didymus's view of a book's canonical status is considerably more complex, requiring a detailed explanation and justification. The method here suggested concerns Didymus's "canonical use" of the Biblical writings. This exegetical *use* of the Bible depends, in turn, on his understanding of the *nature* of Scripture. With regard to his understanding of the Bible, Didymus was very much the disciple of Origen.[7] In simplified terms, Didymus believed that the Bible was to be interpreted both literally and spiritually. The literal interpretation, which Didymus calls a word for word (πρὸς ῥῆμα) or historical (κατὰ ἱστορίαν) interpretation, is necessary in view of the occasional obscurity of the Biblical text. Didymus removed such obscurities by making simple paraphrases of the text. As he states in his commentary on Zechariah:

ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ ἡ λέξις ἡ προφητικὴ συγκεχύσθαι ἐξ ἀκαταληλίας τῆς συνθέσεως, μεταποιητέον αὐτὴν οὕτως (D. *Zech.* 22:1-2). Since the prophetic saying appears to be obscure, on account of the incongruity of its phrasing, it must be reconstructed thus.

But often the literal sense itself is impossible, unlikely, or absurd, making a spiritualized interpretation necessary. This can be illustrated by any number of Didymus's interpretive remarks, such as the following:

καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀσάφειαν ἔχει πολλὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν ταῖς δύο διαθήκαις μετ' αἰνιγμοῦ καὶ βαθύτητος ἀπηγγελμένων ... (D. *Zech.* 5:24-26). And since each of the things proclaimed enigmatically and most profoundly in the two Testaments has a great deal of obscurity ... καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ ῥητῷ τὸ ἐξ ἀσαφείας ἀπόκρυφον σημαίνεται ... (D. *Zech.* 5:28-29). And the matter that is hidden in obscurity is signified in this expression ... οὐκ οὔσης ἀναντιρρήτου τῆς ἱστορίας (D. *Zech.* 61:4). The historical sense is not incontestable.

The exegetical endeavor of getting behind the literal to discern the spiritual sense (ἀναγωγή) is carried out by interpreting literal meanings as "allegory" (ἀλληγορία) or "tropology" (τροπολογία). These latter terms are not more closely defined, and are sometimes used interchangeably, so that the four-fold interpretation of Scripture espoused by John Cassian (A.D. 360-438) is not yet in view. Nevertheless, by his overwhelming emphasis on allegorical interpretation, Didymus makes it clear that for him, the goal of exegesis is not the literal elucidation of the Scriptures, but rather the uncovering of the divine mysteries hidden within the text. As Louis Doutreleau has stated:

> Le secret de la connaissance de l'Écriture est là. C'est lorsqu'il peut mettre un texte quelconque en rapport avec le dogme ou la mystique chrétienne de manière à fournir aliment à la considération doctrinale et spirituelle des âmes que Didyme pense avoir dégagé les "parfums" de l'Écriture.[8]

Such a spiritualized interpretation of the Biblical text presupposes that the Bible is a repository of divine teaching, accounting for Didymus's aforementioned references to the divine authorship of the Bible and for his description of the Scriptures as divine. This understanding of the Bible enables Didymus to *use* the Scriptures in his commentaries. For Didymus, the Bible can function exegetically in two ways: (1) to demonstrate the validity of an allegorical interpretation, (2) to amplify the meaning brought out by this interpretation. An example of each of these may prove helpful.

In order to demonstrate the validity of his figurative interpretation of the "fourth day" of creation, Didymus feels compelled to show that

throughout the Scriptures numbers are to be understood symbolically. He refers to Rev. 14, where John speaks of 144,000 men who were virgins. Obviously, reasons Didymus, there could not have been so many virgin men in John's day. Thus the number 144,000 must be symbolic. *This* symbolism shows the validity of regarding the "fourth day" of Gen. 1 as a symbol (D. *Gen.* 36:1-8).

An example of Scriptural amplification, or "fulfillment," occurs in another passage of the commentary on Genesis (D. *Gen.* 41:9-18). Here Didymus argues that the heavenly luminaries that enlighten the earth (Gen. 1) correspond to the Savior who comes also from heaven to bring light to the world. Furthermore, they correspond to the Apostle Paul who was enlightened from above when he wrote his epistles. Hence, not only does the Genesis account foreshadow the coming of Christ and the inspiration of Scripture—these latter, in turn, show the full significance and meaning of the heavenly luminaries.

From these views of the divine authorship and absolute verbal and conceptual unity of the Scriptures, several implications for the canon of the Bible as a whole can be drawn. In quintessential terms, Didymus views the canon as a collection of divinely inspired books. The divine authorship of these books guarantees an absolute unity among them. Thus, the canon is not a collection of diverse books held in tension, but a unified collection of the teachings of God. Diversity within the canon is acknowledged only to the extent that different authors are recognized as having written the various books. But in terms of theological and linguistical matters, any one passage of the Bible (Old or New Testament) can be used to verify or amplify the interpretation of any other.

In order to discern Didymus's NT canon it is critical to realize that not every writing he quotes functions as a verification or amplification of an interpretation of Scripture. *Only canonical writings are so used.* This can be shown by considering the non-canonical ways he uses *other* books. The following five examples of non-canonical uses of non-canonical works are drawn from the commentary on Zechariah.

(1) *Josephus* (D. *Zech.* 364:16-17). After discussing the prophecy of the razing of Jerusalem in Zech. 14:1-2, Didymus observes that its fulfillment was recorded truly and accurately by a Jewish historiographer named Josephus: ὡς ἰουδαϊκὸς ἱστοριογράφος, Ἰώσιππος ὄνομα αὐτῷ, ἀνέγραφεν ἀληθῶς καὶ κατὰ ἀκρίβειαν τὰς ἐπελθούσας τῷ ἔθνει συμφοράς. There is nothing "canonical" (i.e. inspired and authoritative) in Josephus's description of the destruction of Jerusalem for Didymus. It is simply true in the historical sense.

(2) *A Jewish Tradition* (D. *Zech.* 374:29). While discussing the earthquake of Zech. 14:5, Didymus asserts that the same disaster is mentioned in Amos 1:1, and that, according to a Jewish tradition in circulation (κατὰ περιφερομένην παράδοσιν ἰουδαϊκήν), it was the same earthquake felt by Isaiah at his call in Isa. 6. Again, Didymus does not present this traditional understanding as an authority to verify an allegorization of the text, but simply as an interesting historical conjecture that relates to the passage.

(3) *Xenophon* (D. *Zech.* 257:11). In relationship to the horsemen mentioned in Zech. 10:5b, Didymus distinguishes between skilled horsemen and mere horse riders, referring to the distinction drawn by another ancient writer: τις τῶν ἀρχαίων σοφός (cf. Xenophon, *Memor.* III, 3, 5). Clearly the reference is not to a canonical authority, but rather to a secular writing that makes a distinction helpful for exegesis.

(4) *Philo* (D. *Zech.* 320:4-9). After giving an allegorical interpretation of Gen. 12:1, Didymus admits that his interpretation was also made by another commentator: ὡς τις τῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὴν μωσαϊκὴν παίδευσιν ἡρμήνευσεν ("As a certain wise man, concerning the Mosaic teaching, interpreted," cf. Philo, *de migr. Abr.* I, 2). Here again there is no implication of canonical status for Philo's work; it just happens that both writers agree upon the interpretation of the passage.

(5) *Aristotle* (D. *Zech.* 123:22). Didymus, in commenting on Zech. 7:9, κρίμα δίκαιον κρίνατε ("make a righteous judgment"), discusses the righteous character of God, and says Ἐπῆλθέν τινι τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τὸν δικαστὴν ἔμψυχον δίκαιον εἶναι ("A certain one of the ancients happened to say, 'The judge is justice personified.'"), clearly a reference to *Eth. Nic.* V, 4, 7: ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον ("For the judge wishes to be justice personified."). Didymus does not use this phrase "from a certain one of the ancients" as a canonical authority, i.e. either to validate his exegesis or to show its fuller meaning in the context of the divine mysteries. It is rather a quotation from a philosophical treatise that he himself validates by quoting it with approval. The citation is made simply because the philosopher, in this instance, happens to agree with the meaning of the Scripture text.

One can see that a different *kind* of value is placed on these references than on the canonical works discussed earlier. On the one hand, the books of the canon are quoted as books with self-authenticating authority—needing no defense or validation. Their function is to grant an insight into the mysteries of God, either by verifying an interpreta-

tion of Scripture or by showing the fuller implication of such an interpretation. The non-canonical books, on the other hand, are referred to in passing. Never are they quoted as theological or exegetical authorities. Rather, Didymus refers to them either because they independently concur with a theological or exegetical insight, in which case they are correct but not authoritative, or because they have something of philosophical or historical interest to say.

The preceding analysis is valuable because it shows that Didymus quotes *parts of his canon* of Scripture to verify or amplify the interpretations he ascribes to other parts. But he does *not* use non-canonical writings in this way. For him they lack the requisite divine authority. Hence the second way of determining the canonical status of any given writing: if Didymus uses a book "canonically," i.e. in verifying or amplifying an interpretation of another Scripture, it itself is construed to be part of the canon.

A third way of determining Didymus's view of a book's canonicity can be considered a corollary of the second. Often Didymus will use *two or more* writings "canonically" when making an interpretation of a text. Occasionally in so doing he places an unquestionably canonical book in a functionally parallel relationship to a writing whose canonical status may otherwise be in doubt. By establishing such a relationship, he shows that he conceives of the two works as "canonical equals," both being pressed into service toward the same interpretive end. Thus the book in question is granted, by implication, the canonical status of the other. This corollary criterion of "canonical equality" can be particularly useful in determining the canonical status of books that Didymus quotes infrequently.

The Extent of Didymus's New Testament Canon

Given these guidelines for determining which books Didymus considers canonical, what can be said concerning the extent of his NT canon? There can be no question, in this regard, that Didymus accepted most of the current twenty-seven books of the New Testament. He quotes regularly and "canonically" from all four Gospels, from Acts, from twelve Pauline epistles (including Hebrews, referred to as Pauline, but not 2 Thessalonians and Philemon), and from James, 1 Peter, 1 John, and Revelation. Therefore, an investigation into the contours of his canon must concentrate on two areas: his views of the six remaining

books of the NT—2 Thessalonians, Philemon, 2 Peter, 2 John, 3 John, and Jude—and his views of the writings of the Apostolic Fathers which he quotes—the Shepherd of Hermas, Barnabas, Ign. Romans, the Didache, and I Clement.

Before engaging in this investigation, it must be emphasized that only *positive* conclusions can be considered decisive. That is to say, if Didymus refers to a book as part of the canon, or uses it canonically, no doubt can remain concerning his view. The same applies if, conversely, he explicitly rejects a book. But when Didymus gives no indication at all of a book's canonical status, a corresponding negative inference (that such a book did not belong in his canon) cannot be drawn. It may be that in the portion of Didymus's corpus now extant he found no occasion to quote certain books.

Even given this restriction, it is striking that among the 2000 pages of commentaries found at Toura, not once does Didymus cite 2 or 3 John. Nor does he even allude to their existence. Never, for example, does he introduce a quotation from I John with an explanation that this is from John's *first* epistle. Rather, he either quotes the book without an introduction, or introduces it as "the epistle according to John." The following are characteristic of such introductions:

> ὁ Ἰωάννης ἐν τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστολῇ γράφει (D. *Ps.* 158:7).
> ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ τῇ Ἰωάννου (D. *Gen.* 127:27).
> ἐν τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν καθόλου ἐπιστολῇ ὁ Ἰωάννης λέγει (D. *Ps.* 252:3).

While the definite articles used in all of these instances are intriguing (e.g. "John says in *the* epistle he wrote") they eventually lead nowhere. Without a definite statement to the contrary, one can only assume that Didymus saw no need to refer to 2 or 3 John. Whether or not he viewed them as canonical cannot be determined.

The situation is similar with regard to Philemon. In this case, however, Doutreleau has suggested that a reference to the book may be found in a fragmentary section of the Zechariah commentary (D. *Zech.* 228:5).[9] The letters preserved there are /υδεσμιοι/ which Doutreleau thinks may refer to the δέσμιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ of Phile. 9. The speculative nature of this conjecture is unmistakable. Not only must the words Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ be transposed to precede the nominative δέσμιος, but the latter word itself must be changed from a singular to a plural, which, of course, makes no sense in the Apostle's reference to *himself* as a δέσμιος in Phile. 9. Furthermore, to bring about the required combination of

letters, the same changes could be postulated for Eph. 3:1 (which Doutreleau also notes). Since there is no basis for even considering the fragment from the commentary a Biblical reference at all, there remains no reason to regard it as an allusion to Philemon. Hence, as was the case for 2 and 3 John, the commentaries found at Toura provide no data from which one can determine Didymus's view of the canonical status of Philemon.

The situation is somewhat different in the case of 2 Thessalonians. While the epistle is not quoted at all in the commentaries on Genesis, Job, and Psalms, it may be referred to twice in the Ecclesiastes commentary and is plainly quoted in the commentary on Zechariah. Johannes Kramer, the editor of vol. III of the commentary on Ecclesiastes, considers the reference to υἱὸς ἀπωλείας (D. *Eccl.* 159:4, "son of destruction") a possible reference to 2 Thes. 2:3 (ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας).[10] But in light of the occurrence of the same phrase in John 17:12, nothing definite can be said of Didymus's source. Similarly, the editors of vol. VI of the same commentary, Gerhard Binder and Leo Liesenborghs, regard the statement in 319:15, ὃν ἔσχεν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου πάντας καλέσαντες as a possible allusion to 2 Thes. 2:14: εἰς ὃ καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὑμᾶς διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἡμῶν.[11] It is readily seen that if Didymus is referring to 2 Thessalonians here, he does so in a rather opaque way. The only similarity between these two passages is their mutuality in linking καλέω to εὐαγγέλιον, a link which occurs in yet another way in Gal. 1:6. Hence no conclusions can be drawn from the wording of the passage, so that no unequivocal usage of 2 Thessalonians can be discerned in Didymus's commentary on Ecclesiastes.

From the commentary on Zechariah, however, it becomes clear that Didymus both knew and used 2 Thessalonians as a canonical book. In the first place, there is a definite allusion to 2 Thes. 2:8-9 (ὁ ἄνομος ... οὗ ἐστιν ἡ παρουσία κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Σατανᾶ ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει καὶ σημείοις καὶ τέρασιν ψεύδους) in D. *Zech.* 320:26: ... τοῦ 'Αντιχρίστου ἐπαγγελομένου ἔχειν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ ζῶντα βραχίονα διὰ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα ἃ ἐνεργεῖ ψεύδους ὄντα ("... the Antichrist, who is said to have a strong and living arm through the signs and wonders which, though they are of a lie, are at work."). Although this is obviously not a quotation, the conceptual and linguistic parallels are undeniable (ἄνομος/'Αντιχρίστου; ἐνέργειαν/ἐνέργει; σημείοις/σημεῖα; τέρασιν/τέρατα; ψεύδους/ψεύδους). Furthermore, the verb ἐπαγγέλομαι serves to indicate the authoritativeness of the Pauline description of the Antichrist.

Didymus's view of 2 Thessalonians is plainly revealed in the next paragraph of his commentary: περὶ τούτου κατὰ λέξιν γράφει Παῦλος Θεσσαλονικεῦσιν· Ἕως ἐλθῇ 'ὁ ἄνομος ...' ("Concerning this one, according to what Paul wrote to the Thessalonians, 'until the lawless one should come ...'"). This introduction is followed by a complete quotation of 2 Thes. 2:8. Here, then, Didymus demonstrates his knowledge of 2 Thessalonians, acknowledges its Pauline authorship, and most importantly, uses it in a canonical way to demonstrate the validity of his comments on the figure of the Antichrist which he finds portrayed in Zech. 11:17.

Despite the paucity of evidence, there can be no doubt that Didymus also considers the book of Jude as a part of the NT canon. To be sure, he refers to or quotes the book only seven times in his commentaries (six of which are from Jude 6) and never does he refer to it by name. But once he introduces a quotation from it with the standardized Biblical preface, γέγραπται (D. *Zech.* 79:2), once he includes it among "the Scriptures" (τῶν γραφῶν, D. *Zech. 9:30-32*) and once he labels it as ἡ θεία διδασκαλία (D. *Job* 110:19). Hence it is clear that Didymus numbers it among the inspired books of the canon of Scripture.

One of the most puzzling matters of this investigation has already been alluded to—the explicit claim, allegedly made by Didymus, that 2 Peter is a forgery and does not belong in the canon. This claim is found in a Latin commentary that, since its discovery in the sixteenth century, has often been thought to be that referred to by Cassiodorus (sixth century), namely, Epiphanius's translation of Didymus's work on the Catholic epistles (both the original Greek commentary and its translation having been lost for centuries). The author of this Latin commentary, in discussing 2 Pet. 3:5-7, finds himself in basic disagreement with 2 Peter's conception of the end times. This leads him to write the following:

> Non est ignorandum, praesentem Epistolam esse falsatam, quae licet publicetur, non tamen in Canone est.[12]
> It is not to be ignored that the present epistle is spurious, which, although it is published (in the churches), nevertheless is not in the canon.

Since Mingarelli's publication of the treatise *de Trinitate*, likewise thought to be the work of Didymus,[13] this statement has appeared problematic—not only because it rejects 2 Peter, but also because, in so doing, it contradicts the testimony of the doctrinal work that the epistle is

both genuine and canonical. A reading of the Toura commentaries removes any doubts concerning Didymus's view of 2 Peter. Several times in these exegetical works he affirms both the Petrine authorship of the epistle and its rightful place in the NT canon. While writing on the Scriptural image of the tabernacle in D. *Zech.* 405:9-12, Didymus quotes 2 Pet. 1:14, prefacing it with these words; ὁ τῶν Χριστοῦ μαθητῶν ἁγιώτατος Πέτρος γράφει ("The most holy of Christ's disciples, Peter, wrote ..."). In another section of the same commentary, Didymus refers to apostates, introducing a quotation from 2 Pet. 2:21-22 by saying περὶ τῶν οὕτως γνώμης ἐχόντων γράφει ὁ μέγας Χριστοῦ μαθητὴς Πέτρος οὕτως (D. *Zech.* 277:7-13 "Concerning people who think in this way, Peter, the great apostle of Christ, wrote thus"). The same verses are quoted twice in the commentary on Ecclesiastes, once introduced with the words Πέτρος αἰνίττεται ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ τῇ δευτέρᾳ (175:17, "Peter speaks forth in his second epistle") and similarly with ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁ Πέτρος ἐν τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστολῇ (285:1, "In another place Peter has said in his epistle"). These references clearly show that Didymus considered 2 Peter genuine. That he considered the book *canonical* is borne out by other references in which, for example, he introduces a "proof" from 2 Peter with the standardized Scriptural introduction γέγραπται (D. *Zech.* 79:2), and, especially, in which he argues "from the Scriptures" (ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν) that there are fallen angels, quoting 2 Pet. 2:4 (D. *Zech.* 9:30ff).

These references from Didymus's exegetical works show that he considers 2 Peter genuine and canonical. But what now is to be made of the curious statement from the Latin commentary? Clearly it was written by someone other than Didymus. This contention can be supported by other considerations, the most striking of which is that the commentary must have been an original Latin composition, and so could not be Epiphanius's translation.[14] This becomes clear when one considers the commentator's occasional references back to the *original Greek* of the Biblical text. Thus, for example, while interpreting 1 Pet. 1:12, the writer quotes the (Latin) text, and comments that the Greek words give a different meaning: "*Notandum quod apud Graecos* '*in quae*' *legitur, non* '*in quem.*'" (Migne, col. 1758-59, "It is to be noted that among the Greeks is said '*in quae*,' not '*in quem.*'") Again, in the commentary on 1 Jn. 3:8, the writer explains that the word for Devil in Greek is exegetically significant: "*Diabolos ergo Graeco vocabulo* '*seductor*' *seu* '*accusator*' *vel* '*derogator*' *significat.*" (Migne, col. 1789C, "Therefore, as a Greek word, *Diabolos* signifies 'seducer,' or 'accuser,' or

'slanderer.'"). Obviously only one writing in Latin would have made such statements, so that the commentary is *not* a translation of Didymus's Greek work. Contrary to the claims of several textbooks on the NT, this shows that Didymus himself did not reject either the genuineness or the canonicity of 2 Peter.[15]

The conclusions to be drawn from this section of the study can now be stated. Didymus considered the following books divinely inspired and canonical: the four Gospels, Acts, Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus, Hebrews, James, 1 John, 1 and 2 Peter, Jude, and Revelation. It cannot be determined whether he also considered the three shortest and most personal of the NT letters—Philemon, 2 and 3 John—to be canonical as well.

The single most important question for this investigation can now be addressed. Does Didymus consider *other* books, i.e. those *not* found in Athanasius's canon, likewise to be divinely inspired and canonical? To answer this question attention must be directed toward Didymus's use of the Apostolic Fathers in the Toura commentaries. Didymus quotes these writings fifteen times according to the following frequencies; the Shepherd of Hermas, five times; Barnabas, four times; Ignatius to the Romans, three times; the Didache, twice; 1 Clement, once. Each of these citations requires careful attention if the extent of Didymus's NT canon is to be ascertained.

The Shepherd of Hermas

The Shepherd is referred to twice in the commentary on Job, and three times in the commentary on Zechariah.

(1) D. *Job* 184:33. At this place in the commentary, Didymus is engaged in interpreting Job 6:28: νῦνι δὲ εἰσβλέψας εἰς πρόσωπα ὑμῶν οὐ ψεύσομαι ("But now, looking into your faces, I will not lie."). Concerning the first part of the verse (νῦνι ... ὑμῶν), Didymus comments that it is important never to slander people in their absence. The validity of this principle is established by the Shepherd (Mand. 2, 2): εἴρηται γὰρ, 'μὴ καταλάλει μηδὲ ἡδέως ἄκουε καταλαλοῦντος' ("For it has been said, 'do not slander or hear gladly those who slander.'"). Likewise, says Didymus, the statement of Job, "I will not lie" (οὐ ψεύσομαι) corresponds to St. Paul's claim, "and I do not lie" (οὐ δὲ ψεύδομαι, 2 Cor. 11:31).

From this solitary passage it should be clear that Didymus considers the Shepherd canonical. Not only does he use it to validate his inter-

pretation of Scripture (a "canonical verification"), but also, in so doing, he presents it as a canonical equal to 2 Corinthians by placing the two works in a parallel construction—one for the validation of an element of his interpretation, the other as a Scriptural amplification of a different element.

(2) D. *Job* 224:22ff. Here Didymus is commenting on Job 8:17b: ἐν δὲ μέσῳ χαλίκων ζήσεται, ("And he will live in the midst of stones"). This, says Didymus, refers to the ungodly person who does not dwell in a "well-ordered house," united by virtue and piety, but rather among the shambles, in a house built upon wickedness. His life is constructed from scattered "stones that are not fit together, in the words of the Shepherd, 'unto the building of the tower' " (λίθους οἳ οὐκ ἁρμόζουσιν 'τῇ οἰκοδομῇ τοῦ πύργου,' κατὰ τὸν Ποιμένα, Hermas Vis. 3, 2, 7).

In this citation, unlike the first, Didymus does not quote the Shepherd to validate his interpretation, but rather to show how the interpretation fits into the overall conception of the building metaphor in the Scriptures. The full significance of Job 8:17 is realized only when seen in relation to the Shepherd. This, then, is a quotation for the sake of Scriptural amplification. In this sense, the Shepherd is again used canonically.

(3) D. *Zech.* 86:24-27. With regard to the woman called "lawlessness" (ἀνομία) in Zech. 5:8, Didymus maintains that it is fitting for a woman to be designated as evil conduct, perverse thoughts, and the evil power that produces such things. This is because women are often used as symbols for both vices and virtues in the Scriptures. For examples, Didymus quotes from Proverbs, Wisdom, Psalms, 2 Kings, the Gospels, 1 Corinthians, Revelation, and lastly, the Shepherd: φέρεται ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ τῆς κατηχήσεως τῇ Ποιμένι ἐπιγεγραμμένῃ πολλὰ διὰ γυναικῶν καὶ παρθένων δηλούμενα ("Many things are referred to in the book of catechism entitled the Shepherd, being set forth through women and virgins").

Quite instructive is the progression Didymus follows in his discussion—from the books of the OT, to the Gospels, to the Pauline epistles, to Revelation, to Hermas. Here the Shepherd is paralleled to the other canonical books in order to validate a figurative interpretation of Zechariah. Hence, in its use and in its relation to other books of the canon, the Shepherd is again construed as canonical.

(4) and (5) D. *Zech.* 234:21-22; 355:20-24. These two passages will be treated together because in both Didymus alludes to a vision set forth in

the Shepherd in order to validate his interpretation of a Scriptural symbol. In both places Didymus refers to the Ethiopians of Wisdom 2:12 as those who will be smitten by God. Why will they be smitten? Because they are Ethiopians. What does this signify? This signifies that they participate in the evil of their father the Devil; they are black (i.e. Ethiopian) because he is black, due to his perversity and ignorance of God. These things are confirmed by two books, the Shepherd and Barnabas, referred to somewhat differently in the respective passages: ὡς δηλοῦνται ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ τῆς μετανοίας, Ποιμένι ὀνομαζομένῃ, καὶ τῇ Βαρναβᾶ ἐπιστολῇ ("As is made clear in the book of repentance called the Shepherd, and in the epistle of Barnabas," D. *Zech.* 234:21-22); Ἐν γὰρ τῷ Ποιμένι καὶ τῇ τοῦ Βαρναβᾶ ἐπιστολῇ μέλας ὁ Σατανᾶς προσαγορεύεται ("For in the Shepherd and in the epistle of Barnabas, Satan is called black." D. *Zech.* 355:20-24). The references are probably to Barn. 4:9 which designates Satan as "the black one" (ὁ μέλας), and to the ninth parable of Hermas (9, 9, 1), which describes a black mountain inhabited by [black] apostates and blasphemers for whom there is death but no repentance. Didymus's use of these books for "canonical verification," i.e. for the validation of his symbolic interpretation of the passage in Wisdom, shows that he considers them to be parts of the divinely inspired and authoritative canon of Scripture.

Barnabas

Two of the four references to Barnabas in Didymus's commentaries have already been discussed, since they occurred in conjunction with the Shepherd in the Zechariah commentary. They, like the references to the Shepherd, were used canonically in these instances. The two remaining references to the book, one other from the commentary on Zechariah, one from the commentary on the Psalms, show conclusively that Didymus included the book in his canon of the New Testament.

(1) D. *Zech.* 259:21-24. In commenting on God's promise to restore the house of Joseph and Judah, Didymus claims that the promise is actually extended to the children of believers who are trained in godly and virtuous living. This is shown, argues Didymus, by the circumstance that Scriptural promises are often extended to "children" (τέκνα). Thus the Apostle in Christ wrote to the Corinthians and Galatians (ὁ ἐν Χριστῷ γοῦν Ἀπόστολος Κορινθίοις καὶ Γαλάταις ἐπιστέλλει) calling them his "begotten" and "children," as also did Peter, the prince of the apostles

(καὶ Πέτρος γοῦν ὁ τῶν ἀποστόλων πρόκριτος). Likewise Barnabas, who himself was established with Paul as an apostle unto the uncircumcision (καὶ Βαρναβᾶς γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ Παύλου ἀπόστολος ταχθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκροβυστίας), sent an epistle to those who were faithful to the Gospel, addressing her (the church) as sons and daughters (τοῖς κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον πιστοῖς ἐπιστολὴν διαπεμψάμενος, προσφωνεῖ αὐτὴν ὡς υἱοῖς καὶ θυγάτρασιν). Here Barnabas is called an apostle of the same rank as Paul, and his epistle is put on the same level as 1 Corinthians, Galatians, and 1 Peter, being used to establish the validity of Didymus's exegesis of Zechariah.

(2) D. *Ps.* 300:12-13. While interpreting Ps. 41:5a, ἐν φωνῇ ἀγαλλιάσεως καὶ ἐξομολογήσεως ("in a voice of rejoicing and confession"), Didymus seeks to explain its key words. He notes that in the Scriptures (ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς) the word ἐξομολογήσις can have several meanings. One such meaning is the telling forth of one's sins, as, for example, it means in the Epistle of Barnabas: τοῦτο οὖν ἐν τῷ Βαρναβᾷ κεῖται, ἐν τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστολῇ: 'συναγαγὼν ἐξομολογήσαι ἐπὶ ἁμαρτίαις' (Barn. 19:12, "Gathering together to make confession of sins"). This reference removes any lingering doubts about Didymus's view of Barnabas. Not only does he use the epistle to uncover the meaning of a word in the Psalms, as is possible when both are conceived of as a divine unity, but also, in so doing, he explicitly classifies it "among the Scriptures" (ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς). It can be seen at this juncture that Didymus's NT canon extended at least to the inclusion of the Shepherd and Barnabas.

Ignatius to the Romans

Next in the order of frequency of citation comes Ignatius's letter to the Romans. Of the entire Ignatian corpus, only Romans is quoted in Didymus's commentaries, and indeed all three quotations are of the same verse: ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως ἐσταύρωται ("My own passion has been crucified," Ign. Rom. 7:2).

(1) D. *Eccl.* 81:7. With respect to Eccl. 3:8a, καιρὸς τοῦ φιλῆσαι ("a time to love"), Didymus discusses various concepts of love, and so comes to comment on the idea of passionate love, ἔρως. He quotes with admiration what was said by a "certain saint" concerning ἔρως: ἀξιάγαστος δὲ ἐστιν ὥς τινα τῶν ἁγίων εἰπεῖν, ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως ἐσταύρωται." It is noteworthy that Didymus attaches no canonical authority to this citation. On the one hand, it neither validates a Scriptural interpretation

nor amplifies its significance. Rather it serves to elucidate a *concept*. On the other hand, the quotation is labeled "admirable," and is made, not by an inviolable authority, but by a saint. From this reference, therefore, there can be no inference of a canonical status for Ignatius's epistle.

Of all the quotations of the Apostolic Fathers by Didymus, the other two references to Ign. Romans are perhaps the most difficult to assess. In light of their similarities, it will be helpful to set them both in context before attempting to understand what they imply concerning Didymus's view of the canonical status of the letter.

(2) D. *Eccl.* 86:19. In this passage, Didymus again discusses the concepts of love and passion. Sometimes, observes Didymus, it is unclear whether the verb ἐράω signifies passion in the physical sense or attraction in a more noble sense. Nevertheless, even when there can be no ambiguity, i.e. even when there is no connotation of the physical contact between a man and a woman, the word is sometimes used. This can be illustrated, Didymus says, in the case of "a certain wise and apostolic man" (σοφός τις ... καὶ ἀποστολικὸς ἀνήρ) who spoke concerning *the Savior*, "My own Passion has been crucified."

(3) D. *Ps.* 297:28. In this passage, which involves yet another discussion of the concept ἐράω, Didymus refers to the Song of Solomon in which the bridegroom's desire (ἔρως) is wholly for his bride. This shows that a bridegroom has no pure passion for anything else, which is verified (with respect to the God-human relationship) by what has been said elsewhere (κατὰ τὸν εἴποντα): "My own passion has been crucified."

In these final two references, Didymus seems to be using the saying of Ignatius in a canonical way—the concept of ἔρως in Ecclesiastes is illuminated by the quotation, and the full significance of ἔρως in Song of Solomon is seen in light of the crucifixion of the ἔρως for the sake of God. But beyond this canonical usage of Ignatius's *saying*, it is difficult to discern Didymus's view of the book itself. Is the book part of the NT canon or is the saying alone authoritative? The problem arises at this particular juncture only because the citations differ so radically from those already discussed from the Shepherd and Barnabas. Both of the other books, it was seen, were quoted *as books*, with their titles given. But Didymus never refers to Ign. Romans by name, or even as a book. Rather, he quotes a saying made by a wise (and /or) apostolic man. It is difficult to infer any canonical or binding status from such a casual reference to a source. Even more importantly, Didymus grants canon-

icity to the Shepherd and Barnabas by quoting them side by side, in parallel construction, with unquestionably canonical books. It is noteworthy that the citations from Ign. Romans are *not* placed in such a construction, but rather stand in isolation as sayings of a wise man. The conclusion that can be drawn from these considerations, difficult as it may be, is that Didymus regarded the saying of Ign. Rom. 7:2 to be helpful, and even authoritative in much the same way he regarded some books as authoritative. But it must remain uncertain whether he included the epistle itself in his canon of the New Testament.

The Didache

Didymus quotes the Didache twice, once in the commentary on the Psalms, once in that on Ecclesiastes.

(1) D. *Ps.* 227:26. While interpreting Ps. 34:20, ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰρηνικὰ ἐλάλουν ("Because, on the one hand, they are speaking peacably to me"), Didymus comments on the meaning of the word "peacemaker" from Mt. 5:9. He asserts that a peacemaker must first learn to be at peace with himself. This happens when the soul puts the body under subjection, as Paul states in 1 Cor. 9:27. Once one is at peace with himself, he can make peace with others, whether they are loving by nature or bellicose, for this is what is said "in the catechetical book of the Didache, 'bring peace to those who fight.' " (ἐν τῇ Διδαχῇ τῇ βίβλῳ τῆς κατηχήσεως λέγεται, 'εἰρηνεύσεις μαχομένους.')[16]

In light of the preceding discussion on Ign. Romans, it should be observed that the work in question here is quoted both by name and as a book. Furthermore, it is quoted "canonically," i.e. it is used to establish the validity of Didymus's interpretation of the Scriptural concept of peacemaker. Finally, Didymus grants it a stature parallel to that of 1 Corinthians—the latter being used to verify the first part of Didymus's understanding of the concept, the former the second part. In view of these considerations, one can hardly deny that Didymus included the book within his NT canon.

(2) D. *Eccl.* 78:22f. Didymus grounds his entire interpretation of Eccl. 3:7a, καιρὸς τοῦ ῥάψαι ("a time to sew") upon the teaching of the Didache: ἐν τῇ Διδαχῇ τῆς κατηχήσεως τῶν ἀποστόλων λέγεται, εἰρηνεύσεις μαχομένους' ("In the Teaching of the apostolic catechesis it is said, 'bring peace to those who fight.'"). This shows, says Didymus, that the time to sew is the time to restore friends back to friendship, so that the

garment of salvation might be sewn from this harmony. Here the Didache is tied directly into an apostolic provenance, and, more importantly, it is used as the exegetical key to unlock the meaning of the text in Ecclesiastes. This again shows Didymus's belief in its authoritative, that is to say, canonical, character.

1 Clement

The book of 1 Clement is quoted once by Didymus in the Toura commentaries, in D. *Job* 299:22. In commenting on Job 11:7, μὴ ἴχνος κυρίου εὑρήσεις, ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα ἀφίκου, ἃ ἐποίησεν ὁ παντοκράτωρ ("You will not find a trace of the Lord, nor will you attain to the end thing which the Almighty made."), Didymus seeks to understand what is meant by the word ἔσχατα. Among other meanings, verified by quotations from Ps. 134:7a; 138:51, the word can signify the "ends of the earth" (πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου), for it is said, "The oceans, endless to men—as are the worlds beyond them—are ruled by the same decrees of the Master." (1 Clement 20:8, ὠκεανὸς ἀπέραντος ἀνθρώποις καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτὸν κόσμοι ταῖς αὐταῖς ταγαῖς τοῦ δεσπότου διϊθύνονται).

Obviously there is little evidence here for determining Didymus's view of the canonical status of 1 Clement. It cannot be denied, however, that Didymus uses the epistle "canonically" to validate a possible interpretation of a concept. Furthermore, and this is equally significant, in so doing he places it in a parallel relationship to the Psalms, so that by implication it is assumed to have the same authority. From these things it can be concluded, tentatively, that Didymus considered this epistle also to be among the books of the NT canon.

The conclusions of this study of Didymus's canon of the NT can now be stated. What was his view, or conception of the canon? How did it function for him? What was its extent? Didymus viewed the NT canon as a collection of divinely inspired books given by God for the benefit of the church. When rightly interpreted, this canon, or better, these books, gave a full and correct understanding of the mysteries of God. The key to right interpretation lay in a figurative/spiritual/allegorical exegesis. In order to validate the interpretation of any given passage, appeal could be made to any other part of the divinely inspired canon. Similarly, the full significance of an interpretation of any canonical passage could be seen when placed in an amplificatory relationship to other parts of the canon. Hence, the canon functioned for Didymus as a

means for correctly interpreting and correlating the various aspects of God's revelation. The most critical issue, with respect to Didymus's view of the canon, concerns its extent. Here it has been shown that, beyond doubt, Didymus accepted as canonical most of Athanasius's canon of twenty-seven books: the four Gospels, Acts, thirteen Pauline epistles (excluding only Philemon), five catholic epistles (excluding 2 and 3 John) and Revelation. Concerning the canonical status of the three remaining epistles, the commentaries discovered at Toura are silent. More significantly, it has been shown that Didymus also included the Shepherd of Hermas, Barnabas, the Didache, and 1 Clement within his canon; the status of Ign. Romans, which he also quotes, cannot be determined. It must be reaffirmed that these are tentative conclusions based on fragmentary evidence. It is not inconceivable that future discoveries of other writings by Didymus will necessitate a reconsideration of the issues.

Didymus in Context

This study began with a statement concerning fourth century Alexandria and concludes on the same note. The conclusions mentioned above show the idea of a fixed canon in Alexandria during Athanasius's lifetime to be a fantasy.[17] One of the leading Alexandrian scholars of Athanasius's day—the very man he appointed as head of the famed catechetical school—believed that the NT canon extended beyond the bounds advocated by the bishop. Yet this should not come as a surprise. There are two other historical evidences of the fluidity of the canon in fourth-century Alexandria. These can be mentioned briefly.

The first, interestingly enough, is Athanasius himself. While in his thirty-ninth Paschal letter Athanasius conceives of the NT canon as a fixed entity, elsewhere he vacillates. Thus, although he twice denies the canonicity of the Shepherd of Hermas (39th Paschal Letter, 7: *de Decretis*, 18), in another place he quotes it as canonical. The quotation comes in chapter 3 of *de Incarnatione*, where Athanasius is concerned to show that God created all things out of nothing. To this end he says, "But from the things that were not, which had no prior existence, God made everything to exist through His Word." To verify this statement he quotes a divine word from two sources which are linked by the μέν ... δέ construction. "Concerning this matter, He (God) spoke on the one hand through Moses" (ἤ φησὶ διὰ μὲν Μωυσέως) ... "and on the other

hand through the most profitable book of the Shepherd ..." (διὰ δὲ τῆς ὠφελιμωτατῆς βίβλου τοῦ Ποιμένος). Athanasius, then, claims that God spoke not only the words quoted from Gen. 1:1, but also those from Hermas Mand. 1. This shows that at one point in his life,[18] or at least when it was convenient for refuting heretics, Athanasius himself had a broader canon than that set forth in his thirty-ninth Paschal letter.

Further evidence for the fluidity of the NT canon in fourth century Alexandria is provided by two codices of the Bible— ℵ and A. Modern scholars agree that these mss. were produced in or around Alexandria during Athanasius's lifetime at the earliest: ℵ in the last half of the fourth century, A in the first half of the fifth.[19] What is noteworthy about these mss. is that in them, along with the texts of the canonical books of the NT, are found several others, including some that Didymus considered canonical. In codex ℵ, for example, the Epistle of Barnabas follows the Book of Revelation, and it, in turn, is followed by the Shepherd of Hermas. There is no indication in the text of the ms. that these two books are different in character from those that precede them. It is likely that the copyist regarded them as canonical. Similarly in codex A, Revelation is followed by 1 Clement and part of 2 Clement (the final leaves of the ms. are not extant). Again these books are not set apart from the rest of the NT, showing that they were probably accepted as canonical by the copyist.

The question raised at the outset of this paper concerning the status of the NT canon in Alexandria during the latter part of the fourth century can now be answered. While the entire church there seems to have agreed upon the canonical status of many books, there were others, notably several works of the Apostolic Fathers, that were still disputed. This means that although Athanasius listed no ἀντιλεγόμενα in his thirty-ninth Paschal letter, the category did exist in his church. Hence, rather than describing the status of the canon in Alexandria, Athanasius wrote a prescriptive canon, an "authoritative list of authoritative books." The eventual acceptance of this canon demonstrates the personal influence he commanded.

NOTES

[1] Caspar René Gregory, *Canon and Text of the New Testament* (New York 1907) 269-70. In various ways, other scholars have taken the more radical position that Athanasius merely lists an old Alexandrian canon; cf. B. F. Westcott, *A General Survey of the History of the Canon of the New Testament*, 6th ed. (London 1889) 448. Adolf von Har-

nack thinks that this twenty-seven book list had been fixed in Alexandria a century prior to Athanasius's thirty-ninth Paschal letter. See his *Der kirchengeschichtliche Ertrag der exegetischen Arbeiten des Origenes*, TU, XLII, 3 (1918) 12. Jean Ruwet, S. J., maintains that Athanasius himself, in conformity with the Alexandrian tradition, considered other books to be just as inspired as those of the NT canon, but refused to grant them canonical status out of deference to the tradition which had already proscribed the limits of the canon. See his 'Le Canon alexandrin des Écritures. Saint Athanase,' *Biblica* 33 (1952) 1-29. With regard to this latter position that sees the NT canon as an authoritative list of books based on tradition rather than on the character of the writings, it is worth noting that Athanasius's letter makes it clear that the books *in the canon* are "divine Scriptures" (Sec. 2), "divinely inspired" (Sec. 3), "accredited as divine" (Sec. 3). No such laudatory status is accorded the books "not indeed included in the Canon" (Sec. 7), which are nevertheless profitable for instruction. This makes Ruwet's position difficult to maintain. A plain reading of Athanasius's letter shows that he considers some books divinely inspired and therefore canonical, other books non-inspired but profitable, and yet other books heretical and consequently dangerous. The viable options for fitting Athanasius's other statements concerning the Shepherd of Hermas into his stated view of the canon will be dealt with at the end of this article.

[2] Westcott, 448. This position has been continually reasserted in the literature on the canon. Most recently, see A. B. Du Toit, 'The Canon of the New Testament,' *Guide to the New Testament*, Section B, tr. D. Roy Briggs (Pretoria 1979) 232.

[3] The circumstance that Athanasius felt compelled to provide this list cannot, in itself, preclude the possibility that for the *NT* canon the list is purely descriptive. The letter itself implies that the entire canon (OT and NT) is presented because certain heretics are writing and publishing books that are often read as part of the *OT* canon.

[4] Didymus was one of the most erudite and famous teachers of the fourth century. Numbered among his pupils were Rufinus and Jerome. The latter said of him: "My hair was already streaked with gray so that I looked more like a master than a pupil. Nevertheless I went to Alexandria and heard Didymus. I have much to thank him for, because what I did not know I learned from him and what I already knew I did not forget. So excellent was his teaching." *Epistola* 84, *ad Pammachium et Oceanum.*

[5] For details concerning the discovery and description of these mss., see Didyme L'Aveugle, *Sur Zacharie*, vol. 1, ed. Louis Doutreleau (Paris 1962) 21-22. The inadequacy of using Didymus's other extant works for such an investigation is made evident by Ruwet's article. Not having access to Didymus's commentaries, Ruwet can find no citation of the Apostolic Fathers in Didymus, with the possible exception of a reference to Hermas in a catena on Job, possibly authentic. Of the four other Apostolic Fathers discussed in this article, Ruwet finds not a trace.

[6] In the rest of this article, these commentaries will be referred to with the following sigla: Didymus's initial, the (abbreviated) name of the commentary, the page of the papyrus, the line. Thus, D. *Gen.* 70:14 refers to Didymus's commentary on Genesis, page 70, line 14.

[7] For a full treatment of Origen's allegorical exegesis, see R. P. C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event* (Richmond, Va. 1959) 233-359.

[8] Doutreleau, I, 57.

[9] Ibid., II, 700.

[10] Didymus, *Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes*, vol. III, ed. Johannes Kramer (Bonn 1970) 30.

[11] Ibid., vol. IV, ed. Gerhard Binder and Leo Liesenborghs, 18.

[12] J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 39, *Didymi Alexandrini opera omnia* (1863) col. 1742. Subsequent references to this work will be made in the text of the article.

[13] Some scholars today question its authenticity. See L. Doutreleau, 'Le *de Trinitate* est-il l'œuvre de Didyme l'Aveugle?' *RSR* (1957) 514-57. For the contrary opinion, see Ludwig Koenen, 'Ein theologischer Papyrus des Kölner Sammlung: Kommentar Didymos des Blinden zu Zach 9, 11 u. 16,' *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, vol. 17 (1960) 61-105, esp. p. 90.

[14] See Dom Remy Ceillier, *Histoire générale des auteurs sacrés et ecclésiastiques*, vol. 5 (Paris 1860) 614-15.

[15] Westcott, 448; Gregory, 277; Du Toit, 230.

[61] It is of incidental interest that Didymus refers to the Didache, as he did earlier to the Shepherd, as a catechetical book. These were likewise the only two books of the Apostolic Fathers that Athanasius lists in his thirty-ninth Paschal letter as worthy of being read by young converts. Apparently, then, the term κατήχησις is a functional description having nothing to do, necessarily, with a book's canonical status. These books were simply those out of which young converts in Alexandria could and did receive their basic Christian instruction.

[17] It is noteworthy that much of Didymus's literary work was produced *after* Athanasius's thirty-ninth Paschal letter. Doutreleau, for example, has dated the commentary on Zechariah at least two decades later, c. A.D. 387. Doutreleau, I, 23-27.

[18] *de Incarnatione*, was written very early in Athanasius's career, probably in A.D. 318.

[19] For a description and dating of these mss., see Bruce M. Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament*, 2nd ed. (New York 1968) 42-47.

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ORIGEN ON BALAAM: THE DILEMMA OF THE UNWORTHY PROPHET

BY

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Balaam, the pagan seer of Numbers 22-24 and 31, created perplexing difficulties for patristic exegetes. His prediction of the star which would rise from Jacob (Num 24:17), widely read as foretelling the Incarnation, secured him a place among the gentile prophets of Christ, and established him as a founder of the Magi. His biblically recorded misdeeds, however, particularly his part in engineering the Israelite fall into immorality and idolatry at Baal Peor (Num 25 and 31:16), raised serious questions about his worthiness to deliver God's word. Thus, Christian tradition found in Balaam both villain and prophet. Among the Church Fathers who grappled with this contradictory figure, Origen is of special interest, for in his efforts to understand Balaam he not only discusses the nature of prophecy, but also finds in this inspired miscreant a model of redemption and gentile salvation.

New Testament references to Balaam reflect the view of Balaam as villain. Revelations 2:4 recounts Balaam's part in leading the Israelites into idolatry and debauchery: "But I have a few things against you: You have some there who hold the teaching of Balaam, who taught Balak to put a stumbling block before the sons of Israel, that they might eat food sacrificed to idols and practice immorality." The belief that Balaam had been tempted by the promise of riches becomes a motif in two other New Testament citations. Jude 1:11 declares, "Woe to them! For they walk in the way of Cain, and abandon themselves for the sake of gain to Balaam's error, and perish in Korah's rebellion;" and 2 Peter 2:15-16 writes, describing the ungodly, "Forsaking the right way they have gone astray: They have followed the way of Balaam, the son of Beor, who loved gain from wrongdoing but was rebuked for his transgression; a dumb ass spoke with human voice and restrained the prophet's madness."[1] In their negative estimations, these New Testament authors, both close to Jewish sources,[2] may be echoing early versions of

rabbinic teachings about Balaam, for in rabbinic tradition Balaam is portrayed as an unmitigated scoundrel. He becomes emblematic of the wicked nations of the world who have forsaken divine favor and great gifts in pursuit of vice and illicit profit.[3]

But Balaam was also the bearer of a messianic oracle, and early Christianity was required to see him, not only as villain, but as divinely inspired prophet. The discovery in the Hebrew Bible of various proof texts which could show that the prophecies of Scripture had been fulfilled in Jesus Christ was a popular method of interpretation in the early Church.[4] Among those verses frequently cited was Numbers 24:17, Balaam's prediction.[5] Early Christian apologists, such as Justin and Clement of Alexandria, anxious to establish the antiquity of the Christian tradition, used such messianic texts eagerly to lend greater authority to their arguments against pagan and Jewish opponents. But many authors, suspicious of Balaam's righteousness, attempted to cite the augury without its author. Thus, Justin cites Numbers 24:17 in his *Apology* as an Old Testament verification of the Incarnation, but he amalgates Balaam's star prophecy with the root of Jesse prediction of Isaiah, and attributes the whole to that author.[6] Justin also refers to Balaam's prophecy in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, this time placing it correctly in the Books of Moses, but again without attribution to Balaam.[7] A similar effort to separate the man from his words is found in an oration of Athanasius. In the *Incarnation of the Word*, the fourth century Father quotes Balaam's prophecy under the name of Moses.[8] And when Augustine writes in the *City of God* that we should not be surprised to hear of foreigners, not of the people of Israel, who have prophesied something about Christ, it seems likely that he too has Balaam in mind:

> It is not incongruous to belief that even in other nations there may have been men to whom this mystery was revealed, and were also impelled to proclaim it, whether they were partakers of the same grace or had no experience of it, but were taught by bad angels, who, as we know, even confessed the present Christ, whom the Jews did not acknowledge.[9]

In this passage, where Augustine endorses any true prophecy of Christ, regardless of its origins, he may well be supporting the authenticity of Balaam's predictions, without in any way sanctioning either his character or his standing as a prophet. For as he writes elsewhere of Balaam, the evil man who appears to have been granted the gift of prophecy is not to be esteemed, for even an evil man could have foretold the coming of Christ,[10] and further, "If God can make an ass speak

[Num 22:28-30], he can certainly make an ungodly man submit to the spirit of prophecy for a short time."[11]

In rabbinic tradition Balaam was a gentile prophet, ultimately unworthy, but a prophet nonetheless.[12] But many Christian thinkers maintained as Philo had done, that a prophet must possess special spiritual qualities.[13] Philo's view of prophecy had its origins in Greek philosophy. Following Plato's *Timaeus*, Philo held that a man is incapable of inspired or true prophecy when in his right mind. Prophecy is a power of the irrational mind; it comes only when the power of understanding is inhibited by sleep or when a man is in an abnormal condition owing to disease or divine inspiration.[14] But not everyone is worthy of such a visitation. For Philo, prophecy is a mark of moral distinction; it marks another way station on the path to divine comprehension. Although prophetic possession is an act of grace, it must be prepared for by diligent study and the acquisition of wisdom. According to Philo, therefore, someone like Balaam, whom Scripture shows to have had evil intentions and base desires, cannot be considered a prophet, and is no more than a particularly able soothsayer.[15] When he did happen to deliver God's word, it was only in a moment of total possession when "he spake these oracles as one repeating words which another had put into his mouth."[16] He was neither a participant in, nor a beneficiary of an act of divine grace.

Christian thinkers similarly found it difficult to believe that a prophet appointed to make Christ known to the gentiles might be villainous. Some patristic exegetes, as we have seen, simply separated the man from the prediction. But the contradictions apparent in Balaam's character forced others to question the godly nature of both the prophet and the prophecy. What they decided had much to do with their thinking on the nature of prophecy itself. Athenagoras thought, with Plato, that the prophets "spoke out what they were in travail with, their own reasoning falling into abeyance and the Spirit making use of them as a flutist might play upon his flute."[17] Justin, too, supported the Platonic doctrine,[18] writing in the *Apology*, "When you hear read passages of the Scriptures supposed to have been uttered by various characters, do not imagine that they are said by the inspired people themselves, but by the divine Word who prompted them."[19] Clement of Alexandria called the prophets "organs of the divine voice," but distinguished between the ecstasy of false prophets and the inspiration of authentic prophets.[20] Following this line of reasoning it was quite simple to relegate the

wicked Balaam to the category of false prophet, as Philo had done, and attribute his messianic prophecy to the divine voice which overpowers the chosen speaker. As Augustine put it, "no one should suppose, because he has momentarily prophesied, that he will be enumerated among the prophets."[21]

Still, the problem remained of why Balaam should have been chosen to speak God's words. Some writers, including Jerome, maintain that it was through Balaam that God made his love known to the nations, and he is sometimes allegorically seen as the representative of the pagan Christian.[22] Ambrose, on the other hand, writes in one of his letters that Balaam was allowed to prophesy so that through an adversary's word the proof of God would be raised even higher.[23]

The perplexities raised by Balaam were further complicated by Balaam's relationship with the Magi. He was thought by many to be the founder of this order of magicians and seers, whose representatives came to worship the infant Jesus. Whether such an equation is implied in Matthew 2:2, the account of the adoration of the Magi, is impossible to say, but certainly by the time of Origen this connection was presented as fact.[24] J. Bidez and F. Cumont write:

> L'apocalyptique mazdéene ayant fortement influencé le messianisme d'Israël, peut-être l'équation Balaam-Zoroastre est-elle antérieure à notre ère. Mais, plus probablement elle fut imaginée quand on s'avisa de faire de Zoroastre le révélateur de la naissance de Jésus. L'exégèse chrétienne affirma que l'institution des Mages en Orient remontait à Balaam, et que ceux-ci, descendent de lui, avaient ainsi conservé le texte de ses prédictions, qu'ils virent se réaliser lorsqu'ils aperçurent l'astre annoncé par lui.[25]

These descendants were not viewed as disciples of Balaam the villain, but students of the seer who pronounced blessings on Israel, and foretold the coming of the Messiah. This identification of the Magi as Balaam's progeny constitutes a further facet of the many-sided Balaam who emerges from Christian tradition.[26]

A number of these aspects of Balaam come together in the writings of Origen, who devoted a good deal of attention to understanding this perplexing figure. Not only did Origen write a series of homilies about Balaam in his commentary on Numbers, but he takes other opportunities to refer to him as well. Clearly, the integration of the two disparate accounts of the biblical Balaam presented a special challenge this exegete chose to meet.

Origen's views on prophecy were more complicated than those of many Church Fathers. While a few passages in his writings suggest that he occasionally adopted the "ecstatic" view of how the Holy Spirit inspired its agents, on the whole he rather believes that inspiration does not remove or paralyze the prophet's control of his rational faculties.[27] When the prophets spoke under the influence of the Holy Spirit, he explicitly declares, they were not in ecstasy: "voluntarily and consciously they collaborated with the word that came to them."[28] Indeed, prophets could refuse to speak if they chose, and Origen finds instances of such deliberate refusals in I Corinthians 14:30, Numbers 22:35, and Jonah 1.[29] Hanson attributes this rejection of ecstasy to Origen's intense rationalism: he did not like any theory which tended to put reason into the background in an account of the relation between man and God. Instead, he maintained that a prophet's individual character and consciousness are preserved, even when he is inspired.[30] Consistent with this admission, Origen holds that each prophecy has an immediate reference as well as a future one. At one point, he specifies three ways in which prophecy may be interpreted: things the prophet spoke to his contemporaries, predictions to those who lived later, and most of all, oracles of a certain Savior who was to come and live among mankind. Among the prooftexts Origen provides as examples of this last type of prophecy is Numbers 24:17.[31]

Given his belief that true prophets participate in their prophecy, as well as his acceptance of Balaam's oracle as messianic, Origen had to establish the natures of both Balaam and his prophetic utterance. In his *Homilies on Numbers*, Origen examines Balaam's claims, and attempts to account not only for the meanings of Balaam's prophecies, but, consistent with his own theory of prophecy, to establish whether or not Balaam was a prophet.

Origen was concerned with the literal meaning of the biblical text, and not surprisingly, many of his comments on the basically straightforward story of Balaam are literal rather than allegorical. For Origen, however, the whole of Scriptures also had a deeper meaning which could be revealed through allegory, and much of his exegesis of the Balaam story unfolds on the allegorical level. Since Origen believed that in its literal sense the Bible was too little concerned with the spirits and cosmic forces which regulate the universe, he expressed through allegory his own speculative opinions about the primeval causes of disorder in the cosmos, and the processes by which harmony was being reestablished.[32]

Since Origen sees Balaam first and foremost as a sorcerer and soothsayer, a diviner in touch with evil spirits, he portrays the battle between Israel and Balaam as a microcosm of the larger universal struggle between good and evil. Thus, he draws a parallel between the contrasting uses of words as weapons by each side:

> ["And Moab said to the elders of Midian,] 'This horde will now lick up all that is round about us, as the ox licks up the grass of the field'" (Num 22:4). He uses this example for just as a bull licks up the field with his mouth, so the holy people fight with their lips; they have their defenses in their mouths through prayers. Thus, since Balak knew that in previous wars this obviously had happened, he too wished to enter a fight with the force of lips and he called upon Balaam who had the arms of the contrary power in his lips, namely his curses.[33] The holy angels come to the aid of the just to do good works of salvation; devils come to the support of the evil to do evil works which endanger the salvation of men. The holy, of course, fight by words of prayer, the impious and sinners by magic incantations.[34]

Origen's Balaam, then, is presented as a warrior with words, who fights for the darker forces against the righteous. His goal, and that of his shadowy mentors, is to deceive the God-fearing. God wished to hinder Balaam on his journey, Origen maintains, not because He feared Balaam's curses, but in order to prevent the greater misfortunes which would befall Israel as a result of Balaam's demonic counsel.[35] Indeed, Origen emphasizes Balaam's magic abilities and his intercourse with evil forces:

> This Balaam was most famous in the magic arts and foremost in harmful incantations. He did not truly have power to bless but rather to curse. Demons, indeed, were invoked for cursing, not for blessing. And therefore he was well known in such things according to all who were in the East.[36]

Such occult abilities, of course, are not conducive with godliness, but God saw in Balaam's mastery of them a way to bring many people to true worship; according to Origen, in fact, it was Balaam's skill at divination which made him an appropriate vehicle for God's word.

Origen holds that Balaam was chosen to prophesy, even if only momentarily, that he might turn the peoples of the world from the invocation of demons to worship of God. It was because God saw Balaam's wide renown that He perceived his usefulness as a divine spokesman to the nations, and came uncalled to turn him, and with him the gentile nations, from necromancy to sacred pronouncement:

> Balaam was accustomed by these sacrifices to invoke demons. Indeed, in this way sacrifices are offered in the demon world. Thus, God instituted from the first the

> offering of sacrifices for the people, so that they, in offering to God, would cease offering to demons.[37]

Origen goes on to say that, here, "Balaam is the symbol of the people of the nations who follow auguries, but seeing that God does not fulfil these, cease."[38]

Origen offers several allegorical interpretations of Balaam along these lines. In his *Selecta on Numbers*, he suggests that Balaam is the adversary who has enchained his ass, the gentile peoples, in false worship.[39] Only when Christ sends his disciples is the ass freed, and, clothed in vestments, that is the evangelical virtues, able to enter the holy city. Elsewhere, Origin offers Balaam as a type of the scribes and Pharisees of the Jewish people,[40] who oppress and bind the ordinary people, the ass upon which they ride:

> Moreover they were the scribes and Pharisees who were sitting on that ass and were keeping it bound. The angel therefore grew angry at these, and if it weren't with regard to the future, he would have certainly killed them. He instead saved the ass which saw and revered him who came into the vineyard and stood among the vines. He [the ass] pressed moreover the foot of the one who was sitting on him against the wall, and perhaps for this reason this former rider was not able to walk, nor to come to Him who said, "Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, [and I will give you rest]" (Matt 11:28). The ass, however, came, led by the disciples, and where previously sat Balaam, desirous of wealth, now sits Jesus.[41]

Origen makes similar comparisons elsewhere in his homilies as well, hailing the ass as the Church, which first carried false belief, but now carries Christ.[42] By having Balaam represent both false pagan beliefs and the hypocrisy of the Pharisees, Origen turns him into a metaphor for the spiritual enslavement which he believes kept all mankind in thrall until the advent of Christianity. Similarly, Balaam's messianic message is directed to the nations and the Jews alike, that all may share in the glorious knowledge.[43]

Balaam, then, is an ambiguous figure, for despite his obvious malevolence he was privileged to deliver a divine prophecy. As Origen remarks, it is very difficult to define Balaam's character definitively.[44] On the one hand, he appears to be blameworthy in many ways, as when, "forbidden by God to go to the king, he persists in his intention to go."[45] "He is culpable when he builds altars, and sets out sacrifices to demons, demanding divine counsel by means of magic,"[46] and "He is guilty when he gives lewd counsel, so that the people are beguiled by the Midianite women and the cult of idols."[47] Yet Balaam also has a praiseworthy side as well, for,

> When the word of God is placed in his mouth, then the Spirit of God overcomes him, then he prophesies of Christ, then he makes known to the Jews and to the nations the future mystery of the coming of Christ, then in place of curses he bestows blessings on the people, and extols the name of Israel for great glory with mystical utterances.[48]

As Origen notes, Balaam himself appears to express inner confusion when, despite his evil intentions, and evil activities yet to come, he asks that he might die the death of the righteous (Num 23:10).[49]

The great question for Origen, however, is whether or not Balaam should be numbered among the prophets, and in the end he is clear that, however inspired Balaam may have been, his oracles were both unwilling and shortlived, and he was therefore not a true prophet. In his *Commentary on John*, he writes of Balaam: "... the fact that he was not a prophet is evident; indeed it is written that he was a soothsayer. And truly, if someone is a prophet, he prophesies genuinely; but if indeed someone prophesies, he is not by consequence also a prophet."[50] Along these lines Origen remarks elsewhere that no one should be surprised that Balaam, or any other miscreant, was granted momentary prophecy, nor should one feel that he is therefore totally praiseworthy:

> No one should be extolled because he prophesies, even if his foreknowledge is wondrous, for as Scripture says, ["Love never ends,] as for prophecies they will pass away, as for tongues they will cease, as for knowledge it will pass away. [For knowledge is imperfect, and our prophecy is imperfect"] (I Cor 13:8).[51]

Balaam's prophecy is flawed for the word of God was present only in his mouth, not in his heart. His prophetic utterances were neither collaborative nor ecstatic. Rather his divination and avarice fitted him only for momentary use as a divine vessel. "If Balaam," Origen writes, "had been worthy, the word of God would have been not in his mouth but in his heart. Since, however his heart was filled with greed for wealth and money, God's word could be placed only in his mouth."[52] Thus, Origen cautions that it is the prophetic message, not the messenger which is important:

> He was propelled by miracle and with a great charge, since the words of the prophets, which were contained within the confines of Israel, could not reach the nations. It would be through Balaam, in whom all nations had faith, that the secret mystery of Christ might become known, and the great treasure be offered to the people, even though carried, not through the heart and senses, but through the mouth and by discussion.[53]

Through their trusted soothsayer, then, the nations would have their ears opened, and move beyond him, to more worthy beliefs.

Origen's view of prophecy is clear. The true prophet collaborates in the delivery of the divine message; he speaks with his heart, and is perforce a righteous man. Yet, to bring all people to righteousness, unworthy men may occasionally serve as vessels for the divine message, though they will always speak with their mouths, not with their hearts. Yet to be in some ways unworthy is inherent in the human condition, and even the unworthy may find redemption. Origen believed that as a result of the prophecy Balaam delivered and through its fulfillment, Balaam found a measure of salvation.

This redemption was achieved through Balaam's descendants, the Magi, the first representatives of the nations to recognize and worship the infant Jesus. Origen reveals the key to Balaam's future in his exegesis of Balaam's plea, "Let me die the death of righteous, let my seed be like his" (Num 23:10).[54]

> From the fact that Balaam says "Let my seed be as the seed of the righteous," we can discern that these Magi who came from the East to be the first to adore Jesus are seen to be from his seed, whether through the succession of his seed, or through the disciples of his tradition. It is evident from the fact that these recognized the star which Balaam foretold would rise in Israel, and that they came and adored the king who was born in Israel ... Nor are we speaking only of these, that their seed would be like the seed of the righteous, but all of those of the nations who believed in Christ are saved. From which it is clear, as the Apostle said, "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love" (Gal 5:6).[55]

Through the Magi Balaam finds forgiveness for his excesses, and when he prays, "Let my seed be like his," he provides proof that all gentile believers will be saved.

Origen's Balaam, then, is no longer contradictory. As a miscreant who summoned up demons and harmed others through incantations, he certainly warranted condemnation. Yet in Origen's eyes Balaam becomes worthy of redemption, both because he was chosen, however involuntarily, to deliver a prophecy of Christ which could bring the nations to true worship, and because of the merit of his descendants. In this transformation both biblical Balaams are accounted for, and a lesson in redemption and gentile salvation imparted.

Origen's picture of Balaam influenced his immediate successors in varying degrees, and became a major source for later exegetes, although

few adopted his theory of transformation and redemption. Only Jerome shares Origen's conviction of Balaam's repentance and salvation.[56] Rather Balaam tends to be presented in his two contradictory guises. The conviction that the star of the Magi was predicted by Balaam is represented almost unanimously by the Fathers from the second to the fifth century (although, strikingly, not by Augustine),[57] and side by side with this, although to a lesser degree, the belief in the providential appointment of Balaam as a prophet to the pagan world is enunciated. Thus, Balaam was linked in early Christian tradition with the Epiphany star and the Christmas celebration. Concurrent with this positive valuation, however, runs the view of Balaam as villain and false prophet. It would seem that neither image ever wholly superseded the other, and the two Balaams continued to exist side by side into the medieval period. In the popular mind, as evidenced by medieval art and drama, Balaam remained a prophet of Christ and the forebear of the Magi;[58] in theological writings he was always the archetypal villain, momentarily inspired, through no merit of his own, with the Holy Spirit.

Notes

[1] The notion of those who follow after, or are disciples of Balaam is found in rabbinic literature as well. *Mishnah Aboth* 5, 19, for example, contrasts such men to the disciples of Abraham: "Every man who has three things is a disciple of Abraham our father. Has he three other things, he is a disciple of Balaam the villain. A good eye, a humble soul, and a lowly spirit, belong to the disciple of Abraham. An evil eye, a proud soul, and a haughty spirit, to the disciple of Balaam."

[2] Bo Reicke, *The Anchor Bible. The Epistles of James, Peter and Jude* (New York 1964) 191, points out that Jude was written with great regard for a Jewish Christian audience, and this is evident in its references to Old Testament figures. Norman Perrin, *The New Testament. An Introduction* (New York 1974) 270, notes 2 Peter's use of material from Jude, and also his awareness of and respect for Jewish convictions of what constituted biblical canon.

[3] Negative references to Balaam are found throughout rabbinic literature. In *Mishnah Sanhedrin* 10, 2, Balaam is identified as one of seven men who have no place in the world to come, and the Talmud (*B. Sanhedrin* 105a) further comments that whatever is found written to the discredit of the "wicked Balaam" should be lectured upon to his disadvantage. See Louis Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, 7 vols (Philadelphia 1925, 1953), throughout, for a comprehensive survey of rabbinic teachings about Balaam.

[4] R. P. C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event* (Richmond, Va. 1959) 73.

[5] Ibid. Other common proofs were Genesis 49:10ff., Jacob's prophecy about Judah; Psalm 110; Isaiah 7:14, the virgin who is to conceive; Isaiah 8:14; Isaiah 28:16; Malachi 3:1, the forerunner; and Deuteronomy 28:66, "Thy life shall hang before thee."

[6] Justin, *Apology*, ed. E. J. Goodspeed, *Die ältesten Apologeten* (Göttingen 1915) I 32, 12-13, p. 48. For a survey of patristic comments on Balaam's role as prophet of Christ and ancestor of the Magi, see E. Kirschbaum, Der Prophet Balaam und die Anbetung der Weisen, *Römische Quartalschrift* 49 (1954) 129-171; 130.

[7] Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho* 126, 1(Goodspeed, p. 246).

[8] Athanasius, *Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi* 33, (PG 25, 153).

[9] Augustine, *City of God* 18.47 (CC 48, 645-646).

[10] Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* 2 (PL 40, 129-130).

[11] Ibid.

[12] Thus, Balaam is compared with Moses in *Sifre D'varim*, p. 430, Finkelstein edition, and in *Numbers Rabbah* 14:20, and is even said to have possessed prophetic powers Moses lacked. *Genesis Rabbah* 65:20 relates that there never arose such great philosophers in the world as Balaam and Abnomos of Gadara (probably a reference to the second century cynic Oenomaus). Jay Braverman, Balaam in Rabbinic and Early Christian Tradition, *Joshua Finkel Festschrift*, ed. Sidney B. Hoenig and Leon D. Stitskin (New York 1974) 41-50, briefly surveys some of the parallels between rabbinic and patristic exegesis on Balaam.

[13] Augustine, *Quaestionibus* (PL 40, 136), writes that "It is impossible to be a prophet and lack charity." Philo writes about Balaam in *The Life of Moses* 263 (LCL 6, 413); and in *On the Cherubim* (LCL 2, p. 27). He refuses to grant Balaam the title of prophet, but pictures him as a venal and deceitful soothsayer. He was invaded by the divine spirit only for the protection of Israel.

[14] Philo's view of prophecy is expressed in *On the Special Laws* iv 49 (LCL 8, 37ff.), and in *On the Migration of Abraham* 22-25 (LCL 4, 151). He reflects similar teachings found in Plato, see *Timaeus and Critias*, trans. H. D. P. Lee (Middlesex, England 1971) 97, §72.

[15] Philo, *The Life of Moses* 263 (LCL 6, 413).

[16] Ibid, 277 (p. 419).

[17] Athenagoras, *Legatio pro Christianis* 9.1 (Goodspeed, p. 323).

[18] Hanson, *Allegory*, 194, writes: "The parallels to this type of inspiration are clearly pagan, the Delphic Oracle and the oracle at Cumae described in the sixth book of the Aeneid spring to mind."

[19] Justin, *Apology* I 36.1 (Goodspeed, p. 50).

[20] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 6.18.168.3.

[21] Augustine, *Quaestionibus* (PL 40, 130).

[22] Jerome, *In Ezekiel* 6.18.3 (PL 25, 170c).

[23] Ambrose, *Epistle* 50.14 (PL 16, 1157).

[24] Origen, *Homily on Numbers* 13.7 (PG 12, 675C), writes: "Ex illo Balaam denique fertur Magorum genus et institutio in partibus Orientis vigere, qui descripta habentes apud se omnia quae prophetaverat Balaam, etiam hoc habuerunt scriptum quod 'Orietur stella ex Iacob et exsurget homo ex Israhel.' Haec scripta habebant Magi apud semetipsos et ideo, quando natus est Iesus, agnoverunt stellam et intellexerunt adimpleri prophetiam."

[25] Joseph Bidez and Franc Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés. Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la Tradition Grecque*. 2 vols (Paris 1938) I 48.

[26] Thus, Balaam was linked with Christmas and Epiphany celebrations. Bidez and Cumont, *Les Mages*, 48-49, recount a Syrian legend that the prophetic words of Balaam were preserved by the kings of Assyria and passed on from reign to reign by their dynasty to that of Iran until the time of Augustus when the star appeared in heaven; the Persians,

struck with fear, were able to recognize in it the star which was announced by Balaam, and their king prepared splendid gifts which he sent by the hands of the Magi, under the guidance of the star, to Bethlehem. (This is recounted in a Syriac tract, *On the Star of the Magi*, falsely attributed to Eusebius, and preserved in a sixth century ms; it has been published by Wright, *Journal of Sacred Literature* [1866]). Gregory of Nyssa wrote in a Christmas sermon, *In Diem Natalem Christi* (PG 46, 1133), "Behold how the Magi, who stem from Balaam observed, according to his prophecy, the newly appointed star."

[27] Hanson, *Allegory*, 195.

[28] Origen, *Homilies on Ezekiel* 6, 1 (PG 13, 709).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Hanson, *Allegory*, 196.

[31] Origen, *Commentary on John* 13, 26 (PG 14, 443).

[32] Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Notre Dame, Indiana 1970) 7.

[33] Origen appears to show an awareness here of rabbinic traditions. A similar comment on this verse appears in both editions of the midrash collection *Tanhuma*; and in *Numbers Rabbah* 20:4, which reads: "'And Moab said unto the elders of Midian: Now will this multitude lick up all that is round about us, as the ox licketh up the grass of the field' [Num 22:4]. As the ox, they implied, has his strength in his mouth, so have these their strength in their mouths; as in the case of the ox, all that he licks up loses every sign of fertility, so in the case of these people, any nation that harms them loses all signs of prosperity; as the ox gores with his horns so do these do battle with their prayers, as it says, 'His horns are the horns of the wild-ox' [Deut 33:7]." The sources of Origen's knowledge about rabbinic traditions have been much discussed. N. R. M. de Lange, *Origen and the Jews. Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations in Third-Century Palestine* (Cambridge 1976) 25, notes that Origen himself says that he consulted many Jews, and that he sometimes quotes more than one of them in the same passage. He goes on to say that "At least one of Origen's Jewish informants was a convert to Christianity, and it may be that he made use of several converted Jews." It seems probable that such a convert was Origen's informant on rabbinic material relating to Balaam since he refers to such a man in his *Homily on Numbers* 13, 5 (PG 12, 672B): "Ut autem scias tale aliquid cogitasse regem, ex Scripturae verbis intellige, quae ego a magistro quodam, qui ex Hebraeis crediderat, exposita didici."

[34] Origen, *Selecta in Numeros*, Latin text (PG 12, 578BC); the same comment is also found in his *Homily* 15, 4 (PG 12, 672BC). The *Selecta* text reads: " 'Nunc ablinget synagoga haec omnes qui in circuitu nostro.' Hoc exemplo utitur: sicut vitulus ore ablingit virentia, sic et sanctus populus labiis pugnans, in ore habet arma per preces. Id cum sciret Balac in prioribus bellis manifeste contigisse, vult et ipse labiorum armis pugnare, et vocat Balaam qui contrariae virtutis arma habet in labiis, nempe maledictiones. Sancti enim angeli justos ad salutaria et bona opera, mali autem daemones adjuvant impios peccatores homines ad mala opera quae saluti hominum officiunt. Sancti quippe pugnant verbis precum, impii vero et peccatores verbis magicis."

[35] *Homily* 13, 6 (PG 12, 674BC).

[36] *Homily* 15, 4 (PG 12, 671C): "Hic Balaam famosissimus erat in arte magica et in carminibus noxiis praepotens. Non enim habebat potestatem, vel artem verborum ad benedicendum, sed habebat ad maledicendum. Daemones enim ad maledicendum invitantur, non ad benedicendum. Et ideo quasi expertus in talibus, in opinione erat omnibus, qui erant in Oriente."

[37] *Selecta* (PG 12, 579BC): "Solebat Balaam iisdem sacrificiis invocare daemonia. Eiusmodi enim sacrificia offerebantur in mundo daemoniis. Idcirco Deus a priore populo sacrificia exigebat, ut ea offerentes Deo cessarent offerre daemones."

[38] *Selecta* (PG 12, 579D): "Hic Balaam symbolum erat populi gentilis qui sequebatur prius auspicia, et videns Dominum his non expleri, cessavit."

[39] *Selecta* (PG 12, 579C).

[40] *Homily* 14, 4 (PG 12, 682A-683C).

[41] *Homily* 14, 4 (PG 12, 683A): "Scribae autem et Pharisaei erant qui sedebant super asinam hanc, et tenebant eam vinctam. Ipsis ergo irascitur angelus, et nisi quodam futurorum prospectu, illos quidem peremisset, asinam autem servasset, quae vidit, et reverita est eum qui venit in vineam et stat inter vineas. Compressit tamen pedes sedentis super se in maceriam: et ideo forte non potest ambulare ille eius sessor antiquus, nec venire ad eum, qui dicit: 'venite ad me, omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis' [Matt 11:28]. Asina tamen venit, adducta a discipulis, et cui tunc sedebat Balaam mercedis cupidus, nunc ei sedet Jesus." For a comparison of Balaam with Caiaphas, see this text at 683B, and also Origen's *Commentary on John* 28, 12 and 13 (PG 14, 705A and PG 14, 713CD).

[42] *Homily* 13, 8 (PG 12, 676B): "Et forte haec asina, id est Ecclesia, prius portabat Balaam, nunc autem Christum ..." See also *Selecta*, (12, 579C).

[43] See below, at n. 48.

[44] *Homily* 15, 1 (PG 12, 684A): "Cum ergo haec tam diversa de eo et tam varia indicet Scriptura divina, valde mihi difficile videtur ex definito statuere eius personam ..."

[45] *Homily* 15, 1 (PG 12, 683D): "Nam vituperabilis est, cum prohibitus a Deo venire ad regem, persistit ut veniat ..."

[46] Ibid. "Culpabilis est, cum aedificat aras, et victimas imponit daemoniis, et apparatu magico poscit divina consulta."

[47] Ibid. "Culpabilis est, cum consilium pessimum dat, ut populus decipiatur per mulieres Madianitidas et cultum idolorum."

[48] *Homily* 15, 1 (PG 12, 683d-684A): "[Rursus laudabilis ostenditur,] cum verbum Dei ponitur in ore eius, cum Spiritus Dei fit super eum, cum de Christo prophetat, cum Judaeis et gentibus de adventu Christi mysteria futura pronuntiat, cum pro maledictionibus benedictiones populo largitur, et nomen Israel supra visibilem gloriam mysticis extollit eloquiis."

[49] *Homily* 15, 1 (PG 12, 684A).

[50] *Commentary on John* 28, 12 (PG 14, 707A), Latin text: "... perspicuum est quod propheta non erat; augurem enim fuisse scriptum est. Ac profecto si quis propheta est, is quidem prophetat; sin vero quis prophetat, non continuo etiam est propheta." Origen writes in a similar vein of Caiaphas (Ibid, 706D, Latin text): "Non, si quis prophetat, ideo propheta est."

[51] *Homily* 14, 4 (PG 12, 683B): "... et ideo nemo extollatur etiamsi prophetat, etiamsi praescientiam mereatur; sed redeat ad Apostoli dictum, quo ad ista respiciens, ait: 'Sive prophetiae abolebuntur, sive linguae cessabunt, sive scientia destruetur' [I Cor 13:8]."

[52] *Homily* 14, 3 (PG 12, 681CD): "Si dignus fuisset Balaam, verbum suum Deus non in ore eius, sed in corde posuisset. Nunc autem quoniam in corde eius desiderium mercedis erat, et cupiditas pecuniae, verbum Dei non in corde, sed in ore eius ponitur."

[53] *Homily* 14, 3 (PG 12, 681D-682A): "Agebatur enim mira et magna dispensatione, ut quoniam prophetarum verba, quae intra aulam continebantur Israeliticam, ad gentes pervenire non poterant, per Balaam cui fides ab universis gentibus habebatur, in-

notescerent etiam nationibus secreta de Christo mysteria, et thesaurum magnum proferret ad gentes, non tam corde et sensu, quam ore et sermone portatum."

[54] Origen takes the Septuagint reading which translates the Hebrew "end" as "seed;" in Latin: "Ut fiat semen meum sicut semen justorum."

[55] Origen, *Homily* 15, 4 (PG 12, 689D-690A): "Quod autem dicit, 'ut fiat semen meum sicut semen justorum' [Num 23:10] posset quidem et de illo Balaam intelligi, secundum hoc quod magi illi, qui de oriente venientes primi adorare venerunt Jesum, de semine eius esse videantur, sive per successionem generis, sive per disciplinae traditionem. Evidenter enim constat illos agnovisse stellam, quam praedixerat Balaam orituram in Israel, et sic venisse, et adorasse regem qui natus est in Israel ... Non enim tam ipsi, quam semen eorum efficietur sicut semen justorum, eorum scilicet, qui credentes ex gentibus in Christo justificati sunt. Unde manifestum est, quia sicut Apostolus dicit, 'neque circumcisio aliquid est, neque praeputium, sed fides, quae per charitatem operatur' [Gal 5:6]."

[56] Jerome, too, probably under Origen's influence, also believed that Balaam ultimately repented his misdeeds. Commenting on "May my soul die the death of the righteous" (Num 23:10), in his *Commentarium in Ezechielem* 6 (PL 25, 170), he writes: "And if Balaam, whose name means 'vain people,' [an etymology also found in Origen, *Selecta* (PG 12, 579D)], perceived that formerly he had been a vain member of the nations, now he wished to be joined with the souls of the just, Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, who are called upright and just. Thus prophesies John, 'Truly, truly, I say to you, he who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life: He does not come into judgement, but has passed from life to death' [John 5:24]".

[57] Augustine so condemns Balaam that he refuses to connect him with the Magi. Thus, while he praises the Magi in various of his Christmas sermons, calling them the "first fruits of the nations, as we are the people of the nations," he never mentions Balaam as either an ancestor or a teacher of the Magi. Of the prophesied star he recounts, "To us, through the Magi, the tongue of the apostle announced the star" (This and quote above from Augustine, *Sermo CC in Epiphania Domini* [PL 38, 1028]).

[58] For Balaam's roles in medieval art and liturgical drama, see Emile Mâle, *L'art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France* (Paris 1902) 216; and E. N. Stone, Adam, A Religious Play of the Twelfth Century, *University of Washington Publications in Language and Literature* 4 (1926-28) 188.

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ON SOME FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS IN JEROME'S 22ND LETTER*

BY

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Jerome came to Rome in 382 and there he composed his 22nd letter (he calls it *libellus*) for his young friend Eustochium as an encouragement to persevere in her chosen life of chastity. He begins by describing the perils which beset her (*perit ... et mente virginitas*). She must avoid wine: if the apostle prescribes it, he speaks rather as a doctor (*licet ... apostolus sit medicus spiritalis*). The bible story of Noah shows its dangers (*margarita ... est sermo dei*). Instead she should practise mortification (*quidquid ... in me fuit umoris, excoctum est*). She should also copy the Virgin Mary (*potes et tu esse mater domini*).

5,3 *perit ... et mente virginitas*

Jerome uses *mente nubere* thrice: *adv. Helv.* 20 *adv. Iov.* 41 *in Mt.* 4,25,1/2 cf. Tert. *orat.* 22,10 *praenups(it) ... mens per voluntatem.* Here he distinguishes the good virgin from the bad. The bad one commits adultery in her heart (ibid. Matth. 5,28 'Whosoever looketh on a woman ...').

Or. *hom. in Gn.* 10,4 thinks that a person can possess virginity in body and by receiving the darts of passion in his heart lose chastity of soul. Mental incontinence is described Lact. *inst.* 6,23,36 Bas. *ep.* 42,4 (τὴν ... ἐμαυτοῦ παρθενίαν ἐμόλυνα κατὰ διάνοιαν καρδίας) ps. Bas. *ad fil.* 7 ps. Ambr. *ad virg. dev.* 2 ps. Chrys. *virg. corrupt.* p. 744 (ibid. Matth. 5,28) Aug. *in psalm.* 75,16 (if one is drunken, proud, litigious or talkative). Thought must be virgin (παρθενευέτω καὶ ἡ διάνοια) Greg. Naz. *or.* 37,10. The soul too commits fornication *Apophth. patr.* p. 153A (Gerontius says: τῶν σωμάτων παρθένων φυλαττομένων κατὰ ψυχὴν ἐκπορνεύουσι) ibid. 63 (Nau *RevOrChr.* 12, 1907 p. 393) Ath. *fr. Lc.* p. 1396D (ibid. Matth. 5,28) Bas. Anc. *virg.* 13,43 (it impinges on the body as well). If virginity of heart is lost its bodily counterpart becomes worthless according to Aug. *in psalm.* 90 *serm.* 2,9. 99,13 Euseb. Gall.

serm. 39,4 (mentioning malice, anger, pride, lies and slander) Caes. Arel. *serm.* 155,3. For this opinion ps. Cypr. *serm. de cent.* 81 cited the authority of St. Paul: *si corpore castus et mente corruptus es, nihil prodest* (Reitzenstein *ad loc.* suggested *Acta Pauli* as the source).

Discussing heretical virgins Aug. *in evang. Io.* 13,14 regards the heart's fornication as worse than the body's. He distinguishes between *pudicitia* as a thing of the mind and *virginitas* as of the body and asserts the one can exist without the other *c. Iul.* 4,8,48 cf. ibid. 50. Chrys. *hom. in Hbr.* 28,7 goes further and says that the uncorrupted in soul is a virgin even if she has a husband. Corporal virginity is only a shadow and concomitant of this real virginity. The idea is repeated ps. Chrys. *op. imperf. in Mt.* 52 p. 929.

ibid. *virgines carne, non spiritu*

Jerome continues that bad virgins are virgins only in flesh and not spirit. The view is repeated *adv. Iov.* 1,13 *in Zach.* 3,14,15. In the former of these passage the body is said to be pure but the soul is debauched. Or. *hom. in Lv.* 1,5 makes the same distinction with reference (as here) to the foolish virgins. On the other hand Jerome is confident that Feliciane enjoys virginity both of flesh and of spirit *ep.* 30,14,1 (cf. I Cor. 7,34 'holy both in body and in spirit'). In translating Victorinus' commentary on Revelation he adds virginity in heart and body to his source *in Apoc. rec.* 20,1. There are virgins not only in body but in tongue and thought ibid. 20,2. Cypr. *hab. virg.* 18 says you can stay a virgin in body and mind but not in eyes, ears or tongue.

8,3 *licet ... apostolus sit medicus spiritalis*

The words *medicus spiritalis* are used by Jerome of the prophets *in Is. adbrev.* p. 803, 2 f. *in Mal.* 3,13/5 cf. ps. Chrys. *op. imperf. in Mt.* 46 p. 895. As here they are a description of St. Paul in Ambrosiast. *in I Cor.* 3,2. 9,20. 10,24 *in Rm.* 6,19 Cassian. *inst.* 10,7,1 Caes. Arel. *serm.* 182,1.

Jesus Christ is a fleshly and spiritual doctor as early as Ign. *Eph.* 7,2 cf. ps. Chrys. *op. imperf. in Mt.* 21 p. 748 Caes. Arel. *serm.* 100,1. The name is given to priests Ambr. *in psalm. 118 serm.* 2,23,2 ps. Aug. *serm.* 249,1 Caes. Arel. *serm.* 5,5 ('*nos*' cf. 59,7) 43,9. 57,1; it is given to monks Cassian. *conl.* 22,6,2 *inst.* 12,20 *Comm. s. patr.* 2,7. Finally a correspondent is called by it Paul. N. *ep.* 29,3. 45,4

The title occurs also Chrys. *catech. bapt.* 7,5 (SC 50; concerning mar-

tyrs) 7,9 *hom. in Mt.* 23,10. Jerome speaks of *chirurgici spiritales* at *ep.* 40,1,3.

8,4 *margarita ... est sermo dei*

The same metaphor occurs Chrys. *hom. div.* 7,2 μαργαρίτης ... ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἀπολάμπων.

Jerome calls law and prophets pearls *in Mt.* 2,13,45/6 (on the parable of the 'merchant man, seeking goodly pearls'; so Or. *fr. in Mt.* 308). The pearls are the prophets Or. *in Mt.* 10,8 (also on Matth. 13,45). They are their precious utterances Procl. CP *or.* 4,2. Speaking of scriptural exegesis Or. *in Mt. ser.* 71 will not have pearls that are *nimis exoperatae* cast before swine (cf. Matth. 7,6). He makes the pearls of this parable God's word *hom. in Ios.* 21,2 (cf. *sel. in psalm.* 20,4). The same explanation is given them Ath. *virg.* 9 Aug. *in psalm.* 16,13 Isid. Pel. *ep.* 4,181. Being hard to fish up they are the divine mysteries of scripture ps. Chrys. *op. imperf. in Mt.* 17 p. 728. Gospel teaching is a pearl according to Eucher. *form.* 7 p. 47,11. Caes. Arel. *serm.* 119,2 can understand and fit the pearl of scripture in many ways.

In this passage Jerome adds that, being like a pearl, the word of God can be pierced from all sides (*ex omni parte forari potest*). He is referring to the multiple (generally threefold) interpretation of scripture, which goes back to Origen (e.g. *in Lv.* 5,5: historic, moral, mystic). Here he has in mind the moral lesson to be drawn from Noah's undressing through insobriety. This is the *scripturae ... sacramentum* mentioned at the beginning of the sentence. On the piercing of precious stones cf. *in Is.* 15,54,11/4 (*foratarum caelatarumque gemmarum*). They are pierced to hang Tert. *cult.* 1,6,1.

Virginity is compared to a pearl in chapter 20,1 of this letter. Jerome speaks of pearls with reference to the commentaries of Fortunatian *ep.* 10,3,2; to papal authority 15,1,2; to Paulina's death 66,1,2; to widowhood 79,7,8; and to the fasting of a Christian virgin 107,8,3. Chrys. *hom. in Io.* 88,3 likens spiritual things to a pearl: whichever way you turn them, they delight the eye. Rotating pearls suggest a further metaphor *hom. in psalm.* 115,1/3 (*ZKTh.* 31, 1907 p. 355,16 ff.) δεῦρο πάλιν τρέψωμεν τὸν μαργαρίτην τοῦ λόγου. The same author sees a resemblance between the diversity of pearls and the many paths of virtue *hom. in I Tim.* 14,6.

Jerome's words here are quoted by Cassiodor *in psalm. praef.* p. 11C. D. Gorce, *La 'lectio divina'* I (1925) p. 177 thinks his comparison well-

suited to strike a feminine imagination. He says the widow's ears should be pierced with the word of God *ep.* 54,11,2 (cf. Caes. Arel. *ep. ad virg.* 2,3). According to Aug. *discipl.* 2,2 the treasure of scripture contains precious necklaces. Or. *hom. in Gn.* 8,1 used the same image.

17,5 *quidquid ... in me fuit umoris, excoctum est*

Jerome refers frequently to drying up the wetness of lust: *ep.* 65,14,2. 75,1,3. 98,19,2. 100,2,2 *adv. Iov.* 1,11. 1,21 *adv. Ioh.* 36 *adv. Rufin.* 1,25 *in Is.* 3,7,10/1 *in Ier.* 2,73 *in Ez.* 4,16,10. 7,22,17/22 *in Zach.* 3,14,16 *in Mal.* 4,4. Here he has just quoted Ps. 118,83 (*factus sum tamquam uter in pruina*). This was the ascetic speaking. Lechery is moist *ep.* 122,1,13 *adv. Iov.* 2,4 (Behemoth rules the waters of lasciviousness; the idea comes from Or. *exp. in prov.* 21,19). Continence on the other hand is dry *in Is.* 14,52,4/6.

Chastity and mortification are said to desiccate Tert. *apol.* 40,15 (*ieiuniis aridi et omni continentia expressi*) *ieiun.* 12,2 Or. *hom. in Lv.* 2,4. 4,10 Chrys. *poenit.* 6,2 Cassian. *conl.* 22,6,7 Ast. Soph. *hom.* 21,10 (ἵνα τῇ ἁγνείᾳ ξηράνῃς τὴν ὑγρότητα τῶν παθῶν). Draining the body's fat dries out the pipes around the private parts Bas. *ep.* 45,1 cf. *Vitae patr.* 5,8,23. It is food that engenders this moisture Or. *Io.* 13,2,8. The ascetic accordingly takes dry aliment ps. Bas. *const.* 6,4 Pall. *h. Laus.* 2. Arsenius is described as being 'dry' *Apophth. patr.* p. 109A. Xerophagy and virginity are linked ps. Chrys. *poenit.* 1,1. 1,4. 2,3.

Bas. Anc. *virg.* 9 requires the proportions of wet and dry in the body to be carefully observed. Cassian. *conl.* 12,11,5 wants its wantonness minimized by keeping the consumption of water down. Moistness produced by food and drink gives rise to involuntary ejaculation ibid. 2,23,1; a judicious diet can limit this to three times a year. The same advice is repeated ibid. 22,6,5 cf. *Hist. mon.* 20,3 (Festugière, *Sub. hag.* 34).

38,3 *potes et tu esse mater domini*

Jerome has already recorded that through her exceptional purity Mary deserved to be mother of the Lord. This distinction is now said to be attainable by the virgin. There follows a figurative description of how she conceives and gives bith, which is made up of citations from Isaiah. The paragraph concludes with Matth. 12,49, where pointing to his disciples Christ says, 'Behold my mother ...!'. The next verse of this text explains that Christ's mother is anyone who does his father's will.

When Jerome discusses this passage in his commentary on Matth. *ad loc.* it is the believer whom Christ calls his mother. Or. *fr. in Mt.* 281 refers the text to every virgin soul when it conceives of the holy spirit and bears his father's will. Aug. *virg.* 5,5 applies it to the virgin when she does this will. It refers to ourselves according to Aug. *serm.* ed. Denis 25,8.

Jerome says that we too can give birth to Christ *tract. in psalm.* 84,13 cf. 95,10 (in the heart). Tropologically the divine word is born of the virgin soul *in Am.* 3,9,6 (it is also reared *in Gal.* 2,4,15/6). The virgin begets the godhead daily *ep.* 65,1,3. More surprisingly Pammachius is told to give Jesus his breasts to suck *ep.* 66,10,2 (ibid. Ct. 1,6; the suggestion is nonetheless extravagant).

Meth. *symp.* 8,8,191 affirms Christ's conceptual birth in everyone. Or. *comm. in Rm.* 4,6 makes a sufficient purity of mind, body and action the qualification (ibid. Matth. 12,50 Gal. 4,19 *donec formetur Christus in vobis*). Bachiar. *ep.* 2 (*RB* 40, 1928 p. 298,5) reserves it to the virgin. What happened physically to Mary recurs in each chaste soul Greg. Nyss. *virg.* 2,2. This gives birth to Christ spiritually Ambr. *virginit.* 4,20. Greg. Naz. *or.* 38,1 wants women to be virgins so they can be mothers of Christ. Euseb. Gall. *serm.* 1,8 urges his hearers to conceive him by faith and beget him by confession.

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* For Latin authors the abbreviations are those of *TLL*; for Greek authors those of Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon*.

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THE PRESENT STATE OF GNOSTIC STUDIES

BY

R. VAN DEN BROEK

The study of Gnosticism flourishes like never before and is rapidly becoming a specialism apart on the borderland of Judaism, early Christianity, and the religions and philosophies of the Roman world. This increase of gnostic studies received its impetus from the discovery of the Coptic Gnostic Library of Nag Hammadi (1945), which presented the scholarly world with fifty-two ancient works, not all of them originally gnostic, of which fourty were previously completely unknown.

By now, all thirteen Nag Hammadi Codices have been published in a facsimile edition (Brill, Leiden 1972-1979) and their contents have been made accessible by a complete English translation of the Coptic texts (*The Nag Hammadi Library in English*, ed. by J. M. Robinson, Brill, Leiden 1977). Most of the texts have been edited in more or less critical editions and translated into various languages. Two great international projects aim to publish critical editions of all the Nag Hammadi texts: *The Coptic Gnostic Library*, edited with English translations, introductions and notes, published under the auspices of the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, Claremont, USA (in the series *Nag Hammadi Studies* [NHS], Brill, Leiden) and the *Bibliothèque Copte de Nag Hammadi* (Section "Textes"), edited with French translations, introductions and commentaries, published under the auspices of the Laboratoire d'histoire religieuse de l'Université Laval, Quebec, Canada (Les presses de l'Université Laval—Editions Peeters, Louvain, Belgium).

Apart from occasional fragments preserved in anti-gnostic ecclesiastical writers, only a few original gnostic works had been known before the discovery of the Nag Hammadi Library: the Berlin Coptic papyrus 8502, containing the *Gospel of Mary*, the *Apocryphon of John* and the *Sophia Jesu Christi*, of which the last two were also found at Nag Hammadi (ed. by W. C. Till [1955], 2nd rev. ed. by H.-M. Schenke, Berlin 1972), and two long-known Coptic manuscripts, the

Codex Askewianus, containing the *Pistis Sophia* (ed. by C. Schmidt, Copenhagen 1925) and the Codex Brucianus, containing the *Books of Jeû* and an untitled gnostic treatise (ed. by C. Schmidt, Leipzig 1892, and by Charl. A. Baynes, Cambridge 1933). A German translation of these works was given by C. Schmidt, Leipzig 1905, 2nd. and 3rd. ed. by W. C. Till (Berlin 1954 and 1959), 4th. ed. (with a new Preface) by H.-M. Schenke (Berlin 1981). After the discovery of the Nag Hammadi Library the scholarly interest in these obscure texts was reanimated: their Coptic text as established by C. Schmidt was recently reprinted, together with a new English translation by Violet MacDermot (NHS 9 and 13, Leiden 1978).

In the end, all these new and old texts will provide a new and, it is to be hoped, solid base for the study of the gnostic movement in the ancient world. But before we are that far much work has to be done on the texts themselves. Several important texts have only been badly edited or have not yet been edited at all. Not every editor seems to know that editing a manuscript is something quite different from editing and establishing a text. Most of these texts are extremely difficult to interpret and, therefore, all translations are bound to be provisional until more is known about the doctrinal and mythological peculiarities and presuppositions of the separate texts. A complicating factor is that these works have survived in Coptic, and even in various dialects of that language, but most probably without exception were translated from the Greek. The philological aid of Coptologists is indispensable for the study of these texts. But a good knowledge of Coptic alone does not suffice for a correct translation, as can been seen, for instance, from the German translation which accompanies the editio princeps of the *Tractatus Tripartitus* (NHC I, 5; Bern 1973 and 1975). For the elucidation of the new texts joint efforts of Coptologists, classicists, historians of the religions and philosophies of the hellenistic and Roman period, and Judaistic, patristic and New Testament scholars will be indispensable.

Under these circumstances, studies on textual problems and questions of interpretation and, not least, editions of and commentaries on separate texts are more likely to be written than comprehensive surveys of the gnostic movement in general (an outstanding exception is K. Rudolph, *Die Gnosis. Wesen und Geschichte einer spätantiken Religion*, Göttingen 1978, 1980²; less convincing C. Colpe, art. 'Gnosis II (Gnostizismus)', *RAC* 11, 1981, 537-659). The enormous literature on the Nag Hammadi Codices and Gnosticism is aptly listed in D. M.

Scholer, *Nag Hammadi Bibliography* 1948-1969 (NHS 1), Leiden 1971 (continued in *Novum Testamentum* 13 (1971)-17 (1975) and 19 (1977)-23 (1981)).

The world-wide scholarly interest in Gnosticism provoked by the Nag Hammadi Library was recently evidenced by four large collections of gnostic studies: the proceedings of the colloquia on Gnosticism at Yale and Quebec, both held in 1978 and published in 1981, and the volumes composed in honour of Hans Jonas (1978) and Gilles Quispel (1981). There appeared also two minor collections of gnostic studies, mainly consisting of papers presented at a colloquium at Halle, GDR (1976; published in 1979) and at the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford (1979; published in 1981). These works give a good impression of the present state of gnostic studies. Of course, the many questions of detail raised in the 120 studies contained in these volumes cannot be dealt with in a review article. But their appearance offers a good opportunity to make some comments on the topical issues in the study of Gnosticism which may be of some interest for patristic scholars in general. First I give more particulars of these works and their contents.

YALE I: *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*. Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28-31, 1978, Volume One: *The School of Valentinus*, edited by Bentley Layton (Studies in the History of Religions, XLI) Leiden 1980, XXIV and 454 pp. Price: Dutch Flor. 128,—. Contents: H. Chadwick, The Domestication of Gnosis; G. Quispel, Gnosis and Psychology; C. Colpe, The Challenge of Gnostic Thought for Philosophy, Alchemy, and Literature; H. Bloom, Lying Against Time; G. C. Stead, In Search of Valentinus; U. Bianchi, Religio-Historical Observations on Valentinianism; G. Quispel, Valentinian Gnosis and the Apocryphon of John; R. McL. Wilson, Valentinianism and the Gospel of Truth; R. Greer, The Dog and the Mushrooms: Irenaeus's View of the Valentinians Assessed; J. Whittaker, Self-Generating Principles in Second-Century Gnostic Systems; M. Tardieu, La Gnose Valentinienne et les Oracles Chaldaïques; H. Koester, Gnostic Writings as Witnesses for the Development of the Sayings Tradition; E. Pagels, Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ's Passion: Paradigms for the Christian's Response to Persecution?; J. Fineman, Gnosis and the Piety of Metaphor: The Gospel of Truth; B. Aland, Gnosis und Christentum; J. Dillon, The Descent of the Soul in Middle Platonism and Gnostic Theory; D. J. O'Meara, Gnosticism and the Making of the World in Plotinus; W. R. Schoedel, Gnostic Monism and the Gospel of Truth; J.-D. Kaestli, Valentinisme italien et valentinisme oriental: leur divergences à propos de la nature du corps de Jésus; J. F. McCue, Conflicting Versions of Valentinianism? Irenaeus and the Excerpta ex Theodoto; M. Harl, Les "mythes" valentiniens de la création et de l'eschatologie dans le language d'Origène: le mot hypothesis; A. Méhat, "Vrai" et

"fausse" gnose d'après Clément d'Alexandrie; P. Corby Finney, Did Gnostics make Pictures?

YALE II: *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*. Proceedings etc., Volume Two: *Sethian Gnosticism*, edited by Bentley Layton (SHR, XLI), Leiden 1981, pp. XVI and 455-882. Price: Dutch Flor. 136,—. Contents: R. Kraft, Philo on Seth: Was Philo Aware of Traditions which Exalted Seth and his Progeny?; M. E. Stone, Report on Seth Traditions in the Armenian Adam Books; B. A. Pearson, The Figure of Seth in Gnostic Literature; G. W. E. Nickelsburg, Some Related Traditions in the Apocalypse of Adam, the Books of Adam and Eve, and I Enoch; C. Colpe, Sethian and Zoroastrian Ages of the World; F. Wisse, Stalking those Elusive Sethians; K. Rudolph, Die "Sethianische" Gnosis—Eine häresiologische Fiktion?; H.-M. Schenke, The Phenomenon and Significance of Gnostic Sethianism; A. Böhlig, Triade und Trinität in den Schriften von Nag Hammadi; J. M. Robinson, Sethians and Johannine Thought: The Trimorphic Protennoia and the Prologue of the Gospel of John; N. A. Dahl, The Arrogant Archon and the Lewd Sophia: Jewish Traditions in Gnostic Revolt; I. Gruenwald, Aspects of the Jewish-Gnostic Controversy; A. Henrichs, Literary Criticism of the Cologne Mani Codex; L. Koenen, From Baptism to the Gnosis of Manichaeism; K. Koschorke, Gnostic Instructions on the Organization of the Congregation: The Tractate Interpretation of Knowledge from CG XI; M. Marcovich, The Naassene Psalm in Hippolytus (Haer. 5.10.2); L. Painchaud, Le cadre scolaire des traités de l'Ame et le Deuxième Traité du Grand Seth (CG VII, 2); J. H. Sieber, The Barbelo Aeon as Sophia in Zostrianus and Related Tractates; M. Smith, The History of the Term Gnostikos; G. G. Stroumsa, Aḥer: A Gnostic; M. A. Williams, Stability as a Soteriological Theme in Gnosticism.

QUEBEC: *Colloque international sur les textes de Nag Hammadi (Québec, 22-25 août 1978)*, édité par Bernard Barc (Bibliothèque Copte de Nag Hammadi, Section "Études", 1), Quebec-Louvain 1981, pp. XII and 462. Contents: J.-É. Ménard, La Gnose et les textes de Nag Hammadi; J. M. Robinson, From the Cliff to Cairo. The Story of the Discoverers and the Middlemen of the Nag Hammadi Codices; R. McL. Wilson, Twenty Years After; T. Säve-Söderbergh, The Pagan Elements in Early Christianity and Gnosticism; K. W. Tröger, The Attitude of the Gnostic Religion towards Judaism as Viewed in a Variety of Perspectives; F. Wisse, The "Opponents" in the New Testament in Light of the Nag Hammadi Writings; B. Barc, Samaèl—Saklas—Yaldabaôth. Recherche sur la genèse d'un mythe gnostique; M. Tardieu, "Comme à travers un tuyau". Quelques remarques sur le mythe valentinien de la chair céleste du Christ; D. Rouleau, Les paraboles du Royaume des cieux dans l'Épitre apocryphe de Jacques; B. Layton, Vision and Revision: a Gnostic View of Resurrection; G. Quispel, The Gospel of Thomas Revisited; C. Trautmann, La parenté dans l'Évangile selon Philippe; R. Kuntzmann, L'identification dans le Livre de Thomas l'Athlète; F. Morard, Thématique de l'Apocalypse d'Adam du Codex V de Nag Hammadi; Y. Haas, L'exigence du renoncement au monde dans les Actes de Pierre et des Douze Apôtres, les Apophtegmes des Pères du Désert et la Pistis Sophia; J.-P. Mahé, Le fragment du Discours Parfait dans la Bibliothèque de Nag Hammadi; M. Roberge, Le rôle du Nous dans la Paraphrase de Sem; L. Painchaud, La polémique anti-ecclesiale et l'exégèse de la passion dans le Deuxième

Traité du Grand Seth; Y. Janssens, Les Leçons de Silvanos et le monachisme; P. Claude, Approche de la structure des Trois Stèles de Seth; M. Scopello, Youèl et Barbélo dans le Traité de l'*Allogène*; P.-H. Poirier, Le texte de la version copte des Sentences de Sextus; A. Pasquier, L'eschatologie dans l'Évangile selon Marie: étude des notions de nature et d'image; J.-P. Mahé, Le Discours Parfait d'après l'Asclépius latin: utilisation des sources et cohérence rédactionelle.

JONAS: *Gnosis*. Festschrift für Hans Jonas in Verbindung mit Ugo Bianchi, Martin Krause, James M. Robinson und Geo Widengren herausgegeben von Barbara Aland, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1978, pp. 544. Contents: E. Jüngel, Die Wirksamkeit des Entzogenen. Zum Vorgang geschichtlichen Verstehens als Einführung in die Christologie; U. Bianchi, Le Gnosticisme: Concept, Terminologie, Origines, Délimitation; W. C. van Unnik, Gnosis und Judentum; A. H. Armstrong, Gnosis and Greek Philosophy; J. M. Robinson, Gnosticism and the New Testament; G. W. MacRae, Nag Hammadi and the New Testament; B. Aland, Gnosis und Kirchenväter. Ihre Auseinandersetzung um die Interpretation des Evangeliums; M. Krause, Die Texte von Nag Hammadi; K. Rudolph, Der Mandäismus in der neueren Gnosisforschung; G. Widengren, Der Manichäismus. Kurzgefasste Geschichte der Problemforschung; G. Sfameni Gasparro, Sur l'histoire des influences du Gnosticisme; H.-M. Schenke, Die Tendenz der Weisheit zur Gnosis; B. A. Pearson, The Tractate Marsanes (NHC X) and the Platonic Tradition; W. Schmithals, Zur Herkunft der gnostischen Elemente in der Sprache des Paulus; E. H. Pagels, Visions, Appearances, and Apostolic Authority: Gnostic and Orthodox Traditions; F. Wisse, Gnosticism and Early Monasticism in Egypt; R. McL. Wilson, One Text, Four Translations: Some Reflections on the Nag Hammadi Gospel of the Egyptians; J. E. Ménard, La Lettre de Pierre à Philippe; E. Segelberg, The *pihta* and *mambuha* Prayers. To the Question of the Liturgical Development among the Mandaeans; A. Böhlig, Zur Vorstellung vom Lichtkreuz in Gnostizismus und Manichäismus; G. Quispel, Herman Hesse und Gnosis; Bibliographie Hans Jonas.

QUISPEL: *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, edited by R. van den Broek and M. J. Vermaseren (Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'Empire Romain, 91), Leiden 1981, pp. XIV and 622. Contents: List of Professor Quispel's Publications; J. van Amersfoort, Traces of an Alexandrian Orphic Theogony in the Pseudo-Clementines; U. Bianchi, The Religio-Historical Relevance of Luke 20:34-36; R. van den Broek, The Creation of Adam's Psychic Body in the Apocryphon of John; C. Colpe, Daēnā, Lichtjungfrau, Zweite Gestalt. Verbindungen und Unterschiede zwischen zarathustrischer und manichäischer Selbst-Anschauung; I. P. Culianu, The Angels of the Nations and the Origins of Gnostic Dualism; H. Dörrie, Gnostische Spuren bei Plutarch; H. J. W. Drijvers, Odes of Solomon and Psalms of Mani. Christians and Manichaeans in third-century Syria; J. Flamant, Éléments gnostiques dans l'œuvre de Macrobe; J. Fossum, Samaritan Demiurgical Traditions and the Alleged Dove Cult of the Samaritans; R. M. Grant, Charges of "Immorality" against Various Religious Groups in Antiquity; I. Gruenwald, The Problem of Anti-Gnostic Polemic in Rabbinic Literature; A. Guillaumont, Les sémitismes dans

l'Évangile selon Thomas. Essai de classement; Marguerite Harl, Pointes antignostiques d'Origène: le questionnement impie des Écritures; A. F. J. Klijn, An Analysis of the Use of the Story of the Flood in the Apocalypse of Adam; J.-P. Mahé, Le Livre d'Adam géorgien; J. Mansfeld, Bad World and Demiurge: A 'Gnostic' Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo; G. Mussies, Catalogues of Sins and Virtues Personified (NHC II, 5); B. A. Pearson, Jewish Elements in Corpus Hermeticum I (Poimandres); A. F. Segal, Hellenistic Magic: Some Questions of Definition; Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, Interpretazioni gnostiche e misteriosofiche del mito di Attis; M. Tardieu, Aberamenthô; M. J. Vermaseren, L'iconographie d'Attis mourant; H. A. J. Wegman, Une anaphore incomplète? Les fragments sur Papyrus Strasbourg Gr. 254; R. McL. Wilson, Gnosis and the Mysteries; J. C. M. van Winden, "Terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione". Reflexions on a Remarkable Translation of Genesis 1: 2a; E. M. Yamauchi, Jewish Gnosticism? The Prologue of John, Mandaean Parallels, and the Trimorphic Protennoia; J. Zandee, "The Teachings of Silvanus" (NHC VII, 4) and Jewish Christianity.

HALLE: *Studien zum Menschenbild in Gnosis und Manichäismus*, herausgegeben von Peter Nagel (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Wissenschaftliche Beiträge 1979/39 (K5)), Halle (Saale) 1979, 296 pp. Contents: J. Irmscher, Erwägungen zum Menschenbildbegriff in der Altertumswissenschaft; K. Rudolph, Zur Soziologie, soziologischen "Verortung" und Rolle der Gnosis in der Spätantike; C. Colpe, Die gnostische Anthropologie zwischen Intellektualismus und Volksfrömmigkeit; W. Ullmann, Bild- und Menschenbildterminologie in koptisch-gnostischen Texten; W.-P. Funk, "Blind" oder "Unsichtbar"? Zur Bedeutungsstruktur deverbaler negativer Adjektive im Koptischen; P. Nagel, Anatomie des Menschen in gnostischer und manichäischer Sicht; K.-W. Tröger, Moral in der Gnosis; W. Beltz, Zur Rolle der Arbeit in den Lehrsystemen der Gnosis; G. Bröker, Lachen als religiöses Motiv in gnostischen Texten; P. Pokorný, Über die sogenannte individuelle Eschatologie der Gnosis; D. Kirchner, Zum Menschenbild in der Epistula Jacobi apocrypha; H.-M. Schenke, Der sogenannte Tractatus Tripartitus und die in den Himmel projizierte gnostische Anthropologie; H.-G. Bethge, Anthropologie und Soteriologie im "Zweiten Logos des Grossen Seth" (NHC VII, 2); G. Schenke, Anthropologische Implikationen der Erlösungsvorstellung in der Schrift "Die dreigestaltige Protennoia" (NHC XIII); W. B. Oerter, Manichäische Frömmigkeit und Heilserwartung am Beispiel des 16. Thomaspsalms; O. Klíma, Aš-Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-milal wa'nnihal ed. Cureton S. 193, Z. 1-3; M. Loos, Die Frage der Willensfreiheit im Mittelalterlichen Dualismus; K. Onasch, Zur Frage der Hierarchie in der Bogomilenkirche; G. Strohmaier, Eine sabische Abrahamlegende und Sure 37, 83-93; H. Berthold, "Makarios" und seine Hörer. Methodische Betrachtungen an antignostischer/antimanichäischer Literatur; J. Dummer, Die Gnostiker im Bilde ihrer Gegner; H. Goltz, Antihäretische Konsequenzen: 'Monismus' und 'Materialismus' in der orthodoxen Tradition.

OXFORD: *Gnosis and Gnosticism.* Papers Read at the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies (Oxford, September 3rd-8th 1979) (Nag Hammadi Studies XVII), Leiden 1981, VIII and 153 pp. Contents: S. Arai, Zum "Simonianischen" in *AuthLog* und *Bronté*; R. van den Broek, Autogenes and Adamas:

The Mythological Structure of the Apocryphon of John; J. Helderman, Isis as Plane in the Gospel of Truth?; M. Krause, Christlich-gnostische Texte als Quellen für die Auseinandersetzung von Gnosis und Christentum. A. H. B. Logan, The Epistle of Eugnostus and Valentinianism; Violet MacDermot, The Concept of Pleroma in Gnosticism; G. M. Shellrude, The Apocalypse of Adam: Evidence for a Christian Gnostic Provenance; J. Frickel, Naassener oder Valentinianer?; K. Koschorke, Patristische Materialien zur Spätgeschichte der Valentinianischen Gnosis.

1. *The purpose and character of the Nag Hammadi Collection*

Several hypotheses have been launched with respect to the purpose of the Nag Hammadi library in its present form and the people who used it. The books were bound in a Pachomian monastery in the middle of the fourth century, as is testified by the papyri found in the covers of the codices (see J. Barns, Greek and Coptic Papyri from the Covers of the Nag Hammadi Codices: A Preliminary Report, in NHS VI, Leiden 1975, 9-18 and *Facsimile Edition. Cartonnage*, Leiden 1979). T. Säve-Söderbergh has suggested that the texts were collected by monks for heresiological purposes (Holy Scriptures or Apologetic Documentations?, in NHS VII, 3-14). But that would not account for the clearly non-gnostic works which are also contained in the collection, nor would it explain the occurrence of more than one copy of the same text (for instance, there are three versions of the *Apocryphon of John* and two of the *Gospel of Truth*). Therefore, there is a growing consensus that the books were collected from various quarters by Pachomian monks who read them as edifying literature (see Wisse in JONAS, 431-440, Robinson, *The Nag Hammadi Library in English*, 14-21, Chadwick in YALE I, 14-16, and with reservations now also Säve-Söderbergh in QUEBEC, 71-83). That the collection was put into a jar and hidden in a cave shows that the owner(s) intended to preserve the books and not to destroy them. In this connexion reference has been made to Athanasius' famous Paschal Letter of A.D. 367, which presents a detailed list of the biblical canon and condemns heretics and their "apocryphal books to which they attribute antiquity and give the name of saints". The Pachomian monasteries of that time were apparently not as orthodox as modern scholars used to think on the basis of later monastic literature. As a parallel case I may draw attention to the story of the monk Annarichos, who lived in the neighbourhood of Maiome near Gaza and was said to have received instruction "in the heresy of Bion and Harpocratius (i.e. Ebion and Carpocrates) his master, of whose books he had obtained possession", and to have expounded them publicly. When he was sum-

moned by Cyril of Jerusalem to come to the episcopal palace and to account for his doctrine he told the archbishop that Sator (= Saturninus) and Ebion were his spiritual Fathers. One of the heretical works in his possession was a book called the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, from which Hennecke-Schneemelcher's first (spurious) fragment derives (for text and translation see E. A. W. Budge, *Miscellaneous Coptic Texts in the Dialect of Upper Egypt*, London 1915, 58-60, 636-638). In this connexion it does not matter whether this story is true or not. In any case it shows that even at a later time the idea that there still had existed heretical, gnostic monks in the latter half of the fourth century was quite conceivable.

Some of the codices show a deliberate composition. Thus Codex V contains after the book of *Eugnostus the Blessed*, which reveals the structure of the divine world, four apocalypses (one of Paul, two of James and one of Adam). Codex I contains predominantly or even, according to many scholars, exclusively Valentinian writings. There is reason to suppose that at least some of the Coptic codices existed already in their present form in Greek (see my remarks on Codex III in *Vig. Chr.* 31 (1977) 234).

Though the Nag Hammadi collection is still often referred to as "the Coptic Gnostic Library" (cf. the title of the Claremont editorial project) or as CG (= Cairensis Gnosticus), it has become increasingly clear that not all the tractates are gnostic. The most conspicuous case is Cod. VI, 5, a bad translation of Plato's *Republic*, 588A-589B. The same codex contains several other non-gnostic works: the *Acts of Peter and the Twelve Apostles* (see A. Guillaumont, De nouveaux Actes apocryphes: Les Actes de Pierre et des Douze Apôtres, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 196 (1979) 141-152), *The Thunder or Perfect Mind* (see G. Quispel, Jewish Gnosis and Mandaean Gnosticism, in NHS 7, Leiden 1975, 82-122), the *Authentikos Logos* (see my article in *Vig. Chr.* 33 (1979) 260-286), and several hermetic treatises, *int. al. Asclepius*, 21-29 (see J. P. Mahé's excellent edition in the *Bibliothèque Copte de Nag Hammadi*, Section "Textes", vol. 3: *Hermes en Haute-Égypte*, tom. 1, Quebec-Louvain 1978, and his studies in QUEBEC, 304-327 and 405-434; also Säve-Söderbergh, *Ibid.*, 75-76). Other non-gnostic works are, for instance, the *Teachings of Silvanus* (Cod. VII, 4; see J. Zandee, *"The Teachings of Silvanus" and Clement of Alexandria: A New Document of Alexandrian Theology*, Leiden 1977; *Idem* in QUISPEL, 498-584) and a fragmentary Coptic version of the *Sentences of Sextus* (Cod. XII, 1;

P.-H. Poirier, in QUEBEC 383-390, shows that the Coptic version is an important witness to the original Greek text). Many of these non-gnostic texts are of great importance for the study of the beginnings of Egyptian Christianity and the earliest stage of Alexandrian theology. That they have survived in Coptic only seems to be the main reason that patristic scholars have not yet paid to them the attention they deserve. The *Gospel of Thomas* is now mostly interpreted as an originally non-gnostic work which in its present form is only slightly gnosticized. In a long article (QUEBEC, 218-266) Quispel reaffirms his positions with respect to the main problems of this most famous writing from Nag Hammadi. He takes it to be an essentially encratite, non-gnostic collection of Sayings, in which three sources can be distinguished: a Jewish-Christian source (which contained an independent Gospel tradition), an encratite source, and a Hermetic source (which is hold to be responsible for *int. al.* Log. 67: "Whoever knows the All but fails to know himself lacks everything"). The Aramaic background of the Sayings has been pointed out by Guillaumont in QUISPEL, 190-204. Most of the non-gnostic writings proclaim a strong asceticism, and as such they must have been attractive to the great majority of all gnostics. Even the positive appreciation of the "mystery of intercourse" in the *Asclepius* must have been acceptible to some gnostic groups, for instance the Valentinians. Therefore, there is no need to suppose that the non-gnostic tractates were added to the collection by those who were the last to use it.

2. *Gnosticism and the Church Fathers*

The discovery of the Nag Hammadi Library made it possible to test the reliability of the anti-heretical ecclesiastical writers whose polemics formerly constituted our main source for the knowledge of Gnosticism. I draw attention here to three aspects: the judgement on gnostic ethics (a), the reproduction of gnostic sources (b), and the reports on gnostic schools or groups (c).

a) The traditional view, based on the Fathers, that there were ascetic and libertine, licentious gnostics is not justified by the sources which now are available. Accusations of libertinism were not only raised by ecclesiastical writers but also by Plotinus, but nevertheless the libertine gnostics must have formed a small minority within the gnostic movement. Clement of Alexandria's report of license among the Carpocra-

tians (*Strom.* III, 8-9) seems trustworthy and so is Epiphanius' testimony of the obscene behaviour of a group of Egyptian gnostics (*Pan.* 26, 4-5). However, similar excesses could also happen among non-gnostic Christians, as Chadwick has pointed out. In any case, the people behind our new gnostic sources were all strenuously ascetic (see Chadwick in YALE I, 4-11; Tröger in HALLE 95-107; Wisse in QUEBEC, 115-117 and his earlier work 'Die Sextus-Sprüche und das Problem der gnostischen Ethik', in F. Wisse-A. Böhlig, *Zum Hellenismus in den Schriften von Nag Hammadi*, Wiesbaden 1975). The accusations of licence in the Church Fathers and Plotinus "are mainly false deductions and hearsay" according to Wisse, who also refers to "the common assumption in the Hellenistic world that false teaching must of necessity lead to an immoral life". That charges of immorality to various opponents were indeed quite normal in Antiquity was shown by R. M. Grant in QUISPEL, 161-170. One may ask whether there were principal differences in the motivation of asceticism by the gnostics (pagan and Christian) and other people who supported an ascetic way of life. Recently G. G. Stroumsa, Ascèse et gnose: Aux origines de la spiritualité monastique, *Revue Thomiste* 89 (1981) 557-573, has argued that in the gnostic sources asceticism is not a means to obtain personal purification but only to preserve a purification already obtained. He proposed to distinguish clearly pagan and Christian *asceticism*, mainly an ethical process, and gnostic *encratism*, the expression of the gnostic's complete rupture with the world and its creator. Characteristic of the former would be its dependence on the free choice of the individual believer and of the latter its being obligatory for all the members of the gnostic community. Personally, I prefer to reserve the term encratism for that radical form of asceticism that went as far as to forbid all kinds of sexual intercourse, even within wedlock, because it was considered the propagation of death. In this sense Tatian and the author of the *Sentences of Sextus* were encratites, but they were not gnostics. Moreover, there is no justification for such a clear-cut distinction between 'gnostics' and 'Christians': there were pagan and Christian gnostics, and among those who believed in Christ there were gnostic Christians and non-gnostic, mostly catholic, Christians. Gnostics like Valentinus and the author of the *Tractatus Tripartitus* saw themselves as true Christians; modern scholars have no right to say they were not. There were admittedly differences in ascetic motivations among gnostic and catholic Christians which roughly went along the lines indicated by

Stroumsa, but, in my opinion, it was more a question of different accents than of sharply opposed fundamental views on ethics and anthropology (for useful suggestions regarding further study of gnostic asceticism, see Tröger in HALLE, 103-106).

b) In their reproduction of gnostic sources the Fathers were much more reliable than in their reports on gnostic ethics. In several cases the new sources enable us not only to establish that the heresiologists quite fairly reproduced their sources but also to note successive stages in the development of these sources and the ideas they express. I give three examples. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* I, 29, gives a summary of the doctrine of the Gnostikoi which closely resembles the first, metaphysical part of the *Apocryphon of John*, with its description of the development of the divine Pleroma and the origin of the demiurge. But the recension of the *Apocryphon* which had come into Irenaeus' hands demonstrably contained an older version of the myth than that given by the extant four Coptic translations. In the latter texts Christ, the third 'person' of the divine triad, is identified with Autogenes who, however, in Irenaeus is a lower aeon of the Pleroma. This identification could only be made by disturbing the original scheme of aeonic generations as preserved by Irenaeus. The Coptic text of NHC III even enables us to trace an apparent mistranslation of the original Greek in the extant Latin translation of Irenaeus' work. In I, 29, 2, it is said that Autogenes is generated *"ad repraesentationem Magni Luminis"*. NHC III, 11, 5 has preserved here the Greek word παράστασις (*eouparastasis* = εἰς παράστασιν). This word can mean "representation", indeed, but it can also indicate a "position or post near a king' (Liddell-Scott), viz. of a high-placed servant. This was originally meant by the *Apocryphon* (and Irenaeus). The same word is used in NHC III, 11, 19 with respect to the task of the four Great Luminaries, the servants of Autogenes. In this case Irenaeus' Latin translator interpreted it in the right way: they were emitted *"ad circumstantiam Autogeni"* (see my article in OXFORD, 16-25).

In his *Refutatio*, V, 19-21, Hippolytus gives an outline of the doctrine of the Sethian gnostics apparently based upon a work entitled *Paraphrasis of Seth*, to which the reader is referred for further information (V, 22). Hippolytus must have made use of an awkwardly christianized version of a work which under the title of *Paraphrasis of Shem* is preserved in NHC VII. But the Coptic work itself already bears the traces of a long literary history, though the final redaction does not lack

all coherence (see Roberge in QUEBEC, 328-339). According to the *Paraphrasis of Shem*, NHC VII, 1, 25-28, there were from the beginning three principles of the universe: "There was Light and Darkness and there was a Spirit between them". Hippolytus, V, 19, says: αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐσίαι φῶς καὶ σκότος· τούτων δέ ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ πνεῦμα ἀκέραιον. In both texts the genesis of the cosmos and of all things it contains is described as the generation from a womb (μήτρα). But the exact relationship between the Coptic text and Hippolytus' source is very difficult to determine. There are, however, no indications that Hippolytus deliberately distorted his source; he simply had at his disposal a text which represented a quite different stage of development of basically the same ideas as found in the *Paraphrasis of Shem*.

Epiphanius, *Pan.* 31, 5ff. has preserved a Valentinian doctrinal letter which in many aspects deviates from original Valentinian speculations. Though in many cases Epiphanius is admittedly an unreliable source, it has never been doubted that he reproduced here an authentic Valentinian letter. Karl Holl and others even took the letter to represent an archaic type of Valentinianism. But now it has become clear that its author was strongly influenced by the *Letter of Eugnostus the Blessed*, a non-Christian work found in NHC III and V, which led him to modify some original Valentinian views (see Logan in OXFORD, 66-75).

c) The anti-gnostic writers described the gnostic movement as one broad stream of schools and systems which had sprung from one polluted fountain-head, Simon the Magician (for a recent study of the anti-gnostic polemics of Irenaeus, Hyppolytus, and Epiphanius, see G. Vallée, *A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemics: Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Epiphanius*, Waterloo, Ont. 1981; also Dummer in HALLE, 241-251). However, this heretical genealogy and the classification of the gnostics into a great many different and differing groups has found little support in the new sources. It has become increasingly clear that the various gnostic groups were not isolated one from another, but freely made use of each other's texts (see Logan's article mentioned above, and Wilson in QUEBEC, 63). The Yale Conference on Gnosticism had as its focal points two seminars, devoted to Valentinian and Sethian Gnosticism respectively. The participants in the Valentinian seminar concluded time and again that neither of the generally accepted Valentinian writings can be wholly fitted into one of the Valentinian schools known from the Fathers. Features which according to some scholars point to an early date are taken by others as indications of a later stage of development.

The *Gospel of Truth* (NHC I, 3; XII, 2), for instance, was once claimed by W. C. van Unnik to have been written by Valentinus himself, others denied its Valentinian character, but most scholars took it to reflect a later stage of western Valentinianism (see Wilson in YALE I, 133-145). G. W. MacRae calls it "a gnostic and perhaps a Valentinian tractate" (*The Nag Hammadi Library in English*, 37). The pendulum now seems to swing back. By means of a comparative, statistical, and rhetorical analysis Van Unnik's claim was reinforced by B. Standaert, L'Évangile de Vérité: critique et lecture, *NTS* 22 (1975) 243-275 (see, with much approval, Tardieu in YALE I, 142, and Layton in QUEBEC, 209: "almost certainly by Valentinus himself"). G. C. Stead has pointed out that in many studies on Valentinus and Valentinianism there is "an overconfident assimilation of the new sources to the old, in which points of agreement have been emphasized and elaborated, while inconsistencies and omissions in the evidence have been, not indeed ignored, but underrated" (YALE I, 76). He warned against the oversimplification of picturing the history of gnostic thought "as a one-way process of complication and accretion", so that texts in which Valentinian notions are hinted at but not elaborated are interpreted as representing a "primitive" or "original" phase of Gnosticism (YALE I, 77). Stead describes Valentinus primarily as a Christian Platonist: "the fragments of Valentinus, taken by themselves, would give no ground for supposing anything but a Platonizing biblical theologian of some originality, whose work hardly strayed beyond the still undefined limits of Christian orthodoxy" (YALE I, 75). Valentinus remains an elusive figure in the history of Christian thought. Quispel, who looks at the Valentinian problem from a quite different angle, concludes: "On the whole there can be no doubt that Valentinus and his Gnostics remained more faithful than Origen and his followers to the essence of primitive Christianity. If we remove the cosmological framework and discern the basic intuitions, Valentinus was the Novalis of early Christianity. Two knights of Christ and Sophia" (YALE I, 127).

Rowan Greer has shown that Irenaeus' refutation of the Valentinians, and the gnostics in general, which he based on the catholic doctrine of the Creator God, supplied the perspective from which he described their systems (YALE I, 146-171). That does not mean that his information is without value. The division of Valentinianism into a western or Italian school (Ptolemaeus and Heracleon) and an eastern school (Theodotus and others), pointed out by ancient heresiologists and modern scholars

as well, remains of great importance for the classification and evaluation of the new-found Valentinian writings from Nag Hammadi. There is no doubt that the system of the *Tractatus Tripartitus* (NHC I, 5), according to Schenke an excerpt from a more extensive work (HALLE, 148-149), is closely related to that of western Valentinianism and of Heracleon in particular, though there are also views which are thus far unparalleled. One of the most conspicuous differences is that the Aeon which tried to grasp the incomprehensibility of God, an act which finally entailed the creation of the material world, was not Sophia but the Logos, who, moreover, is said to have acted in accordance with the Father's will. In conclusion it may be said that the new texts primarily ask for an unbiased study of their contents without attempts to connect them right from the start with gnostic systems known from the Fathers, but also that it would be very unwise to neglect this external evidence and to think that the study of Gnosticism which preceded the discovery of such a great many gnostic manuscripts had not already led to some unshakeable results.

The combination of an unprejudiced study of the original texts and a critical use of the ecclesiastical sources is especially necessary for the study of general gnostic themes. What is urgently needed is a comprehensive study of gnostic, in particular Valentinian, christology, which is mostly too easily dismissed as simply docetic (and thus heretical and thus of no positive influence on the development of early Christian christology). The western Valentinians taught that Jesus had a psychic body, but the eastern Valentinians assigned to him a celestial, pneumatic body. The latter view, which was that of Valentinus himself, determines in the main points the christology of the *Gospel of Philip* (NHC II, 3), which, therefore, has to be reckoned to the eastern branch of Valentinianism (see Kaestli in YALE I, 391-403). Michel Tardieu has pointed out that to explain the celestial nature of Christ's body the Valentinians made use of a formula which, with respect to the incarnation of the soul, was current among the Platonists of their time: καθάπερ ὕδωρ διὰ σωλῆνος (QUEBEC, 151-177). Berthold has drawn attention to the fact that this Valentinian christological image was used by the Syrian 'Macarius' in an anthropological argument (in HALLE, 233-236, mentioning several texts which are not included in Tardieu's list of relevant passages).

There has been much debate on the question of whether or not the Nag Hammadi writings provide us with the system of the Sethians who

are mentioned as a separate gnostic sect by some of the anti-gnostic authors. The Yale seminar on Sethianism discussed the problem in six sessions. After reading all the papers and the discussions following their presentation I can only conclude that the attempts to reconstruct from the new sources a specific Sethian system have failed. The great advocate of the alleged Sethian system, Hans-Martin Schenke, has taken some mythologumena of the *Gospel of the Egyptians*, in which Seth plays a predominant part, as characteristic Sethian doctrines. If these mythologumena also occur in other gnostic texts he declares these writings also Sethian. The next step is to consider other features of the texts which have thus been connected as typically Sethian too. In this way, "it is possible to identify a given writing as Sethian, even if Seth (for whatever reason) does not appear in it at all, whether under his own name or as one of its equivalents" (YALE II, 593). As typical features which connect several members of his group of Sethian writings he mentions, *int. al.*, "a specific deployment of negative theology: *Apocryphon of John* and *Allogenes*" and "a specific philosophical terminology: *Three Steles of Seth*, *Zostrianus*, *Marsanes*, *Allogenes*" (*Ibid.*). However, neither the negative theology nor the philosophical terminology of the texts mentioned have anything specifically Sethian; they only show the influence of Greek philosophy on gnostic theology (see also below, sub 4). Schenke's most fervent opponent is Frederik Wisse (YALE II, 562-576). The heresiologists transmit two sets of traditions concerning the Sethians, which both derive from Hippolytus (see Wisse in YALE II, 568-571, and Pearson, *Ibid.* 473-475). Unfortunately, the Sethians of Hippolytus' *Paraphrasis of Seth* cannot be fitted into the Sethian sect as described by Schenke! There is no doubt that there were gnostics who assigned to Seth an important role in the history of salvation. He was not only seen as the son of Adam and Eve but also as a heavenly figure and interpreted as a) a recipient and transmitter of divine revelation, b) the progenitor of a pure race which lived before the Flood and then also the spiritual father of the gnostics, and c) the Saviour, identified with Christ (see the gnostic evidence in Pearson, YALE II, 475-500; Wisse, *Ibid.*, 571-572; Rudolph, *Ibid.*, 577). Seth as Saviour, apart from his function as revealer of divine knowledge, is only found in the *Gospel of the Egyptians*, Pseudo-Tertullian (*Haer.* 8), and Epiphanius (*Pan.* 39, 1, 3; 39, 3, 5). The evidence is scanty but enough to show that there must have been gnostics who interpreted Seth as a saving figure who in some way or another was to be identified with

Christ. Seth as transmitter of divine revelation and as the father of a pure indestructible race are already found in Jewish apocryphal traditions on Adam and Seth (on these traditions in Armenian and Georgian Adam Books, see Stone in YALE II, 459-471, and Mahé in QUISPEL, 227-260). In a study of some related traditions in the gnostic *Apocalypse of Adam*, the *Books of Adam and Eve*, and I *Enoch*, George W. E. Nickelsburg has shown that the first-mentioned writing derives from a Jewish Testament of Adam that was influenced by traditions also found in I *Enoch* (YALE II, 515-549). Nearly all the features of Seth in gnostic literature can be traced back to Jewish, non-gnostic traditions. Wisse concludes: "The heresiological references to the Sethians appear to be due to a wrongheaded approach and false assumptions. We are forced to the conclusion that there never was a sect properly or improperly called Sethian. The name should be eliminated from the lists of gnostic schools and sects. The views and books which until now have been called Sethian will need another and better-founded explanation" (YALE II, 573). I would have preferred a less apodictically expressed conclusion, but I agree that we should stop speaking about a Sethian gnostic system as constructed by Schenke. Kurt Rudolph has given a balanced assessment of the gnostic evidence for the alleged Sethian sect with which I may conclude this section: "Zieht man die Originalquellen heran, so gibt es kein eindeutiges Indiz für die Existenz einer geschlossenen gnostischen Gemeinschaft, die sich als "Sethianer" titulierten und ein eigenes "System" besassen" (YALE II, 577).

3. *Gnosticism and Judaism*

The presence of Jewish traditions in a great number of gnostic texts is acknowledged by every student of Gnosticism. This observation had led to a heated discussion, started by Quispel in 1951 (see his bibliography in QUISPEL, 1-12, and Van Unnik in JONAS, 65-66), on the question of whether or not the origin of Gnosticism itself has to be sought in Judaism. The discussion sometimes takes the form of a perfect babel of tongues because the participants obviously have quite different ideas in mind when they use the words 'Jewish', 'Judaism', 'Gnostic', 'Gnosis', and 'Gnosticism'. It may be useful to make some remarks on this question of definition. Both sets of words can be used in a narrow, limited sense and in a broad, more general sense. Van Unnik, who was very sceptical about the alleged Jewish origin of Gnosticism and minimized

the Jewish influence on gnostic texts, has pointed out that from Old Testament times two major points were constitutive for the Jewish religion: the belief in one God (Deut. 6, 4) and life according to the Law. According to him 'heretical' or 'heterodox' Judaism did not exist. One could only accept or reject its two basic principles; everyone who rejected one of them placed himself outside the Jewish community. The Samaritans cannot be seen as a Jewish *hairesis* in the original sense of the word: Jews and Samaritans had already been divided for centuries when Gnosticism emerged (JONAS, 74-79). However, the rabbinic polemics against *minim*, 'heretics', who threatened the belief in one God (see below) show that there were Jews who were considered heretics by their co-religionists. But Van Unnik's emphasis on the two major points of the Jewish religion is right. If there were Jews whose religious outlook was dominated by an anti-cosmic attitude which expressed itself as hatred of the Creator, who was exposed as an ignorant fool, unaware of the existence of the true, inaccessible God, then they certainly were no longer adherents of the Jewish religion. Nevertheless, ethnically they remained Jews, able to draw on the religious traditions and speculations that were current in the Jewish community. But not all the gnostics adhered to such a radical kind of Gnosticism. Since the colloquium on Gnosticism at Messina (1966) it has become usual to distinguish between Gnosticism and Gnosis. Gnosticism was defined there as involving "a coherent series of characteristics that can be summarized in the idea of a divine spark in man, deriving from the divine realm, fallen into this world of fate, birth and death, and needing to be awakened by the divine counterpart of the self in order to be finally reintegrated (...) This idea is based ontologically on the conception of a downward movement of the divine." Gnosis was regarded as "knowledge of the divine mysteries reserved for an élite" (*Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, ed. by U. Bianchi, Leiden 1967, XXVI-XXVII). This distinction leaves little room for the many variations and gradations within the gnostic movement. As can be shown from recent studies, it tends to make scholars believe that it is based on the gnostic sources themselves—*quod non*!—and that the first term indicates a set of 'heretical' ideas, whereas the second was used for more generally accepted, though elitist, mystic views. It has been pointed out that the Messina series of characteristics is not as coherent as it was then thought to be, that the only author who styled himself a true gnostic was Clement of Alexandria, who, however, according to the Messina definition was not a gnostic at all, and that Clement

and others reserved the term 'gnostics' for the followers of Prodicus and Carpocrates (see N. Brox, Gnostikoi als häresiologischer Terminus, *ZNW* 57 (1966) 105-114; Quispel in YALE I, 119, 128; Méhat, *Ibid.*, 426-433; Smith in YALE II, 796-807).

There can be no doubt that the gnostic cosmogonical and anthropogonical myths originated and first developed within a Jewish milieu. Two examples may suffice. In a recent article on 'Jewish Merkavah Mysticism and Gnosticism' (in *Studies in Jewish Mysticism.* Proceedings of the Regional Conferences held at the University of California, Los Angeles, and McGill University in April, 1978, ed. by J. Dan and F. Talmage, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, 41-55), Ithamar Gruenwald has drawn attention to the close agreement between the descriptions of the divine chariot in the *Hypostasis of the Archons* (NHC II, 4) and *On the Origin of the World* (NHC II, 5) and in Jewish Merkavah (= Divine Chariot) mysticism; for instance, the 68 "forms" at the four corners of the chariot (*OW* 105, 9) are also mentioned in the Targum to Ezekiel 1, 6 (p. 48). That points to an intimate knowledge of the speculations of Merkavah mysticism on the side of those who developed the gnostic myth. This observation is more important than the question of whether or not Merkavah mysticism should be termed "Jewish and rabbinic Gnosticism", as was done by Gershom Scholem, who did not distinguish between Gnosis and Gnosticism. Gruenwald vehemently opposes Scholem's characterization because he erroneously takes Gnosticism "to designate the *heretical* (italics mine) movements that crystallized within and alongside the early Christian Church". For him "Gnosis" seems harmless and acceptable, "Gnosticism" dangerous and heretical: "Admittedly, Merkavah mysticism contains several items of a secret 'Gnosis', knowledge, but this is not to suggest that it is a Jewish type of Gnosticism" (p. 42). Since we have for both words only one adjective form, 'gnostic', it seems justifiable to call the Merkavah mystics Jewish gnostics, albeit that this term needs some qualification: they certainly were not gnostics in the radical sense described above.

In his excellent edition of the *Hypostasis of the Archons* (in the Bibliothèque Copte de Nag Hammadi, Section "Textes", 5 Quebec-Louvain 1980), Bernard Barc has shown that there is a close agreement between the description of the birth of the demiurge, Samael, and that of the giants of Gen. 6, 1-4, as told in I *Enoch* 6-7. There the angels come down from heaven and unite with the daughters of men, who then

give birth to the giants (in the Bible called *Nephilim*) who finally devour the human beings. In the *Hypostasis* a shadow from heaven appears in the inferior world and unites with matter, which then gives birth to an abortion which resembles a lion. The Hebrew word *nephilim* literally means "abortions"; the idea of a creature which devours man immediately suggest the lion (Barc, *o.c.*, 28-32). Similar ideas are found in Philo with respect to the embodied soul (Barc in QUEBEC, 131-134). Barc's analysis of the myth underlying those of *On the Origin of the World* and the *Hypostasis of the Archons* leads to the conclusion that the first redaction of the latter work was written in the Jewish community of Alexandria in the first half of the second century A.D. "par un juif gnostique dans le but d'attirer à sa foi ses frères de race fidèles aux dogmes du judaïsme officiel" (edition, 4). The view that these works were written for Jews is shared by Gruenwald: "Only Jews could see the full relevance of the Gnostic argument made through the Jewish Scriptures. In other words, it stands to reason to say that the Gnostic writings which contain the Jewish material were written for Jews, or ex-Jews, who had to be convinced of both the falsity of their understanding of Scripture and of the truth latently maintained in their Scriptures; non-Jews, that is heathen believers, could not see the point made by such a shrewd procedure. Thus, it is conceivable that the Jewish writings under discussion were mainly addressed to Jews, or to people who had previously been Jewish believers, apparently Christians" (YALE II, 717-718). Though Gruenwald is somewhat reluctant to admit the existence of Jewish gnostics, he assumes "that some Jews or ex-Jews had an important role in transmitting the Jewish material into Gnostic hands". The Jews "who shared in and were addressed by the Gnostic heresy were familiar with Palestinian, sometimes Alexandrian, traditions" (YALE II, 722-723).

The main question is whether the emergence of the gnostic demiurge, as the low, negative counterpart of the transcendent God, can be explained from Jewish ideas. The rabbinic polemics show that there were *minim*, the best-known being Elisha ben Avuyah, nicknamed Aḥer, "Apostate", who taught that there were Two Powers in heaven. The rabbinic evidence was discussed by Alan F. Segal, *Two Powers in Heaven. Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism*, Leiden 1977. He argued that at its earliest stage this polemic was directed against speculations about a secondary divine being, the agent or vice-regent of God, known under various names (Angel of the Lord,

Lesser JHWH, the Name, Shekina, Logos, Man, etc.), who shared in or was wholly responsible for the creation of world and man. On the basis of Samaritan sources Jarl E. Fossum has recently shown that the same ideas and the same polemics are to be found in Samaritanism: *The Name of God and the Angel of the Lord. The Origins of the Idea of Intermediation in Gnosticism*, Utrecht 1982. The agreement between the views of the Jewish and the Samaritan heretics and those of the defenders of the unity of God on both sides shows that the border-line between Jews and Samaritans was not as closed as Van Unnik would lead us to believe. Gruenwald, who admits that "the belief in Two Powers was considered heretical in Talmudic times" tries to avoid a conclusion which in his view must seem nearly inevitable, viz. that there were Jewish gnostics in the very heart of Judaism, by suggesting that "it seems more likely to think that the Jewish polemic against Two Powers in heaven was directed towards a non-Jewish heresy" (YALE II, 721). In another article he argued that it is impossible to prove that the rabbinical polemics against the rather unspecified *minim* were in fact directed against Jewish gnostics (QUISPEL, 171-189). I think he is right, but the opposite, that the *minim* were not, or did not include, Jewish gnostics cannot be proved either. What is more important is that in the Jewish or Samaritan sources the agent or intermediary of God is never said to be in opposition to God. If these heretics should be called gnostics they certainly were not gnostics of the radical type described above. But their views could have been developed into those of the radical gnostics. Fossum, 231-238, has drawn attention to the fact that also in the reports on the earliest gnostics the demiurgic angel(s) is (are) not opposed to God from the beginning (Simon Magus, Menander, Justin the Gnostic). Saturninus was the first to put the creating angels into direct opposition to God; the last stage of this development is found in the *Apocryphon of John*, which describes the demiurge as "a clear travesty of the God of the Jews".

Thus, the conclusion seems justified that the gnostic myths developed within Jewish circles on the basis of Jewish cosmogonical and anthropogonical speculations. However, that does not explain the radicalization: what led some Jews to construct a sharp opposition between the good, highest God and the bad demiurge and to identify the latter with the one God of Judaism? It has recently been described as resulting from a hardening of the opposite positions taken in the debate on the Two Powers in heaven. Nils A. Dahl, further developing a sug-

gestion by Alan Segal, puts it in this way: "The close correspondence between rabbinic and gnostic texts is best explained on the assumption that some "two powers heretics" responded to the rabbinic polemic by portraying the god of their intransigent monotheistic opponents as an inferior deity, an ignorant and arrogant Archon. In the situation of conflict, the doctrine of two powers was radicalized. The secondary element in the deity was degraded and no longer simply seen as manifestation and agent of the supreme God. (...) This explanation of the gnostic split in the deity accounts for the presence of Jewish traditions in the gnostic revolt, while at the same time providing reasons for the great ambivalence with which these traditions are used" (YALE II, 690-691). Where exactly this radicalization took place cannot be established with certainty. Though there are reports on early gnostics in Samaria and Antioch (Simon, Menander, Saturninus), it is virtually certain that at least the great gnostic myths were developed at Alexandria, which had a large Jewish community. We know that already before the Christian era there was in Alexandria much speculation on the two basic divine hypostases of Judaism, Wisdom (Sophia) and Man (Anthropos), which later on formed the centres of the two principal gnostic myths (see G. Quispel, Gnosis, in *Die orientalischen Religionen im Römerreich*, edited by M. J. Vermaseren (EPRO 91), Leiden 1981, 413-435). There is also a strong Alexandrian-Jewish influence on the early Hermetic writings, especially the *Poimandres* (See Pearson in QUISPEL, 336-348).

It would be a mistake to take the gnostic religion for a degraded form of Judaism. In its radicalization the gnostic movement became a new, anti-cosmic religion, with, as K. W. Tröger put it, "a new mental focus" (QUEBEC, 86-98). In this it may be compared with Christianity which first was also merely a Jewish sect, but very soon, in its gentile form, with Paul's emphasis on salvation by grace and the Spirit and not by the works of the law, became a religion in its own right. The debate on the Jewish origin of Gnosticism will certainly go on, hampered by its inevitable lack of terminological clarity. In my view, it is not the all-important question of gnostic studies which it is sometimes held to be. The Jewish influence is especially clear in the gnostic myths. But there are also many gnostic writings which do not show any Jewish influence at all; and the gnostic religion also won its adherents among people who did not have any relationship with Judaism whatsoever. The persistance of a religious phenomenon in varying cultural and religious contexts is not explained if one is able to locate exactly the place of its cradle. The spirit of Gnosticism cannot be explained from Judaism.

4. *Gnosticism and Philosophy*

The problem dealt with in this section has a long history. Hippolytus already argued that the gnostics, like all other heretics, had derived their ideas and systems from Greek philosophy and astrology (see K. Koschorke, *Hippolyt's Ketzerbekämpfung und Polemik gegen die Gnostiker*, Wiesbaden 1975). Recently, several experts in classical philosophy have studied the problem with less animosity and more factual knowledge than Hippolytus. The question can be approached from different sides: Were there developments in earlier philosophy which could explain the emergence of Gnosticism or which could have lent themselves for an *interpretatio gnostica*? Are there indications of direct gnostic influence on Greek philosophers or of Greek philosophy on the development of Gnosticism?

The study of possible Greek antecedents of Gnosticism has concentrated on the gnostic idea of the bad world and the evil demiurge, which indeed is much more decisive than the doctrine of the soul or the gnostic's experience of alienation from the world. Though there are in pre-Socratic philosophy ideas on the origin of the universe (connected with the figure of Ananke in Parmenides and Hate in Empedocles) which have a gnostic ring, the world is never held to be essentially bad (see Mansfeld in QUISPEL, 263-290). It is, however, quite understandable that later gnostics interpreted Empedocles in their own way, making Hate the evil demiurge (see J. Frickel, Unerkannte gnostische Schriften in Hippolyts Refutatio, in *Gnosis and Gnosticism*, NHS 8, Leiden 1977, 126-130, and Mansfeld, 288-290). In early Orphism and early Pythagoreanism there is an anthropological pessimism (incarnation as punishment, the body as a tomb) which every gnostic would approve, but it is not based on nor does it correspond to an equally pessimistic cosmology (Mansfeld, 290-293; the latter aspect is neglected by Colpe, in YALE I, 36, who finds in 'Orphic' texts of the 4th and the 5th century B.C. "a veritable gnostic scenario"). Plato and Aristotle were convinced of the goodness and indestructibility of the cosmos; both conceived the idea of a bad world created by a bad demiurge, only to reject it immediately—Plato by concluding that the demiurge is good, Aristotle by arguing that there can be no demiurge at all (Mansfeld, 293-304). Only the Epicureans held that the world is not good, because it is a "random, meaningless, transitory and very badly arranged cosmos" (thus Armstrong in JONAS, 90-92; see also Mansfeld in QUISPEL,

309-312). The thesis that the world is good made two options possible: 1a. there is a good demiurge (Plato and the Stoics), 1b. there is no demiurge (Aristotle). The thesis that the world is not good also allows of two possibilities: 2a. there is no demiurge (Epicureans), 2b. there is an evil demiurge (the gnostics). The last position was not defended by any Greek school of thought but the gnostics could claim that they offered an original cosmological explanation of the misery of human existence (see Mansfeld's conclusions in QUISPEL, 312-314).

Though Plato and the Platonists described the cosmos as essentially good, they did acknowledge the existence of imperfection and evil in the material world, into which the soul has descended or fallen. Especially on this point there are close correspondences between Gnosticism and contemporary Platonism. The descent of the soul could be interpreted by the Platonists as willed by the gods (Calvisius Taurus and his school), but also, in a more gnostic mood, as caused by wantonness or love of the body (*int. al.* mentioned by Albinus, who himself accepted the last-mentioned explanation; see J. Dillon in YALE I, 357-364). The doctrine of the descent and the ascent of the soul is not the core and kernel of Gnosticism which it is often thought to be; the gnostics shared it with the Platonists, though sometimes enriching it with mythological peculiarities of their own. Especially in the second century there were Platonists who came very close to the position of radical Gnosticism. When Plutarch and Atticus assumed a maleficent world soul as the principle of evil in the material universe, based on Plato's *Laws*, 896E-897D connected with *Timaeus* 52-53, they nevertheless did not introduce a gnostic kind of cosmic dualism (see Armstrong in JONAS, 103-106, and J. M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, London 1978, 202-208, 254). According to Dillon, 204-205, the Valentinian Sophia and her offspring the demiurge are the gnostic equivalents of Isis and her offspring Horus in Plutarch's interpretation. That may be possible, though it deserves a more thorough investigation. That the figure of *Plane* in the Valentinian *Gospel of Truth* in fact is a devaluated Isis, because the goddess's wandering (πλάνη) was considered not to "lead to the truth in gnostic opinion", is a very unlikely suggestion (Helderman in OXFORD, 26-46). Heinrich Dörrie has shown that there are indeed aspects of Plutarch's thought which can be characterized as "gnostic traces", but that his piety does not depend on the gnostic religious world view but only shows a close affinity to it. Dörrie concludes: "Plutarch steht in manchen seiner Äusserungen der Gnosis nahe; in

seiner philosophisch-religiösen Entscheidung steht er in radikalem Gegensatz zu ihr" (in QUISPEL, 116). More difficult to assess is the position of the Pythagorean Platonist Numenius of Apamea, who taught the existence of two souls, a good and a bad one, in the universe and in man. His demiurge, the second Nous, though being good because of his Father, has a certain ambiguity and imperfection about him: he forgets himself in his concern for matter. Nevertheless, his world remains a Platonic world; it is "a beautiful cosmos, beautified by participation in the Beautiful" (Frg. 16 Des Places; 25 Leemans). Armstrong concludes his discussion of Numenius (in JONAS, 106-109) with this judgement: "Numenius, for all his "Orientalism", remains a Platonic-Pythagorean philosopher who looks at Gnosticism, as he looks at other Oriental, non-Greek ways of thinking, from the outside, adopting and adapting any ideas from the Gnostics which he thinks will be helpful for his Platonic philosophical purposes" (see also Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 366-379). This seems a more balanced assessment of Numenius' position than that expressed by Chadwick (in YALE I, 13): "Numenius of Apamea (...) is simply to be reckoned among pagan gnostics". It is interesting to see that Macrobius, though adopting Numenius' 'gnostic' view that the planetary spheres are part of the inferior, 'infernal' world, firmly rejects the idea of a demonization of the cosmos (see Flamant in QUISPEL, 130-142). An important question is that of the relationship between Gnosticism and the *Chaldaean Oracles*, which have so much in common with Numenius. In a long and very learned article Michel Tardieu has dealt with this problem, concentrating on the correspondences between the *Oracles* and Valentinianism. His conclusion is that there was no direct influence of gnostic mythology on that of the *Oracles* but that "la réactualisation gnostique des mythes platoniciens par les mythes venus de l'Orient allait servir de modèle à la chaldaïsation du platonisme scolaire" (YALE I, 230). Or, in the words of his own summary (*Ibid.*, 233): "I conclude that the system of the *Oracles* is incomprehensible unless we see at its foundation the development of the Gnostic systems around Valentinus. Thus, I have affirmed Kroll's position, but I refuse to use the word "Gnosis"."

Especially in the second century there were Platonists and Platonic-influenced religious thinkers (also among the Christians) who came very close to radical Gnosticism in their valuation of the material world and man's position in it. From the third century onwards, starting with Plotinus, the Platonists resumed a more positive and world-accepting

attitude (only Porphyry shows a tendency to return to Numenius' position). Plotinus strongly opposed the gnostic view of the universe and its maker. Armstrong discovers in Plotinus "an intense enjoyment of this world in all its horizontal richness and diverse beauty and variety" (in JONAS, 113). "Of all ancient thinkers, pagan or Christian, he is the least interested in life after death and escape from the body" (*Ibid.*, 115). That he speaks of the "audacity" (τόλμα) of his second and third hypostases has its background in the Neopythagoreanism of the first century B.C., where the term served to indicate the Dyad, the principle of indefinite multiplicity. In Plotinus the τόλμα does not introduce, as it does in Gnosticism, a cosmic disaster (Armstrong, 116-121). That there were gnostics in the school of Plotinus is clearly shown by his polemics, especially in *Enn.* II, 9 (see C. Elsas, *Neuplatonische und gnostische Weltablehnung in der Schule Plotins*, Berlin 1975; also O'Meara in YALE I, 365-378). In Porphyry's *Vita Plotini*, 16, it is told that there were Christians who declared that Plato had failed to penetrate into the depth of intellectual being. In his lectures Plotinus frequently attacked these people, who based themselves on, *int. al.*, "apocalypses bearing the names of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, Mesus, and others of that order". The Nag Hammadi Library contains two works which most probably are identical with two of the apocalypses mentioned by Porphyry. The long treatise of Cod. VIII, 1 is called *Zostrianus*, a name which may be identical with Zoroaster. At the end of the work we read, 132, 6-9: "Zostrianus. Words of Truth of Zostrianus. God of Truth. Words of Zoroast[er]". In Cod. XI, 3 there is a tractate, called *Allogenes*, in which a person of that name gives a revelation discourse to his son Messus (cf. Mesus in Porphyry). In *Zostrianus* and *Allogenes*, and also in another gnostic work, the *Three Steles of Seth* (NHC VII, 5), there are speculations about the Neoplatonic triad Being, Life, and Intelligence (on this triad see P. Hadot, Etre, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin, in *Les sources de Plotin* (Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 5), Geneva 1960, 105-141; E. R. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1963, 252-254). These texts show a gnosticization of Neoplatonic conceptions, not the influence of gnostic ideas on Neoplatonism (see Claude in QUEBEC, 373; Siever in YALE II, 788-795, Williams, *Ibid.*, 819-821). It seems likely that the *Three Steles of Seth* and also the tractate *Marsanes* (NHC X, 1; see Pearson in JONAS, 373-384) were among the "other works" in the hands of Plotinus' opponents which Porphyry left

unmentioned. The conceptions of these texts need to be studied by an expert in Neoplatonism who is not a complete 'Allogenes' in gnostic studies (a good example is Whittaker's study of the idea of self-generation in Porphyry and earlier philosophers, in YALE I, 176-189).

In conclusion we may say that the influence of Gnosticism on Greek philosophy was extremely slight. The only one who seems influenced by gnostic ideas, Numenius, still remains far from becoming a gnostic in the radical sense. But his work and the *Oracula Chaldaica* show that in certain quarters of second-century society a spiritual climate prevailed in which gnostic systems could easily develop. It explains why the influence of Greek philosophical ideas can be detected in most of the new-found gnostic works. It would have been strange if the situation had been otherwise and the gnostics had not made use of the cosmological and anthropological speculations of their environment. It is becoming increasingly clear that also in formulating the typically gnostic myths which were based on Jewish traditions the gnostic authors drew heavily on contemporary Greek philosophical works. When in *On the Origin of the World* the author seems to use Hesiod's *Theogony* and to quote literally Parmenides, he is actually basing himself on a late Hellenistic cosmological source which was also known to Plutarch (see Mansfeld, Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi, *Vig. Chr.* 35 (1981) 174-182). And when in the *Apocryphon of John* the creation of Adam's psychic body corresponds to that of the body of man in the *Timaeus*, the author did not consult Plato's work directly but made use of a contemporary writing in which each of the seven components of the human body was combined with a particular planet (see my contribution to QUISPEL, 38-57). From the Greek papyri of Plato found in Egypt we should not too easily infer that the gnostic authors had a direct access to the original works of Plato and that, therefore, the interpreter of Nag Hammadi texts "is free, within the limits imposed by ancient education itself, to treat certain parts of the Platonic corpus, read by second-century eyes, as one of the direct sources of gnosticism" (Layton in QUEBEC, 196, who overestimates the Middle Platonic element in the *Treatise on Resurrection*, without knowing that the names Albinus and Alcinous refer to the same man). Gnosticism is more than "a Platonism run wild" (thus A. D. Nock in *Early Gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic Background*, 2nd ed., New York 1964, XVI), nor does it wholly belong to the "Platonic Underworld" (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 384ff.). The spirit of Gnosticism cannot be explained from Platonism nor from any other Greek school of thought.

5. *Gnosticism and Christianity*

There are no gnostic works which in their present form are demonstrably pre-Christian. But the Nag Hammadi Library contains several gnostic tractates which are certainly non-Christian. These writings show that Gnosticism did not arise as a Christian heresy. Therefore, at least "the *possibility* of interaction between Gnostics and Christians during the formative period of the New Testament writings themselves" cannot be ruled out (thus George W. MacRae in JONAS, 150). The discussion on the impact of the Nag Hammadi writings on New Testament studies has concentrated on the Sayings of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels, the Prologue of the Gospel of John, and Pauline theology.

The discovery of the *Gospel of Thomas* has been of extreme importance for the study of the Sayings tradition in the Synoptics. But we need not enter here into the problems involved because in this case it is not the influence of Gnosticism which is at stake (on 'Thomas' see Quispel's and Guillaumont's articles mentioned above in section 1; Koester in YALE I, 238-261; Robinson in JONAS, 135-143; MacRae, *Ibid.*, 152-153, who thinks the Gospel of Thomas is "a thoroughly gnostic work"). It has been claimed that *Trimorphic Protennoia* (NHC XIII, 1) depends on a source which was also used, but less accurately, in the Prologue of the Gospel of John. The Berlin group of scholars around H.-M. Schenke designated the gnostic tractate as a non-Christian, "Sethian", secondarily christianized work, and especially Gesine Schenke and Carsten Colpe drew attention to what they saw as striking parallels with the Johannine Prologue. R. MacL. Wilson and Yvonne Janssens have challenged the view that *Trimorphic Protennoia* is an originally non-Christian work (see Robinson's report of the relevant studies in YALE II, 644-662 and in JONAS, 128-131; Yamauchi in QUISPEL, 480-484; on the anthropology of *Protennoia* see Gesine Schenke in HALLE, 173-179). In reading the gnostic treatise I absolutely do not get the impression of the Berlin group that "the relevant statements of *Protennoia* stand in their natural context, whereas their parallels in the Johannine Prologue (...) seem to have been artificially made serviceable to a purpose really alien to them" (G. Schenke in *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 99 (1974) 733; Robinson in YALE II, 651). I agree with Colpe and Wilson (see YALE II, 644), that there are sapiential traditions behind both writings, but in my view *Trimorphic Protennoia* as a whole

deserves a fresh and unbiased study before anything should be said about its possible relationship with the Johannine Prologue. Of course, there is much Gnosis in the Gospel of John, and there is much in the Nag Hammadi Library to elucidate it. This was pointed out by MacRae, whose conclusion I would like to subscribe: "In my view the Fourth Gospel is neither a genuinely Gnostic work nor an anti-Gnostic one. It is rather an independent reinterpretation of the Jesus story on the part of a gifted Evangelist who was strongly influenced by the multiple currents of his syncretistic world including Gnosticism. His Gospel represents in part a gnosticizing of the tradition which, however, stops short of absolute dualism and its corollary, docetism. Thus, despite the attempt of the Valentinians to appropriate John as their Gospel because they rightly recognized its tendencies, the Fourth Gospel is not a Gnostic work" (JONAS, 156-157).

That Paul not only attacked gnostic ideas in his letters but was also strongly influenced by them was argued by many New Testament scholars long before the discovery of the Nag Hammadi Library. It was claimed, for instance, that the view opposed by Paul in 1 Cor. 15, 2, that there is no resurrection of the dead, should be interpreted by the gnostic idea expressed by the heretics of 2 Tim. 2, 18, that the resurrection has already taken place. The latter view is indeed found in several gnostic tractates, e.g. the *Treatise on Resurrection*, NHC I, 49, 9-24 (see Robinson in JONAS, 131, but also Wisse's critical remarks in QUEBEC, 108-114). An important question is how far Paul's christology was influenced by gnostic conceptions. When Paul in 1 Cor. 2, 8 says that the rulers of this age were ignorant of Jesus' true identity and therefore crucified him, he seems to make use of a wide-spread gnostic mythologumenon which is also found in such non-christian, gnostic works as the *Paraphrasis of Shem* (NHC VII, 36, 2-24) and the *Apocalypse of Adam* (NHC V, 77, 4-20; see MacRae in JONAS, 153-155; Shellrude, however, sees in the *Apocalypse* a document of Christian Gnosticism, in OXFORD, 82-91). According to Walter Schmithals there are in Paul's theology clear traces of a pre-Christian, Jewish Gnosticism which already used the name 'Christ' for its Saviour and later on, in a christianized form, identified this figure with Jesus. It was, still according to Schmithals, to this type of gnostic Christianity or christianized Gnosticism that Paul was converted at Damascus. This would explain Paul's anthropological dualism and his pneumatic view of salvation and life in the Church as being "in Christ", whereas the apocalyp-

tic and christological-soteriological elements of his theology would reflect the views of the Christian communities of Jerusalem and Antioch (JONAS, 385-414). Schmithals's article is fascinating but, in my view, too speculative and sometimes rather fantastic. He works with a Bultmannian concept of Gnosis without any attempt to check its elements on the new sources. It is no longer possible, nor acceptable, to speak about the gnostic aspects of Paul's theology without any reference to the original gnostic writings. There is no doubt in Paul's language and thought much that reminds us of gnostic ideas. These elements should be studied very carefully in the light of our present knowledge of Gnosticism, without building hypothesis on hypothesis. In this area of New Testament studies there is still much work to be done.

The gnostics and Christians of the first centuries of our era are often viewed as two separate groups who were sharply opposed to one another. In that view a Christian gnostic, or gnostic Christian, really is not a Christian at all but at best a syncretist who has adapted his views to those of the Church. According to Martin Krause the gnostics sought to win ordinary Christians over to their side "by adaptation, by a gnostic allegorical exegesis of biblical texts (...), by the composition of Christian-gnostic writings (...), and by the adoption, reinterpretation and expansion of the Christian sacraments" (OXFORD, 48). This picture of the Christian gnostics as people who pretended to be Christians for propagandist reasons only cannot be true. Of course, there were gnostics who had picked up some Christian notions without having any real affinity to Christianity; the sources show this abundantly. But the Valentinians were sincere Christians, who participated in the local Christian communities as long as they were allowed to do so. Koschorke has shown that the Christian gnostics did not reject the ecclesiastical offices—they often held them themselves—but were indifferent to them. They ascribed to these offices of the Church only a limited importance. The bishop, presbyters, etc., could mediate salvation by instruction and through the sacraments to those members of the congregation who had not yet reached the level of the true gnostics. The gnostics themselves did not need these forms of outward mediation, even if they did not abstain from them (a similar position was held by Clement of Alexandria). The situation changed when the bishops began to make exclusive claims in behalf of the mediation of salvation by the ecclesiastical offices. It was against this exclusiveness that the gnostics raised their polemics, not against the offices themselves. In a study of

the gnostics' valuation of the apostolic tradition and authority Elaine H. Pagels has come to the same conclusion (in JONAS, 415-430). There were gnostic communities which continued the Pauline tradition of Church organization, solely based on the Spirit and its gifts, long after the rise of monarchical episcopacy. The *Interpretation of Knowledge* (NHC XI, 1) is directed to such a congregation, which seems more in accordance with the gnostics' pneumatic interpretation of Christianity than a community ruled by a bishop and presbyters. But in that congregation pneumatics and ordinary, less enlightened members of the church lived together, though there were difficulties between them which the author of the treatise tries to counter (see on all this Koschorke in YALE II, 757-769).

It is a serious mistake to see the gnostics simply as a separate group outside and in opposition to the Church. The Valentinian Florinus, who was active as a missionary in Gaul, was a presbyter of the Roman church and only deposed at the urging of Irenaeus (frg. syr. 28). The gnostics who are opposed, and sometimes quoted with approval, by Clement of Alexandria apparently still lived within the Church. Especially in Egyptian Christianity it took a long time before the border-line between orthodoxy and heresy became clearly discernible.

In the second century there was a theological debate between early-catholic and gnostic Christians within the Church itself. This insight opens the way to a theological appreciation of the gnostic issues. Much attention has been paid to the question of the origin of Gnosticism and the syncretism of its mythology and doctrines, but very little to its contribution to the development of Christian theology. Its influence seems to have been more considerable than was surmised by an earlier generation of scholars. On this point our classic text-books of the history of Christian doctrine are so completely insufficient that new studies are urgently needed. A first and important step in this direction was made by Barbara Aland in her contribution to the Jonas Festschrift (158-215). She describes the debate between gnostic and catholic Christians as focussed on the right interpretation of the Gospel. One might object that she puts this debate too much into the perspective of protestant, in particular Barthian theology (she even participates in the debate herself). But in my view that does not diminish the value of her analyses. The gnostics experienced their salvation as a gift of grace which made them free of the world and put them right away into the new life. They understood Paul better than most of their fellow-Christians, who

tended to express salvation into the ethical categories of merit and reward. The Christian gnostics emphasized the unexpected novelty of Christ's revelation; they rejected the ideas of a history of salvation and a *praeparatio evangelica* by the Logos, which in their view debased the unique significance of the Christ event. Mrs. Aland convincingly argues that the well-known gnostic expression "saved by nature" does not refer to an innate faculty of the elect but to the divine nature which as a gift of grace is bestowed on man (210-212). It is to be hoped that more scholars will devote their studies to this area of research.

In conclusion we may say that Gnosticism is one of the most complex and variegated religious phenomena of Antiquity. In its mythology and doctrines there are distinct Jewish and Platonic elements, which seem to reach back to its first developments. But it cannot be explained exclusively from Judaism or Platonism, and certainly not from Christianity (Mrs. Aland's suggestions to that effect, in YALE I, 339-342, lead into a blind alley). Not any of the exclusive explanations of its origin is satisfactory. But there is no doubt that it was only in its Christian form that Gnosticism became really important and was able to exert a lasting influence, not only on the development of Christian theology, but also on western thought in general. In this respect, the study of Gnosticism is still in its infancy.

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REVIEWS

J. Fontaine, *Naissance de la poésie dans l'occident chrétien. Esquisse d'une histoire de la poésie latine chrétienne du IIIe au VIe siècle.* Avec une préface de Jacques Perret. Paris, Études Augustiennes, 1981. 304 pp.

It is with great pleasure that we announce this important book in which the author gives a full description of the origin of Christian Latin poetry and of the further evolution of its various genres. The two main virtues of this book are: the completeness of the information, which is evident from the full bibliography (pp. 289-304), and the continuous endeavour to show how both the creation and the evolution of the increasingly numerous genres can, at all events externally, be explained from the course of general history and of cultural history in particular. To these we must add the author's gift for vivid description and exact formulations. The combination of these qualities has produced a book which every student of Christian Latin literature should study with the greatest exactness.

We shall give here a survey of the contents of the sixteen chapters, adding a number of notes and additions which, as we hope, may be of some use.

At the beginning (pp. 9-16) we find a *Préface* by Professor Jacques Perret which contains several original observations as, for instance, that the hexameter in the more simple form which became more and more usual in late Antiquity and which required hardly more than six accentuated syllables, regained somehow the authority which it had once possessed in archaic Greek culture as the metre used by the priests of the sanctuaries and the oracles, and in this way became "un hexamètre recrée, un peu raide, mais hiératique".

In his prologue (pp. 17-24) the author observes that the vital and central point of Christian Latin poetry is to be found in the liturgy, and that for this reason it continues and rejects at the same time the liturgy of the synagogue, thus using, first directly, then indirectly, the treasures of Hebraic religious poetry: "Jésus avait déjà chanté ces poèmes avec ses disciples. Mais il les avait aussi invités à y déchiffrer le Mystère de sa

personne", which leads to the conclusion: "La spécificité du christianisme, qui est celle du Mystère de la personne du Christ, se trouve engagée en toute poésie chrétienne digne de ce nom" (p. 18).

Particularly important is the first chapter ("Du Nouveau Testament à Tertullien; les Chrétiens affrontés à diverses traditions poétiques") in which the author shows that St. Paul in the prose of his letters has inserted certain christological hymns which he probably had borrowed, at least partially, from the earliest Christian liturgy and then remodeled in order to insert therein a synthesis of the first Christology. A clear example of this is found in Coloss. 1, 15-20, where one clearly sees the original relationship between the hymn and the homily, a combination already to be stated in the very ancient hymn *Phōs hilaron*.

The transition from this hymnology which derives from the liturgy of the synagogue, in which God is the object of the cult, to the Greek forms of hymnody takes place in various ways but in all cases Christ becomes more and more the centre of the cult.

Several of the earliest hymns which have been preserved in papyri have as their metre anapaests, which is also the case with the famous hymn which ends the *Paedagogus* of Clement of Alexandria. To this group belongs also the first instance of Christian Latin Poetry which we still possess, *viz.*, a *Psalmus abecedarius* on a papyrus of the third or the beginning of the fourth century (first edition in *JbAC* 19 (1967) 212-3).

Very interesting are the observations concerning Tertullian, from whose works it is clear that he did not yet know original Latin hymns but only the singing of psalms. To the generally known passages *Apol.* 39, 8 and *De anima* 9, 8, we should add two statements about an individual singing of psalms (*exh. cast.* 10, 2; by husband and wife *ad ux.* 2, 8, 8), and especially the following sentence from *De orat.* 27: *hoc genus psalmos, quorum clausulis respondeant, qui simul sunt*, which situation, as the author rightly observes, presupposes the existence of a *cantor* whom the community answers periodically, which is a continuation of the Jewish tradition. Since Minucius Felix seems to know already the existence of Christian hymns which may be reckoned to Latin poetry (cf. especially P. G. van der Nat, Zu den Voraussetzunger der christlichen Literatur: die Zeugnisse von Minucius Felix und Laktanz, in: *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique*, 23 (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1977) 191-235), we may find here one more argument in favour of the (now almost generally accepted) priority of Tertullian to Minucius Felix.

The subject of the second chapter are the two poems by Commodianus, the *Instructiones* and the *Carmen de duobus populis*, also called

Carmen Apologeticum. The author is convinced that this poet lived in the third century; this conviction is based on linguistic and historical arguments. As to the first group, he regards as particularly important the arguments drawn from lexicology by H. A. M. Hoppenbrouwers, *Commodien poète chrétien* (Latinitas et Graecitas christianorum primaeva, Suppl. 2 (1964) 49-96) and by Kl. Thraede, Beiträge zur Datierung Commodians (*JbAC* 2 (1959) 90-114), whose statements are for the greatest part adopted by J. Daniélou in the fourth chapter (pp. 93-111) of his well-known book *Les origines du christianisme latin*. The author arrives at the conclusion that Commodianus belonged to a judeo-christian group which was, however, in conflict with Jewish proselytism. On account of the mention made of the Goths (*Carm. Apol.* 810), Thraede dates the poems after 240 A.D., whereas Daniélou supposes them to be composed between 220 and 240.

However, the question of the datation is greatly complicated by the structure of the metre, which is indeed the most developed form of rhythmical poetry known from Antiquity. Numerous scholars have, primarily on this account, attributed Commodianus' poems to the fifth century. The first of these was H. Brewer, who published two books on this subject, *viz.*, *Kommodian von Gaza, ein arelatensischer Laiendichter aus der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts* (Forsch. z. christl. Lit. 5, 1906) and *Die Frage um das Zeitalter Kommodians* (*id*, 10, 5:1910). His datation was adopted by K. Holl, *Über Ursprung und Heimat des pseudotertullianischen Gedichts adversus Marcionem* (SB Preuss. Akad. d. W. 1918, 1, 533 ss.) and Schanz-Hosius-Krüger, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* 3^2 (1922) 133 s.; P. Courcelle, Commodien et les invasions du cinquième siècle, *REL* 34 (1946) 227 ss.; Courcelle supposed that the verses *Carm. Apol.* 807-822 refer to the capture of Rome by Alaric. As to the late datation on account of the metre, cf. particularly H. Vroom, *De Commodiani metro et syntaxi annotationes* (diss. Utrecht 1917), whose observations were brought into a system by A. W. de Groot, *Neophilologus* 8 (1923), 304 ss. and further E. H. Sturtevant, Commodian and medieval rhythmic verse, *Language* 2 (1926) 223-37.

It should also be noted that H. Vroom in his book *Le psaume abécédaire de saint Augustin et la poésie latine rhythmique*, 35, observes about the *Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum*, which was certainly composed at the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century (cf. below, p. 85): "On pourrait dire que le poète se trouve sur la voie qui mène à la technique de Commodien". A similar relation exists

between the *Carmen adversus Marcionitas* and the poems by Commodianus; cf. A. Oxé, *Prolegomena de carmine adversus Marcionitas* (Leipzig 1888) 18 ss., and J. Königsdorfer, *De carmine adversus Marcionem, quod in Tertulliani libris traditur, Commodiano abrogando* (inaugur. diss. Würzburg 1905), *passim*.

The author can only defend his early datation by assuming a particularly vigorous and entirely personal initiative by Commodianus in the field of rhythm: "... ses inventions métriques, hardiment sacrilèges envers la forme véritable du vers homérique, déconcertent moins, si on les considère sur la toile de fond, si diversifiée, que nous ont brossée les fragments hymniques des *papyri* paléochrétiens". However, it is in our conviction impossible to suppose an *inventio* so entirely different from what was usually done in the third century of our era, and, moreover, to ignore the strong connection of Commodianus' rhythmical form with the semi-rhythmical form of the *Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum* and *the Carmen adversus Marcionitas*. And finally it must be pointed out that the arguments taken from history seem to be hardly convincing, since the misery of the sixth century (especially after the invasion of the Langobards, when, in our conviction, Commodianus did write his poems) was hardly less catastrophic than that of the third century of our era.

We must grant that the reaction on the *judaizantes* presents a serious problem for our presentation of the facts. But at all events a more full discussion of the arguments *pro* and *contra* would have been desirable or rather necessary in this chapter.

The third chapter is devoted to the poem *De ave phoenice* which was for the first time ascribed to Lactantius by Gregory of Tours (*De cursu stellarum* 12: *Tertium est quod de phoenice Lactantius refert*). It seems to be certain that this attribution is correct, the more so, since, as the author, and before him already P. G. van der Nat in his paper quoted above, has demonstrated, Lactantius shows himself also in this domain to be rightly called the *Cicero christianus*, since he is the first Christian author who accepts the poetry of pagan civilisation as something self-evident and who defends the rights of the *poetica licentia*, which allows the poets—and here he stands entirely within the rules of the *interpretatio Vergiliana*—to *figuris involvere et obscurare quae dicant*. Finally, it is worthy of notice that the entire *Carmen de ave phoenice* can be read both as a purely pagan and as a purely Christian poem, an exception being only created by vs. 25 (*Sed fons in medio est, quem*

vivum nomine dicunt), which contains an undeniable reference to Gen. 2, 6.

It is in the *Evangeliorum liber*, a poem composed by the Spanish priest Iuvencus that we are for the first time confronted with an epic poem in the official form of Greco-Roman poetry, which is apertly and thoroughly Christian. The author rightly observes (p. 68) that the choice of the classical form of pagan poetry may be explained by the fact that the real subject of the poem is the triumph of Christ which is seen as a counterpart of the victory of Constantine the Great: Christ is called *mundi regnator* (2, 265) and the emperor *terrae regnator apertae* (4, 807). Iuvencus imitates Vergil very frequently, and further the typically Spanish poets Lucan and Statius. After this the fact is emphasized that, in order to understand the poem of Iuvencus in the right way, one should entirely forget the romantic conception of poetry. The author recommends in this context the study of Byzantine poetry, of a drama like the *Christos paschōn* and the *Kontakia* of Romanos the Melode, as also of the Byzantine icons. We would like to add that one is also reminded here of the unadorned but strikingly exact presentations of biblical scenes by Spanish painters like Ribera and Zurbaran, in short, of the realistic, 'arid' style which, together with its contrast, the *stilus floridus* or *floridissimus* of the Baroque, has always been present in Spanish art. We think that the author goes somewhat too far, when he says about the icons (p. 70): "Ce qui apparente leur esthétique à celle de Iuvencus peut se définir, comme une quête de la transparence au sacré, de la psychagogie vers le Divin, de la communication de la Révélation". Very useful is the observation (pp. 70-1) that, when St. Jerome says about Iuvencus (*De viris ill.* 84): *quattuor evangelia hexametris versibus paene ad verbum transferens*, he does not mean that the poet wanted to give a translation of the gospels (the correct form would then be *(con)versio* or *interpretatio*) but a "métaphorisation, soit, en termes issus du latin, transposition".

Here it is to be observed that it might be interesting to compare Iuvencus' poetic rendering of the contents of the gospels with similar endeavours by Greek poets of the same period. The first Greek poem in this domain is the poetic paraphrase of the Psalms by Apollinarios of Laodicea which sticks very faithfully to the text of the Septuagint. Nearer to Iuvencus' much more free rendering of the gospels is Nonnos' Μεταβολὴ τοῦ κατὰ Ἰωάννην ἁγίου εὐαγγελίου (ed. by A. Scheindler, Teubner, 1881), on which cf. the excellent monograph by J. Golega,

Studien über die Evangeliendichtung des Nonnos (Breslau 1930) and R. Keydell, art. Nonnos, *RE* XVII (1936) 917-20.

The fifth chapter leads the reader to the first and deeper root of Christian Latin poetry, *viz.*, "L'hymnodie expérimentale d'Hilaire de Poitiers ou la mutation difficile de la psalmodie".

The chapter is opened by a vivid description of the creator of hymnody, *viz.*, St. Hilary of Poitiers, the great opponent of the religious policy of the emperor Constantius II which had as its aim, to say it in the words of the author, "une réunification doctrinale sur la base d'un compromis arianisant". The supposition that it was at a late stage of Hilary's activity that he began to compose hymns is supported by two arguments, the first and more important being found in Hilary's long stay in exile in Asia minor, where he certainly became acquainted with the hymnody of the Greek Church, which also deeply influenced his theology. In this context it is particularly important that his first hymn has the form of an alphabetic acrostichon, a form frequently used in Semitic poetry for mnemotechnical reasons. It is a particularly interesting fact that we see Hilary's endeavours in the domain of poetry improve before our eyes, for, whereas the first hymn which has been written in a combination of the Asclepiadic and the Glyconic metre, has a still highly irregular form, the second and third hymn—which were clearly written at a later date—show a correct metrical structure. It is evident that Hilary, of course deeply influenced by the practice of the Greek Church, is doing here a pioneer's work in Latin; however, he may have passed the experimental stage in his third hymn, written in the typically Roman *versus triumphalis*.

It is somewhat surprising that the author does not discuss in this same chapter the equally experimental hymns of Marius Victorinus. Editions of these hymns are found in the Vienna Corpus, Vol. 83, by Paul Henry, S. J. and Pierre Hadot (Vienna 1971, 285-305) and, earlier, with a French translation and commentary by the same scholars in the earlier edition in the Sources chrétiennes, voll. 68-9 (Paris 1960; text by Henry and French translation by Hadot, vol. 1, 619-653; commentary by Hadot, vol. 2, 1058-88). By their formal (in this context I prefer this word to 'metrical') structure these hymns are shown to belong to the pre-Ambrosian period of hymnody. On the first hymn Hadot observes (p. 1058): "Dans son ensemble, cet hymne est amétrique. On peut seulement reconnaître à la fin de chaque vers un crétique".

The sixth chapter ("La poésie chrétienne mondaine du centon de Proba aux petit vers d'Ausone", pp. 95-110) has for its subject the *centones* and a number of small poems written by aristocratic laymen. The most striking fact mentioned here is that the *cento* (a Christian poem consisting exclusively of verses or parts of verses by Vergil) composed by Proba, a lady belonging to the highest class of society, which we now regard as mere 'Machwerk', actually had considerable influence in and on the Christian community. The important thing about this fact is, of course, that there must have been a great need for real Christian poetry in the metre of the epic poetry of the classical period. In this context the subject of the seventh chapter, *viz.*, the epigrams by Pope Damasus, is of the greatest interest, since here the hexameter leads to really creative work. The author gives a description both exact and original of the evolution of the relation between the funeral epigrams of the Romans and Christian doctrine. He begins by pointing out that in the pagan *carmina epigraphica* from the first centuries of our era we still can state a high frequency of statements according to the philosophy of Epicurus that with death everything is finished. It is only in the course of the fourth century that these pagan epigrams begin to exhibit, and then in a quickly increasing frequency, a belief in the immortality of the soul. Now it is this kind of funeral epigrams which is adopted by the Christians. Moreover, by being admitted to *loca sacra* like mausoleums, basilicas, baptisteries and martyrs' graves, these poems—of course composed with increasing care—gradually begin somehow to take part in the celebration of the Christian cult and the administration of the sacraments.

It is in this sphere that the poetic activity of Pope Damasus is to be situated. His epigrams, which *more Romano* never contain one word too much, are completely integrated into the whole of ancient Christian art. The impression which they made on the faithful must still have been greatly enhanced by their impressive technical form which the pope had entrusted to one of the greatest artists in this field who ever lived, *viz.*, Furius Dionysius Filocalus (p. 117).

One little remark. It is, in my opinion, not necessary to connect (as is done in p. 118, n. 190) the verse epigr. 51, 8 *Aetheriam cupiens conscendere lucem* especially with two verses of Iuvencus (2, 195 *aetheriam liber conscendit in aulam* and 3, 400 *caeli conscendere sedem*), since in this context *conscendere* is very frequently found in Roman poetry. Originally it is used in connection with *currum* (sc. *Musarum*) as in

Lucr. 6, 47 *semel insignem conscendere currum* (imitated by Manilius 5, 10 *aetherios iussus conscendere currus*, cf. also Lucan 1, 48 *flammiferos Phoebi conscendere currus*; Prop. 2, 18, 13). The image of the chariot of the Muses dominates the prologue of Parmenides' Περὶ φύσεως and is frequent in the odes of Pindar, from which it was undoubtedly borrowed by the Roman poets. Then the expressions *conscendere lucem* and *conscendere caelos* (*-um*) became a constant formula in Christian Latin poetry: the first is found in CEL 670, 8 (which shows that it must have been a usual formula), the second *e.g.* in Iuv. 2, 214; *carm. adv. Marcion.* 5, 247; Avitus *carm.* 2, 108; cf. also Iuv. 2, 185; Prudent. *Perist.* 8, 7: *aeternum caeli conscendere regnum*; for further material see our note on *Carm. de resurr. mort.* 373 (one wonders whether Damasus could make use of a collection of such useful formulas).

Besides the *carmina funebria* in hexameters there begins in this same period (which is indeed the *aetas aurea* of ancient Christian culture: Theodosius, the edict of Thessalonica, the poetry of Prudentius, and the entire activity of Ambrosius, the first 'prince of the Church') an extensive creation—occassionally fabrication—of inscriptions to be put on, usually great, Christian buildings; they are mostly composed in elegiacs. Great masters in this field must have been Prudentius (the *Dittochaeum*) and Paulinus of Nola, but most of all St. Ambrose who was a poet in the highest degree, and to whom we turn in the eight chapter: "Ambroise de Milan, théoricien et maître de la poésie liturgique" (pp. 127-41). (That St. Jerome did not possess the slightest gift for poetry is evident from the fact that during the three years when he was Damasus' secretary he was not inspired to write one single epigram.)

The author shows admirably that, within the whole of St. Ambrose's restless activity in many fields, the composition of hymns which in a cristal-clear way formulated the fundamental tenets of the Catholic faith and which, moreover, on account of their simple and pure metrical form which was so entirely different from the metres of St. Hilary and Marius Victorinus, were easy to remember, forms part, together with the foundation of the cult of the Milanese martyrs Gervasius and Protasius, of St. Ambrose's attack on the temporary revival of Arianism around the year 386 which received strong support from the empress Justina, the mother of the young emperor Valentinianus. We need not repeat here the facts concerning the introduction of hymnody in the Church of Milan, which have been told by St. Augustine in *Confess.* 9, 7, 15, a passage interpreted in a most careful way by the author.

Further, he rightly points out that Ambrose like Hilary, whom he appreciated so much (also because they both were ardent opponents of Arianism), understood perfectly the immense importance of hymnody for the conservation of the pure faith, since these usually brief hymns could easily be learned by heart and thus made it possible for the faithful, as Ambrose observes in a very famous passage (In *Psalm* 118, *serm.* 7, 25) that, like the ruminating animals, *ita et nos de memoriae nostrae thesauro, de interioribus nostris ruminandum nobis pabulum promamus.* This leads the author to the following particularly fortunate formulation (p. 132): "l'exégète des Psaumes coïncide avec le poète des *Hymnes*, en la personne d'un liturgiste qui fait souvent, dans une même cérémonie, pratiquer à la fois la psalmodie et l'hymnodie".

After this no less than five chapters are devoted to the two great masters of Christian Latin poetry in the classical style, *viz.*, Paulinus of Nola and Prudentius. The ninth chapter has as its subject: "Les projets poétiques de Paulin et de Prudence", the tenth the poems of Paulinus, the eleventh the *Cathemerinon* and *Peristephanon* of Prudentius, the twelfth his three didactic poems (*Apotheosis*, *Hamartigenia*, and *Psychomachia*), and the thirteenth the two books of the *Contra Symmachum*.

In the ninth chapter the author shows how these two poets managed to create a third form of Christian Latin poetry between the two main genres which existed in their time, *viz.*, the hymns, with their strictly liturgical style and what he calls 'the biblical style', about which he says: "Elle s'interpose comme une médiatrice entre l'Écriture et l'aristocratie lettrée ..., elle établit entre Virgile et l'Écriture une sorte de complicité efficace."

The 'third way' created by these two poets has been caused by the twofold provocation which had been given to the Christian community of the Theodosian era, one coming from the outside and the other one from the inside. The first is the last endeavour of the pagans to regain their former supremacy which begins with the conflict about the altar of Victoria (384) till the decisive battle at the river Frigdus (394). The danger which came from the inside is the provocation of the new ideal of perfection which was found in monastic ascetism. Now for these two poets poetry had, according to the author, the function of a spiritual exercise (for the common people, as opposed to monastic ascetism); for Paulinus' poetry is strongly connected with the devote life of the converted.

The author then shows how Paulinus has always somehow remained connected with the poetry of his former teacher Ausonius who, also on account of his high position in the imperial administration, was the 'spiritual father' of the poets of his time and how, working in the spirit of this poet, Paulinus has never strived after the composition of long poems (except the thirteen *carmina natalicia* in honour of St. Felix of Nola). The well-chosen title of this chapter is: "Les poèmes de Paulin de Nola ou la conversion inachevée de la poésie ausionienne."

Prudentius' two volumes of hymnical poetry, the *Cathemerinon* and the *Peristephanon*, have the same subjects as the hymns of St. Ambrose which either belong to the prayers of the hours and days or are devoted to the celebration of various martyrs. According to the author, Prudentius in these poems has endeavoured to become 'the Christian Horace'; he finds a clear indication of this endeavour in the numerous allusions, especially in the *Peristephanon*, to biblical stories, which he considers to be comparable to the many allusions to Greek myths which we find in Horace's odes. Here we must disagree: in our view, Prudentius only makes rather brief allusions to stories from the Old and New Testament, whereas Horace in the steadily increasing number of his pindarizing odes narrates, like his great example, *complete* myths, which narration he concludes by a *sententia* which is a direct imitation of the Pindaric γνώμη. However, a genuine Pindaric feature may be found in Prudentius' habit (probably borrowed from the structure of Horace's pindarizing odes) to treat three subjects in each ode of the *Peristephanon*, viz., the death of the martyr, his triumph in heaven and his posthumous cult.

We can be fairly brief here about the three great didactic poems *Apotheosis*, *Hamartigenia*, and *Psychomachia*. Occasionally it is said that some of these poems are somewhat behind the times, especially the *Hamartigenia*, which is directed against the doctrine of Marcion who had been combated hundred and eighty years before by Tertullian. This assertion gives rise to a few remarks. In the first place, it is evident that Tertullian's greatest work, however famous in modern times, was by no means a success in his own age, since soon after its composition he had become a heretic, being first a Montanist and next the founder of the sect of Tertullianists which existed for almost two centuries (it was liquidated by St. Augustine). Further, it is clear that a *Carmen adversus Marcionitas* was composed at the earliest in the course of the fourth century.

The reproach of treating superannuated subjects was also directed against Prudentius on account of his poem *Contra Symmachum* in two books which for a great part repeat the arguments brought forth twenty years before (384) by St. Ambrose in the famous case of the altar of Victoria. Here the author rightly underlines the fact that Prudentius composed this poem in a particularly dangerous period of the history of Christianity, when the pagan reaction concentrated its power for a final attack (see above, p. 80). At all events, the fact that Prudentius himself regarded these three poems as entirely up to date is evident from the circumstance that the poem which has the first place almost in the entire manuscript tradition, *viz.*, the *Apotheosis*, has two prologues, the former being a hymn in twelve hexameters, whereas the second, which has the metre of Horace's first ten epodes (distichs consisting of a iambic trimeter and a iambic dimeter) and which is written in the same agressive spirit, gives an enumeration of the principles of a successful refutation of the pagans, which principles are, of course, considered to be valid for all three poems. The author here acutely observes that Prudentius' method of arguing is primarily based, as in Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, on visible evidence. It is in fact often too much forgotten that in a world in which the whole spiritual life was more and more dominated by a diluted form of Platonism, which continuously depreciated the body, the Christian doctrine brought back, in the first place by means of the dogmas of transsubstantiation and resurrection, a considerably higher estimation of the body. Still in the age of Prudentius the thought expressed in *Ave verum corpus* would be completely incomprehensible to leading personalities of pagan culture like Symmachus and Praetextatus.

The *Psychomachia* is a typical product of the Theodosian era: it reminds us at once of the style of Claudianus, the court-poet. The author rightly observes that it is this period in which the allegorical interpretation of the *Aeneid* began (Marobius, Fulgentius).

Whereas it is our opinion that the refutation of Marcion in the *Hamartigenia* was not an anachronism (it is also to be noticed that in this poem not one argument has been borrowed from Tertullian's great work), I must concede to the author that the *Contra Symmachum* is in fact best called a *retractatio*, since Prudentius has practically nothing to add to the very realistic and very complete argumentation given twenty years before by St. Ambrose. Moreover, the second book even more clearly follows the course of the argument in the *Relatio* of Symmachus,

combating the statements of this author in the same order. Here Prudentius glorifies Rome in the same way as Rutilius Namatianus. In fact the motto of this exceedingly long book may be found in the famous line of Rutilius: *Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam*; of course there is the difference that Rutilius just states this fact, whereas Prudentius considers this unity to have been created by the God of the Christians in order to make possible the Christianization of the world.

It is probable that during the reign of Theodosius two remarkable poetic attacks on paganism were composed, *viz.*, the so called *Carmen ultimum* and the *Carmen contra paganos*, also called *Carmen contra Nicomachum Flavianum*. Nicomachus was the soul of the pagan revolt of 392 which was defeated completely by Theodosius in 394 (cf. *supra*, p. 80). However, the author may well be right when he supposes that the pagan who is so heavily attacked here may rather be the famous Vettius Agorius Praetextatus who was initiated into a great number of pagan cults, for the poem mentions a considerable number of cults and mysteries.

We have already observed that one of the most striking virtues of this description of the development of Christian Latin poetry is the fact that the author continuously emphasizes its strong connection with contemporary history. Prudentius, living in the Theodosian era, can produce monumental poems in the grand style of the classical period. But the series of calamities, which befall the Roman empire after the death of Theodosius (406 the invasion of Gallia by the Vandales, Burgundiones and Suebi; 408 the execution of Stilicho; 410 the looting of Rome by the troops of Alaric; 418 the settling of the Visigoths in South-West Gallia) definitely destroy the illusion that the Roman empire can continue to exist. In this atmosphere the poets no longer turn to subjects of public interest but rather to individual subjects which the author calls "l'examen de conscience et la conversion".

Here we want to insert the remark that for the period after the poetic activity of Prudentius it is always advisable to read the excellent chapters on these poets in René Pichon's *Histoire de la littérature latine*. On account of his thorough knowledge of these poets Pichon could evoke the individual merits of each of them for the first time.

It is impossible and also unnecessary to mention here the poets described in this chapter. The only observation which we have to make here is that it is not quite sure that the *Carmen de providentia divina* was composed by Prosper Tiro Aquitanus, as the author asserts without further discussion.

Therewith we arrive at the last but one chapter of the book (15, pp. 245-64) with the title "De l'éclat à l'éclatement de l'épopée biblique aux Ve et VIe siècles." In this chapter five poets are discussed, *viz.*, Cyprianus Gallus, Sedulius, Dracontius, Avitus, and Arator.

The first mentioned poet is usually called Cyprianus Gallus according to a suggestion made by Lucian Müller (*Rhein. Mus.* 21 (1866) 123 and 266) which was adopted by R. Peiper in the introduction of his edition of this poet in the Vienna Corpus, vol. 23, p. XXLV. The arguments were, firstly, that many of the manuscripts of his poem were written in France and, secondly, that, as C. Becker was supposed to have demonstrated in his inaugural thesis *De metris in Heptateuchon* (Bonn 1889), the idiom of Cyprianus, to say it in Becker's own words, "*alienum prorsus ab Africanis ad vulgarem usum Gallorum accedere.*" This second argument has no value whatever, since the theory of Carl Sittl concerning the existence of 'provincial' forms of Latin, especially of African, Spanish and Gallic Latin, has been refuted more than once (cf. especially the treatment of 'African Latin' by Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, 588-98). As to the first argument, the fact that the majority of the older manuscripts was written in France was certainly caused in the first place by the fact that in the seventh till the tenth century the number of active *scriptoria* was the greatest in the centre and the south of France. Therefore, the author is certainly right when he writes: "Cyprianus, longtemps dit Gallus." It is worth while to note that Cyprianus' *Heptateuchos* was used with a rather great intensity by the author of the *Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum*, as is evident both from a considerable number of imitations and even more from a remarkable similarity in the (already partly rhythmical) use of the hexameter (cf. below p. 85). Cyprianus' poem—which hardly deserves this name—has the style of a chronicle told with considerable difficulties in the form of hexameters. For this reason, its dryness is fundamentally different from the both subtle and severe, typically Spanish style (cf. *supra*, p. 76) of the *Evangeliorum liber* of Iuvencus. The fact should not be overlooked that the two poets had quite different aims: Iuvencus wanted, by means of his poetic presentation of the New Testament, to *convert* the major part of his readers, whereas Cyprianus by his popularization of the (much longer) contents of the Old Testament—a popularization which originally must have been considerably more at length than what has remained, for a catalogue of the monastery of Lorsch of the tenth century mentions: *Metrum Cypriani super*

Heptateuchum et Regum et Hester et Machabaeorum, to which a manuscript from Cluny of the twelfth century adds the *Paralipomena*—probably only wanted to *give information* to Christian readers. (We are not inclined to give a positive answer to the following question of the author (p. 247): "Faudrait-il imaginer cet anonyme impénétrable comme un Juif d'Occident, soucieux de ne pas laisser aux chrétiens le monopole de l'expression épique? ou comme un chrétien judaïsant?"). In this context it is to be noted that in this period Christian art, especially the mosaics, begin to borrow more and more subjects from the Old Testament, especially such as in the interpretation by the Fathers of the Church and by the Church in general were regarded as *praefigurationes* of what was narrated in the New Testament.

We have few observations to make concerning the treatment of the last four epic poets of the Christian Latinitas of Antiquity, *viz.*, Sedulius, Dracontius, Avitus and Arator; we only want to say that our judgement of Avitus is considerably more favourable than that of the author—Avitus possesses an indubitable gift for colourful and graphic description—and that many verses of Dracontius, who was put in jail by the Vandal king Gunthamund of North Africa, were borrowed by the author of the *Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum ad Flavium Felicem*; this Flavius Felix lived during the reign of Gunthamund's successor Thrasamund (496-523). We want to add here a few observations concerning this poem which is found in six manuscripts of St. Cyprian with the first mentioned title *de resurrectione mortuorum*, and, further, in the edition of Christian poetry by Georgius Fabricius (Basel 1564) where it is published in a thoroughly adulterated form with the title *Tertulliani De iudicio domini*. In his bibliography the author does not mention our edition of this poem which appeared at Bonn in 1937 as *Supplementum* I of the series *Florilegium Patristicum* (this edition has remained practically unknown, since by far the greatest number of copies was burned during the bombardment of Bonn in the second world war (24 december 1943); we hope in about two years to be able to publish a second and revised edition). We also want to mention here the inaugural dissertation of the famous liturgist Leo Eizenhofer († 1981) with the title *Die Prosodie des Carmen ad Flavium Felicem de resurrectione mortuorum et de iudicio domini* (inaugural diss. Heidelberg, 1942), which has never been printed. Eizenhofer has given a thorough analysis of the half metrical, half rhythmical structure of the poem which, however, we have some difficulty to adhere to entirely, since the poet borrows verses

or parts of verses from Cyprianus (Gallus) with a striking frequency and, in our opinion, also imitates the metrical form of the poem of Cyprianus.

The poem on the resurrection is opened by a rather rambling introduction in which the poet, after mentioning that he has already written a poem on nature, and especially on the four seasons, exhorts his readers in a somewhat circumstantial way to drink the water of life (39: *et celeres vitae facilem haurite liquorem*), if they want *poenas aeternae evadere flammae*. After this he gives a description of the creation of the world and of the fall of Adam which brought death into the world (43-82). Next he gives a graphic description of the resurrection of the dead (83-192) which is interrupted by a series of proofs of the possibility of the resurrection (102-134). After that he first gives a description of paradise (193-268) which is entirely in accordance with the numerous descriptions of it found in Christian poetry, followed by a lurid picture of the damnation of the wicked (269-355). After a description of the repeated announcement of this misery by the prophets (356-379), the poem is finished by one more exhortation to the readers to better their way of living (380-406).

A third poem from Vandalic Africa has also penitence as its object, *viz.*, the poem *De satisfactione poenitentiae* by Verecundus, bishop of Iunca in the Byzacene (now a part of Tunis), who got into a situation similar to that of Dracontius. After the conquest of the Byzacene by the Byzantine army he was ordered in 551 to come to Constantinople on account of his resistance against the emperor Justinian during the 'controverse about three chapters' ('Der Dreikapitelstreit'). The author suggests, quite probably, that this "plainte pénitentielle" was written by Verecundus during his exile in Chalcedon, where he died in 552. The author quotes the edition by Kullendorf (Lund 1943), which has been reprinted in the fourth Supplement to the Patrologia Latina (1967, pp. 39 ss.); he does not know the more recent and more correct edition by R. Demeulenaere in: *Verecundi Iuncensis opera* (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, vol. XCIII, Turnholti 1976, pp. 205-14). Further, we may draw attention to the correction of the text of a number of passages by A. Hudson-Williams, Notes on Verecundus, *Vigiliae Christianae* 6 (1952) 47-52.

In p. 276, n. 591, the author informs us that "selon l'expression de l'auteur africain repris dans la rédaction longue (et médiévale) d'Isid. vir. ill. 7" Verecundus has also composed a poem (now lost) *De resur-*

rectione et iudicio. Here one wonders for a moment whether this poem can be identical with the Ps.-Cyprianean *Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum* which in the 'Tertullianean' tradition (*i.e.*, the edition by Georgius Fabricius) has the title *De iudicio Domini* (see above, p. 85); moreover, we have already made the supposition that (in the Lorsch manuscript?) the complete title of the poem was: *Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum et de iudicio Domini* (cf. our paper: Einige Bemerkungen über den Text des Carmen de resurrectione mortuorum et de iudicio domini, in: Jenseitsvorstellungen in Antike und Christentum. Gedenkschrift für Alfred Stuiber (*JbAC*, Ergänzungsband 9, Münster Westfalen 1982), 79-85). However, this supposition is made very improbable by the fact that, like the author of the *Carmen de resurrectione*, Verecundus, too, gives a detailed description of the Last Judgement (vss. 142-212) which is written in a different spirit (for instance, the poem by Verecundus is entirely egocentric near the end, since it forms part of a 'penitential' poem, whereas the author of the *Carmen de resurrectione* addresses his fellow-men, whom he exhorts to leave the path of sin).

It is at this point that we want to conclude our presentation of Professor Fontaine's stimulating book which will certainly contribute much to a better general understanding of Christian Latin poetry, as also of numerous details. The most important virtue of this book is undoubtedly—as we already have remarked at the beginning—the much stronger connection of the contents of these poems with the history of culture and general history. It is, for instance, thanks to this continuous referring to history that the great importance of St. Ambrose for the development of the culture of Western Europe becomes considerably more clear.

All those who are interested in the study of Christian Latin poetry will do wise, if, after, reading this book, they take up Professor Fontaine's *Études sur la poésie latine tardive,* which are presented in a review immediately following the present one. To this should be added the conference La naissance difficile d'une latinité médiévale (500-714): mutations, étapes et pistes (*Bull. de l'Assoc. Budé, Lettres d'Humanité* 40 (1980) 360-8).

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Études sur la poésie latine tardive d'Ausone à Prudence. Recueil de travaux de Jacques Fontaine. Société d'éditions Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1980.

In this book Professor Fontaine has collected eighteen papers on Christian poetry of the fourth and fifth centuries. He has arranged these in four chapters with an epilogue. We limit ourselves here to mentioning the titles of the chapters and the papers.

Première partie: L'esthétique tardive du mélange des genres: 1. Le mélange des genres dans la poésie de Prudence. — 2. Université et diversité du mélange des genres et des tons chez quelques écrivains latins de la fin du IVe siècle: Ausone, Ambroise, Ammien. — 3. Prose et poésie: l'interférence des genres et des styles dans la création littéraire d'Ambroise de Milan.

Deuxième partie: Les racines de la poésie latine chrétienne: 4. Le poète latin chrétien nouveau psalmiste. — 5. L'apport de la tradition poétique romaine à la formation de l'hymnodie latine chrétienne. — 6. Poésie et liturgie: sur la symbolique christique des luminaires, de Prudence à Isidore de Séville.

Troisième partie: Thèmes et valeurs, le profane et le sacré: 7. La conversion du christianisme à la culture antique: la lecture chrétienne de l'univers bucolique de Virgile. — 8. Valeurs antiques et valeurs chrétiennes dans la spiritualité des grands propriétaires terriens à la fin du IVe siècle occidental. — 9. Société et culture chrétiennes sur l'aire circumpyrénéenne au siècle de Théodose. — 10. Romanité et hispanité dans la littérature hispano-romaine des IVe et Ve siècles. — 11. Le culte des martyrs militaires et son expression poétique au IVe siècle: l'idéal évangélique de la non-violence dans le christianisme théodosien. — 12. Le distique du chrismon de Quiroga: sources littéraires et contexte spirituel. — 13. Les symbolismes de la cithare dans la poésie de Paulin de Nole.

Quatrième partie: Figures et images dans la poésie de Prudence: 14. La femme dans la poésie de Prudence. — 15. Démons et sibylles: la peinture des possédés dans la poésie de Prudence. — 16. Le pèlerinage de Prudence à Saint-Pierre et la spiritualité des eaux vives. — 17. Trois variations de Prudence sur le thème du paradis.

Épilogue: 18. Comprendre la poésie latine chrétienne: réflexions sur un livre récent.

On p. 519 the author mentions one more publication in this field: Monumentos y textos: por una triple lectura arqueológica de las obras paleocristianas (a paper read at the II Reunion de Arqueología paleocristiana hispánica (Montserrat, nov. 1978), to be printed (probably printed by now) in the Acts of this Congress).

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Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Teil II. Principat, Band 23. 1-2: Religion (Vorkonstantinisches Christentum: Verhältnis zu römischem Staat und heidnischer Religion). Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Haase. Berlin-New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1979-1980. 1558 S. DM 360 + 289.

Mit diesem 23. Band betritt das mit dem Namen 'Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt' bezeichnete Unternehmen den mit dieser Zeitschrift gemeinsamen Bereich des frühen Christentums, speziell in seiner Beziehung zur antiken Welt. Deshalb ist eine Besprechung hier angebracht. Es soll jedoch sofort hinzugefügt werden, dass eine Besprechung die allen in diesem Band gesammelten Beiträgen Recht tut in diesem beschränkten Raum nicht möglich ist. Ich werde mich zu einer kurzen Übersicht der hier behandelten Themen beschränken und dazu einige Bemerkungen in bezug auf drei oder vier Beiträge hinzufügen. Die Übersicht wird zum Teil dem Wortlaut des Vorwortes (S.V-VI) folgen.

Von den zwei Halbbänden befasst sich der erste vorwiegend mit dem Verhältnis des Christentums zum Staat und zur Gesellschaft Roms, der zweite mit dem zwischen christlicher und nicht christlicher Religion.

In dem Einführungsbeitrag bietet E. A. Judge eine knappe Motiv- und Literaturübersicht. Der Titel dieses Beitrags, ' 'Antike und Christentum': towards a Definition of the Field. A Bibliographical Survey' (S.3-58) ehrt den Mann, von dem dieses Studium seine Anregung erhalten hat, nämlich Franz Joseph Dölger. Diese weitgreifende Übersicht wurde in dem nach ihm genannten Institut geschrieben und fängt mit einer Beschreibung seiner Aktivität an.

Die übrigen Beiträge des ersten Halbbandes befassen sich mit dem Thema Kirche und römischer Staat, Kirche und römische Gesellschaft, teils grundsätzlich und umfassend, teils im Hinblick auf chronologische

oder systematische Abschnitte. Zu der ersten Gruppe gehört die grosse Abhandlung von K. Aland, 'Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in der Frühzeit', eine Monographie von 185 Seiten. Die Titel der Kapitel lauten: 1. Kirche und Staat bis Konstantin; 2. Die Kirche und der Kaiserkult im 4. Jahrhundert; 3. Die ersten christlichen Kaiser; 4. Kirche und Staat seit Konstantin; (obwohl das Titelblatt von 'Vorkonstantinisches Christentum' spricht, wird es hier klar, dass man sich nicht auf diese Periode beschränkt). Dann kehrt der Verf. zurück zum Neuen Testament und behandelt: 5. Kirche und Staat nach dem Neuen Testament; und 6. Der Übergang zur Neuorientierung nach dem Verlust der eschatologischen Voraussetzung; die Aussage der Kirche im 2. Jahrhundert. Im 4. Kapitel setzt er sich kritisch mit dem bekannten Buch von H. Berkhof, *Kirche und Kaiser*, auseinander.

Die zweite noch grössere Abhandlung in dieser Gruppe heisst 'Frühchristlicher Widerstand', geschrieben von W. Schäfke (S. 460-723). Die Form dieses eindrucksvollen Beitrags verdient besondere Erwähnung. Der überreiche Anmerkungsapparat mit ausführlichen wörtlichen Quellenzitaten und das der Abhandlung hinzugefügte Stellenregister machen diesen Beitrag zu einem Repertorium des ganzen Bandes.

Die Artikel der zweiten Gruppe seien hier kurz aufgeführt: P. Keresztes, 'The Imperial Roman Government and the Christian Church: I From Nero to the Severi' (S. 247-315), 'II From Gallienus to the Great Persecution' (S. 375-386). Ch. Saumagne, M. Merlin, 'De la légalité du Procès de Lyon de l'année 177' (S. 316-339). M. Sordi, 'I rapporti fra il Cristianesimo e l'impero dai Severi a Gallieno' (S. 340-374). C. Andresen, ' "Siegreiche Kirche" im Aufstieg des Christentums. Untersuchungen zu Eusebius von Caesarea und Dionysios von Alexandrien' (S. 387-459). J. Helgeland, 'Christians and the Roman Army from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine' (S. 724-834). L. J. Swift, 'War and the Christian Conscience. I. The Early Years' (S. 835-868).

Der zweite Halbband fängt an mit zwei grundsätzlichen Beiträgen über das Verhältnis zwischen christlicher und heidnischer Religiosität. In 'Christlicher Glaube und antike Religiosität' (S. 871-909) hebt P. Stockmeier besonders hervor, "dass die christliche Botschaft nicht einem Vakuum in religiosis gegenübertrat", so dass auch unter dem Aspekt der Religiosität von einer Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt gesprochen werden kann. — Die Auffassungen der Christen über die heidnischen Religionen werden von R. P. C. Hanson

in dem Aufsatz 'The Christian Attitude to Pagan Religions up to the Time of Constantine the Great' (S. 910-973) beschrieben. Anfangs wunderte ich mich, dass im ersten Abschnitt, handelnd über die Polemik, Tertullians *De idololatria* nicht erwähnt wurde. Bei näherer Betrachtung wurde es mir jedoch klar, dass es sich hier um eine irrtümliche Verweisung handelt. S. 911 sagt der Verf.: "A Christian was not allowed to pursue the trade of an idolmaker, nor even to sell incense", und verweist in Anmerkung 2 nach Tertullians *Scorpiace* 7.1,2 und 11.7. Hier soll man offensichtlich *De idololatria* lesen.

Dann handeln 4 Beiträge über wechselseitige Kritik von Heiden und Christen: C. A. Contreras, 'Christian Views of Paganism' (S. 974-1022). D. L. Jones, 'Christianity and the Roman Imperial Cult' (S. 1023-1054). S. Benko, 'Pagan Criticism and Christianity during the first two Centuries' (S. 1055-1118). A. Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians' (S. 1119-1149).

Anlässlich des Beitrags von Contreras möchte ich einiges bemerken: Bei der Behandlung der Apologien Justins (S. 980) vermisst man eine Erwähnung der Lehre vom Logos Spermatikos. (Siehe Waszinks bekannten Artikel in *Mullus*, Festschrift Klauser). Und wenn er aus *De idololatria* 1 die Schlussfolgerung zieht, dass "Tertullian seems to identify idols with demons", dann ist das meines Erachtens unrichtig. (Siehe meinen Beitrag '*Idolum* and *idololatria* in Tertullian', in *Vigiliae Christianae* 36 (1982) 108-114.)

Es folgt dann eine Reihe von Darstellungen und Untersuchungen, die einzelne religiöse Phänomene nach Unterschieden und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen dem frühen Christentum und seiner nichtchristlichen, heidnischen und jüdischen, Umwelt behandeln: E. Ferguson, 'Spiritual Sacrifice in Early Christianity and its Environment' (S. 1151-1189). A. Hamman, 'La prière chrétienne et la prière païenne, formes et différences' (S. 1190-1247). D. H. Wiens, 'Mystery Concepts in Primitive Christianity and in its Environment' (S. 1248-1284). J. Helgeland, 'Time and Space: Christian and Roman' (S. 1285-1305). G. Lease, 'Mithraism and Christianity. Borrowings and Transformations' (S. 1306-1332). A. F. Segal, 'Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and their Environment' (S. 1333-1394). J. S. Hanson, 'Dreams and Visions in the Graeco-Roman World and Early Christianity' (S. 1395-1427). K. Berger, 'Hellenistisch-heidnische Prodigien und die Vorzeichen in der jüdischen und christlichen Apokalyptik' (S. 1428-1469). A. B. Kolenkow, 'Relationship between Miracle and Prophecy in the Greco-

Roman World and Early Christianity' (S. 1470-1506). D. E. Aune, 'Magic and Early Christianity' (S. 1507-1557).

Die Titel dieser Beiträge sprechen für sich mit Ausnahme von Helgelands' 'Time and Space'. Dieser Beitrag handelt über die Entwicklung die man im christlichen Denken zwischen Neuem Testament und Mittelalter feststellen kann und die A. Harnack bekanttlich dem Übergang von hebräischem zum griechischem Denken zugeschrieben hat. Der Verf. entwickelt die These, dass hier vielleicht eine tiefere Erklärung gegeben werden kann, in der die Kategorien Zeit und Raum eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Im neutestamentlichen Christentum war 'Zeit' das Leitmotiv, aber "The ink of the New Testament scarcely dried before the shift from time to space had started" (S. 1292). Die Kategorie 'Raum' war, nach dem Verf., das Leitmotiv der römischen Religion. "So one can see in the church how the Roman structure of culture, based largely on spatial models, grew into the dominant mode of church life" (ibid.). Also war es nicht griechisches Denken, sondern römisches Erleben, das die Entwicklung verursacht hat. Dies ist eine interessante Hypothese, ich meine jedoch dass die Bedeutung der Kategorien Zeit und Raum hier überzogen wird.

Wie dem auch sei, mit diesem Doppelband hat ANRW ein Werk seiner Reihe hinzugefügt, dass das Fachgebiet 'Antike und Christentum' in hohem Masse bereichert. Jeder der sich mit dem frühen Christentum befasst wird mit vielem Erfolg dieses Werk konsultieren. Mit grosser Erwartung und Zuversicht sieht man nach der Fortsetzung dieses Werkes aus, namentlich im Bereich der Auseinandersetzung des christlichen Denkens und der griechisch-römischen Philosophie.

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Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel, 1/1 Hermann Josef Frede, *Kirchenschriftsteller. Verzeichnis und Sigel*, 3., neubearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage des «Verzeichnis der Sigel für Kirchenschriftsteller» von Bonifatius Fischer, 1 vol., 784 p., Verlag Herder Freiburg. Preis: DM 278.— (for subscribers DM 238.—). Ergänzungen pro manuscripto (Dezember 1981), p. (1)-(8).

La première publication de la *Vetus Latina* fut, en 1949, un Répertoire de sigles indiquant des manuscrits bibliques latins et des écrivains

«ecclésiastiques» latins. Il fut remplacé en 1963 par un Répertoire concernant les écrivains uniquement. Ce Répertoire fut imprimé sur des feuilles volantes, ce qui a permis de le tenir à jour régulièrement. Finalement, en 1981, le Professeur H. J. Frede a fait paraître une troisième édition de l'ouvrage, tout en modifiant le titre (le terme de «sigles» se trouve désormais dans le sous-titre) et en remplaçant le système des feuilles volantes par un livre relié (magnifiquement relié!). Je ne suis pas certain que cette dernière modification a été heureuse. Il a été nécessaire déjà d'ajouter, *pro manuscripto*, un cahier de compléments de huit pages. Le changement du titre est significatif. Il exprime un changement d'optique. Après avoir été d'abord une sorte de manuel pratique pour faciliter la consultation de la *Vetus Latina*, le livre est maintenant un Répertoire actualisé de toute la littérature patristique latine (et même non-latine, dans le cas de traductions). Les correspondances avec la *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* sont soigneusement notées par des chiffres (en romain) et les correspondances avec la *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, quand il s'agit de traductions, par des chiffres en italiques. Les p. 581-786 dressent le «catalogue» de toutes ces précieuses indications. Le livre ouvre par l'Introduction (légèrement modifiée) à la *Vetus Latina* que Dom B. Fischer avait rédigée en 1963.

Restant dans le domaine de mes propres spécialités, je me demande d'abord si l'indication de certaines dates (p.e. Augustin, *De sancta virginitate*; 401) ne risque pas de bloquer de souhaitables recherches. Le *De sancta virginitate* est le vingt-troisième (!) œuvre qu'Augustin a mise en chantier après sa consécration épiscopale (en 395?, 396?), si bien que la date de 401 est bien loin d'être certaine. Et ce n'est qu'un exemple.

Puis, à la p. 312, je lis sous *Eugippius*: «reg: Regula; um 530; Exzerpte aus [AU] reg II und III, CAn co, in, HI ep 125, 9, Pach, NOs, REG Ser, RUF reg und der ursprünglichen (verlorenen) Fassung von REG Mag». Je ne dis rien à propos des extraits de deux œuvres de Cassien, de la Lettre de Jérôme, de la Règle de Pacôme, de Novatus, de la Règle de Serapion etc., de la Règle de saint Basile, traduite par Rufin, de la Règle du Maître. Mais, dans la «Règle d'Eugippius», l'*Ordo Monasterii* (reg II) et le *Praeceptum* (reg III) sont cités, l'un après l'autre, de façon intégrale, avec, contrairement aux autres pièces citées, une «souscription»: *Explicit Regula sancti Agustini episcopi*, ce qui fait que la «Règle d'Eugippius» est un «centon» à dominante augustinienne. C'est là un fait important qui n'apparaît pas dans le résumé donné par le Répertoire. D'autre part, à propos de reg III, l'auteur de ce

compte rendu n'aurait pas mis [AU], mais AU; cependant ici, pour parler avec Augustin d'Hippone lui-même, *non ago pugnaciter.*

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Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel, nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Erzabtei Beuron, vol. 11/1 *Sapientia Salomonis*, hsgg. von Walter Thiele, fasc. 1-5, Freiburg, 1977-1981, 400 p. Preis DM 52.50. pro Lieferung (for subscribers DM 45,—).

L'édition de la *Sapientia Salomonis* dans la *Vetus Latina*, commencée en 1977, en est maintenant à son cinquième fascicule. Nous disposons ainsi de la longue et fort intéressante Introduction de W.Th. (fasc. 1-3, p. 1-238) et de l'édition du *Livre de la Sagesse* de 1,1 à 8,8 (fasc. 4 et 5).

L'aperçu «*Lateinische Textformen*», donné à la p. 238, résume très clairement les lignes essentielles de l'Introduction. Les textes latins de *Sap* constituent exclusivement (sauf interventions personnelles) des formes variées d'un seul type ancien de texte. Il est connu d'abord dans un état africain (K) qui est attesté au IIIe siècle, notamment chez Cyprien et dans des «cyprianiques». Le texte qui se trouve dans la Vulgate (V) est également ancien et un «développement» de K. Mais aussi bien en Afrique qu'en Europe on rencontre un troisième type de texte (D) qui est également apparenté au vieux texte et qui a gardé, surtout dans la seconde moitié de *Sap*, des libellés que la Vulgate avait fait disparaître. Un des principaux témoins de D est Augustin d'Hippone, qui a connu également un quatrième type, T. Il reste qu'il y a des leçons de *Sap* qui se trouvent exclusivement chez Augustin ou dans des textes qui dépendent d'Augustin. Elles sont indiquées dans l'apparat par le sigle A.

L'auteur de l'Introduction formule ainsi ses conclusions générales concernant Augustin, auteur qui dans le domaine de *Sap* est un témoin très important: il utilise le texte latin qu'il trouve dans ses livres et en adopte éventuellement les fautes; mais il arrive qu'il corrige le texte et, dans ce cas, il le fait d'une façon ponctuelle et non pas systématiquement; il va même jusqu'à regarder de près le texte grec et à forger ensuite des formes personnelles qu'on ne trouve nulle part ailleurs; son retour d'Italie en Afrique a comporté un changement dans les types de

ses citations, changement auquel il convient d'être très attentif; on a l'impression qu'en Afrique progressivement des niveaux plus récents de la tradition verbale de *Sap* ont exercé leur influence (ce qui est certain pour le type T).

Étant donné que l'auteur de ce compte rendu est également le dernier éditeur des *Confessions*, il a comparé son apparat de références bibliques avec les informations données par la *Vetus Latina*. Le résultat a été surprenant.

En *Sap* 1, 6 le texte latin dit: *testis est deus*; dans l'apparat il n'y a aucun renvoi à *Confessions* VI, 9 (15): *testis eras tu solus*. En *Sap* 4, 18 nous lisons: *illos dominus inridebit*; il n'y a aucun renvoi, ni à I, 6 (7) et (9): *inrides me*, ni à VI, 6 (9): *tu inridebas*. En *Sap* 7, 27 le texte latin porte: *sapientia ... (per)manens in se (ipsa) omnia innouat* (*-uans*); il n'y a pas de renvoi à IV, 5 (10): *tu in te manes*. Je suppose que c'est la substitution par Augustin de la 2e personne du singulier à la 3e du texte biblique qui est la raison de ces omissions. D'autre part à propos de *Sap* 5, 7 *ambulauimus uias difficiles*, nous trouvons dans la *Vetus Latina* les renvois que voici: IV, 12 (18): *ambulare uias difficiles* et V, 2 (2): *post uias suas difficiles*, allusions nettes, mais fort libres. A propos de *Sap* 7, 27 *sapientia ... (per)manens in se (ipsa) omnia innouat* (*-uans*), nous trouvons dans la *Vetus Latina* — où il n'y avait pas de référence à *Confessions* IV, 5 (10) — les renvois suivants: I, 4 (6): *innouans omnia*; VII, 9 (14): *manentis in se sapientiae*; VII, 11 (17): *in se manens innouat omnia*; IX, 10 (24): ... *uerbo tuo ... in se permanenti sine uetustate atque innouanti omnia*, allusion nette, mais fort libre. Ce n'est donc pas le caractère librement allusif des «citations» qui a motivé W. Th. à passer sous silence la première série de références. Comme je l'ai dit, je suppose que c'est l'emploi de la 2e personne, au lieu de la 3e qui se trouve dans la Bible. Autrement dit, dès qu'Augustin adapte le texte biblique à son propre débit priant, les références cessent. Je ne puis pas trouver que ce système est très satisfaisant. C'est se condamner à méconnaître en partie le caractère profondement biblique de cette œuvre unique et *sui generis* que sont les *Confessions*, et à priver la *Vetus Latina* de nombreuses références augustiniennes, intéressantes précisément parce qu'elles ont été assumées dans la prière personnelle d'un grand Chrétien.

Toujours à propos de *Sap* 7, 27, déjà cité deux fois, je lis dans l'Introduction (p. 205) qu'Augustin écrit généralement *in se ipsa manens*, parfois *in se manens*, parfois *manens in se*, mais qu'il n'a jamais le vieux

libellé *permanens in se*. Or nous venons de constater que dans *Confessions* IX, 10 (24) Augustin dit — le cas est en effet unique —: ... *uerbo tuo ... in se permanenti* ... L'endroit où ces paroles se trouvent est extrêment intéressant. Augustin y est en train d'évoquer l'entretien qu'il a eu avec sa mère Monique, quelques jours avant la mort de cette dernière. Autrement dit, il s'agit de la fameuse «vision d'Ostie». Si *permanenti* porte la marque du vieux texte de la *Sagesse*, l'évocation de la «vision d'Ostie» en IX, 10 (24) pourrait bien avoir un aspect concrètement historique beaucoup plus fort qu'on pourrait le croire: Augustin ou Monique, employant ce terme, aurait parlé «à la façon d'Italie» ... Même si W.Th. ne l'a pas vu, c'est grâce à ses labeurs que nous arrivons à nous rendre compte de cette particularité bien intéressante.

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Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Erzabtei Beuron, vol. 25, *Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses, Timotheum, Titum, Philemonem, Hebraeos*, hsgg. von Hermann Josef Frede, fasc. 6-9, Freiburg, 1978-1981, 320 p. Preis DM 52.50 pro Lieferung (for subscribers DM 45.—).

Nous avons déjà eu l'occasion de consacrer un compte rendu aux cinq premiers fascicules de ce volume de la *Vetus Latina* (voir *VigChr* 33, 1979, 182-184).

Tous ceux qui ont un compte rendu à rédiger sur des fascicules de cette publication diront et rediront que la *Vetus Latina* est une œuvre extrêmement importante, faite avec compétence, publiée avec une régularité impressionnante et imprimée avec un savoir-faire consommé. Mais ils se demanderont ensuite ce qu'ils en peuvent dire encore. C'est dans cette aporie qu'il faut situer les observations qui vont suivre.

Préparant la dernière édition critique des *Confessions* de saint Augustin, l'auteur de ces lignes s'est bien rendu compte du cas redoutable que constitue cette œuvre pour ses éditeurs comme pour les rédacteurs de la *Vetus Latina*, qui dépendent d'eux. Nombreuses sont les pages des *Confessions* qui sont de véritables tissus de textes scripturaires. Mais les citations bibliques explicites y sont plutôt rares. On y trouve quantité de citations implicites et parfois celles-ci sont quand même très littérales. Il s'agit alors de phrases bibliques qui se laissaient sans difficulté insérer telles quelles dans la prière personnelle de saint Augustin, par exemple

IX, 3 (6): *tibi dixit cor meum, quaesiui uultum tuum; uultum tuum, domine, requiram* (verset 8 du Psaume 26 dans la numérotation d'Augustin). C'est une citation, sans en être une: le sujet de *quaesiui* et de *requiram* n'est pas le Juif qui "résume" son peuple, mais Augustin lui-même. Et puis, il y a les innombrables passages, moins faciles à identifier, où saint Augustin a modifié le texte biblique afin de pouvoir l'assumer dans sa prière, par exemple I, 1 (1): *Magnus es, domine, et laudabilis ualde*, au lieu du *Magnus dominus et laudabilis ualde* du Psaume 47, 2 (et autres). Là, il n'y a, ni citation littérale, ni allusion libre, mais "assomption". D'autre part, de véritables allusions libres ne manquent pas dans les *Confessions*, mais il ne faudrait pas les confondre avec la catégorie précédente. Elles sont plus difficiles encore à reconnaître, surtout si leur libellé est celui de la *Vetus Latina*, et non pas celui de la Vulgate. Les éditeurs des *Confessions* ont besoin de la *Vetus Latina*, pour rédiger leur apparat scripturaire, les rédacteurs de la *Vetus Latina* dépendent de ces éditeurs. On se trouve là devant un cercle vicieux dont il n'est pas facile de sortir. Après ce long préambule, je comparerai la Première à Timothée et le début de la Deuxième (fasc. 6-9 de ce volume de la *Vetus Latina*) avec mes propres données.

— 1 Tim 2, 4: ... *omnes homines uult saluos fieri* ... Renvoi à faire à *Confessions* X, 43 (68): *Hic* (Christus Iesus) *demonstratus est antiquis sanctis, ut ita ipsi per fidem futurae passionis eius ... salui fierent.*

— 1 Tim 2, 5: ... *unus mediator dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus* ... Renvoi à faire à XI, 2 (4): ... *Iesum Christum ... filium hominis, quem confirmasti tibi mediatorem tuum et nostrum* ..., et à XI, 29 (39): ... *domino meo, mediatore filio hominis inter te unum et nos multos* ...

— 1 Tim 4, 8: ... *uitae quae nunc est* ... (Vulgate); ... *uitae praesentis* ... Aug. Renvoi à faire à XIII, 24 (37): ... *secundum praesentem uitam*, passage particulièrement intéressant dans ce contexte.

— 1 Tim 5, 9: ... *quae fuit unius uiri uxor* ... Renvoi à faire à IX, 13 (37): *Sit ergo* (Monnica) *in pace cum uiro, ante quem nulli et post quem nulli nupta est* ...

— 1 Tim 5, 10: ... *in operibus bonis testimonium habens* ..., et 6, 18: ... *diuites fieri in operibus bonis* ... Renvoi à faire à VI, 2 (2): ... *eius* (sc. Monnicae) *religiosissimam conuersationem, qua in bonis operibus tam feruens spiritu frequentabat ecclesiam* ...

— 1 Tim 6, 11: *Tu autem o homo dei haec fuge* ... Renvoi à faire à V, 13 (23): *Suscepit me paterne ille homo dei* (Ambrosius) *et peregrinationem meam satis episcopaliter dilexit.*

— 2 Tim 1, 10: ... (Iesus Christus) *qui destruxit quidem mortem inluminauit autem uitam* ... Renvoi à faire à IV, 12 (19): *Et descendit huc ipsa uita nostra et tulit nostram mortem et occidit eam de abundantia uitae suae* ...

— 2 Tim 1, 13: *Formam habe sanorum uerborum quae a me audisti* ... Renvoi à faire à IX, 8 (17): ... *addens uerbum sanum* ...

Cette liste est peut-être impressionnante, mais il est probable qu'elle n'est pas exhaustive. D'autre part, dans la *Vetus Latina* des renvois ont été faits à plus de vingt passages des *Confessions* (dans le domaine de 1 et 2 Tim), même dans des cas où la «citation» n'excelle pas par son caractère littéral.

Somme toute, le cas des *Confessions* est redoutable, aussi bien pour les éditeurs de cette œuvre que pour les rédacteurs de la *Vetus Latina*, et si je me suis permis d'en parler si longuement dans ce compte rendu, c'est surtout pour ajouter quelque chose de personnel aux louanges formulées dès le début.

F-75015 *Paris*, 159, rue de Javel L. M. J. VERHEIJEN

Maurice Sachot, *L'homélie pseudo-chrysostomienne sur la Transfiguration CPG 4724, BHG 1975*. Contextes liturgiques, restitution à Léonce, prêtre de Constantinople. Édition critique et commentée, traduction et études connexes. Publications Universitaires Européennes, Série XXIII, Théologie, Vol. 151. Frankfurt am Main — Bern, 1981, 554 p.

Ce livre contient un exposé exhaustif sur une homélie pseudo-chrysostomienne pour la Transfiguration, connue par 7 mss. (*BHG* 1975). S. débute par une bonne analyse du contexte liturgique de l'homélie et démontre qu'elle ne fut pas composée pour la célébration de la fête de la Transfiguration, une fête dont l'auteur suppose qu'elle a été introduite à Constantinople par André de Crète lors de son séjour dans la Capitale (685-692). Vu la pauvreté des données c'est une hypothèse attrayante, mais rien de plus. Une tradition tronquée (*BHG*^{a} 1986, 1987), qui ne transmet que la fin de l'homélie à partir de §8 a vu le jour à Constantinople comme conséquence de la réforme du calendrier byzantin, à laquelle elle doit également sa diffusion remarquable ($\pm$ 60 mss.). Une autre tradition tronquée (*BHG* 1996 p), connue actuellement par 3

mss. (S. omet le codex Athous Philotheou 98, ff. 70^{v}-74), transmet l'homélie à partir de §7, 53; elle a été façonnée dans les mêmes circonstances, mais à une date postérieure et dans un centre qui peut-être n'avait pas une grande influence en matière liturgique.

Sur la base de critères internes S. conclut dans le chap. II qu'il faut attribuer cette homélie à Léonce, prêtre de Constantinople. L'essentiel de ce chapitre est une reprise d'un article déjà paru dans *RScR* 51, 1977, 234-245: «Les homélies de Léonce, prêtre de Constantinople!» Se basant sur 11 homélies, attribuées dans les mss. à Léonce, dont 4 ont été publiées, S. a repéré un ensemble de traits qui caractérisent ce prédicateur. Cependant, sans parler d'autres critères, le problème demeure de déterminer dans quelle mésure des tournures semblables se trouvent chez d'autres auteurs. S. passe cette question sous silence, ce qui nuit à la valeur de chap. II. En revanche, il veut démontrer dans l'Appendice III que 14 homélies pseudépigraphiques doivent être restituées à Léonce précisément à cause de ces critères stylistiques. A la question pourquoi ces homélies ne paraissent pas sous le nom de Léonce, S. répond que nous avons affaire à un faussaire qui avait besoin du patronat d'autres auteurs pour la diffusion de son œuvre dans les homéliaires. Nous pensons qu'on a là une hypothèse peu plausible, puisque nous constatons que Léonce a publié au moins 11 homélies sous son propre nom. Pourquoi choisir alors le patronat d'un personage inconnu comme Timothée, prêtre de Jerusalem, ou d'Antioche?

Dans le chap. III nous trouvons une description détaillée des mss. collationnés (± 70) et leurs relations mutuelles. Pourtant cette partie contient beaucoup de fautes, fruit de mélecture des mss. Ceci aboutit à donner des renseignements fautifs et des variantes dans le texte qui se ne trouvent pas dans les mss. (p.e. 4, 11 προαλήτως Sachot: προβλήτως P, ἀβουλήτως MBCV; 5, 15 παραττομένους Sachot: ταραττομένους MBC, om. P; 5, 39 καταχαλύπτεται Sachot: καλύπτεται mss.). Dans notre édition des homélies de Léonce nous compléterons ce liste. S. a pourvu l'*editio princeps* d'une traduction de bonne qualité et d'un commentaire étendu, dans lequel la relation de cette homélie avec les autres de Léonce devient très claire.

L'exposé de S. se conclut par trois Appendices, dont nous avons déjà mentionné le troisième. Dans l'Appendice I S. situe 15 homélies anciennes sur la Transfiguration, dans l'Appendice II il identifie Pantoléon l'auteur de *BHG*^{a} 430, avec le prêtre et archimandrite Pantoléon qui a souscrit en 518 à une pétition contre Sévère. En même temps S. consi-

dère que ce Pantoléon est l'auteur de *BHG* 1978, une homélie sur la Transfiguration. L'ouvrage se termine avec 4 indices (index du vocabulaire, index des citations bibliques, index des manuscrits, index des auteurs, ouvrages et noms anciens).

Des faiblesses dans l'*editio princeps* de *BHG* 1975 mises à part, l'ouvrage de S. est un apport bienvenu pour mieux comprendre le contexte de cette homélie de Léonce.

Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit C. DATEMA

J. Janssens, *Vita e morte del Cristiano negli epitaffi di Roma anteriore al sec. VII* (Analecta Gregoriana vol. 223). Rome, 1981. XXIV, 339 pp.

'Die beste Auskunft über die Vorstellungen der durchschnittlichen christlichen Gemeinde können uns die Grabinschriften geben, die aus allen Schichten der Gläubigen stammen ...': these words of the late A. Stuiber (*Refrigerium interim*, Bonn 1957, 105) concern the special subject of his study, viz. *Der Zwischenzustand*, but they could be used just as well about many other aspects of Christian life, ethics, ideas etc. The wealth of information potentially present in even a small corpus of Christian inscriptions has been demonstrated in the by now famous SICV, edited by H. Zilliacus and his collaborators (Helsinki 1963). Janssens, however, is not concerned with such subjects as onomastics, biometrics, social positions, but with the 'spiritualità della Chiesa Antica' and his book belongs to the sphere of studies which is represented so impressively by G. Sanders and his pupil D. Pikhaus in (the relevant parts of) their respective books on the views emerging from the contents of the metrical inscriptions.

In order to understand the full range and purport of this study one has to take notice of three restrictions. J. has not taken into account 'la parte iconografica ed ornamentale degli epitaffi', he has refrained from a comparison with the writings of the Fathers and there is very little information about the chronological aspects and the development of ideas. It is true that on p. 96 in the conclusive paragraph of the chapter devoted to the subject 'morire da fedele' J. has this formula: 'In questo processo, assai lento e talvolta anche zoppicante, si arriva ad una formulazione ...', but on the preceding pages the reader has received hardly

any information about an evolutionary process of ideas. I have mentioned these restrictions not because of grave disappointment or the wish to make complaints—it would have been a more than Herculean task to pay full attention to all these aspects and their connections—, but rather in order to indicate where the real value of this book can be found, viz. in the store of informatory material. J. quotes an enormous amount of inscriptions, his chronological and geographical limits being the pontificate of Gregory the Great and the urban and suburban zone of Rome up to 3 miles from the Servian wall.

The collection of quoted texts is divided into three parts devoted to 'Il fedele davanti a se stesso' (17-99), 'Il fedele in relazione con gli altri' (101-129) and 'Il fedele in relazione con i santi in Dio' (231-329). Of course there are many overlaps, because the wording of many epitaphs often touches more than one of the subjects distinguished by J. There is, however, one thing which has puzzled me considerably: obviously J. has deemed it practical to present his material in a survey in which relationships are the decisive factors for the partition in chapters and paragraphs. Now in view of J.'s main subject ('spiritualità') it seems somewhat surprising that no paragraph is explicitly devoted to the relationship of the faithful with God and Christ. J. indeed quotes such expressions as *accepta apud deum*, *dormit in deo* (or *in pace domini*), which concern the deceased, and he may be right in stating: 'Il fedele riconosce in tutte queste fasi (viz. of life and death) la presenza di Dio' (331), but in any case specimens of a personal relation to God are scarce. Either J. despite the vast range of his reading and collecting of material has unexpectedly neglected this subject or indeed very little can be found. But in that case it would have been feasible to account for such a remarkable fact.

In the details of his translations etc. J. is quite reliable. I noticed few questionable points like the following: on p. 41 the second part of *Fructosa bene uixsisti/uene consumasti* (ICVR III 8918) is translated with '... bene hai consumato'. But rightly the *Thesaurus* notes about similar cases, e.g. CE 211, *omittitur vita* (TLL IV s.v. *consummare*, col. 602.10 sqq.) and the quoted words mean: 'bene hai terminato (portato a termine) la tua vita'; on p. 82 about *perire* it is said: 'il suo significato etimologico di trasferimento ...', but surely in such cases *per-* indicates 'une déviation' (Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. Etymol.* s.v. *per-*) or 'upset' (OLD s.v. *per-* 2); on p. 177 the qualification *seruus* is stated to have been used 'raramente', but on p. 196 'in nessuna delle iscrizioni ...'.

As already stated, J. has presented a very useful collection of texts and scholars interested in the ideas of average Christians in the period which has been chosen, will do well to consult it. Unfortunately, however, there are no indices at all (sic!), so that in looking for a special theme one can only consult the table of contents, which although quite detailed cannot compensate a regrettable lack in this clear and well-produced book.

Leiderdorp, van Effendreef 15 J. DEN BOEFT

Paul Keresztes, *Constantine A Great Christian Monarch and Apostle*. Amsterdam, J. C. Gieben, 1981. 218 p.

This is one book which can be judged by its cover. The *parti pris* of the title is carried over into the whole work, it being the aim of K. to rehabilitate what he considers Constantine's maligned reputation by studying the emperor's relationship to Christianity on the basis of "documents and reports and with a view to some modern expressions of opinion". Arguments in support of the sincerity of Constantine's Christian beliefs are adduced often at the cost of the good name of other scholars, and on the evidence of extensive passages from ancient writers, offered to the reader in a poor translation.

K. is in favour of turning the clock back to pre-rationalist times, such that the historicity of the reports of Eusebius and Lactantius on the visions of Constantine will be admitted. In the same spirit, K. wishes to return to the days before Otto Seeck, when one could speak with impunity of Constantine as the author of an edict of Milan. In chapters devoted to the Donatist schism ("The Donatist Schism and Constantine: His Zeal for the House of the Lord") and to the Arian controversy ("Arianism and Constantine: Wolves within the Fold in Sheep's Clothing"), K. attempts to demonstrate Constantine's "unbridled munificence and exclusive support of the Holy and Catholic Church". The picture painted is black and white. Arianism, for example, is portrayed as a "disease" (117), and the heresiarch himself as a man "badly in need of admiring crowds" (118). The argument for Constantine's being a "Christian Monarch and True Apostle"—the title of the final chapter—seems to falter somewhat over the question of the emperor's delayed baptism. "All this, of course, did not mean that Constantine

was a perfect Christian, but rather, on the contrary, that he was really a very weak Christan, finding it—like most Christians—difficult to live up to the standards of Christianity" (170). The book ends with the hope that there will arise some new Athanasii, and a new Constantine to reign in orthodoxy and firmness over a new and Holy Roman Empire (186).

The idea of including extensive passages in translation from the relevant works of ancient authors is, on the surface, a good one. K.'s translations, however, are unserviceable at many points because of bad punctuation, sentences which are too long (e.g. pp. 65, 76, 78), words presumably omitted through inadequate proofreading (p. 15, 8-11; p. 106, 11; p. 135, 11), and above all, an adherence to the original which results either in bad English or in nonsense. This is illustrated by the following examples.

p. 74: In this he also lies, my Lord, *for to Mauritania one can get only through the Numidias*. (my italics)

nam ad Mauritaniae situm non nisi per Numidias pergitur

p. 76: Honestly, what fortune did these thoughts, being such as I have mentioned, should have received?

equidem haec, ut dixi, quam fortunam debuerunt sortiri

p. 86: And on arrival to the house of Felix, the worker in marble, this brought forth five books.

et cum uentum fuisset ad domum Felicis sarsoris, protulit codices quinque.

p. 107: I am well aware that *those who sincerely pursue the heavenly hope and firmly place it to God's heaven* as their heart's desire have no need of the favour of men. (my italics)

οἱ τὴν οὐράνιον ὀρθῶς καταδιώξαντες ἐλπίδα καὶ ταύτην ἐξαίρετόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπὶ τῶν θείων

Occasional misprints, from which no book is exempt, are not worth mention in a review, but when the number and nature of the errors are such that they irritate and distract the reader, this should be pointed out. A few examples are: p. 17 was for war, p. 28 Haat for Hatt, p. 69 ist for is, p. 74 tel, p. 75 bussiness, p. 82 understadibly (sic), p. 90 a artisan, p. 108 wo for we, p. 133 dicision, p. 135 herectics, p. 136 actrocious, p. 144 Nicaeac.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

The inclusion of a book in this list, which contains all books received by the editors, does not guarantee its subsequent review.

Manuel Guerra Gomez, Teologia del sacerdocio. Los nombres del Papa. Estudo filológico-teológico de varios nombres del Papa en los primeros siglos del cristianismo. (Facultad de teologia nel Norte de España — sede de Burgos — Instituto "Juan de Avila"). Ediciones Aldecoa, S.A., 1982. 522 p.

Basile de Césarée, Contre Eunome, suivi de Eunome, Apologie. Introduction, traduction et notes de Bernard Sesboüé, s.j., avec la collaboration pour le texte et l'introduction critiques de Georges-Matthieu de Durand, o.p. et Louis Doutreleau, s.j. Tome I: Contre Eunome I (Sources Chrétiennes, 299). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 274 p. 167 F.

Scripta Ariana latina I: Collectio Veronensis. Scholia in Concilium Aquileiense. Fragmenta in Lucam rescripta. Fragmenta theologica rescripta. Cura et studio R. Gryson (Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina, 87). Turnholti, Brepols, 1982. XXX, 286 p.

Jean Chrysostome, Panégyriques de Saint Paul. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes par Auguste Piédagnel, de l'Oratoire. (Sources Chrétiennes, 300). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 376 p. 289 F.

Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum. Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der Antiken Welt. Herausgegeben von Theodor Klauser, Carsten Kolpe, Ernst Dassmann, Albrecht Dihle, Bernard Kötting, Wolfgang Speyer, Jan Hendrik Waszink. Lieferungen 89, 90, 91. Von Gottesschau (Visio beatifica) bis Grabinschrift I. Stuttgart, Anton Hiersemann, 1981-82.

Théodoret de Cyr, Commentaire sur Isaïe II (sections 4-13). Texte critique, traduction et notes par Jean-Noël Guinot (Sources Chrétiennes, 295). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 480 p. 251 F.

Égérie, Journal de voyage (Itinéraire). Introduction, texte critique, traduction, index et cartes par Pierre Maraval. Valérius du Bierzo, Lettre sur la B^{se} Égérie. Introduction, texte et traduction par Manuel C. Díaz y Díaz (Sources Chrétiennes, 296). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 384 p. 297 F.

Giuseppe Sgherri, Chiesa e Sinagoga nelle opere di Origene (Studia Patristica Mediolanensia, 13). Vita e Pensiero. Pubblicazioni della Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, 1982. 500 p. L. 65.000 (63.725).

Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel, 25. Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses, Timotheum, Titum, Philemonem, Hebraeos, herausgegeben von Hermann Josef Frede 11. Lieferung: 2 Tm 4, 5 bis Schluss. Freiburg, Herder, 1982.

Silvano Zucal, La teologia della morte in Karl Rahner. Publicazioni dell' Isitituto di Scienze Religiose in Trento, 3. L. 14.000.

Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones et Dubia, ed. José H. Declerck (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, 10). Turnhout, Brepols/Leuven, University Press, 1982. CCLIV, 256 p. 495.00 b.Fr.

Jean-Marie Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, Tome II: Le fragment du Discours Parfait et les Définitions hermétiques arméniennes (NH VI, 8.8a). Bibliothèque copte de Nag Hammadi. Section «Textes», 7. Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1982. L, 566 p. 2.500 b.Fr.

André-Jeans Festugière, O.P., Actes du Concile de Chalcédoine. Sessions III-VI (La Définition de la Foi). Traduction française. Préface par Henry Chadwick (Cahiers

Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983) 105-109, E. J. Brill, Leiden

HOMER, HESIOD, AND HERACLES IN PSEUDO-JUSTIN

BY

ROBERT M. GRANT

Without trying to redo the works of G. Glockmann (*Homer in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Justinus*)[1] or N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst (*Les citations des poètes chez les apologistes chrétiens du IIe siècle*),[2] we ought to consider what seem to be the two oldest echoes of Homer and Hesiod, then pass at once to the mysterious *Ad Graecos* sometimes ascribed to Justin.

In our opinion, Homer is first echoed in 1 Clement 20. 8. Following the suggestion of Werner Jaeger that there are echoes of other poetry in 1 Clement 20,[3] we venture to propose that Homer lurks in the words about the Ocean. "The Ocean, not crossable by men, and the worlds beyond it, are directed by the same commands of the Master". It is Homer (*Od.* xi. 158) who speaks of "Ocean, which is not possible for one to cross." To be sure, he adds line 159: "on foot, unless one has a well built ship". The banality of this may have contributed to Aristarchus' decision to delete lines 157-159 in toto. Knopf claimed that the text means "endless" but the examples and exegesis he gives show it means "für die Menschen ohne Ende". We see at least a verbal parallel.

Second, the influence of Hesiod seems present in the Wisdom of Solomon 14. 6, where we hear of "haughty giants" who were perishing at the time of the deluge. The adjective comes from the *Theogony* (149), where the giants, Cottus, Briareus, and Gyes, are described as the "haughty offspring" of Earth and Heaven. Barely noticeable, but at least suggesting, as we should expect, that in early Hellenistic Judaism and Christianity, Greek influence was not confined to philosophy.

The third-century address *Ad Graecos*, ascribed to Justin in the one Greek manuscript (burned in 1870) and to Ambrose in a Syriac version first published by Cureton in his *Spicilegium Syriacum*, contains significant surprises in regard to Homer and Hesiod. The work begins with an attack on Greek poetry as full of madness and incontinence. A pupil in school who comes to the chief poet of the Greeks is described as the most wretched of men. Why is this?

Homer (not thus far named, but plainly in view) tells how Agamemnon helped his incontinent brother (Menelaus) and gladly sacrificed his daughter (Iphigenia) and stirred up trouble in Greece in order to rescue Helen who had been abducted by a "leprous shepherd". This is all very learned and at the end of the first chapter will be presented as coming from the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. Such is not actually the case. There were other poems of the "epic cycle" sometimes ascribed to Homer, but usually not by the more learned after Aristotle's time. The cyclic epic *Cypria* actually did contain the story of Iphigenia.[4] The reference to Paris as a "leprous shepherd" is especially erudite. According to *Iliad* xxiv. 30, Paris suffered from *machlosynē*, lustfulness. (Various ancient critics refused to accept the line as genuine, but no matter.) Now it is Hesiod who tells us that the daughters of Proetus, king of Tiryns, also suffered from *machlosynē*—and were divinely punished with leprosy (fragments 132-33 Merkelbach-West). Something intermediate between Hesiod and Pseudo-Justin has transferred the leprosy to Paris.[5]

It is true that Agamemnon's "captivity" under Chryseis (or Briseis in the Syriac version) could come from the *Iliad* (i. 183-85), though it also occurs in the *Cypria*,[6] but the tales about Achilles come partly from the *Iliad* and partly from other sources. He held back a river (*pedēsas*, an emendation found in Otto's text though not underlying the Syriac) as in *Iliad* xxi. 328-82. He overturned Troy by overcoming Hector (cf. *Iliad* xxii. 433-36). In addition, he was the love-slave of Polyxena and had been vanquished by a dead Amazon. For Polyxena he took off his divinely fashioned armor, put on a wedding garment, and fell victim to love magic in the temple of Apollo. First the dead Amazon. She was named Penthesileia, killed by Achilles, but said to be an object of his love in the epic *Aethiopis*.[7] Second Polyxena. We know that she was mentioned in the epic *Cypria*,[8] though the details about Achilles' proposed wedding to her and his death in the temple of Apollo are now preserved only in late scholia.[9] The romance with Achilles seems to be a fairly late development.[10] Details about Odysseus come from the *Odyssey*, but the statement that Ajax wore a shield "with sevenfold bull's hide" may come from the *Iliad* (vii. 220). On the other hand, the notion that Ajax went mad after losing a struggle with Odysseus over the arms of Achilles must come from the epic *Little Iliad*.[11]

These details clearly show that for Pseudo-Justin, Homer wrote not only the mentioned *Iliad* and *Odyssey* but the (other) poems of the epic cycle as well, at least the *Cypria*, the *Aethiopis*, and the *Little Odyssey*.

In this regard he differed from second and third century scholars like Pausanias, Athenaeus, and Clement of Alexandria, who followed the line taken by Aristotle and assigned other authors than Homer to the rest of the epic cycle.[12] But his point about all is the same: one cannot believe the "myths of Homer" (in any of the epics) when one recalls that "the whole rhapsody, the beginning and end of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*" is Woman. Greek and Latin authors agreed in drawing this moral.[13]

From Homer the author turns to Hesiod, "who wrote his Works and Days after Homer", but is especially famous for his idiotic *Theogony*. Here Pseudo-Justin cannot quite get away from the *Iliad*. He follows Hesiod when he tells of Kronos and the early days of Zeus,[14] not when he comes to speak of how three sons of Kronos distributed, "as the story goes", their portions: Zeus, the aether, Poseidon, the deep, Pluto, the lot of Hades. This is an interpretation of *Iliad* xv. 187-93 as if it were from Hesiod. Gnostic sectarians were fond of this passage.[15] Pseudo-Justin does not discuss the threefold division but proceeds to list the sexual misdeeds of the three gods, and others, relying on a general knowledge of mythology that is not especially interesting or significant until we reach the account of the unnamed son of Zeus (Heracles) whose courage was celebrated in song.

Pseudo-Justin tells how Heracles was one "who slew the mighty lion and destroyed the many-necked hydra, who put to death the indomitable wild boar, who was able to clean out the man-eating winged birds and brought the three-headed dog up from Hades, who was able to clean out the ordure from the strong wall of Augeias, killing bulls and a stag whose nostrils breathed out fire, who took the golden fruit from the tree trunk, who killed the poisonous serpent and Achelous (why he killed him it is not lawful to say) and Busiris, who leaped across mountains to obtain water that gave forth an articulate voice, as the story goes". Then he contrasts these "labors of Heracles" with the pathetic stories about how "as a boy he was deafened with the cymbals of satyrs" and later "was beaten on the buttocks by a laughing Lydian, weakened by love," and finally "when he could not take off the tunic of Nessus, built a pyre and ended his life". Where did Pseudo-Justin get all this information?

One source that immediately comes to mind, because it came to Otto, is the anonymous epigram of the Greek Anthology (xvi. 92). "First, in Nemea he slew the mighty lion. Second, in Lerna he destroyed the many-necked hydra. Third, after this, he killed the Erymanthian boar ...."

After this, the items of the list begin to diverge and so does the language. What comes at the beginning, however, is virtually the same. In order to find further parallels, we have to turn to the Tabula Albani of the so-called Tabula Iliaca, where verses dealing with the deification of Heracles are inscribed.[16]

In the Tabula Albani, the twelve canonical labors begin as in the epigram: "First, in Nemea he slew the mighty lion. Second, he killed the Lernaean hydra. Third,..." and so on, but with a divergent order. The first twelve are concluded thus: "He completed these twelve, and then killed Busiris in Egypt". In Pseudo-Justin, then—at least as compared with the Tabula list—we have Heracles' *athla* combined with his parerga (cf. Hyginus 30-31). Details such as man-eating Stymphalian birds (Paus. viii. 22. 4) and fire-breathing bulls and stag (Quint. Smyrn. vi. 226, 236) come from mythographers, one would suppose.

The details about his weaknesses are just as erudite. Lucian tells us of pictures showing how Omphale beat Heracles with a golden sandal.[17] Themes of this kind recall the scene depicted on the Tabula Albani, with Heracles resting in the middle with two satyrs and a maenad on each side. This would also explain why he was thought to have been deafened by satyrs' cymbals.

Perhaps we should add just a word about the provenience of this little treatise. Further discussion of myths and drama lead up to the claim that the author has "hated your festivals"—an echo of Amos 5:21—and an appeal to "become as I am, for I was as you are" (almost, but not quite, the same as Gal. 4:12). A selective list of vices contains "especially lust, through which everything dreadful grows, enmities, quarrels, jealousy, disputes, outbursts of anger, and what is like these." The content clearly points to Galatians (5:16-21) again, where Paul begins with lust, then turns to ... enmities, quarrels (same word, *ereis*, in many manuscripts), jealousy, outbursts of anger, disputes, ... and what is like these." For this reason we reject Goodenough's thesis that Pseudo-Justin was Jewish because his language about Logos resembles Philo's,[18] and follow Harnack instead.[19] Pseudo-Justin is a Christian book, possibly a textbook.[20]

NOTES

[1] Texte und Untersuchungen 105 (1968).

[2] Louvain, 1972.

[3] Echo eines unerkannten Tragikerfragments in Clemens' Brief an die Korinther, *Rh Mus* 102 (1959) 330-40.

[4] For the cyclic fragments cf. T. W. Allen, *Homeri opera* V (Oxford, 1912; repr. 1974) 93-114; these items from *Cypria*, p. 102:16, 104:15.

[5] The emendation by M. Marcovich (*JTS* 24, 1973, 500) is therefore unnecessary.

[6] Cf. p. 105:15 Allen.

[7] Or more exactly in *Il.* xxi. 269, noted by A. Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du iie siècle de notre ère* (Paris 1912) 230 n. 1. *Aeth.* p. 105:22-27 Allen.

[8] *Cypr.* p. 125 frag. XXVI.

[9] Schol. Eur. *Tro.* 16; Schol. Lycophr. 269; cf. E. Wüst in *RE* XXI (1952) 1840-50.

[10] Hygin. *Fab.* 110.

[11] *Il.* parv. p. 106:20.

[12] See the citations, pp. 116-36 Allen.

[13] E.g., Herodotus in Plut. *Mor.* 856F; Athen. 560B; more vulgarly, Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 107-8; *Priap.* 68. 9-10.

[14] The Curetes whom he mentions occur in Hesiod, frag. 123 Merkelbach-West (from Strab. 471) as "gods and dancers." It may be that a fragment of the epic *Titanomachy* (Ath. 22C, p. 111, frag. V Allen) with Zeus dancing should be associated with this.

[15] Hippolytus, *Ref.* v. 8. 3; v. 20.

[16] A. Sadurska, *Les tables Iliaques* (Warsaw 1964) 88.

[17] *Dial. deor.* 13. 2; *Quomodo hist.* 10.

[18] *HTR* 18 (1925) 186-200.

[19] *ThLZ* 50 (1925) 441-43.

[20] The Syriac version seems to correct the Greek in regard to the content of Homer, deleting Iphigenia and substituting *Il.* ii. 177-78, also omitting the Labors of Heracles.

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ADAM AND ANTHROPOS

A STUDY OF THE INTERACTION OF SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE IN TWO ANTHROPOLOGICAL TREATISES OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.*

BY

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There are some who today assert that biblical ideas should provide a critique of contemporary presuppositions, that theologians should not pay respect to current scientific knowledge at the expense of distinctively Christian insights. My aim in this paper is to explore the extent to which the Bible actually did perform such a function in the theology of the patristic period, by examining the relationship between science and the Bible in two key anthropological texts of the late Fourth Century. These two texts differ to the extent that one purports to be an exegetical work, while the other is a philosophical or scientific treatise. (It should be remembered that science and philosophy were not then distinguishable disciplines, though one can, and should distinguish between serious philosophy of a professional kind, including medicine, and more popular semi-philosophical assumptions.) Simply because they belong to different genres, the similarities and differences between these two treatises should prove particularly illuminating.

Example 1: an exegetical treatise: De Opificio Hominis

Gregory Nyssen, the author of this work, took upon himself to further the work of his brother Basil in a number of directions, and this treatise is no exception. Basil had produced the famous nine *Homilies on the Hexaemeron*, but these, at least in their original form, had not covered the creation of man.[1] In his preface to the *De Opificio Hominis*,[2] Gregory states that Basil alone had adequately expounded God's creation, but he intends to add to his work, the consideration of man being lacking in his *Hexaemeron*; so Gregory wrote to make up the deficiency, probably soon after Basil's death.

After explaining his purpose, Gregory summarises his intentions. He has taken on a daunting task, for he proposes to examine everything that concerns man, and man is the greatest wonder of the world, the human creation alone having been made *like to God*. Here he anticipates the central theme of the treatise. His principal aim is to integrate the contrasting views of man suggested by the account of creation and his actual state at present, drawing from both scriptural instruction and from the conception of man discovered by the use of reason. In this way he hopes his treatment will be consistent and logical. Gregory aimed then to combine rational knowledge with biblical exegesis. His starting-point was the Genesis narrative of creation, but like Basil in his *Hexaemeron*, he drew upon contemporary science to fill out what scripture had to say. He aimed to produce something systematic. The question is, how successful was he in integrating his scientific knowledge with the Bible. We shall summarise his treatise, and then examine more closely the nature of the biblical and scientific contributions respectively.

A. *Outline of treatise*

Gregory first surveys creation in general (I.1-5: MPG 44.128-132), and it is immediately apparent that his cosmological understanding depends upon contemporary assumptions about such things as the laws of motion or the reactions of contrary elements. Yet the Genesis narrative is brought into relation with these, so that God is seen as the creator who providentially ordered everything, and adorned the created world with its appropriate beauty. All this was prepared for man, who was to be its ruler and to enjoy the rich estate provided by the Maker of all. So man was made capable of enjoying both the earthy and the divine (II.1-2: MPG 44.136B-D).

The unique nature and status of man within the created order is then clarified on the basis of Gen. 1.26: the autonomous soul can exercise sovereignty because it is the image of the Sovereign of all (IV.1: MPG 44.136B-D). God is Mind, Word, Love, all-seeing and all-hearing; in man these divine capacities are imitated (V.2: MPG 44.137).

Gregory then turns to the interesting differences between man and other created beings (VII-VIII: MPG 44.140D ff): man's uprightness, his lack of defence from cold and predators, his dexterous hands. These and other characteristics point to man's capacity to tame and co-operate

with creatures providentially adapted to serve him; in other words, to man's royal status and skill. Confirmation of Moses' order of creation, beginning with vegetation and ascending via the beasts to rational beings, is found in the fact that there are three orders of soul corresponding to each level: the nutritive, the sensitive and the intellectual. The highest order of bodily life is found in man who combines all these forms of soul (VIII.4: MPG 145A). The mind, itself intelligible and incorporeal, needs a physical medium of communication; man's body is to his mind as a musical instrument to a skilled musician (IX: MPG 44.149B-152A). Mind is not to be identified with the senses, though it depends upon them for information; indeed mind is incomprehensible, and being in the image of God, points to God's incomprehensibility (XI: MPG 44.153C-156B). It cannot be identified with any particular organ in the body, but pervades the whole. It is affected by physical disorders—Gregory here engages in discussion of current debating points, like the reasons for sleep, yawning and dreams (XII-XIII: MPG 44.156C ff); yet in spite of the complex relationship between body, senses and mind, the intellectual is to be identified as soul proper, and its union with the body is stated to be inconceivable (XV: MPG 44.176C-177C).

Gregory now returns to his principal theme in what is probably the key section to his treatise (XVI: MPG 44.177D ff). Heathen writers who call man a μικρὸς κόσμος, he scorns; for that is to dignify man with the attributes of a gnat or a mouse. According to the doctrine of the Church, man's greatness consists not in his likeness to the created world but in his being in the image of the nature of the creator. Gregory then faces the question, how can this mortal, passible, short-lived being be the image of one who is immortal, pure and everlasting? To answer it he turns to Gen. 1.27 and argues that the Bible contains two accounts of man's creation: man-in-the-image is different from man in his present state of wretchedness. The intellectual element in man, man like to God, preceded the irrational which is characterised by its polarisation into male and female. Gregory understands the original creation of man as the creation of man-in-totality, the whole race in one body as it were, not an individual. This archetypal man was not sexually differentiated; sexuality (male and female created he them) was a subsequent concession to the fallen state of man which God foreknew (XVI.17: MPG 44.185C). As a result of sin came fragmentation and death which meant provision had to be made for procreation. So in spite of seeing man as

the crown of creation (II-IV), in spite of describing the human body as perfectly adapted for the operations of mind (VII-IX), Gregory is unhappy about the things which man shares with the beasts, especially sexuality. Man, he says, is two-fold, the mean between the divine, incorporeal nature and the irrational life of brutes (MPG 44.181A-C).

Having established this two-stage creation of man, Gregory proceeds to attribute man's predicament to his tendency to be dominated not by his rational soul but by the irrational passions he shares with the beasts. Even man's intellect can be dragged down and rendered brutish. The doctrine of the Fall becomes a key element in his ability to affirm that in spite of man's present state, he is created in the image of God (XVIII-XX; MPG 44.192 ff). Resurrection and eschatology are likewise key elements in his thinking about man; for man's destiny is restoration to his original state and status in Paradise. This process of return Gregory presents as a matter of 'necessity', i.e. it is natural and inevitable (XXI: MPG 44.201B-204A), and he devotes much of the rest of his treatise to a rational defence of resurrection while attacking various other doctrines like the pre-existence and independence of souls. His final section (XXX: MPG 44.240C-256) outlines current understanding of the construction of the human body, a discussion which he justifies on the grounds that "spiritual sheep" would rather get instruction from those inside the Church, instead of having to turn to a "strange voice". But before and after this, Gregory summarises his fundamental position: that man is *one*, a composite unity composed of soul and body, both of which were created together at one and the same time (XXIX: MPG 44.233D ff); that humanity is an animated body (XXX.29: MPG 44.253B) whose soul can mature to perfection and "be renewed after the image of him who created him." (XXX.33: MPG 44.256C).

B. *The Biblical Contribution*

Since the fundamental idea that Gregory pursues is that man was made in the image of God, it is clear that his entire discussion revolves around a biblical idea, and that scripture is seen as a source for basic anthropological concepts.

The accompanying Table (Table I on p. 121) indicates that of thirty chapters, there are only four which contain no scriptural quotation or Biblical allusion, and we may add that those four are the shortest chapters in the entire work. Still the use of scripture is somewhat

patchy, and a number of occurrences are merely sententious, rhetorical or homiletic flourishes, inessential to the argument. Nevertheless, there are areas of considerable interest, some where scripture is the determining influence, others where scriptural warrant for an idea is deliberately sought.

(i) *The exegesis of Gen. 1.26-7*

Gen. 1.26 occurs in all *eight* times, scattered around the treatise (for references, see Table I). Gregory notes that only in the case of man did God "take counsel" (a point deduced from the form of the text: *let us make* man .....); everything else was produced by a word, but in the case of man, God took careful forethought, relating the human form to its function. Man was made for royalty, Gregory infers from the context; his "purple" is virtue, his "sceptre" immortality, his crown "righteousness". His royal prerogative is that he is "self-governed", ruled by his own will. Man was created last because the ruler could not appear before his subjects—the banquet had to be prepared. Man was to enjoy creation, and so have knowledge of the Creator. Hence, man is two-fold, blending the divine with the earthy, enjoying God by means of his more divine nature and the good things of earth by the sense that is akin to them (II-IV: MPG 44.132D-136D).

As a king, freely pursuing his own ends, man is the image of the one who rules over all. The Godhead is *Nous* and *Logos* (John 1.1), and the prophets, according to Paul, "have the Mind of Christ" which "speaks" in them (I Cor. 2.16; II Cor. 13.3): thus, the Logos and Mind "in you" is an imitation of the divine. Again, God is Love (I John 4.7, 8); and "hereby shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you love one another" (after John 13.35).

In this way Gregory uses other texts to fill out and interpret his basic biblical insight. His argument is by no means exclusively biblical, but scriptural cross-references certainly play a significant role in the development of his fundamental anthropological position.

Gen. 1.27 is discussed in XVI. As already noted, the final phrase of this verse raises the question of sexuality, which was clearly a problem for Gregory; for it is "a thing which is alien to our conception of God" (XVI.8: MPG 44.181). He resolves the problem of sex by appeal to Gal. 3.28: in Christ, there is neither male nor female; and on the basis of Jesus' reply to the Sadducees (Luke 20.35-6), he argues that without the

fall, man would have become a plurality in the same way as the angels. Sexuality was therefore God's concession to the fallen state of man which he foreknew, and did not belong to the original creation of man. Again Gregory's use of other scriptural quotations to interpret his key text is a sign of the extent of biblical influence.

(ii) *Man as a composite being, based on scriptural material.*

(a) Gregory believes that man is composed of "lower" and "higher" elements and has to make choices. He speaks of man as "a man of earth" using I Cor. 15.48 (XXII.3: MPG 44.204D); and uses the text, "He is compared to the beasts that have no understanding and made like to them" (Ps. 48.13, 21 LXX) (XVII.5: MPG 44.189D). The Apostle bids us "Think on those things which are above" (Col. 3.2), adds Gregory (XVIII.5: MPG 44.193C). "Our nature is conceived as twofold, according to the apostolic teaching, made up of visible man and hidden man" (XXIX.2: MPG 44.236). Thus Gregory regards the two poles of man's nature and the opposing attractions of carnal pleasures and spiritual perfection as fundamentally scriptural teaching.

(b) Gregory recognises different faculties of soul, the "nutritive", the "sensitive" and the "intellectual", and he tries to relate this to biblical terminology. He refers to Paul's prayer that the full grace of their *"body and soul and spirit"* may be preserved at the coming of the Lord (I. Thess. 5.23, though Gregory erroneously refers to Ephesians); and he speaks of the Lord instructing the scribe in the Gospel that he should set before every commandment that love to God which is exercised with all the *heart and soul and mind* (VIII.5: MPG 44.145C-D). The Apostle recognises three kinds of dispositions, calling one *carnal*, another *natural* (ψυχικήν) and another *spiritual*; Gregory quotes I Cor. 3.3 and I Cor. 2.14, 15 to support this statement (VIII.6: MPG 44.148A-B). Gregory has hardly derived the tripartite division from this varied scriptural terminology, but he has attempted to find scriptural warrant for an analysis adopted from contemporary science.

(iii) *Man as Fallen*

While man was created in God's image, an image implies difference as well as likeness; the difference arose from the mere fact of creation. Man came into being; he is therefore subject to change, unlike the eternally existent God. Man's freedom and independence, coupled with his

mutability, led to his fall; the fall means that man is made like the beasts, inclined to material things and subject to passions (XVIII: MPG 44.192 ff). The fall means a perversion of man's nature:

> ... in the compound nature of man, the mind is governed by God, and by the mind is governed our material life, provided the latter remains in its natural state; but if perverted from nature, it is alienated also from mind. (XII.13: MPG 44.164)

Gregory here follows a fundamentally biblical insight, though he works it out in terms of contemporary ideas about the relation between the mind and the passions. He notes that mere temporary gratification of the senses such as animals seek, is made worse in the case of human beings because the passions pervert the mind: thus, anger is akin to the impulse of beasts, but increases when associated with thought into malignity, envy, deceit, hypocrisy; the greed of swine becomes covetousness; and so on. On the other hand, if the impulse of the emotions is harnessed by mind, every motion is conformed to the beauty of the divine image and the image is not obscured, as in the case of Moses and other great figures (XVIII: MPG 44.192-6).

Gregory devotes some consideration to the story of the fall, because it raised some difficulties (XX: MPG 44.197 ff). What was the forbidden tree? How is it that the tree which offered knowledge of good and evil represents the gratification of the senses? How can knowledge or science be condemned? Gregory plunders scripture to ascertain the meaning of its terms. Discernment between good and evil he finds to be a good thing on the basis of Heb. 5.14, I Thess. 5.21, and I Cor. 2.15. Knowledge, however, according to scriptural usage, means "the disposition towards what is agreeable": see II Tim. 2.19, Exod. 33.12 (LXX), and Matt. 7.23. The problem with the tree was that it was deceptive—it appeared good but was evil. The nature of evil is mixed; destruction is concealed like a snare. The fruit of the three is not absolutely evil, though it contains poison. The serpent made it seem glamorous.

Gregory concludes that

> the image (of God) properly belongs to the better part of our attributes; but all that is grievous and wretched in our life is far removed from likeness to the divine. (XX.5: MPG 44.201)

Gregory has taken seriously both the degradation and the glory of man, and on the whole, the biblical expression of the contrast predominates over more philosophical analyses.

(iv) *Man's destiny—the resurrection*

As we have already seen, Gregory deduces certain features of the archetypal man from statements about the resurrection-life. Man would have lived and is to live like the angels: Luke 20.35, 36; man was created "a little lower than the angels" (Ps. 8.6) (XVII.2: MPG 44.188-9).

That is man's destiny; that is when his character as God's image will be fully realised. If someone is ashamed of the fact that man has to eat like the animals and therefore doubts whether he is made in the image of God, he can rest assured that one day he will be free of this necessity: for the Kingdom of God is not meat and drink (Rom. 14.17), and man shall not live by bread alone (Matt. 4.4) (XVIII.9: MPG 44.196A). But does that mean that the resurrection life is fundamentally different from man's present life? No, Gregory concludes. For scripture does not speak only of bodily meat and drink, but of the soul's nourishment: Prov. 9.5; Jn. 7.37; Is. 12.3; Amos 8.11. God gave man fruit to eat in Paradise, and whoever is hungry for the good will eat of the tree of life: Gen. 2.16; Ps. 37.4; Prov. 3.18 (XIX: MPG 44.196C-197B).

Why cannot man enjoy this already? Gregory believes that the full compliment of man's numbers has to be made up first; but the transformation will suddenly occur: I Cor. 15.51-2; I Thess. 4.17. Like the patriarchs and prophets, we have to press on in faith, depending on God's promises: Heb. 11.40, 13, 11; Ps. 84 passim (XXII.6-7: MPG 44.205-208). The Gospel miracles are a kind of "foretaste" of God's restoring power, and thus a confirmation of the promise of resurrection to come; Gregory describes a number, including Jairus' daughter, the widow's son at Nain, the raising of Lazarus, and the resurrection of Christ himself. "Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created and thou shalt renew the face of the earth" (Ps. 104.29-30) (XXV.3-13: MPG 44.216A-225A). Thus prophetic and eschatological texts are used to confirm the hope of re-creation.

Oddly, fall and restoration are not related to Christological statements or to a doctrine of atonement. Christ never appears as "proper man". The cross is only mentioned because it confirms scriptural predictions; or because it heightens the miracle of Christ's resurrection and reinforces the proof that scripture is reliable when it predicts the resurrection of mankind.

However, we may conclude that Gregory not only began from the scriptural account of creation, but also drew certain key ideas from

scriptural doctrines. His use of texts is not merely arbitrary, and he did try to establish many of his anthropological ideas on the basis of biblical texts.

C. *The scientific contribution*

Nevertheless, scripture was not sufficient on its own to provide an account of how the human organism works, nor even to supply a comprehensive analysis of man's nature and destiny.

(i) Gregory does not give a great deal of space to medical knowledge as it then existed; but he finds it necessary to give some account of man's anatomical functioning, and the relationship of his bodily activities with the motivating power of soul. The mind, he had argued in chapters IX-X, works through sense-perception, although it is impossible to identify the location of soul with any particular organ. He had also treated of tears and laughter, sleep and dreams (XII-XIII). Now in a long final chapter (XXX: MPG 44.240 ff), he summarises a mass of information about respiration, the functions of the heart, liver and brain, the natural combinations of heat and cold, moist and dry, which constitute the parts of the body. He regards such subjects, the typical topics of contemporary discussion, as a digression from his main purpose, which was to show that

> the root cause of our constitution is neither a soul without a body, nor a body without a soul, but that, from ensouled and living bodies, our nature is generated at the first as a living and ensouled being. (XXX.29: MPG 44.253)

The power of soul is interwoven with the body.

Here Gregory is largely uninfluenced by scripture (though he did take the trouble to refute the claim that scripture locates the 'ruling principle' in the heart (XII.7: MPG 44.160D)); insistence on man's psychosomatic unity he derived from current scientific observation, while according to the apostolic teaching, man's nature is two-fold (see above). Gregory believes that the union of corporeal and incorporeal is established scientific truth, but beyond rational conception.

(ii) Gregory was the most distinguished Christian Neoplatonist. This is evident in his treatise. He acknowledges that one can speak of the nutritive and sensitive aspects of soul; but really the word soul should only properly be applied to the intellectual, from which stems a certain 'vital energy' somewhat erroneously referred to as soul (XV.1-2: MPG 44.176-7). The soul finds perfection in what is intellectual and rational;

mind may use the body as a musical instrument perfectly adapted to express its music (IX: MPG 44.149), but mind itself is invisible and incorporeal (XI: MPG 44.153). Men should not use the more complex analysis of the concept of soul as an excuse for attaching themselves to the phenomena of sense; rather they should busy themselves with their spiritual advantages, as the true soul is found there (XV.2: MPG 44.177A-C). Beauty, Goodness, Intellect, these are the Platonic notions of the Divine which Gregory dwells upon (though acknowledging that God transcends them and is incomprehensible); and these are the characteristics he sees reflected in the divine image in man (e.g. V: MPG 44.137; XII.9-11: MPG 44.161C-4). In any case, ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ (likeness to God) is a phrase from Plato's *Theaetetus*; so this fundamental idea of his was not exclusively biblical. Gregory is not very happy about man's "animal nature", and, as we have noted, envisages the needs and desires of the flesh—for food, for sex—being in the end transcended. The archetypal man is virtually a Platonic "form" of man.

Gregory resists dualism—but then so did Plotinus. The universe is full of light, and evil but a shadow; evil implies change, evil is limited—so its end is inevitable. The genesis of evil was the withdrawal of the beautiful and the good (XII.11: MPG 44.164A). Gregory's thought is fundamentally Neoplatonic, though his positive treatment of the goodness of creation has strong Biblical roots, and he firmly rejects the Platonist doctrine of Origen that the soul is bound to the body as a punishment for wickedness. (Plotinus would not have liked that doctrine either).

(iii) Gregory gives a scientific explanation of the "downward drag" that afflicts man—the tendency of sin is heavy and downwards; so our souls are inclined to sink, weighed down by the heavy and earthy element in the irrational nature (XVIII.6: MPG 44.193C). Thus his notion of the fall is by no means entirely inspired by the Bible. Theories of motion and cosmology dominate the description of creation with which his treatise opens, and are even used to establish the 'necessity' of resurrection and restoration in the future (XXI: MPG 44.201-204A). Scientific assumptions dictate the fact that man is treated as a "rational animal" whose hands are adapted for the arts of peace and war, and whose form is an instrument for the use of reason; and current science poses questions like "Why is man helpless compared with the animals?", "Why does man stand upright?" etc. (VII-IX: MPG 44.140-153) These features are typical of a great deal of the treatise. Biblical texts may be interspersed pretty liberally, and may to some

extant dictate the framework, but on the whole rational argument predominates. Gregory *argues* that matter is not co-eternal with God, that motion is not eternal, that creation implies End (XXIII-IV: MPG 44.209-13). Gregory decides that mind pervades the whole body only after surveying the scientific arguments for locating it in the heart or the brain (XII: MPG 44.156-164). His approach is fundamentally rational.

Besides this, a striking characteristic of Gregory's style is his brilliant appeal to political and particularly musical analogies, together with his fine descriptions of natural or aesthetic wonders; these were traditional rhetorical devices, though not the less forceful for that. All this means that the total impact of Gregory's work is much less biblical than our first comments might have led the reader to suppose. Gregory is not only deeply imbued with the culture of the contemporary world, but he also takes very seriously indeed the need to fit scripture with the findings of reason.

What conclusions can we draw from our study of Gregory's treatise concerning the interaction of Bible and philosophy in his anthropology? 1. For Gregory, the Bible is the starting-point, but scientifically speaking it is inadequate. Current philosophical and scientific arguments are used to fill out and explain scripture. Thus the agenda in detail is fundamentally philosophical, and rational arguments are needed to resolve philosophical and scientific problems. Neoplatonism lies behind many of the deductions and inferences drawn from scriptural texts. 2. Gregory has some difficulty in drawing together consistently two opposing concepts of man: (i) that man is the crown and perfection of God's creation which is wholly good, and that therefore, man's enjoyment of the world is part of God's creative purpose; and (ii) that man is twofold, torn between living according to his *Nous* so as to realise God's image in bodily form, and living like the beasts, seeking gratification of his sensual desires. The tension is highlighted by Gregory's positive acceptance of man as a rational animal in the early part of his treatise, and his suggestion later that man is dragged down to the level of the brutes by his passions which arose from subsequent sexual differentiation. It is over-simplifying to suggest that this is a tension between man as psychosomatic unity and man understood in dualist soul-body terms; it is also clear that this difficulty does not arise from a tension between science and the Bible. Gregory believes, not unjustifiably, that both these ideas are drawn from scripture. To some extent the biblical doc-

trines of fall and redemption help him to ease the conflict; yet not entirely, for the resurrection-life often appears in a highly spiritualised guise. The basis of that spiritualisation is usually found in scriptural argument, for all its Neoplatonic roots.

Gregory's treatise, therefore fulfils remarkably well its basic intention—to marry scripture and reason, the Bible and contemporary scientific knowledge. Where scripture fails, reason prevails, raising the questions and providing the solutions. Yet scripture is seen as the source of fundamental anthropological ideas, and scriptural texts are exploited in masterly fashion. Gregory does not retreat from science, but embraces and Christianises it.

TABLE I

Texts used or alluded to in Gregory's *De Opificio Hominis*

Prologue	Prov. 17.6 (LXX)	'the whole world of money', as Solomon says
I.1	Gen. 2.4 (LXX)	'This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth', saith the scripture ...
I.5	Gen. 2.1	'the heaven and the earth', as Moses said, 'were finished' ..
II		No quotes, but the subject is why man was created last, i.e. a question raised by scripture.
III.1	Gen. 1.26 (not exact)	'God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the beasts of the earth, and the fowls of the heaven, and the cattle, and all the earth.'
IV		No quotes, but the subject is man's royalty, derived from scripture.
V.2	Jn. 1.1	'In the beginning was the Word'
	Cf. I Cor. 2.16	the prophets, according to Paul, 'have the
	Cf. II Cor. 13.3	mind of Christ' which 'speaks' in them.
	I Jn. 4.7, 8	'Love is of God'; 'God is love'.
	Jn. 13.35 (not verbally)	'hereby' .. 'shall all men know that ye are my disciples if ye love one another'
VI.2	Ps. 94.9	'He that made the eye' and 'that planteth the ear'
VI.2, 3	Gen. 1.26 twice	See above.
VIII.5	I Thess. 5.23 (Ephesians, acc. to Greg.)	praying that the complete grace of their 'body, soul and spirit' may be preserved at the coming of the Lord.
	Cf. Mk. 12.30	The Lord instructs the scribe in the Gospel that he should set before every commandment that love to God which is exercised with all the heart and soul and mind.

VIII.6		The Apostle recognises three divisions, calling one 'carnal' .. another 'natural' (ψυχικήν) ... and another 'spiritual'
	I Cor. 3.3	'Ye are carnal'
	I Cor. 2.14, 15	'but the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit, for they are foolishness unto him. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, and yet he himself is judged of no man.'
X.2	Cf. Eccles. 1.8	'the ear', as Solomon somewhere says, 'is not filled with continual hearing'
XI.2	Rom. 11.34	'Who knoweth the mind of the Lord?' the Apostle asks
XI.3	Gen. 1.26	See above.
XII.7	Ps. 7.10	'God trieth the hearts and reins'
XIII.11	Gen. 40.1 ff	the butler presses the cluster for Pharoah's cup; so the baker seemed to carry his baskets; each supposing himself in sleep to be engaged in those services ....
XIII.12		Daniel and Joseph etc. v. Interpretation of dreams
XV.2	Gen. 9.3 (not verbally)	'ye shall eat all kinds of flesh even as the green herb'
XVI.1- .	Gen. 1.26	See above.
XVI.5, 7, 8, 16, 17	Gen. 1.27	'and God created man; in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them'
XVI.7	Gal. 3.28	'In Christ Jesus, there is neither male nor female'
XVI.13	Matt. 22.20, 21	As the Gospel calls the stamp upon the coin 'the image of Caesar'
XVI.15	Hist. Susanna 42	He 'knoweth all things before they be'
XVII.2	Lk. 20.35, 36	'For in the resurrection' .. 'they neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being children of the resurrection.'
	Ps. 8.6	'made a little lower than the angels'
XVII.5	Ps. 48.13, 21 (LXX)	'Man being in honour knew it not'; therefore he says, 'he is compared to the beasts that have no understanding, and made like unto them.'
XVIII.5	Col. 3.2	the Apostle bids us 'think those things which are above'
XVIII.8		In Moses and men like him, the form of the image is kept pure, according to Gregory.
XVIII.9	Rom. 14.17	'The Kingdom of heaven is not meat and drink'
	Matt. 4.4 *et al. loc.*	'Man shall not live by bread alone but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God'
XIX.1	Prov. 9.5	'Eat of my bread' is the bidding of Wisdom to the hungry.

	Jn. 7.37	'If any man thirst let him come unto me and drink'
	Cf. Is. 12.3	'Drink ye joy' is the great Isaiah's charge to those who are able to hear ...
	Amos 8.11	'not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but a famine of hearing the word of the Lord'
XIX.2	Gen. 2.16	'Of every tree of the garden' he says, 'thou mayest freely eat'
XIX.4	Ps. 37.4	'Delight thou in the Lord'
	Prov. 3.18	Solomon names Wisdom herself (which is the Lord) 'a tree of life'
XX.1	The chapter is an exegesis of the 'tree of knowledge of good and evil' (Gen. 2.9)	
	This involves an examination of the scriptural meaning of 'discernment' and 'knowledge'. Texts quoted:	
	Heb. 5.14	to discern .. the Apostle says, is a mark of more perfect condition and of 'trained faculties'
	I Thess. 5.21	and he bids us 'prove all things'
	Cf. I Cor. 2.15	'discernment' belongs to the spiritual man
	II Tim. 2.19	'The Lord knoweth them that are his'
	Ex. 33.12 (LXX)	'I know thee above all'
	Matt. 7.23	'I never knew you'
XX.2	I Tim. 6.10	'The love of money is the root of all evil'
XX.4	Gen. 3.6 (LXX)	'and the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes to behold, and fair to see; and she took of the fruit thereof and did eat'
	Gen. 2.9	See above.
	Ps. 143.4 (LXX)	'like unto vanity'
XXI.4		Paradise to be restored
XXII.3	Gen. 1.26	See above
	I Cor. 15.48	man 'of the earth'
XXII.4		Man in the image of God
	Ps. 95.4	'in his hand are all the corners of the earth'
	Hist. Susanna 42	See above.
	Gen. 1.28	'Increase and multiply and replenish the earth.'
XXII.6	I Cor. 15, 51, 52	'Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump'
	I Thess. 4.17	'we shall be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and so shall we ever be with the Lord'
XXII.7		Abraham and the patriarchs were promised good things:
	Heb. 11.40	'God having provided some better things for us' according to the words of Paul, 'that they without us should not be made perfect'
	Heb. 11.13	they saw 'afar off' and 'embraced them' as the Apostle bears witness, placing their certainty of the

		enjoyment of the things for which they hoped in the
	Heb. 11.11	fact that they 'judged him faithful who had prom-
	Ps.84.2	ised'; the prophet's 'soul hath a desire and longing to be in the courts of the Lord', even if he must needs
	(v. 11 LXX)	be rejected to a place amongst the lowest, as it is a greater and more desirable thing to be last there than to be first among the ungodly tents of this life ... for
	Ps. 84.10	he says, 'one day in Thy courts is better than thousands'
	Ps. 84.12	wherefore he says at the end of the Psalm. 'O Lord of hosts, blessed is the man that hopeth in thee'
XXII.8	Acts 1.7	'It is not for us to know the times and seasons'
XXIII.1	Heb. 11.3	'By believing we understand that the worlds were
	(not exact)	framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear'
XXIII.3		Argumentative men might upset our faith in Scripture; therefore Gregory produces arguments.
XXV.3-11	Cf. Mk. 13.1	'What works! What buildings!'
	Gospel stories outlined include:	
	Lk. 23.27-29	Women at cross
	Lk. 4.38-9	Simon's mother-in-law
	Jn. 4.46 ff	the Nobleman's Son
	Mk. 5.22 ff	Jairus' Daughter and the Woman with an issue of blood
	Lk. 7.11 ff	Widow's Son at Nain.
	Jn. 11	The Raising of Lazarus
	Each of the above is re-told, sometimes with quotations from the immediate passage; a quote from elsewhere appears in the following example:	
XXV.11		For as in the regeneration of the universe, the
	I Thess. 4.16	Apostle tells us that 'the Lord Himself will descend with a shout, with the voice of the archangel', and by a trumpet sound shall raise up the dead to incorruption—so now he who is in the tomb, at the voice of command, shakes off death as if it were a sleep ...
XXV.12		In truth the Lord seems to me not to have spoken in vain to them of Capernaum, when he said to
	Lk. 4.23	himself, as in the person of men, 'Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, 'Physician heal thyself'.' For it behoved him .. to confirm his word in his own humanity.
		Gregory speaks of Christ's passion and resurrection.
	Cf. Jn. 20.27	Behold him whose hands were pierced with nails; behold him whose side was transfixed with a spear; pass thy fingers through the print of the nails; thrust thy hand into the spear-wound ...
	I Cor. 15.12	If then he has been raised, well may we utter the Apostle's exclamation, 'How say some that there is no resurrection of the dead?'

XXV.13	Col. 2.8	Shall we not bid farewell to those who pervert our simple faith by 'philosophy and vain deceit' and hold fast to our confession in its purity ...
	Ps. 104.29, 30	'Thou shalt take away their breath and they shall fail and turn to dust. Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit and they shall be created, and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth'
XXVI.2	Ps. 95.4	Scripture teaches that the world is held in God's hand
XXVII.2	Cf. Lk. 16.19 ff	The Parable of Dives and Lazarus
XXVII.4	2 Kings 5.1 ff (cf. Lk. 4.27)	Healing miracles: Naaman the Syrian and the Gospels.
XXVIII.1	Cf. Gen. 2.7	Reference to the making of man as stated by Moses .. God first took dust from the earth and formed man, and then animated the being thus formed by his breath. Gregory is anxious to refute the argument based on this text that the flesh is prior and therefore more noble than the soul.
	Matt. 6.25	'the soul is more than meat and the body than raiment'
XXIX.1	Hist. Susanna 42	See above.
XXIX.2		Our nature is conceived as two-fold according to the apostolic teaching (but unspecified).
XXIX.9	Deut. 4.28	'Take heed to thyself,' as Moses says.
XXX.1	Cf. Jn. 10.5	spiritual sheep, as the Lord says, ... hear not a strange voice
XXX.31	I Cor. 13.11	'When I was a child I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child, but when I became a man, I put away childish things'
XXX.32	Col. 3.9, 10	Paul .. tells them that they must 'put off the old man' and put on the man 'which is renewed after the image of him that created him'
XXX.34	Gen. 1.26	See above.

Example 2: a scientific treatise: De Natura Hominis[3]

The manuscript tradition attributes this treatise to one Nemesius of Emesa, about whom we know no more than we can deduce from the work itself. The date is relatively clear from internal evidence: he is the contemporary of Eunomius and Apollinaris, and he is chary of acknowledging his dependence on Origen—so he must have written towards the end of the Fourth Century. He may have used Gregory's work; he certainly seems to have written some ten or twenty years later. However, the work is of a somewhat different character—a kind of

philosophical handbook in which the views of various different philosophers are summarised and assessed. It was once plundered by scholars for evidence concerning Posidonius, the famous Platonic-Stoic of the first Century BC, but Posidonius' name is not mentioned and in any case the whole theory that Posidonius was the Father of Middle Platonism is a hypothesis built on sand.[4] The only reason for mentioning it is to highlight the fact that this work is an exposition of current scientific ideas about man, and not fundamentally a work of Christian theology: the most consistently used source is Galen. At least of its final draft, the author is clearly a Christian, but he addresses himself not only to a Christian but a pagan audience (§ 42: MPG 40.781B, 792B). The work may have an apologetic intent; certainly it shows that Christians were not necessarily credulous, illiterate and obscurantist, but were up with their contemporaries in anthropological studies.

A. *Outline of treatise*

The treatise falls naturally into five sections. Following the pattern recommended in rhetorical schools, it begins with an exordium, introducing and summarising the subject and endeavouring to engage the reader's interest (Section A: §§ 1-10: MPG 40.504-536). This section is most important for understanding Nemesius' overall view, and here we find the most important references to the Bible. However, it is Plotinus, Aristotle and Plato who appear first, as Nemesius opens his book with a discussion of the dichotomist versus trichotomist controversy (the one Christian teacher mentioned, Apollinaris, is said to be trichotomist following Plotinus). The dichotomist view prevails: man is composed of soul and body. That man has much in common with the animals and yet is rational, so that he is on the boundary between the phenomenal and intelligible, indicates the unity of creation, the interlinking of every order of reality, and so proves that the whole universe is the creation of one God (§ 2: MPG 40.508). Nemesius produces proofs from the observations of natural history (Aristotle is the authority he mentions) that there is no clear division between the inanimate, the nutritive, the animal and the rational orders of creation, for one shades into the other; then he suggests that this justifies the order of the Mosaic story and he appeals to other scriptural texts to indicate that man is on the border between the rational and the irrational (§ 4: MPG 40.512-3). Here his theme and the texts he chooses are reminiscent of Gregory's

treatise. Nemesius then proceeds to discuss the story of creation and fall as taught by the Hebrews. It has been suggested that his source here was Origen's commentary on Genesis;[5] wherever he got the ideas from, Nemesius identifies himself with the views expressed (§ 5: MPG 40.516A). He believes man was made poised between being mortal and immortal, or perhaps mortal yet potentially immortal. Until man had reached perfection, his state was to be concealed from him; but man ate of the forbidden tree of knowledge and learned the truth about himself. As a result he became enslaved to bodily needs.

Nemesius now proceeds to explore man's bodily composition out of the four elements and his development of social intercourse; in an interesting section (§ 7: MPG 40.521-4—to be discussed later), he tries to define the distinguishing marks of man, and then develops the Hebrew idea that the whole world was created for man's benefit (§ 8-9: MPG 40.525-532). His exordium ends with a panegyric of man (§ 10: MPG 40.532C-533A), which seems to summarize his fundamental position while pulling out a number of rhetorical stops: man is not only the crucial link in the hierarchy of created orders of being, but he is in himself a μικρὸς κόσμος, bearing an image of the whole creation in his own nature. (Here Nemesius accepts a commonplace rejected by Gregory, and clearly regards it as compatible with the 'link' idea; precisely this combination of ideas is not found elsewhere, and it was once attributed to Posidonius). Man, Nemesius believes, is the object of God's special providential care, and the creature for whose sake God became man so that this creature might attain incorruption and escape corruption. He is pre-eminent among creatures in his skills and his authority.

In the next section of the treatise, Nemesius turns to a more technical discussion of the relation between soul and body (Section B: §§ 11-22: MPG 40.536-608). He adopts the method of reviewing a wide range of options, from the pre-socratics to his own time, explores the various proposals suggested, leading up to his own view which will be discussed later.

The centre part, comprising a third of the whole treatise (Sections C-D: §§ 23-45: MPG 40.608-717), consists of further technical discussions concerning the body and the elements of which it is composed; sense-perception, the imagination, the functions of the intellect and the different capacities of soul; the passions and the irrational soul; nutrition, respiration, generation, etc. Here Nemesius again surveys the

many opinions of philosophers, and for the most part follows the medical writer Galen. All this leads up to the final part of the work which is concerned with morality, the chief preoccupation of Graeco-Roman philosophy (Section E: §§ 46-70: MPG 40.717-816). The related issues of freewill, fate and providence are given extended treatment before the treatise breaks off, apparently unfinished.

Before considering the contribution of the Bible to this treatise, we will follow up a crucial aspect of Nemesius' discussion, namely, his views on the composition of man.

B. *The composition of man*

Nemesius' fundamental interest concerns man's place in the universe and his experience of making moral decisions. He realises, however, that these matters are closely related to an understanding of man's constitution, and understanding man's nature is a very complex matter. For this reason he discusses at length various ways of analysing the components which go to make up man, and their various functions. The soul for Nemesius is no simple entity (§ 34: MPG 40.669)—it has rational and irrational parts, and the interaction of the various faculties of soul with each other and with the body are sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious. The irrational is partly susceptible to reason's control, partly not. The elements (earth, air, fire and water) which constitute the body have an effect on man's temperament, and emotion provides the driving force of human action. Thus "passions" are necessary to human life (a useful corrective to the widespread ascetic emphasis on ἀπάθεια current at the time when Nemesius was writing). There are good passions as well as evil ones, and pleasures are necessary and natural to the good life which is directed towards divine learning and the virtues (§§ 36-9: MPG 40.676-685). It is only in the light of such a complex analysis of human being that conclusions can be drawn about man's responsibilities and moral potentialities. Man's behaviour is affected by temperament, upbringing, habit; but he has freewill to make choices in certain spheres, and ideally his rationality should be in control of his overall behaviour.

Nemesius recognises, then, very considerable complexity. Yet his underlying conception is that man, as a complex two-fold being, has a footing in two orders of reality. Through the body, he has much in common with the animals—he is indeed the crown of the animal creation;

but by being also rational, he shares many things with incorporeal, rational intelligences. So Nemesius accepts the generally agreed analysis that man is composed of soul and body, and it is the relationship between these entities which is most crucial for his understanding of man.

Nemesius' view is no simple dualism. The presupposition of Nemesius' physiological statements is the intimate union of soul and body. The soul is the driving force (ἐνέργεια) of muscular movement:

> Whatever movement takes place by the operation of nerves and muscles involves the intervention of soul, and is accomplished by an act of will. (§ 43: MPG 40.708)

Soul also provides the ἐνέργεια in respiration: panting and sobbing accompany moments of great grief, and soul keeps respiration going during sleep, since it is essential for human life. So the physical and the psychic are intimately woven together: τὸ ψυχικὸν συνεπλάκη τῷ φυσικῷ (§ 44: MPG 40.709). Thus,

> a living creature is composed of soul and body; the body is not a living creature by itself, nor is the soul, but soul and body together. (§ 49: MPG 40.733)

Here is an expression of a true psycho-somatic unity, and it is clearly based upon current scientific observation of how the human organism functions.

The nature of the soul and the manner of its union with the body were not, however, matters easily resolved. Nemesius reviews the following questions: Is the soul corporeal or incorporeal? Is the soul real—that is, some real thing, a substance? Or is it the harmony or temperament or "form" of the body? What is the origin of the soul? Is there more than one kind of soul—rational and irrational, for instance? Are there many individual souls, or is there one "world-soul"? Nemesius concludes that the soul is incorporeal and immortal on the basis of Plato's arguments, yet affirms at the end:

> There are numerous proofs of the soul's immortality offered by Plato and others, but they are difficult and full of obscurities, and can scarcely be understood by those who have been brought up to such studies. But for us the sufficient demonstration of the soul's immortality is the teaching of Holy Scripture, which is self-authenticating because inspired by God (§ 19: MPG 40.589).

In other words, Nemesius thinks the immortality of the soul is a *scriptural* doctrine which *contrasts* with the views of Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen, whose views he has already discussed and dismissed earlier in this section: he does not, like some modern commentators, regard as

"typically Greek" the assertion of the soul's immortality. For him, the Bible confirms the dualist analysis, while science demands that some account of man's psychosomatic unity is given.

It is the union of soul and body (§§ 20-22: MPG 40.592-608) which Nemesius finds the most puzzling aspect of the whole subject, and he refuses to consider other analyses of man's constitution partly because three or four constituents (say, body, soul, mind and/or spirit) would complicate the problem of unity still further. The union is a puzzle because there are no satisfactory natural analogies. What comes together to form a single entity is made completely one only if the constituents undergo change. So how is it possible for body and soul to be united without the body losing its corporeity or the soul ceasing to be incorporeal and self-subsistent? Unity can only be achieved by change or juxtaposition, which is not a true unity. Nemesius, having ruled out the possibilities of juxtaposition and mixture, adopts the Platonic view that the soul "puts on" the body; intelligibles, he says, can unite with things adapted to receive them and remain unconfused while in union. So the soul suffers no change through union with the body. The soul is united to the body through "sympathy"—the whole living being συμπαθεῖ ...· ὡς ἓν ὄν.

The soul, being itself ἀσώματος, is yet present in every part of the body giving it life and movement, while also being transcendent, that is, not confined to some portion of space (the evidence for this being the occurrence of dreams). Thus, the soul is said to be in the body, not because it is located in it, but because of its habitual relation of presence there. Natural analogies fail, so Nemesius turns to theological ones. The soul is in body *even as God is said to be in us.* How good is that as an account of man's unity? He tries another analogy:

> (the divine Word) continued thus in union without confusion, and without being circumscribed. (§ 22: MPG 40.601)

Christology he uses to cope with his anthropological puzzle, though he does admit that there are difficulties in the analogy since the soul is mutable and the Word immutable. Yet clearly, for the ancients, the transcendence and immanence of the soul, like that of the Word, posed intellectual problems, and it is interesting that just as the anthropological analogy could be used to ease Christology, so the Christological analogy could be used to ease anthropology. In fact, Nemesius makes both moves, rounding off the circle by quoting Porphyry on the

union of soul and body in order to confute the mockery of the Greeks who say that the incarnation is impossible.

This fascinating Christological interlude is not of immediate relevance to our theme; yet it is interesting to note that Nemesius presents a remarkable picture of man's psychosomatic unity without being able to offer a very convincing account of it—a situation which is closely paralleled by the Christological position of, say, Theodore of Mopsuestia. To return to our main concerns, however, it is important to observe that for Nemesius it was not the Bible which taught a psychosomatic unity and demanded a resolution of the difficulties raised by a fundamentally dualistic analysis of human nature. Rather, the need for an account of man's unitary being arose from within the scientific philosophy of the time. While Christian doctrine provided possible analogies for solving the problem (though they are really quite peripheral and rather unsatisfactory), the Bible, as Nemesius read it, supported the underlying dualist analysis.

C. *The Biblical Contribution*

The framework and detail of Nemesius' understanding of man comes entirely from current scientific knowledge; Biblical ideas are subtly interwoven with anthropological ideas plundered from Plato, Stoicism and elsewhere. The Bible could provide no alternative science on the basis of which a critique of current assumptions might be constructed. It did confirm Nemesius' preference for one set of conclusions rather than another, but it contributed little that was distinctive.

The actual extent to which the Bible is quoted, alluded to or appealed to is indicated in the accompanying tables (Tables II and III). It is noticeable that its use is extremely patchy, occurring mostly in the general introduction and in the treatment of providence. Plato and many others figure more prominently. The Bible had nothing to say about many of the things discussed, and many of the texts quoted are marginal to the main drift of Nemesius' treatise. Actual use of the Biblical material, then appears very slight. So we may profitably proceed to ask whether any Christian doctrines regarded as deriving from the Bible, have affected his work. What does he make of the stories of fall and salvation? Are there present ideas, like that of resurrection, which are not "christianised" versions of late Roman eclectic philosophy?

One of the most interesting, and yet most unsatisfactory, sections of Nemesius' treatise is § 7: (MPG 40.521-4). Here Nemesius is discussing man's "choice prerogatives" which "are shared by no other creature." He begins by stating that there are two of them:

> Man only on repenting can gain forgiveness; and only man's body, though mortal, is immortalised. This privilege of the body is for the soul's sake. So likewise, the soul's privilege is on account of the body, for it is only man, among rational beings, that has this unique privilege of claiming forgiveness by repenting. Neither demons nor angels repent and are forgiven.

Quite clearly Nemesius has adopted two central Christian doctrines and wedded them to his view of man as the one creature which is a compound of the corporeal and incorporeal. The peculiar character of man's being means that he cannot escape wants and passions, and therefore God is just and merciful in granting him a means of forgiveness; and the soul's immortality means that man alone of the living creatures will experience bodily resurrection. Nemesius' scientific insight into the psychosomatic unity of man could have been developed in a distinctively Christian direction.

The frustrating thing about these comments is that Nemesius develops neither idea in the rest of his work. For the most part, his emphasis elsewhere is on the immortality of the soul rather than the resurrection of the body (contrast Gregory); and his discussions of morality imply the somewhat Pelagian position that man's freewill means that he could succeed in choosing the good life. Furthermore, even in this section, he slips away from the two characteristics with which he begins and introduces other traditional philosophical estimates:

> "Laughter is a peculiar mark of man's being"
> "It is peculiar to man to learn arts and sciences"

—that is, man is rational compared with the irrational beasts. The whole discussion has been described as a "bizarre combination",[5] and Nemesius has not really succeeded in what might have been a promising attempt to introduce into current scientific orthodoxy certain central Biblical insights.

Given this, it is perhaps not surprising to find that overall the fall and redemption play a rather minor role in Nemesius' treatment of man. It is true that Nemesius espouses the view (§ 5: MPG 40.513-6: see Table III), that man was created potentially immortal, and understands the story of Adam as an account of how man discovered his ambiguous

position and lapsed from the way of perfection. Yet the treatise as a whole suggests that he regarded this story as paradeigmatic rather than as the account of a fatal fall reversible only by an act of redemption. As long as man controlled his passions and the irrational element in him, no other living creature dared to do man harm; sin laid man open to the ravages of wild beasts, but great men like Daniel and Paul proved man's potential authority over animals (§ 9: MPG 40.532). Man in control of his passions is still destined for immortality, but he has to make the choice and strive for virtue. Thus Nemesius' basic view is that man's dual nature means that he has the freewill to make a choice between living like the beasts or aspiring to the heavens. Freewill under God's providence is man's prerogative which he could not have exercised if he had not been created mutable (§ 41: MPG 40.776-7). Evil came to all rational creatures through their own choice. On a couple of occasions Nemesius hints that man could not rise from his fall without God's grace and immortality (§ 7: MPG 40.521 and § 10: MPG 40.533); but for the most part he is fundamentally optimistic about human nature and man's moral potentialities, showing little awareness of the need for redemption. Christ is barely mentioned, the cross only appears as an example of how God may permit evil so that good may be vindicated (§ 69: MPG 40.812: see Table III), and Christology merely figures as an analogy (already noted) to ease the conceptual problems of Nemesius' Two-in-One anthropology. Only in the panegyric on man is anything made of the incarnation:

> He is the creature for whose sake God became man, so that this creature might attain incorruption and escape corruption, might reign on high, being made after the image and likeness of God, dwelling with Christ as a child of God, and might be throned above all rule and all authority (§ 10: MPG 40.533).

From this survey a number of conclusions suggest themselves concerning the interplay of science and the Bible in the anthropological thought of Nemesius:

1. Anthropology was a subject in which pagan and Christian shared a common interest and a common stock of knowledge. Pagan and Christian intellectuals are referred to side by side in this treatise; for both were engaged in a common enterprise and both used the same intellectual tools.
2. The Bible had nothing distinctive to contribute to scientific discussion. Nemesius understood it to confirm what seemed to him the most

reasonable account of man's being advanced by current scientific orthodoxy. It provided useful examples to add to the commonplaces of literature and moral philosophy, but the only distinctive item it added was the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*.

3. The main focus of interest was man's behaviour and destiny. Ethics, freewill, providence and immortality were issues raised by contemporary discussion, not the result of reflection on the Biblical material.

4. Contrary to the impression given in some modern discussions, the idea of man as a psychosomatic unity more obviously arose from current science than from the Bible, which was understood to confirm the soul's transcendence and immortality. On the other hand, the Biblical doctrine of creation is happily married in this treatise with the philosophical understanding of man as a microcosm uniting all orders of Being. The Bible, then, provided no alternative anthropology, nor a critique of current understanding; but it could confirm conclusions already established on other grounds or derived from other sources.

TABLE II

Plan of Nemesius' treatise *De Natura Hominis* indicating in what sections the Bible is actually used. (The section divisions are my own.)

Section A: General introduction. §§ 1-10.
Several texts quoted or Biblical material alluded to in §§ 4, 5, 8, 9, 10.
Subjects = Creation, Fall, Man's high estate.
See Table II for details.
Section B: On the Soul and its union with the Body. §§ 11-22.
Bible only used in one context § 17, where Nemesius produces a Biblically-based argument against creationism.
General comment v. immortality of soul being scriptural teaching § 19.
Section C: On the Body, the Elements, Sense-perception, the Intellect and other functions of soul. §§ 23-34.
Bible only used in a discussion of creation § 26.
Section D: On the irrational soul, the passions, pleasures, emotions, nutrition, generation, respiration, etc. §§ 35-45.
No use of the Bible at all.
Section E: On voluntary and involuntary acts, choices, deliberation, fate, providence §§ 46-70.
Reference to Biblical examples of choice § 46.
All things possible to God—Biblical examples § 55.
Texts supporting freewill § 57.
On providence and evil: texts quoted §§ 66, 68, 69.
Use of the Bible largely concentrated in a few paragraphs of Sections A and E. In the bulk of the treatise, no use of the Bible at all.

TABLE III

Comprehensive list of passages in Nemesius' *De Natura Hominis* where texts are quoted or alluded to, or Biblical examples used.

Section A

§ 4 "The foregoing conclusions justify the Mosaic story of creation when it makes man the last to be created ..." (i.e. the fact that creatures are made for man's sake). Another reason: man = link between intelligible and phenomenal order. If man "leans towards the things of the body", he becomes "in Paul's words, 'a man of earth' to whom it is said, 'Dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return' and 'He shall be compared unto the beasts that have no understanding and is likened unto them' ..."
If man "advances in the direction of reason", he "deserves to be called a 'heavenly man' in accordance with the Apostle's words, 'Such as is the earthy, such also are they that are earthy, and such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly'."

Texts quoted: Gen. 3.19; Ps. 49.20 (LXX); I Cor. 15.48.

§ 5 "The Hebrews say that man was created at first neither avowedly mortal not yet immortal, but rather in a state poised between the two, in the sense that, if he gave himself up to his bodily passions, he should be subject to all the changes of the body, but that if he put the good of his soul foremost, he should be deemed worthy of immortality."
"Until man had attained his perfection, however, it was not at all suitable for him to know how he was constituted. God, for that reason, forbad him to taste the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge ... Man disobeyed and learned the truth about himself ...
Moses says that the man was naked and now knew it, whereas, until that moment, God had caused him to be entranced with existence and happily unconscious of himself.
When man lapsed from the way of perfection, he likewise lost the immortality which, by favour of his creator, he is to recover at the last."

§ 8 "It is the doctrine of the Hebrews that the whole world was made for the sake of man ..." Man's authority over irrational animals discussed: "Such as ill-use the irrational beasts, sin, therefore ...; as it is written, 'The righteous man hath compassion on the life of his beast'."

Text quoted: Prov. 12.10.

§ 9 "As long as man controlled his passions, no animal dared to harm him. "The truth of this is confirmed by the instances of those who lived the best of lives ... Daniel was superior to attack by lions, and Paul to the bite of an adder."

§ 10 "Knowing then the nobility of which we are partakers, and how we are a 'planting from heaven', let us do nothing that would put our nature to shame."

Text quoted: Is. 61.3.

Section B

§ 17 "... everything of which the genesis is in body and time is corruptible and mortal. The words of Moses agree to these things. For when describing the creation of the sensible

universe, he did not expressly say that the nature of the intelligibles was also established by that creation." "Moses does not say that the soul was created at that moment at which it was put into the body ..."
"But if souls arrive out of non-existence, then creation is still going on in defiance of the words of Moses that 'God rested from all his works' ... For the saying, 'My Father worketh' does not refer to creation but to providence."
Texts quoted: Gen. 2.2; John 5.17.

§ 19 Quoted on p. 129 in the text of the paper.

Section C

§ 26 "Those who favour the doctrines of the Hebrews take a different line concerning the heaven and the earth ..." "... (they) say that the heaven and the earth were not made from any pre-existing matter, since Moses said, 'In the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth'. Apollinaris however will have it that it was out of the deep that God made the heaven and the earth, seeing that in his account of the world's creation Moses made no mention of the coming into being of the deep. Nevertheless in Job we have 'who made the deep'. So Apollinaris will have it that it was from the deep as pre-existing matter that all other things were made ..."

Section E

§ 46 "In most cases one ought to choose what is grievous rather than what is shameful, as Susanna and Joseph did."
Texts referred to: History of Susanna 43; Gen. 39.12.

§ 54 "(Plato) diverges but a little from Holy Writ which teaches that providence alone rules over all."

§ 55 "On the contrary all things are possible to him (God), including those we call impossible. To prove this, he established once for all the courses of the sun and moon, which are borne on their way by inevitable laws ... and at the same time to prove that nothing is to him inevitable ... just once he made a special 'day' that scripture sets forth as a 'sign' ..." "In like manner, he made unending the lives of certain men, Elias and Enoch ..."
Texts referred to: Joshua 10.13, 14; II Kings 2.11; Gen. 5.24 cf. Heb. 11.5.

§ 57 Defending the doctrine of freewill: "(some) .. refute us by adducing a citation from scripture that 'A man's ways are not in his own power' ... They cite again 'The thoughts of men's hearts are vain' ..." Nemesius acknowledges that we cannot choose whether to be rich or poor, ill or healthy, etc. but we have power to promote either good or evil, and choice is subject to judgment. "This is proved by what it says in the Gospel, 'Everyone that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.' Also Job sacrificed to God for the trespasses his children had committed in thought."
Texts quoted or alluded to: Matt. 5.28; Job 1.5.

§ 63 "... (man) provides for his children everything that their life requires, of whatever kind or whatever quality ... It has been proved therefore that God is the God of providence."

Compare Luke 11.11-13.

§ 66 "These things are addressed, however, to those who make themselves God's judges. To them may also fittingly be cited these words of scripture, 'Shall the clay say to the potter' and so forth".

Texts quoted: Is. 45.9, cf. Rom. 9.20-21.

§ 68 "If the doctrine of providence over particulars exceeds our comprehension—and surely it does that, as it is written, 'How unsearchable are thy judgments and thy ways past finding out'—still we ought not, on that account, to deny that providence exists ..."

Texts quoted: Rom. 11.33.

§ 69 "... oftentimes God gives permission for a man, though righteous, to fall into misfortune, just so that he may reveal to others, as in the case of Job, what virtue is latent in that man. Another example of divine permission is when God allows some monstrous crime to be committed, so that through the perpetration of an evident outrage, some great and admirable vindication of the right may be achieved, as when by means of the cross, man's salvation was attained. Divine permission appears in a different form where God, as he did in the case of Paul, allows a godly man to suffer grievously only lest his clear conscience and the might that has been granted him should cause him to fall into spiritual pride. One man is forsaken of God for a season so that another man may be corrected, and that others again, in witnessing that man's correction, may be warned by it. It was thus in the case of Lazarus and Dives. For it is natural that we should be restrained by the sight of what happens to others, according to that admirable line from Menander: 'The dread of heaven is fallen on us as we behold what has befallen thee.' Again one man is forsaken of God so as to promote the glory of another, as in the case of the man who was born blind not through any fault of his or of his parents, but for the glory of the Son of Man."

N.B. (1) the quotation from Menander in the midst of a list of Biblical examples. (2) the use of the Cross as an example of 'divine permission' of evil.

Biblical references: Job 1.12; N.T. refs. to the passion; II Cor. 12.7-10; Lk. 16.17-31; Jn. 9.1-38.

"... life is a contest and a striving-ground for virtue ... That is why Paul was allowed to fall into countless afflictions ..." "to the end that the crown of victory .. might be the greater, or rather that it might be unsurpassable."

Texts alluded to: II Cor. 11.23-20; II Tim. 4.7-8.

Concluding Remarks

The two treatises we have examined clearly do not present exactly the same position with respect to the interplay of science and scripture; but they do have certain features in common. For one thing anthropological *analysis* is drawn from contemporary philosophy and medical science;

the Bible may complement this or put it in a different perspective, but it does not replace it. This different perspective had less to do with specifically anthropological observations, more to do with the overall theological context, that is, with the doctrine of creation and the eschatological hope.

I have argued on the basis of these two treatises that contemporary scientific knowledge played a significantly greater part in patristic anthropology than the Bible. In a few concluding remarks, inevitably sketchy and to some extent deliberately provocative, may I suggest that the patristic material in general seems to signify the possibility that the adequacy of an anthropology, even a Christian one, is related very little to its dependence on the Bible and a great deal to the weight given to what scientific knowledge is available.

The anthropology of these treatises is not typical. The popular Platonism presupposed by many of the Fathers was clearly more dualistic and less ready to admit the psychosomatic unity of man. Why are these treatises untypical? Some scholars have spoken of Aristotelian or Stoic influences; but my impression is that most intellectuals were pretty eclectic in this period, and that these elements were already integrated into the general Platonic stream of late Roman philosophy. We shall not find the reason why they are untypical by looking at rival philosophical schools or at the Bible; the reason is simple—they were specifically dealing with the subject of anthropology, taking it seriously, not operating uncritically with popular assumptions but paying attention to serious anthropological discussion among the scientists, particularly the medical philosophers, of the day.

Those who accepted popular assumptions uncritically were trapped into inadequate anthropologies. The major difficulty implicit in the Alexandrian Christological tradition arose from such an inadequate anthropology. Unlike Gregory and Nemesius, Cyril believed that the soul was ἀπαθής, though in some way affected by the body's sufferings; thus the soul was more 'separable' and there was a far less adequate grasp of the psychosomatic unity of man. The consequence was an inadequate understanding of the fall—it was the 'flesh' which distracted and weighed down the mind, not the mind which was perverted. Of course, there is a contradiction here—that the soul should be impassible and yet reduced to passibility by its association with the flesh; yet Cyril's Christological paradox—ἀπαθῶς ἔπαθεν—is an exact parallel. It is no wonder that the soul-body analogy was so central to the Alexandrian

Christology; for man too was "one nature *out of* two natures", and incompatible ones at that! Here was no real engagement with anthropological problems and a consequent over-simplification of the Christological problem. No amount of attention to the Bible could compensate for what was a failure to utilise the best of contemporary science.

Excessive attention to the Bible without considering questions of coherence and without regard to current intellectual demands in fact seems to be characteristic of some who came to be condemned as heretics. Apollinaris appears to have derived his anthropological terminology from the Epistles of Paul, and as a result his position is equally unsystematic. Was he a dichotomist or a trichotomist?—the question has been discussed since his own day! What he says is that according to Paul, man is a νοῦς ἐν σαρκί (dichotomist?); so Christ is the Νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, or flesh συνουσιωμένη with the divine πνεῦμα. But he also says that the Christ, having God as Spirit, that is Mind, together with soul and body, is reasonably called the 'man from heaven'; he is "of three, Spirit, soul and body, but he is 'heavenly man' or 'divine spirit'" (trichotomist?).[6] Pauline terminology lies behind the inconsistencies of the fragments, the confusion of Apollinaris' opponents, and their accusation (which he stated was false) that he taught that the flesh came from heaven.

The one instance where Biblical ideas did successfully contribute to anthropology seems to me to be that of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The case is well put in the widely known book by R. A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ* (Oxford 1963). The success was at least partly due to Theodore's appreciation of the eschatology of the New Testament and the moral imperatives of the Biblical tradition. But then Theodore, too, was condemned as a heretic!

NOTES

* This is a revised version of a paper given at the Conference of the Society for the Study of Theology in March 1980.

[1] There are two homilies on the creation of man found in quite different collections of texts, and variously attributed to Basil and Gregory of Nyssa. Their Basilian authorship has recently been defended (A. Smets and M. van Esbroek, *Basile de Césarée. Sur l'origine de l'homme*, Sources Chrétiennes, Paris 1970); but the problems of authenticity are such that we may disregard them. Clearly Gregory did not know of the existence of such homilies from the pen of Basil. Besides the Sources Chrétiennes edition, these homilies appeared in a supplementary volume to Jaeger's edition of Gregory of Nyssa, ed.

H. Hörner, 1972. The question of their origin is by no means settled, and for our purposes we may disregard them.

[2] Text in Migne, P.G. 44.123-255 (The Forbes edition, Burntisland 1855, is hardly obtainable); translation in NPNF Series II. vol. 5 (This translation is usually quoted in the paper).

[3] Text in Migne, P.G. 40.504-817; translation, commentary and notes by W. Telfer in LCC vol. IV (This translation is usually quoted in this paper).

[4] W. W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa.* Quellenforschungen zum Neuplatonismus und seinen Anfängen bei Poseidonios (Berlin 1914); followed by many others, e.g. Telfer, *Op. cit.* But see L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius* Vol. 1 The Fragments (Cambridge 1972); and the comments in J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977).

[5] W. Telfer, *Op. cit.* p. 248, in his commentary on § 7.

[6] H. Lietzmann, *Apollinaris und seine Schule* (Tübingen 1904), Fragments 36 (p. 212), 116 (p. 235), 69 (p. 220), and the *Tomus Synodalis* (p. 263); also fragments 72 (p. 221), 29 (p. 211), 25 (p. 210), 89 (p. 237), and especially 69 ff (p. 220 ff).

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NEMESIUS OF EMESA AND SOME THEORIES OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE[1]

BY

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At the beginning of the last chapter of his treatise *On the Nature of Man* Nemesius (fl. c. 400 A.D.) outlines five rival theories concerning divine providence, before proceeding to argue for his own view. He has already argued that divine providence exists (ch. 42) and discussed what it is (ch. 43); he is now concerned with its sphere of operation, whether it is concerned with the universal, with the particular, or with both.[2] He has indeed indicated, in ch. 42, that he himself considers providence to be concerned with particulars as well as with universals; it is a marvellous work of divine providence that we all look different from one another, for if we did not we would not recognise one another, and the results of this would be horrific—we would not be able to tell friends from enemies, or avoid committing incest with sisters or mothers, and there would be no laws or political institutions.[3] And I shall be concerned to stress that it is the contrast between providence concerned only with what is universal and general on the one hand, and providence concerned also with the individual on the other, that dominates Nemesius' treatment of the rival theories in ch. 44 as well.

I

The first view is that which he attributes to Plato. As is well known, his account of this is closely parallel to those in the treatise *On Fate*, falsely ascribed to Plutarch, and in Apuleius' *De Platone*.[4] There are other well-known similarities too between the later part of Nemesius' treatise and the pseudo-Plutarch work.[5] The theory of three providences which these sources attribute to Plato is inspired, as [Plutarch] makes explicit,[6] by *Timaeus* 39-41; the Demiurge there creates the structure of the universe as a whole, the world-soul, the heavenly gods (i.e. the stars, the planets and the earth), and the immortal, rational parts of the souls of mortal creatures; but he leaves it to the heavenly gods to create the

mortal parts of these souls and their bodies. This is elaborated, in the later sources, into a hierarchy of three levels of providence; the primary providence of the supreme god, concerned with the heavens and with rational souls,[7] the secondary providence exercised by the heavenly bodies, concerned with the orderly coming-to-be of perishable things and the preservation of natural kinds,[8] and tertiary providence, exercised by *daemones*, concerned with the actions of men. This tertiary providence is not in fact found in the *Timaeus*, but it is pretty clearly based on the Myth of Er in Plato's *Republic*, X 620D.[9]

The most striking difference between Nemesius' account and those of his predecessors is in the number of things he attributes to primary providence. It is concerned not just with the heavens and the order of the universe as a whole, but first of all with the Ideas,[10] and then with the universe as a whole (τοῦ καθόλου κόσμου), for example the heavens and all universals (πάντων τῶν καθόλου), these being the genera—which Nemesius identifies as the Aristotelian categories—and the species under them.

It is not clear what is to be understood by providence exercised over the Ideas, in a Platonic context, though if one follows the common middle-Platonist doctrine that the Ideas are God's thoughts, he may perhaps exercise providence over them in a sense by thinking them. Telfer suggests that Nemesius is trying to extend the scope of primary divine providence as far as possible;[11] this indeed seems to be the case, but the emphasis on what is universal should be noted, in view of some of the other theories that Nemesius cites and the slant of his whole discussion. The Aristotelian categories had been accepted as Platonic by Plutarch and by Albinus-Alcinous.[12]

Nemesius praises this first, Platonic theory for attributing all things to the providence of the supreme god (though it must be said that it does so only indirectly). However, he criticises the doctrine of secondary providence for confusing providence with fate and necessity, since the effects of the heavenly motions follow from those motions of necessity, while in Nemesius' view providence and necessity are incompatible.[13] The relation between secondary providence and fate seems already to have been a topic of controversy among the original proponents of the three-providence theory.[14]

The incompatibility of divine providence and fate is also Nemesius' objection to the second theory, that of the Stoics who hold that everything is governed by divine providence. Like many others,

Nemesius regards determinism as incompatible both with providence[15] and with human responsibility;[16] if things are predetermined by fate, this leaves no room for God to act.

The third theory is the complete denial of providence. Nemesius illustrates this by quoting Epicurus' first Principal Doctrine;[17] the divine neither has troubles itself nor troubles anything else. Surprisingly, though, he couples Heraclitus with the Atomists as denying divine providence. Siclari suggests that Nemesius is thinking of fr. 30, where Heraclitus denies that the world-order was instituted by any god.[18] Heraclitus' point, however, is not that the divine is not involved in the world-order at all, but that that world-order had no beginning; consequently, if this is the passage that Nemesius has in mind, he is misinterpreting it. When he goes on to connect the denial of divine providential concern for the world with the view that it owes its origin to chance, it must be the Atomists that he has in mind rather than Heraclitus.

The fourth and fifth theories require more detailed discussion, and it will be convenient to discuss the text section by section.

II

... ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους δόξαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀπρονόητα λεγόντων τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως μόνης[19] διοικεῖσθαι βούλεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἕκτῷ[20] τῶν Νικομαχείων ἠθικῶν ὑπηνίξατο. ταύτην γὰρ θείαν οὖσαν καὶ τοῖς γεννητοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσαν, ἑκάστῳ φυσικῶς ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν τῶν συμφερόντων αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν βλαπτόντων φυγήν. ἕκαστον γὰρ, ὡς εἴρηται, τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὸν κατάλληλον ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν ἐκλέγεται, καὶ τὸ συμφέρον μεταδιώκει, καὶ τὰς ἰατρείας τῶν παθῶν φυσικῶς ἐπίσταται. Εὐριπίδης δὲ καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν ἐνίοις τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ φασὶ προνοεῖν ἑκάστου, θεῶν δὲ μηδένα.

> ... Let us turn to the opinion of Aristotle and of the others who say that individual things are not objects of providence. For Aristotle indeed is of the opinion that particular things should be governed by nature alone, as he hinted in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For this (i.e. nature), being divine and being present in all created things, naturally instructs each to choose the things that are beneficial and to avoid those that are harmful. For each living creature, as has been said,[21] both selects the nourishment that is appropriate for itself, and pursues what is beneficial, and naturally understands the remedies for its ailments. And Euripides and Menander in certain (places) say that it is the mind in each (individual) that takes forethought for each (individual), and not any of the gods.

Aristotle himself, at least in the extant esoteric works, says scarcely anything about divine providence, and indeed *Metaphysics* A might seem to rule it out altogether as far as the Unmoved Mover is concerned.[22] The situation in the exoteric works may have been rather different.[23] Nevertheless, the question what position on divine providence could be inferred from Aristotle's works was one of considerable interest in later antiquity. The most common view, amply documented by Festugière,[24] was that for Aristotle divine providence governed the heavens but did not extend below the moon. This position is attributed to him by many authors, both pagan[25] and Christian.[26]

Nemesius, however—and this I want to stress—does not refer to *this* contrast, between the sublunary and the superlunary. Rather, what is central to his account is the implied contrast between the universal and the individual or particular (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τὰ κατὰ μέρος). It is true that he speaks of the role of nature in the sublunary, and that in some of the other accounts of Aristotle's position sublunary nature is contrasted with superlunary providence;[27] but Nemesius does not state the contrast in these terms, and, as will be seen shortly, he interprets 'nature' in a somewhat restricted and special sense.

Nemesius appeals to the *Nicomachean Ethics* for the view that nature governs particulars; it is the divine nature of each living creature that causes it to pursue what is to its advantage.[28] There seems to be some confusion over whether the reference is to the sixth or the seventh book; this may have been caused by the ambiguity of Z, the sixth *letter* of the Greek alphabet but the *numeral* for seven.[29] Nemesius' words in any case show that we have to do with an *interpretation* of what Aristotle said (n.b. ὑπηνίξατο), rather than with an explicit statement by him.

Matthaei suggested that the reference was to *Eth. Nic.* 6.13.[30] Verbeke refers to 6.13 1144b4ff., "for it seems to all that each type of character is present, in a way, by nature; for we are just and self-controlled and brave, and possess the other (types of character), right from our birth",[31] and also to 6.11 1143a32-b9;[32] cf. especially b5-7, where Aristotle, speaking of the moral agent's knowledge of particulars, says "so one must have perception of these things, and this is intuition (or "mind", νοῦς). And for this reason these things seem to be natural, and although no-one is *wise* by nature, (people do) possess judgement and understanding and intuition (by nature)."

However, it has also been suggested to me that the reference might be to 7.13 1153b25ff.,[33] "And the fact that all, both beasts and men,

pursue pleasure is a sign that it is in a way the best thing; ... but since the nature and the state that is the best neither is the same (in every case) nor seems so, they do not all pursue the *same* pleasure, though they do all pursue pleasure. Perhaps, though, they do not pursue (the pleasure) they think they do, nor that which they would say (they do), but the same (pleasure in any case); for all things have by nature a certain divine (element)." One may especially compare the last words with the description of nature as "divine" in the Nemesius passage.

Moreover, as Koch in particular has argued, Nemesius earlier in his treatise (chs. 29-34) seems to be drawing on a commentary on the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, rather than on Aristotle himself;[34] and the surviving commentaries on the passage from 7.3, too, show some similarity with our Nemesius passage.[35] The difficulty is that both Aristotle and the commentators are concerned with *pleasure*, and particularly with the contrast between the best pleasure and inferior pleasures; Nemesius' concern is more general.

Nemesius then couples with the 'Aristotelian' theory the view that it is each individual's own mind that takes forethought for himself (προνοεῖν), not the gods; for this he cites Euripides and Menander. The reference to Euripides is to fr. 1018 Nauck²,

ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός.

"It is our mind, in each (of us), that is god."

This is also attributed to Menander; Koerte suggests that he may only have had ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός.[36] But there are other passages too which express a similar idea; Justin Martyr cites two as evidence for Menander's "denying the existence of gods",[37] and Elias in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* cites the beginning of a third,[38] linking Menander with Epicurus as limiting providence to the heavens (sic!) so as not to give the divine trouble by its being concerned with things here on earth.[39] It may be noted that the Euripides and Menander passages suggest an emphasis on individual nature, differing from man to man, while the position attributed to Aristotle stresses rather the natural instincts common to all members of a given species, at least.

III

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν νοῦς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι μόνων· ἢ γὰρ τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, ἢ τῆς θεωρίας· ἡ δὲ πρόνοια τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὡς τοῦ πλουτεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ μή, ὧν οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ὁ νοῦς δύναται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ φύσις, ὡς

'Αριστοτέλει δοκεῖ. εὔδηλα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα. τί δὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὴν φύσιν τὸ ποτὲ μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι τὸν φονέα, ποτὲ δὲ διαφεύγειν;

> But mind is (concerned) only with the things that depend on us; for (it is concerned) either with things done and with the crafts, or with theoretical enquiry. Providence however is (concerned) with things that do not depend on us, like (our) being wealthy or not, and healthy or not; and mind cannot bring about any of these. Nor indeed can nature, as Aristotle thinks (it can). What has it to do either with mind or with nature that a killer is sometimes punished and sometimes escapes punishment?

Nemesius begins his criticism of the fourth theory by arguing that there are certain things that can be attributed neither to mind nor to nature. Mind is concerned with the things for which we are responsible; providence with those for which we are not. The contrast between things for which we are responsible and those for which we are not had been emphasised by the Stoics;[40] Nemesius stresses it in the context of his own treatment of free will,[41] and takes the fact that not every man succeeds in killing those he intends to as evidence for the existence of providence.[42] So too here it is implied that the fact that a murderer is sometimes punished and sometimes not is the work of providence.

Nemesius could have refuted the original claim, that providence is not concerned with particular events, without arguing that among particular events it is confined to things that do not depend on us. It therefore seems likely that this last point is something that he is concerned to assert for its own sake; and indeed he later says that the claim that everything happens rightly under divine providence is to be understood as referring not to men's actions, but to the things brought about by providence, which do not depend on us.[43] Actions are not to be attributed to providence, even if their effects are; the slayer slays unjustly, even if it is just that the victim should die.[44]

It seems clear that 'nature' in this passage must be understood in the light of the account of Aristotle's position given previously. It would be odd to say that nature in a broad sense is not a cause of being healthy or not; but it is more plausible if nature is understood particularly in terms of the natural instincts that govern our actions.

Nemesius then continues with some remarks that seem to have only indirect relevance to the position attributed to Aristotle, Euripides and Menander.

IV

εἰ μή τις λέγοι, τὸ μὲν τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς φύσεως προνοίας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, εἱμαρμένης. εἰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ φύσιν προνοίας ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ἐπακολουθοῦντα

τῆς εἱμαρμένης, ἀνῄρηται τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἀλλ' οὐκ οὕτως ἔχει. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ νοῦ, τοῦ τε πρακτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐδείχθη. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως, εἰ καὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὐκ ἔστι φύσεως ἔργα, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ φονέως ἐδείχθη. ἔστι γὰρ μέρος προνοίας ἡ φύσις, οὐκ αὐτοπρόνοια.

> Unless indeed someone should say that what (depends on) mind and nature is (the work) of providence, but what (comes) later (is the work) of fate. But if what is according to mind and nature is (the work) of providence, and the things that follow (are the work) of fate, what depends on us is done away with. This however is not so. For the (works) of mind, both practical and theoretical, were shown to depend on us.[45] And not everything that is in accordance with providence is (a work) of nature, even though the things that are (works) of nature come about in accordance with providence; for many of the things that are in accordance with providence are not works of nature, as was shown in the case of the killer. Nature is a part of providence, but not providence itself.

The position first outlined and then attacked here seems to be a version of the middle-Platonist theory of conditional fate; our actions are our responsibility, but once we have performed them the consequences are fated.[46] In this version, however, there are two special features; the first, clearly derived from what has preceded, is that the initial action is attributed to mind or nature; and the second is that providence is said to operate at this point. Nemesius' reply is, in effect, to say that such a theory would locate providence in the wrong place. The things that depend on mind are our responsibility; it is with the consequences, which are not in our control, that providence is presumably concerned—like the murderer's escaping or being punished. It has already been observed, both that Nemesius wishes to argue that our actions are not the responsibility of divine providence, and also that he objects to the attribution of consequences to fate, on the grounds that this leaves no room for providence to act.[47]

It is true that the attribution of the actions for which we are responsible to mind or nature takes up what was asserted earlier about the positions of Aristotle, Euripides, and Menander. But they were said to deny any concern of providence with particulars at all, whether actions or their consequences; and there was no mention of fate in connection with their position. The point of contact between the present section and what has preceded is in fact much more specific; the theory put forward and then criticised is a possible answer to the question at the end of the preceding section, what has nature or mind to do with a murderer's

escaping or being punished? Answer: a great deal, if things like this are the fated consequences of actions which are in our power and are the work of mind or of natural instincts. Even so, the reference to providence is unmotivated;[48] and Nemesius seems concerned not so much with the original theory attributed to Aristotle and the others, as with stressing that the actions for which we are responsible are not to be attributed to providence. The present section should therefore be regarded as essentially parenthetical.

Nemesius also comments that, even if all that is natural is providential, the converse does not apply; the catching of the murderer shows this, for that could not be argued to be a work of *nature*. If the point that all that is natural is providential is indeed being conceded here, it follows, if Nemesius is to be consistent, that there must be some aspects at least of human behaviour—those things that do depend on us—that are not to be attributed to nature.

V

οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ νῷ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐπιγράφουσι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τῷ θεῷ μέλειν φασὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διαμονῆς, ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν γενομένων ἐπιλεῖψαι, καὶ τούτου μόνου πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι· τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα φέρεσθαι ὡς ἔτυχε· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰς μὲν ἀδικίας, πολλὰς δὲ μιαιφονίας, καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν, πᾶσαν κακίαν ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καὶ τούτων, ὡς ἔτυχε, τινὰς μὲν διαφεύγειν τὴν δίκην, τινὰς δὲ καὶ κολάζεσθαι, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ νόμον πάντως ἀποβαινόντων. ἔνθα δὲ μήτε νόμος μήτε λόγος κρατεῖ, πῶς ἄν τις φαίη, θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον; καὶ γὰρ συμβαίνει, τοὺς χρηστοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι καὶ μυρίοις κακοῖς περιβάλλεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς καὶ βιαίους αὔξεσθαι δυναστείᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγαθοῖς.

> These people, then, ascribe forethought for individual things to nature and mind; but the others say that god is concerned for the continuance of the things that are, so that none of the things that came to be should fail, and that it is with this alone that his providence is concerned; individual things are swept along at random. And for this reason many injustices, many murders and in short every sort of wickedness has its dwelling among men; and of these (men), as it chances, some escape justice, while others are indeed punished, the outcome not in every case being in accordance either with right reason or with law. And where neither law nor reason prevails, how could anyone say that it is god who exercises care? For indeed it comes about that the good for the most part suffer injustice and are humiliated and are surrounded by countless evils, while the wicked and violent grow in power and wealth and authority and all the other good things in life.

Nemesius now introduces the fifth theory, that of those who say that god is concerned for the continuity of things, but not with particulars. In referring to this view later he explicitly states the contrast as one between the universal and the particular (804a): οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς ἀπρονόητα λέγεται τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν καθόλου καὶ γενικῶν προνοίας τυγχανόντων, "they are wrong to say that individual things are not objects of providence, while those that are universal and generic are recipients of providence." It is against this view, or at least against its negative part, the denial of providential concern with particulars, that Nemesius directs the rest of his argument and the major part of the whole chapter; his overriding concern is to demonstrate that particular events *are* divinely ordered.

The proponents of the fourth theory had a positive view of their own about the causes of particular events; the fifth theory differs from this, as Telfer says, in stressing the negative aspect—the lack of concern of divine providence with such things—and attributing them to random chance. Telfer indeed argues that the fifth theory is not a philosophical one at all; and Nemesius' phrase 'but the others' seems to contrast the adherents of the fifth view with those of all the first four, considered as a group.[49] No doubt the view that individual events are not the concern of providence was one that was popularly held, and this may explain the amount of attention Nemesius gives to it in the rest of the chapter. Nevertheless, the statement that providence is concerned with the continuity of the things that come to be, and the reference to what is universal and generic, have a philosophical ring; and as will be seen later there are other elements too in Nemesius' discussion which suggest that it is in part a philosophical theory that he has in mind here also.

The view that the divine is not concerned with details has a long history.[50] It may be useful to draw a distinction here, while realising that it may not always have been clearly recognised in antiquity. This is the distinction between (1) saying that divine providence pays attention to the general rather than the particular, in the sense that it deliberately and consciously sacrifices the interests of the part to those of the whole, and (2) saying that providence simply disregards what happens to individuals, this being of no interest to it at all. (1) is in no way incompatible with a belief in universal divine providence; and it was asserted by Chrysippus[51]—though it must be added that for the Stoic it is not really a question of sacrificing the interests of the part to the whole, for the true interest of the part *is* that of the whole.[52] Plutarch attributes to

Chrysippus an analogy between the universe and a great household in which some details are neglected although the whole is well organised;[53] this on the face of it suggests (2), but it is difficult to see how that can be squared with Chrysippus' general position, and Babut seems right in suggesting that Plutarch may be quoting Chrysippus out of context.[54] In Cicero's *De natura deorum* the Stoic spokesman Balbus has recourse to the argument that *magna di curant, parva neglegunt*;[55] this might seem to be evidence for a Stoic view that providence was concerned only with the general, and not with the particular, but it is in fact placed at the end of an argument showing that the gods do at least care for great men as individuals, even if they do not care for every detail of our daily lives. Moreover, Cicero immediately follows the remark by an allusion to the argument that, since virtue is the only good, the apparent misfortunes of the righteous are not misfortunes at all;[56] there would be no need to use this argument to defend divine providence if it had been conceded that the fortunes of individuals were of no concern to it in any case.

Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.12.1-5, lists five views concerning providence. The first is that the gods do not exist at all; the second, that they do not exercise providence—the Epicurean view; and the fifth, that they exercise providence even over individuals, the view for which Epictetus himself argues. The third view in Epictetus, confining providence to divine and heavenly things and excluding it from things on earth, is the view conventionally ascribed to Aristotle,[57] though not by Nemesius. The remaining view, the fourth, is that providence *is* concerned with things on earth and with human affairs, but only in a general and not in a particular way. This has generally been taken to be a Stoic position, on the basis of passages like that from Cicero just discussed;[58] but in fact it seems to go further than such passages, in denying divine concern for individuals altogether. Moreover Epictetus, himself a Stoic, opts for the fifth view, not the fourth.

With the fourth view in Epictetus Upton compared a passage in Justin Martyr referring to a view according to which God is concerned with the whole and with genera and species, but not with individual things.[59] Van Winden suggests that this is a Stoic position;[60] but the terms in which it is stated seem reminiscent not so much of Stoicism as of the description of Platonic secondary providence in [Plutarch] *On Fate*, with the difference that in the latter concern for individuals does make its appearance at the tertiary level, which it does not do in Justin.

That divine providence is concerned with sublunary things, but only with species and not with individuals, was also the position presented as that of Aristotle by the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. Like those cited by Nemesius, he used this to explain the occurrence of injustices and the misfortunes of the righteous.[61] Divine providence is exercised in the preservation of coming-to-be and passing away, and hence of natural species, by the heavenly motions;[62] this account of the effect of the heavenly motions is genuinely Aristotelian,[63] even if its description in terms of providence is not. Nemesius, it may be noted, refers to the Aristotelian theory in his account of Platonic secondary providence.[64]

There are a number of points that at least suggest that it may in part be Alexander's position that Nemesius has in mind in his discussion of the fifth of the theories he lists. Firstly, there is the reference in Nemesius' fifth theory to the preservation of natural kinds, coupled with the emphasis, here and throughout Nemesius' account, on the contrast between universal and particular. It is true that each of these points individually can be parallelled elsewhere—in [Plutarch]'s account of secondary providence, and in passages like that from Epictetus just discussed, respectively—but it is above all in Alexander that we find these two themes combined.

Secondly, Nemesius criticises supporters of the fifth view for ignoring two points; firstly that the soul is immortal, and secondly that it is virtue, not external goods, that is essential for happiness.[65] Both points are indeed often enough made; the latter, in particular, is common in attempts to reconcile divine providence with the apparent misfortunes of the righteous.[66] But it is worth noting that both points are prominent in attacks on Aristotle by both pagan and Christian authors,[67] and that Alexander was regularly criticised in later antiquity for denying the immortality of the soul.[68] Nemesius also attacks, in connection with the fifth view, the supposition that providential concern for particulars is beneath God's dignity;[69] Telfer sees this as directed against Neoplatonists,[70] but it is a point that is repeatedly stressed by Alexander.[71]

A more specific piece of evidence is the following. Nemesius brings against the fifth view the objection that, if there is no providential concern for particulars, the universal species too will perish; the existence of particulars and of species is mutually independent, each implying the other.[72] This objection will clearly only have point against those who

hold that the existence of universals depends on that of particulars. It would thus apply both to Peripatetics and to Stoics, although the terms in which Nemesius expresses the point do not seem Stoic. Telfer suggests that it may be directed against Neoplatonists who had abandoned an interpretation of Platonism that gave the Ideas reality independent of other orders of existence;[73] but he does not cite any evidence for this. Plotinus' claim that there are Ideas of individuals is rather different.[74] Alexander the Peripatetic, however, asserts both—with Aristotle—that the existence of universals depends on that of individuals,[75] and also conversely that the existence of an individual man or horse, for example, depends on that of the common nature of man or horse, though *not* on its instantiation as a *universal* in *more than one* individual.[76]

Having made this objection, Nemesius goes on to say that, if the proponents of the fifth view say that providence ensures that there are always *some* members of a species, they are, unbeknown to themselves, introducing providential concern for individuals after all.[77] This is precisely what Alexander *does* say; it is by the succession of individuals that the species is preserved, although providence is not concerned with the detailed career of each individual, and with ensuring that *every* creature produces offspring.[78] Nemesius' claim that such a position involves introducing providential concern for individuals after all seems disingenuous; it is very different from ascribing to providence the sort of concern for individuals that raises problems over the prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the righteous.

These points may not be enough to show conclusively that Nemesius is influenced, either directly or indirectly, by Alexander's views concerning providence. But they, and the other points discussed earlier, do suggest that this whole section of Nemesius' treatise is best understood in the context of debates about divine providence that flourished in the first two centuries A.D. in particular.

NOTES

[1] This article is a revised version of a paper which was read to the Oxford Philological Society and to the Open University London Region Classics Staff Seminar. I am most grateful to all who participated in the discussion on both occasions, and especially to Jonathan Barnes, Christopher Kirwan, and Professor Richard Sorabji.

References to Nemesius are to the edition by Matthaei as reprinted in vol. 40 of Migne's Patrologia Graeca. There is no more modern critical edition of the Greek text, but G. Verbeke has edited the Latin translation by Burgundio of Pisa (*Corpus Latinum Com-*

mentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, suppl. 1, Leiden 1975) and in his apparatus cites an unpublished critical text of the Greek by Professor Benedict Einarson. Some passages are also discussed by M. Morani, 'Note critiche e linguistiche al testo di Nemesio', *Classical Philology* 77 (1982) 35-42, who gives further information about MSS readings. In what follows L indicates Burgundio's translation; J = Rome, Bibl. Vat. Chisianus 13, the MS on which it was based; A, D and M = Matthaei's A2, D1 and M2, the only MSS cited by Matthaei that include the passage with which we are concerned. The numbering of the chapters varies (see Morani p. 39); ch. 44 in Matthaei is ch. 42 in Verbeke.

Other abbreviations: CIAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca; GCS = Die griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller; PG = Migne, Patrologia Graeca; SA = Supplementum Aristotelicum; *SVF* = H. van Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*.

[2] Nemesius 44 793A. The distinction between showing that something exists and showing what it is is ultimately Aristotelian (*An. Post.* 2.1 89b23-35, *Phys.* 3.4 202b35-6, 4.10 217b31-2); cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.13. And for Nemesius' three-fold division of his topic cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Mantissa* 24 and 25 (SA 2.1 176.2-5, 179.26-31) and *De fato* 2 (SA 2.2 165.14f., 23f.).

[3] Nemesius 42 788B, 789A-792A; cf. also 40 772A.

[4] [Plutarch], *De fato* 9, 572F-573A; Apuleius, *De Platone* 1.12 (96.2ff. Thomas). See next note.

[5] In the attribution to Plato of a theory of conditional fate (Nemesius 38 765A-B, [Plutarch] 4 570A-B; cf. Albinus (Alcinous), *Didasc.* 26 179.7ff. Hermann; Calcidius, *In Timaeum* 150 186.13ff. Waszink) and in the treatment of possibility (Nemesius 34 737AB, 740B-741A, [Plutarch] 6 570F-571D; cf. Calcidius, *In Timaeum* 155-6 189.13-190.13). A. Gercke, 'Eine Platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus', *Rh. Mus.* 41 (1886) 266-291; W. Theiler, 'Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre', *Phyllobolia für P. von der Mühll* (Basel 1946) 67-82; J. M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 294-8, 320-6.

[6] [Plutarch], *De fato* 9 573C-574A.

[7] Rational souls are not mentioned in connection with primary providence by Nemesius himself. A reference to the souls of men would be implied if one read ἀτίμων (ζῴων) at the beginning of his account of secondary providence, with Ellebodius and Matthaei; but the ἀτόμων of ADL and Valla is clearly preferable; cf. Morani (above n. 1) 40. [Plutarch] does not mention rational souls in his *initial* account of primary providence (572F); but cf. μέχρι ψυχῶν ἀνθρωπίνων (573D).

[8] The reference to the preservation of natural kinds is explicit only in [Plutarch]; but cf. below, n. 64.

[9] Although [Plutarch] tries to find it in *Timaeus* 42D; [Plutarch] 573F. Cf. my 'Alexander of Aphrodisias on divine providence; two problems', *CQ* n.s. 32 (1982) 204 n. 54.

[10] Reading ἰδεῶν (A corr., Valla Matthaei Einarson); ἰδίων ADL.

[11] W. Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*. Library of Christian Classics 4 (London 1955) 434 n. 3.

[12] Plutarch, *De an. procr. in Tim.* 23 1023E; Albinus, *Didasc.* 6 159.34f. Hermann. Dillon (above n. 5) 226, 279.

[13] Nemesius 38 756C-760A (against the middle-Platonist conditional fate theory); cf. 37 752A, and below n. 15.

[14] [Plutarch], *De fato* 10 574CD.

[15] Nemesius 35 741B (of astrological determinism). Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato* 17 (SA 2.2 188.1-6, 8-10); Theodoret, *Graec. aff. cur.* 6.3 150.7ff. Raeder.

[16] Nemesius 35 741B, 745A; Alexander, *De fato* 14 (SA 2.2 182.20-184.20).

[17] Nemesius 44 796B.

[18] A. Siclari, *L'antropologia di Nemesio di Emesa* (Padua 1974) 291, n. 119.

[19] This, the reading of a number of MSS including Patmiacus S. Johannis 202 and of the Armenian version, is preferred by Morani (above n. 1) 40 to the ἡμῖν of the MSS used by Matthaei.

[20] ἐκτῷ eds. Valla Matthaei; om. A; *Z* D; ἑβδόμῳ MJL Einarson. See below. L omits Νικομαχείων.

[21] It is not clear to what this refers.

[22] See, however, on the question of divine knowledge of the sublunary, pages 205-6 of my article cited in n. 9, and references there.

[23] Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.33, 2.95f. (Aristotle fr. 13, 26 Ross); Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De providentia*, p. 33.1ff. of the edition by H.-J. Ruland, *Die arabische Fassung von zwei Schriften des Alexanders von Aphrodisias* (diss. Saarbrücken 1976); S. Pines, 'Un texte inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe', *Arch. d'hist. doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 31 (1956) 14f., 26f.; D. J. Allan, *The Philosophy of Aristotle*[2] (Oxford 1970) 19-22.

[24] A.-J. Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'Évangile* (Paris 1932) 221-263; cf. also P. Moraux, 'L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce', *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 47 (1949) 33f., and *D'Aristote à Bessarion* (Laval 1970) 54ff.; H. Happ, 'Weltbild und Seinslehre bei Aristotles', *Antike und Abendland* 14 (1968) 77ff.; F. P. Hager, 'Proklos und Alexander von Aphrodisias über ein Problem der Vorsehung', *Kephalaion: Studies presented to C. J. de Vogel* (Assen 1975) 177f.

[25] Critolaus fr. 15 Wehrli; Aëtius 2.3.4; Diogenes Laertius 5.32; Atticus fr. 3.56f. des Places; Calcidius, *In Timaeum* 250 p. 267ff. Waszink.

[26] Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.14, 90.3 (GCS 52 (15) 385.19f.); Theodoret, *Graec. aff. cur.* 5.47, 6.7 (p. 136.21-4, 151.9-11 Raeder); Hippolytus, *Ref. omn. haeres.* 7.19.2 (GCS 26, 194.4-8); Epiphanius, *Adv. haeres.* 3.31 (H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* 592.10-13).

[27] Cf. Atticus fr. 8.14f. des Places, and perhaps Hippolytus, loc. cit. p. 194.6 (ἀρχούμενον μόνῃ τῇ φύσει τῇ ἑαυτοῦ). Alexander of Aphrodisias identified fate with nature, regarded it as connected especially with the sublunary, and related it to human actions (*Mantissa* 25, SA 2.1 181.14ff., 185.11-33, 186.18; *De fato* 6, SA 2.2 170.9-171.17. P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote* (Liège 1942) 198f.) but he links fate and nature closely with the providential influence of the heavens (*De providentia*, above n. 23, 77.12; Moraux loc. cit.). The part of the divine in human desire is mentioned by Aristotle in *Eudemian Ethics* 8.2 1248a25-33 (Allan, above n. 23, 95f.); but there is no close similarity to the present passage. It may be noted that nature is described as θείαν in the present passage even though its connection with providence is being denied.

[28] It is clearly indicated in the Greek that "for this—harmful", as well as what precedes, is to be taken as part of the position attributed to Aristotle.

[29] Above, n. 20. Cf. John S. Keaney, 'The Early Tradition of Theophrastus' Historia Plantarum', *Hermes* 96 (1968) 296, n. 2.

[30] PG 40 797 n. 15.

[31] Verbeke (above n. 1) lxxiv n. 51.

[32] *Ibid.* p. 161.13 n.

[33] Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 10.2 1173a1ff.

[34] H. A. Koch, *Quellenuntersuchungen zu Nemesios von Emesa*, (Berlin 1921) 26f., 32ff., 40. Cf. also my 'Alexander of Aphrodisias *De fato*: some parallels', *CQ* n.s. 28 (1978) 265f.

[35] Aspasius, CIAG 19.1 153.7ff.; Anon., CIAG 20 455.14ff.; Heliodorus, CIAG 19.2 159.27ff.

[36] So Plutarch, *Quaest. Plat.* 1.1 999D. Menander, fr. 749 Koerte; *Menandri sententiae*, monostich. 588 Jaekel.

[37] Justin, *De monarchia* 5, PG 6 324B. Menander, frr. 13, 64 Koerte; cf. also *Menandri sententiae*, pap. 2.15 Jaekel.

[38] Elias, *In Cat.*, CIAG 18.1 112.1-7; Menander, *Epitrepontes* 726-40 Koerte. Telfer (above n. 11), 436 n. 2.

[39] Atticus regarded the alleged Aristotelian denial of sublunary providence as tantamount to the Epicurean denial of providence altogether; fr. 3.51ff. des Places.

[40] *SVF* 2.990, p. 290.6-8; *SVF* 2.991, p. 290.29-31 (= Nemesius 35 744B); Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.1.7, 4.1.100. A. A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 189ff. and nn.

[41] Nemesius 40 768A-769C.

[42] id. 42 780C-781A.

[43] id. 44 813B. On the question whether this commits Nemesius to Pelagianism cf. Fell at PG 40 837C-838C; B. Domanski, *Die Psychologie des Nemesius* (Münster 1900) 161 n. 1, Koch (above n. 34) 44, and Siclari (above n. 18) 241-3.

[44] 44 816Aff. Cf. Plotinus, 3.2.13; Euripides, *Electra* 1244.

[45] In chapters 39 and 40; cf. especially 40 768A-769A.

[46] It seems that τὸ μὲν refers to the action which is the result of mind and nature, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον to its consequences—like τὰ ἐπακολουθοῦντα in the following sentence. Cono translated *'quod primum intellectus et naturae est, providentiae esse'* (PG 40 797 n. 29).

[47] Above, nn. 13, 43.

[48] It can hardly be supposed that Nemesius is referring to human forethought by πρόνοια and not to divine providence at all. Admittedly, προνοεῖν is the term he uses in his statement of the Euripides-Menander position (above, section II); and Atticus, fr. 8.7f. des Places, uses πρόνοια of human forethought in Aristotle, contrasted both with heavenly fate and with sublunary nature. But if πρόνοια were understood in this way in the present passage of Nemesius, there would be no grounds for saying that human responsibility was done away with.

[49] Telfer (above n. 11) 437 n. 5. I am grateful to Professor van Winden for drawing my attention to the significance of 'the' in the phrase 'but the others'.

[50] Many examples are given by A. S. Pease, ed., *Cicero: De natura deorum*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 973. The discussion goes back in philosophical contexts at least to Plato, *Laws* 10 900E-903A, on which Nemesius 44 804A-808A is clearly based.

[51] *SVF* 2.1175-7, cf. 1170; and compare Marcus Aurelius 6.44.

[52] Cf. *SVF* 3.191.

[53] Plutarch, *De Stoic. Rep.* 37 1051C (*SVF* 2.1178).

[54] D. Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 291f.

[55] Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.167.

[56] See below, n. 66.

[57] Above, nn. 25-6. O. Gigon, review of Pease (*op. cit.* in n. 50), *Gnomon* 34 (1962) 673.

[58] So Gigon *loc. cit.*, and Upton, cited by J. Schweighaüser, *Epicteti dissertationum libri iv* (Leipzig 1799) 2.1.159f.

[59] Justin, *Contra Tryphonem* 1.4 (PG 6 473C-476A).

[60] J. C. M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher. Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho chs. i-ix* (Leiden 1971) 33.

[61] Alexander, *De prov.* (above n. 23) 11.6ff., 101.3ff.; and fr. 36 in J. Freudenthal, 'Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur *Metaphysik* des Aristoteles', *Abh. Berl.* 1884 no. 1.

[62] Alexander, *De prov.* 31.1ff., 87.5-91.4; cf. *Quaestiones* 1.25 (SA 2.2 41.8ff.), 2.19 (*ibid.* 63.15ff.).

[63] Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* 2.10 336b31ff.

[64] Nemesius, 44 793B.

[65] *Ibid.* 800B.

[66] Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.167 (above n. 56); Seneca, *De providentia* 2.1; Simplicius, *In Epicteti Enchiridion* p. 95.44ff. Dübner. Pease (above, n. 50) 974.

[67] Cf. Atticus, frr. 2.9ff. and 7; in Christian authors well documented by Festugière, above n. 24.

[68] Philoponus, *In De anima*, CIAG 15 10.1-3, 159.22f.; Elias, *In Cat.*, CIAG 18.1 115.10f., 123.4ff. Moraux (above n. 27) 96 n. 5. I am grateful to Dr F. W. Zimmermann for drawing my attention to this.

[69] Nemesius 44 805A.

[70] Telfer (above n. 11), 442 n. 1.

[71] *De prov.* (above n. 23) 19.3ff., 25.1ff., 31.16, 53.1ff., 63.11ff.; *Mantissa* 2 (SA 2.1 113.12ff.), *Quaestio* 2.21 (SA 2.2 68.19ff.).

[72] Nemesius 44 804AB.

[73] Telfer (above n. 11), 432 n. 1.

[74] Plotinus, 5.7.

[75] *De anima*, SA 2.1 90.4f.

[76] *De prov.* 89.5; *Quaestio* 1.11b (SA 2.2 23.11-13, 24.19-22). S. Pines, 'A new fragment of Xenocrates and its implications', *Trans. American Philos. Soc.* n.s. 51.2 (1961), 28f.

[77] Nemesius 44 804B.

[78] *De prov.* 89.7ff.; cf. 95.4ff., *De fato* 6 (SA 2.2 170.2f.), 23 (193.8-10), 24 (194.8ff.).

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DIVORCE ET REMARIAGE CHEZ SAINT ÉPIPHANE

BY

PIERRE NAUTIN

Saint Épiphane, auteur du plus grand traité contre toutes les hérésies que nous ait légué l'antiquité chrétienne, touche à la question du remariage après divorce dans sa notice sur les Novatiens. Ce passage pose toutefois un problème de syntaxe. On en a beaucoup discuté, mais il semble qu'on ait été souvent plus attentif à des considérations doctrinales ou apologétiques qu'à la grammaire. Je voudrais au contraire l'aborder ici d'un point de vue essentiellement philologique, et cela pour une bonne raison: préparant avec deux collègues une édition critique du traité d'Épiphane, je dois adopter un texte qui satisfasse avant tout aux exigences de la philologie et aux règles ordinaires d'établissement des textes. J'examinerai ensuite un autre passage du même ouvrage qui traite du même sujet et pose aussi des problèmes d'édition.

I. PANARION, *HAER.* 59, 4

Voici donc le premier passage. Épiphane est en train de réfuter les Novatiens qui interdisent tout remariage, même après la mort du conjoint. Il reconnaît que cette règle vaut pour les clercs, mais il nie qu'elle s'impose aux laïcs, et déclare (d'après les deux manuscrits qui nous ont conservé cette partie de son traité[1]):

> Ἔξεστι δὲ τῷ λαῷ δι' ἀσθένειαν διαβαστάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντας[2] ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ γαμετῇ στῆναι δευτέρᾳ μετὰ θάνατον τῆς πρώτης συναφθῆναι. Καὶ ὁ μὲν μίαν ἐσχηκὼς ἐν ἐπαίνῳ μείζονι καὶ τιμῇ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐκκλησιαζομένοις ἐνυπάρχει, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς τῇ μιᾷ ἀρκεσθῆναι τελευτησάσῃ ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως[3] πορνείας ἢ μοιχείας ἢ κακῆς αἰτίας χωρισμοῦ γενομένου συναφθέντα δευτέρᾳ γυναικὶ — ἢ γυνὴ δευτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ — οὐκ αἰτιᾶται ὁ θεῖος λόγος οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀποκηρύττει, ἀλλὰ διαβαστάζει διὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, οὐχ ἵνα δύο γυναῖκας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σχῇ[4] ἔτι περιούσης μιᾶς, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς[5] μιᾶς ἀποσχισθεὶς δευτέρᾳ, εἰ τύχοι, ἐννόμως[6] συναφθῇ.[7]

10 Ἐλεεῖ τοῦτον ὁ ἅγιος λόγος καὶ ἡ ἁγία θεοῦ ἐκκλησία, μάλιστα εἰ τυγχάνει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὰ ἄλλα εὐλαβὴς καὶ κατὰ νόμον θεοῦ πολιτευόμενος.

Parcourons d'abord les interprétations données dans le passé, pour recueillir les enseignements qu'elles comportent, puis nous procéderons à un nouvel examen du texte.

1. *Les interprétations précédentes*

1. Commençons à Petau. Dans son édition d'Épiphane (1622), il garde le texte des manuscrits et le traduit comme suit:[8]

> Quanquam qui unam dumtaxat habuit, maiori ecclesiae iudicio honore dignus est. Sed cui mortua una non sufficit, cum occasione aliqua stupri adulteriique aut alterius flagitii cum ea diuortium fecerit, is si alteram uxorem duxerit, aut alteri uiro mulier nupserit, sacrarum litterarum auctoritas ab omni culpa illos absoluit neque ab ecclesia aut aeterna uita rejicit, sed propter imbecillitatem tolerandos existimat.

On observera que cette traduction interprète le nominatif ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθείς comme s'il exprimait le complément d'objet du verbe αἰτιᾶται: «Celui à qui une femme unique défunte n'a pas suffi ..., l'autorité des Saintes Lettres l'a absout de toute faute». Autrement dit, elle donne à ce nominatif la fonction d'un accusatif! On dira peut-être qu'Épiphane écrit mal. Je ne le sais que trop, mais l'a-t-on jamais vu commettre un solécisme aussi grossier? Pareille solution est philologiquement inacceptable. Petau en avait d'ailleurs conscience et il exprimait dans une note sa conviction que la phrase grecque n'était pas en bon état. La traduction qu'il donnait n'était à ses yeux qu'un pis-aller.

En revanche, Petau faisait une remarque très juste en observant dans la même note qu'Épiphane parle successivement de deux sortes de remariages: d'abord du remariage après la mort de l'épouse (τελευτησάσῃ), puis du remariage après divorce pour cause de fornication (ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως πορνείας ἢ μοιχείας ἢ κακῆς αἰτίας). Et cela lui paraissait «prouver à l'évidence qu'Épiphane veut dire ceci: qu'il est permis de contracter un nouveau mariage non seulement après la mort du conjoint mais encore de son vivant s'il y a une cause légitime».[9]

2. D'autres auteurs, Zenger (1813), Roskovany (1837), Cigoi (1895), Joyce (1948), qui répugnaient à penser qu'Épiphane avait admis le remariage après divorce pour cause de fornication, ont refusé l'interprétation que Petau donnait de l'ensemble de la phrase. Selon eux, Épi-

phane viserait le cas où il y a eu d'abord séparation des époux pour cause de fornication, puis mort de l'épouse; il faudrait comprendre: [10]

> Celui qui n'a pas pu se contenter d'une seule qui est morte, une séparation s'étant produite (auparavant) pour motif de fornication, d'adultère ou pour une mauvaise cause ..., la Parole divine ne le condamne pas.

Mais cette retouche doctrinale ne change rien au problème de fond. Ces auteurs trouvent tout naturel de faire du nominatif ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς le complément d'objet direct du verbe αἰτιᾶται. Leur solution n'est donc pas plus acceptable que celle de Petau.

3. Condamin (1900) repoussait lui aussi l'interprétation générale de Petau pour n'avoir pas à compter Épiphane au nombre des partisans du remariage après un divorce pour cause de fornication, mais il proposait une autre solution que les précédents: il s'agirait d'un veuf qui se remarie parce qu'il craint, s'il reste seul, de tomber dans la fornication ou l'adultère. [11] C'est la solution adoptée par le P. Henri Crouzel, qui traduit: [12]

> Celui qui n'a pu se contenter d'une seule qui est morte, pour motif de fornication, d'adultère ou pour une mauvaise cause, lorsque la séparation (par la mort) a eu lieu, s'il s'est uni à une seconde femme ... la Parole divine ne l'accuse pas.

Mais elle est encore moins satisfaisante que les précédentes parce qu'elle cumule deux fautes:
1) Elle critique Petau pour des raisons doctrinales mais le suit sur le point qui fait le plus difficulté en acceptant de prendre un nominatif comme complément d'objet direct d'un verbe au mépris de toute grammaire. C'est là un vice rédhibitoire.
2) Elle a en outre le tort de donner à χωρισμός, employé *seul*, le sens de «séparation des époux par la mort» qu'on ne lui connaît pas ailleurs. En réalité, rien qu'à voir les mots employés, tout désigne une séparation par divorce: 1° le terme même de χωρισμὸς évoque *Matth.* 19, 6: «Ce que Dieu a uni, que l'homme ne le *sépare* (χωριζέτω) pas»; 2° C'est aussi ce que suggère l'énoncé des motifs: ἕνεκεν ... πορνείας ..., le mot πορνείας renvoyant à *Matth.* 5, 32: «Quiconque renvoie sa femme en dehors du motif de *fornication* (παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας) lui fait commettre l'adultère», et 19, 9: «Quiconque renvoie sa femme, sauf pour *fornication* (μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείας), et en épouse une autre, commet un adultère». Dans un tel contexte, vouloir que χωρισμοῦ signifie autre chose que la séparation par divorce tient du paradoxe, et quand cela s'ajoute à l'impossible hypo-

thèse qui consiste à prendre un nominatif pour complément d'objet direct d'un verbe, nous avons deux raisons plutôt qu'une d'éliminer une solution aussi artificielle.

4. Holl, dans l'édition du Corpus de Berlin (1922), rapporte à son tour les mots ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς au verbe αἰτιᾶται. Il a cherché toutefois à respecter la grammaire en transformant le nominatif en accusatif: τὸν δὲ μὴ δυνηθέντα. Il corrige en outre à la ligne 5 κακῆς en ἄλλης, à la ligne 6 γυνὴ en γυναῖκα, et ajoute à la ligne 4 ἢ après τελευτησάσῃ. Le texte devient alors: [13]

*τὸν δὲ μὴ *δυνηθέντα τῇ μιᾷ ἀρκεσθῆναι τελευτησάσῃ <ἢ> ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως, ἢ πορνείας ἢ μοιχείας ἢ *ἄλλης αἰτίας, χωρισμοῦ γενομένου συναφθέντα δευτέρᾳ γυναικὶ ἢ *γυναῖκα δευτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ, οὐκ αἰτιᾶται ὁ θεῖος λόγος οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀποκηρύττει ...

> Mais celui qui n'a pu se contenter d'une seule (femme), qui est morte <ou> qui, après une séparation effectuée en alléguant la fornication, l'adultère ou une autre cause, s'est uni à une deuxième femme — ou une femme à un deuxième mari — la Parole divine ne l'accuse pas, et ne le bannit pas de l'Église et de la vie ...

Cette solution est meilleure que toutes les précédentes en ce qu'elle tient compte des règles les plus élémentaires de la langue grecque. Mais elle n'est pas encore acceptable pour deux raisons:
1) Elle requiert *trop de corrections*, alors qu'un des critères d'une bonne restitution de texte est qu'elle soit économique;
2) Elle suppose des *fautes difficilement explicables*. Il est extrêmement rare, en effet, de voir un copiste transformer un accusatif en nominatif quand ils ne se ressemblent pas; or ici un copiste l'aurait fait trois fois (τὸν/ὁ — δυνηθέντα/δυνηθείς — γυναῖκα/γυνή), et, qui plus est, il aurait laissé néanmoins un autre accusatif sans le transformer (συναφθέντα); tout cela est de la plus haute invraisemblance.

5. Calogero Riggi a essayé une solution nouvelle qui consiste à rattacher ce nominatif non plus à la phrase suivante comme tous les commentateurs le faisaient depuis Petau, mais à la phrase précédente.[14] Pour cela il corrige ὁ δὲ μὴ en οὐ δὲ μή; puis il adopte l'accentuation ἡ γυνὴ pour faire de ce substantif le sujet de αἰτιᾶται; en conséquence de quoi ὁ θεῖος λόγος, qui n'est plus sujet de αἰτιᾶται, devient le début d'une troisième phrase. Il écrit donc le texte comme suit: [15]

Καὶ ὁ μὲν μίαν ἐσχηκὼς ἐν ἐπαίνῳ μείζονι καὶ τιμῇ πᾶσιν ἐκκλησιαζομένοις ὑπάρχει, *οὐ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς ἀρκεσθῆναι τελευτησάσῃ. Ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως,

πορνείας ἢ μοιχείας ἢ κακῆς αἰτίας, χωρισμοῦ γενομένου συναφθέντα δευτέρᾳ γυναικὶ ἡ γυνὴ δευτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ οὐκ αἰτιᾶται· ὁ θεῖος λόγος οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀποκηρύττει ...

et il en propose cette traduction:

> sebbene la Chiesa lodi e stimi di più chi ne ha avuto una sola, e meno chi non riesce a limitarsi dopo la morte della prima. Avvenuta che sia una separazione, a motivo di fornicazione, di adulterio o di cosa perversa, quella che è diventata moglie per un altro uomo, non a certo recriminazioni da fare contra chi si è unito ad una seconda moglie. Nemmeno la Parole Divina lo bandisce dalla Chiesa e dalla Vita ...

Cette tentative a le mérite d'être sobre en corrections, mais elle biaise encore avec la grammaire ou le sens des mots sur quatre points:
— οὐ δὲ μὴ ne signifie pas «moins» (*meno*)
— μὴ δυνηθεὶς *sans article* ne signifie pas «*celui qui* ne réussit pas à ...» (*chi* non riesce)
— συναφθέντα *sans article* ne signifie pas davantage: «*celui qui* s'est uni» (*chi* si è unito)
— C. Riggi fait commencer une phrase aux mots ὁ θεῖος λόγος, mais dans ce cas la conjonction οὐδὲ devient difficilement justifiable à la place où elle se trouve; il faudrait ou la transporter devant ὁ θεῖος λόγος (pour qu'elle soit mise en parallèle avec le premier οὐ), ou corriger καὶ τῆς ζωῆς en οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς.

Une telle solution ne peut pas plus nous convenir que les précédentes.

2. *La fonction du nominatif* ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς

Force nous est donc de reprendre l'examen du texte pour notre propre compte. Le problème principal au regard de la grammaire est de trouver la fonction du nominatif ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς à la ligne 4. Un autre problème est d'expliquer, à la ligne 6, la présence des mots ἢ γυνὴ δευτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ mal intégrés à la phrase, mais comme ce dernier problème est moins important pour l'intelligence générale du morceau, nous le prendrons après le premier.

Les essais précédents n'ont pas été inutiles, car ils ont démontré que ce nominatif ne peut être:
— ni intégré à la proposition précédente ὁ μὲν μίαν ἐσχηκὼς ἐν ἐπαίνῳ μείζονι καὶ τιμῇ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐκκλησιαζομένοις ὑπάρχει, qui est grammaticalement complète et offre un sens excellent:

> Celui qui n'a eu qu'une femme jouit de plus d'estime et de plus d'honneur auprès de tous ceux qui ont les mêmes sentiments que l'Église;

— ni rattaché au verbe suivant, αἰτιᾶται, qui a un sujet qui lui convient parfaitement (ὁ θεῖος λόγος) et aussi un complément d'objet à l'accusatif, devant lequel il manque toutefois un article: <τὸν> ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως ... συναφθέντα δευτέρᾳ γυναικί.

Un fois admises ces deux constatations, une chose devient très claire: le nominatif ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθείς ..., qui n'a pas de verbe auquel se rapporter, ne peut être que le début d'une proposition dont il nous manque la fin. Autrement dit, il y a une lacune. Le cas n'a rien d'extraordinaire. Il est même bien connu des philologues, car c'est assez souvent que se produisent, dans la transmission des textes, des omissions accidentelles (par saut entre deux mots semblables ou par oubli d'une ligne) qui emportent la fin d'une proposition et le début de la suivante, et ces accidents se reconnaissent précisément au signe que nous avons ici: la partie conservée de la première proposition ne se relie pas grammaticalement à ce qui reste de la seconde.

La lacune est d'ailleurs confirmée de deux manières:
1) par l'absence, au début de la proposition suivante, de l'article τὸν accordé avec συναφθέντα et indispensable dans un cas comme celui-ci; cet article a été emporté par la même omission;
2) par un hiatus dans le sens: jusqu'à τελευτησάσῃ, il s'agit du remariage après la «mort» de l'épouse, puis, à partir de ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως πορνείας ἢ μοιχείας ... χωρισμοῦ γενομένου, nous nous trouvons placés sans la moindre transition devant le cas du remariage après une séparation pour cause d'adultère (le mot πορνείας étant visiblement emprunté aux deux versets *Matth.* 5, 32 et 19, 9 qui traitent de ce cas).

La fin de la première proposition ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς τῇ μιᾷ ἀρχεσθῆναι τελευτησάσῃ se laisse facilement reconstituer, sinon quant aux termes, du moins quant au sens, si l'on observe que cette proposition, affectée d'un δέ, est mise en corrélation avec la proposition précédente, qui était marquée d'un μέν. La précédente envisageait le cas du veuf qui renonce à se remarier: «celui qui n'a eu qu'une femme jouit de plus d'estime et de considération auprès de ceux qui pensent comme l'Église», et celle-ci envisage le cas du veuf qui se remarie. Que pouvait dire Épiphane dans ce dernier cas pour rester fidèle à l'enseignement de l'Écriture qui permet les secondes noces après veuvage, sinon quelque chose comme ceci: «Mais celui qui n'a pas pu se contenter de la première, qui est morte, <et qui en a épousé une deuxième n'est pas condamné>»?

Quant au début de la phrase suivante, on n'attend rien d'autre qu'une formule de transition et l'article τὸν appelé par συναφθέντα.

Il nous suffira donc d'écrire en signalant la lacune:

Ἔξεστι δὲ τῷ λαῷ δι' ἀσθένειαν διαβαστάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντας ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ γαμετῇ στῆναι δευτέρᾳ μετὰ θάνατον τῆς πρώτης συναφθῆναι. Καὶ ὁ μὲν μίαν ἐσχηκὼς ἐν ἐπαίνῳ μείζονι καὶ τιμῇ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐκκλησιαζομένοις ἐνυπάρχει, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς τῇ μιᾷ ἀρκεσθῆναι τελευτησάσῃ <.....
Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν> ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως «πορνείας» ἢ μοιχείας ἢ κακῆς αἰτίας χωρισμοῦ γενομένου συναφθέντα δευτέρᾳ γυναικὶ [ἢ γυνὴ δευτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ] οὐκ αἰτιᾶται ὁ θεῖος λόγος οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀποκηρύττει, ἀλλὰ διαβαστάζει διὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, οὐκ ἵνα δύο γυναῖκας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σχῇ ἔτι περιούσης μιᾶς, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς μιᾶς ἀποσχισθεὶς δευτέρᾳ, εἰ τύχοι, ἐννόμως συναφθῇ. Ἐλεεῖ τοῦτον ὁ ἅγιος λόγος καὶ ἡ ἁγία θεοῦ ἐκκλησία, μάλιστα εἰ τυγχάνει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὰ ἄλλα εὐλαβὴς καὶ κατὰ νόμον θεοῦ πολιτευόμενος.

> Mais il est permis d'user de tolérance avec les laïcs à cause de leur faiblesse, si, n'ayant pas pu s'en tenir à leur première épouse, ils en ont épousé une deuxième après la mort de la première. Celui qui n'en a eu qu'une seule jouit de plus de considération et d'estime aux yeux de tous ceux qui ont les mêmes sentiments que l'Église, mais celui qui n'a pas pu se contenter d'une seule, qui est morte, <..... En outre, si un homme,> après une séparation effectuée en alléguant la fornication, l'adultère ou une cause grave, s'est uni à une deuxième femme,[16] la Parole divine ne l'accuse pas; elle ne le bannit pas de l'Église et de la vie, mais elle use de tolérance à cause de sa faiblesse. Non pas pour que cet homme ait deux femmes en même temps, la première restant là; mais pour que, après avoir rompu avec l'une, il en épouse éventuellement une seconde dans les formes légales. La sainte Parole et la sainte Église de Dieu ont pitié de lui, surtout si cet homme est par ailleurs quelqu'un de rangé[17] qui vit selon la loi de Dieu.

3. *Le mots* ἢ γυνὴ δευτέρῳ ἀνδρί.

Il reste, à la ligne 6, le problème de ces quatre mots qui tranchent sur le reste de la phrase à la fois par leur forme grammaticale et par la pensée qu'ils expriment: d'une part, γυνὴ est au nominatif alors que la construction de la phrase réclamerait un accusatif; d'autre part, ces mots concernent la femme après l'adultère de l'homme alors que tout le reste de la même phrase traite exclusivement de l'homme après l'adultère de la femme.

Allons-nous comme Holl corriger le nominatif en accusatif? Cette solution est moins simple qu'il ne paraît au premier abord:

1) Elle suppose de la part du copiste une faute difficile à expliquer, car les deux mots γυνὴ et γυναῖκα sont visuellement trop différents pour qu'on les prenne l'un pour l'autre; et l'on ne trouve rien dans le contexte

qui pouvait inciter un copiste à transformer un accusatif qui aurait été bien en place en un nominatif qui ne l'est plus.
2) Si Épiphane avait voulu souligner fortement que la femme possède comme l'homme le droit de divorcer et de se remarier après adultère du conjoint, il est vraisemblable qu'il n'aurait pas parlé de l'homme seul dans tout le reste de la phrase, mais qu'il se serait exprimé de manière à désigner chaque fois et l'homme et la femme.

Le manque d'homogénéité de ces quatre mots avec le contexte, aussi bien du point de vue de la grammaire que du point de vue de la pensée, me paraît bien plutôt la preuve qu'ils n'appartiennent pas au texte original d'Épiphane, mais qu'ils proviennent d'une note de lecteur insérée indûment dans le texte comme on en a d'autres exemples dans les manuscrits du *Panarion*.[18] Étonné de voir Épiphane parler seulement du droit de l'homme, ce lecteur a indiqué dans la marge que le même droit existait pour la femme, sans se soucier d'harmoniser grammaticalement son addition avec le reste de la phrase, et le copiste suivant a intégré la note au texte.

En conclusion, nous laisserons à ces quatre mots leur forme grammaticale, qui indique par elle-même leur caractère adventice, et pour le reste nous avons seulement à constater une lacune après τελευτησάσῃ, lacune attestée par un hiatus à la fois grammatical et logique.

Si l'on veut bien comparer cette solution aux précédentes, je crois qu'on lui reconnaîtra trois avantages:
1) la *simplicité*: elle conserve le texte[19] et ne triche pas avec la grammaire;
2) l'*objectivité*, car l'existence d'une lacune après ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς τῇ μιᾷ ἀρχεσθῆναι τελευτησάσῃ n'est pas une hypothèse mais une *constatation* fondée sur deux *faits*: d'abord la présence du début d'une proposition dont il manque la fin (absence du verbe dont ce nominatif était le sujet), puis, immédiatement après, la présence d'une autre proposition qui traite d'un autre sujet et dont il manque le début (absence de l'article τὸν qui introduisait le participe συναφθέντα avec ses compléments);
3) la *clarté* du résultat: il suffit de distinguer ces deux propositions incomplètes et de les lire séparément pour que, malgré la lacune, le passage devienne intelligible et cohérent.

4. *La doctrine d'Épiphane*

Le problème philologique étant ainsi résolu, nous pouvons reprendre tout le passage pour en étudier le contenu doctrinal. En face des Nova-

tiens qui interdisent absolument les secondes noces, Épiphane affirme leur légitimité dans deux cas: après décès du conjoint et après divorce pour cause de crime, mais avec des nuances qu'il est intéressant de relever.

a. Le remariage après décès du conjoint.

Le remariage après veuvage avait été expressément autorisé par saint Paul dans *I Cor.* 7, 39: «La femme demeure liée à son mari aussi longtemps qu'il vit, mais si le mari meurt, elle est libre d'épouser qui elle veut ...» (voir aussi *I Tim.* 5, 14). Épiphane y met toutefois deux restrictions qui s'inspirent d'autres passages des épîtres pauliniennes:
1) Les secondes noces ne sont permises qu'aux laïcs. Épiphane a expliqué dans les phrases antérieures que tout remariage est interdit aux clercs de rang supérieur: évêques, prêtres, diacres et sous-diacres, en vertu de *I Tim.* 3, 2-12 et *Tite* 1, 6, qui demandaient qu'un évêque, un diacre ou un «presbyteros» soit «homme d'une seule femme».
2) La permission accordée aux laïcs n'est qu'une «tolérance» (διαβαστάζεσθαι) en raison de leur «faiblesse». Celui qui ne se remarie pas «jouit de plus de considération et d'estime aux yeux de tous ceux qui ont les mêmes sentiments que l'Église» à cause du conseil de s. Paul en *I Cor.* 7, 8: «Je dis toutefois aux célibataires et aux veuves qu'il leur est bon de demeurer comme moi».

b. Le remariage après divorce pour adultère ou tort grave.

Prenons ici le texte manuscrit par groupes de mots et voyons ce qu'ils signifient dans leur sens obvie:

ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως πορνείας ἢ μοιχείας ἢ κακῆς αἰτίας χωρισμοῦ γενομένου συναφθέντα δευτέρᾳ γυναικί

Épiphane emploie trois mots pour désigner les motifs de divorce qui permettent le remariage. Le premier, πορνείας, est évidemment emprunté à *Matt.* 5, 32 et 19, 9, qui condamnent le divorce et le remariage «sauf en cas de fornication» (πορνείας). Mais, quand il s'agit de gens mariés, la fornication porte un autre nom, qui est celui d'«adultère»; c'est pourquoi Épiphane ajoute: ἢ μοιχείας. Puis vient un troisième terme, ἢ κακῆς αἰτίας, parce que l'adultère n'est pas le seul motif légitime de divorce aux yeux d'Épiphane; d'autres griefs peuvent le justifier. Lesquels? Il ne le précise pas, mais on peut rappeler, à titre d'exemple, qu'Origène envisageait l'infanticide, tout autre meurtre et même le gaspillage du patri-

moine de l'époux.[20] Épiphane ne veut pas dresser un catalogue, il laisse aux évêques le soin de juger de chaque cas particulier: il signale seulement que l'adultère n'est pas le seul motif pour lequel il est permis à un homme de divorcer et de se remarier.

Relevons toutefois le mot προφάσεως, qui semble comporter une réserve sur les motifs allégués. Épiphane ne conteste pas que l'homme ait le droit de se remarier dans les cas précités, puisque, comme il va le dire, «la Parole de Dieu ne l'accuse pas», mais il estime que l'homme ferait mieux de pratiquer le conseil de la continence au lieu de se servir de ces motifs pour contracter un deuxième mariage, les secondes noces n'étant, ici encore, comme en cas de veuvage, qu'une «tolérance».

οὐκ αἰτιᾶται ὁ θεῖος λόγος

Après une séparation survenue pour les motifs qui viennent d'être indiqués, si l'homme s'est «uni à une deuxième femme», la «Parole de Dieu ne l'accuse pas». La «Parole de Dieu» est le Verbe s'exprimant dans l'Écriture. Si Épiphane admet le divorce et le remariage dans les cas susdits, c'est pour être fidèle aux Écritures inspirées. Il pense, pour le cas d'adultère, à *Matth.* 5, 32 et 19, 9 et, pour le cas plus général de tort grave, à *Deut.* 24, 1, qui admettait, et même imposait la répudiation de l'épouse en cas de «chose ignoble»: ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα. Les deux mots employés par Épiphane, κακὴ αἰτία, font écho à ces deux-là, mais en enlevant la référence qu' ἄσχημον pouvait avoir à des fautes sexuelles. Quelle qu'ait pu être la signification originale de l'expression biblique, il est sûr, d'après les termes généraux qu'il choisit, qu'Épiphane l'entend dans un sens très étendu.

οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀποκηρύττει,

Ces mots soulignent le contraste entre les Novatiens et la Parole de Dieu: ils «bannissent de l'Église», et par là même «de la vie»,[21] tout homme remarié; la Parole de Dieu n'a pas cette cruauté.

ἀλλὰ διαβαστάζει διὰ τὸ ἀσθενές,

Épiphane reprend l'expression qu'il a déjà utilisée pour les secondes noces après veuvage.[22] Dans le cas d'adultère ou de faute grave comme dans le cas de veuvage, il tient à marquer qu'il ne considère pas du tout le remariage comme la solution la meilleure, mais comme une simple «tolérance», accordée par l'Écriture «en raison de la faiblesse» humaine.

οὐχ ἵνα δύο γυναῖκας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σχῇ ἔτι περιούσης μιᾶς,[23] ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς μιᾶς ἀποσχισθεὶς δευτέρᾳ, εἰ τύχοι, ἐννόμως συναφθῇ.

L'objection que les Novatiens faisaient aux secondes noces était de contrevenir à la monogamie. Pour Épiphane comme pour les autres évêques de la grande Église, la monogamie exige seulement qu'on n'ait pas «deux femmes en même temps». Encore faut-il respecter cette exigence. L'homme qui a des motifs graves de divorcer doit avoir rompu réellement avec sa première femme et l'avoir quittée avant d'en prendre une autre.[24]

L'adverbe ἐννόμως ne veut pas dire simplement qu'après séparation effective de sa première femme cet homme peut en épouser une autre «légitimement», mais qu'il doit l'épouser «dans les formes légales». Cette condition avait été formulée au concile de Laodicée, dont le canon I prescrit que ceux qui se remarient le fassent «légalement» et non pas clandestinement.[25] Les canons de Laodicée étaient inclus dans la plus ancienne collection conciliaire. Il ne paraît pas douteux qu'Épiphane connaît ce canon et s'en inspire. La rupture avec la première épouse doit donc être consacrée par un mariage officiel avec la seconde. L'homme ne peut pas s'autoriser des torts de la première pour prendre une maîtresse et avoir ainsi deux femmes, mais il peut éventuellement divorcer d'avec la première pour contracter un nouveau mariage légal.

'Ελεεῖ τοῦτον ὁ ἅγιος λόγος καὶ ἡ ἁγία θεοῦ ἐκκλησία,

'Ελεεῖ fait allusion à l'autre erreur des Novatiens: ils refusent la «miséricorde» à ceux qui ont failli pendant la persécution, et ils font de même à l'égard des gens remariés.

Mais on remarquera surtout qu'Épiphane fait ici appel à deux autorités: la Parole divine, c'est-à-dire l'Écriture, et la pratique de «la sainte Église de Dieu». Il nous apprend ainsi que la solution admise par lui ne lui est pas personnelle mais qu'elle reflète l'opinion commune des évêques de son temps.

μάλιστα εἰ τυγχάνει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὰ ἄλλα εὐλάβης καὶ κατὰ νόμον θεοῦ πολιτευόμενος.

Il ne faut cependant pas que la tolérance dont font preuve l'Écriture et l'Église soit la porte ouverte au dévergondage. L'évêque jugera dans chaque cas, et il sera naturellement plus indulgent pour quelqu'un qui, dans le reste de sa vie, se conduit en homme rangé et en bon chrétien.

Tout cela est parfaitement clair. Épiphane admet, en se fondant sur l'Écriture et sur la pratique ecclésiastique, que le mari qui a divorcé pour cause d'adultère ou de crime de son épouse peut se remarier.[26]

La seule question qui subsiste est de savoir s'il admettait le remariage de l'épouse qui a divorcé pour adultère ou crime de son mari, car il ne

parle que des hommes. On sait qu'à la même époque l'Église latine refusait cette faculté aux femmes, parce que saint Paul avait dit de la femme: «En cas de séparation, qu'elle ne se remarie pas ou qu'elle se réconcilie avec son mari» (*1 Cor.* 7, 11). Mais à une époque plus ancienne elle avait reconnu aux femmes le même droit qu'aux hommes, et les pontifes romains le feront à nouveau dans les siècles suivants.[27] Dans le cas d'Épiphane, l'emploi du masculin ne permet pas de conclure, car, dans les lignes précédentes qui traitent du remariage après veuvage, Épiphane n'emploie aussi que le masculin et personne ne le soupçonne de vouloir exclure les veuves du droit de se remarier, puisque la parole de saint Paul qui fondait ce droit les mentionnait expressément (*1 Cor.* 7, 8-9). Le masculin provient simplement du début du passage, où il était question de savoir si un homme remarié peut accéder aux ordres;[28] Épiphane a gardé le même genre ensuite. Il semble que s'il avait voulu exclure positivement les femmes dans le cas d'adultère ou de crime du conjoint, alors qu'il ne les exclut certainement pas dans le cas de veuvage, il l'aurait signalé.

II. PANARION, *EXP. FIDEI*, 21

L'autre passage à examiner se trouve dans l'Exposé de la foi qui termine le *Panarion*. Après avoir traité de questions dogmatiques, Épiphane en vient à la discipline et commence par énumérer les différents états de vie: au sommet la virginité, puis la vie monacale, puis la continence dans le mariage, puis le veuvage, ensuite le mariage et enfin les secondes noces. Le texte manuscrit pose toutefois des problèmes à l'éditeur en ce qui concerne ces deux derniers états:[29]

Ταύταις δὲ ταῖς τάξεσιν ἀκόλουθος ὁ σεμνὸς γάμος ἐν μεγάλῃ τιμῇ, ὁ ἐν μονογαμίᾳ μάλιστα καὶ παραφυλακῇ ἐνταλμάτων. Εἰ δέ τις τελευτησάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ γυναικὸς [ἢ ἀνδρὸς τελευτήσαντος τῆς τινος γυναικὸς] <...>, ἐφίεται δευτέρᾳ συναφθῆναι [ἢ δευτέρῳ μετὰ θάνατον τοῦ πρώτου ἢ τῆς πρώτης].

> Le saint mariage, qui vient à la suite de ces ordres, est en grand honneur, surtout quand il reste dans la monogamie et l'observation des commandements; et si quelqu'un, après la mort de sa femme [ou quand le mari de la femme de quelqu'un est mort] <...>, on le laisse en épouser une deuxième [ou un deuxième mari après la mort du premier ou de la première].

Cette phrase présente deux sortes d'incohérences qu'on peut circonscrire et réparer:

1) Les deux membres de phrases que j'ai mis entre crochets droits [ ] s'intègrent très mal à la phrase et laissent voir qu'ils n'ont pas été écrits par Épiphane dans la lancée du reste, mais écrits après coup par quelqu'un d'autre que lui:

— le premier, ἢ ἀνδρὸς τελευτήσαντος τῆς τινος γυναικός, n'est pas seulement très maladroit dans sa formulation («après la mort du *mari* de la femme de *quelqu'un*»), mais on remarquera aussi son décalage par rapport aux mots précédents τελευτησάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ γυναικὸς qui suggéraient d'écrire simplement ici τελευτησάντος τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀνδρός. Il est clair que l'auteur de cette addition l'a rédigée sans tenir compte de la structure du reste de la phrase;[30]

— le second membre, ἢ δευτέρῳ μετὰ θάνατον τοῦ πρωτοῦ ἢ τῆς πρώτης, est solidaire du premier, puisqu'il se rapporte comme lui au remariage des veuves, et il n'est pas mieux intégré à la phrase. Celle-ci a pour sujet l'homme qui se remarie après la mort de sa femme: il est incohérent de dire de lui qu'on le laisse épouser «un deuxième (mari) après la mort du premier».

Nous avons déjà trouvé une interpolation semblable dans la notice sur les Novatiens: comme Épiphane parlait seulement du mari, un lecteur a tenu à préciser que le même droit existait pour la femme et a ajouté quelques mots qui ne s'accordent pas grammaticalement avec le reste de la phrase. Nous avons visiblement ici une intervention du même lecteur pour la même raison.

2) Comme Petau l'a fait remarquer, il manque la fin de la proposition conditionnelle introduite par Εἰ δέ τις τελευτησάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ γυναικός.

Si nous voulons circonscrire ce qui subsiste du texte original, il convient donc d'éliminer les deux interpolations et de marquer la lacune:

> Le saint mariage, qui vient à la suite de ces ordres, est en grand honneur, surtout quand il reste dans la monogamie et l'observation des commandements; mais si quelqu'un après la mort de sa femme <...>, on le laisse en épouser une deuxième.

Quand au contenu de la lacune, on ne peut faire que des conjectures. Le passage parallèle de la notice sur les Novatiens étudié plus haut suggère quelque chose comme ceci:

> Si quelqu'un, après la mort de sa femme <ou après une séparation motivée par l'adultère ou un tort grave ne peut se passer de femme,> on le laisse en épouser une deuxième.

Après cette observation de critique textuelle, continuons notre lecture. Ayant énuméré les états de vie, Épiphane recense les ordres du

clergé. Au faîte, il y a le sacerdoce, qui comprend les évêques, les prêtres, les diacres et les sous-diacres; ils se recrutent de préférence parmi les vierges, ou à défaut de vierges parmi les moines, ou à défaut de moines parmi les époux qui pratiquent la continence ou les veufs qui n'ont eu qu'une seule femme. Ensuite prennent place les lecteurs, qui peuvent être choisis comme les ordres majeurs parmi les vierges ou les moines ou les époux pratiquant la continence, mais aussi parmi les époux qui usent du mariage «et même, en cas de nécessité, parmi ceux qui, après la mort de leur première femme, en ont épousé une seconde», εἰ δὲ εἴη ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετὰ θάνατον τῆς πρώτης γυναικὸς δευτέρᾳ συναφθέντων,[31] car, explique Épiphane, les lecteurs ne font pas partie du sacerdoce. Après, on a les diaconesses, qui doivent être ou des femmes mariées en premières noces et pratiquant la continence, ou des femmes restées veuves après un seul mariage, ou des vierges. Puis viennent les exorcistes et les traducteurs,[32] enfin les employés chargés des funérailles,[33] les portiers et tout le personnel nécessaire à la bonne marche de la communauté.

Ce passage de l'Exposé de la foi évoque donc à deux reprises l'éventualité des secondes noces et, dans l'état actuel du texte, il ne mentionne que les secondes noces après veuvage. Condamin en tire argument pour soutenir qu'Épiphane n'admettait pas le remariage après divorce pour motif d'adultère ou de crime;[34] mais cette conclusion, qui contredit la notice sur les Novatiens, ne découle nullement des deux mentions que nous venons de rencontrer dans l'Exposé de la foi. En effet:

1) Dans la première mention, la phrase est lacuneuse et c'est précisément à l'endroit de la lacune, après la mention des secondes noces pour veuvage, que pouvait venir une mention des secondes noces pour cause d'adultère ou de crime;

2) La deuxième mention concerne les états de vie parmi lesquels doivent être choisis les lecteurs. Épiphane admet en cas de nécessité qu'on prenne des veufs remariés; s'il ne mentionne pas les gens divorcés et remariés pour cause d'adultère et de crime, ce n'est pas parce qu'il leur dénie le droit de se remarier, mais parce que cet état de vie lui paraît inconciliable avec une fonction qui attire les regards sur son titulaire lorsqu'il monte à l'ambon et lit la Parole de Dieu devant tous.[35]

Ce dernier texte complète seulement notre information en montrant qu'Épiphane, tout en admettant, d'après l'Écriture et la tradition, la légitimité des secondes noces pour cause d'adultère ou de crime, ne les met pas sur le même plan que les secondes noces après veuvage. Les

chrétiens divorcés et remariés pour les motifs précités ne sont pas exclus définitivement de la communion, mais ils sont écartés des ordres majeurs et même, à la différence des veufs remariés, de l'ordre de lecteur qui les mettrait en vedette et semblerait les donner en exemple.

NOTES

[1] Le Marcianus gr. 125 (= *M*) et l'Urbinas 17/18 (= *U*).

[2] δυναθέντα *M*.

[3] post προφάσεως add ἢ *M*. Holl adopte la leçon de *M* προφάσεως ἢ πορνείας, mais celle de *U* προφάσεως πορνείας est plus probable, car elle ne fait que traduire le λόγου πορνείας de *Matt.* 5, 32; comme la particule ἢ figurait entre les génitifs suivants, un copiste a bien pu l'insérer par mégarde entre les deux premiers.

[4] σχοίη *M*.

[5] τῆς om *M*; cf. ligne 4.

[6] εἰ τύχοι ἐν νόμῳ *U*: ἐννόμως εἰ τύχοι *M*.

[7] συναφθῇ Dindorf: συναφθῆναι *M* συναφθειναι *U*.

[8] D'après la réimpression de Migne, PG 41, 1024 C.

[9] *Ibid.* col. 1023, n. 13: «Ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνηθεὶς τῇ μιᾷ ἀρκεσθῆναι. Deprauatus sine dubio iste locus est. Nam quae proxime sequuntur, euidenter demonstrant id Epiphanium uelle: licere non modo post coniugis mortem, sed eo quoque superstite, si causa legitima quaepiam intercesserit, alteras inire nuptias. Nam si de secundis dumtaxat post mortem ageret, quorsum haec adiiceret, ἕνεκέν τινος προφάσεως πορνείας etc., *ob aliquam stupri, adulterii, uel alterius flagitii causam*? Tum id clarius subinde, cum dixit, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀποσχισθεὶς δευτέρᾳ, εἰ τύχοιεν, νόμῳ συναφθῆναι. Quocirca non dubito, quin ita corrigendum sit τελευτησασῃ, ἕνεκέν τινος etc., ut duo sint digamiae genera: primum uxore mortua; secundum, post diuortium, altera sibi copulata. Ita quidem Epiphanius».

[10] Références dans H. Crouzel, *L'Église primitive face au divorce* (Paris 1971) 226.

[11] A. Condamin, Saint Épiphane a-t-il admis la légitimité du divorce pour adultère? dans *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*, I (1900) 16-21.

[12] Crouzel, *op. cit.*, 225.

[13] Epiphanius, 2. Bd (GCS 31), *Panarion*, haer. 34-64 (Leipzig, 1922, 368, 15 s.). La réédition récente par J. Dummer (Berlin 1980) n'apporte aucune modification sur ce point; elle indique simplement dans les Nachträge, p. 531, la lecture de C. Riggi (voir ci-après).

[14] C. Riggi, S. Epiphanio divorzista? dans *Salesianum*, XXXIII (1971) 599-666.

[15] C. Riggi, *op. cit.*, 608.

[16] Je laisse de côté les quatre mots que j'ai provisoirement mis entre crochets et sur lesquels je vais revenir.

[17] Ou: «quelqu'un de religieux».

[18] K. Holl, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Epiphanius* (*Ancoratus und Panarion*) (Leipzig 1910) avait déjà donné des preuves péremptoires que les manuscrits actuels du *Panarion* dépendent d'un ancêtre disparu sur lequel un lecteur avait opéré des corrections et écrit des notes marginales qui ont été ensuite comprises dans le texte; voir notamment les pages 16-19, 33 et 49. Nous en avons trouvé nous-mêmes d'autres exemples.

[19] A une seule correction près, dont la nécessité est reconnue par tous: συναφθῇ à la ligne 9.

[20] Origène, *Commentaire de Matthieu*, XIV, 24; éd. Klostermann (GCS), t. I, 342, 28 s. et 344, 24.

[21] Dans la notice sur les Montanistes, Épiphane avait déjà dit à propos de l'homme remarié: οὐκ ἐκβάλλομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωῆς (h. 48, 9, p. 232, 2). La mention de la «vie» fait allusion à *Luc* 15, 24, où le père de l'enfant prodigue dit: «Mon fils que voici était mort et il est *revenu à la vie*». Cette parole s'appliquait directement au retour des pécheurs dans l'Église (cf. h. 59, 2. 8, p. 366, 5; 59, 8, 3, p. 373, 17), mais à partir de là elle s'appliquait tout naturellement aussi à ceux (veufs compris) qui contractaient des secondes noces, puisqu'ils étaient considérés comme des pécheurs qui ne pouvaient être réintégrés qu'après une période de pénitence; voir le canon 1 du concile de Laodicée cité plus loin (note 24) et dans la même collection conciliaire les canons 19 d'Ancyre et 3 de Néocésarée.

[22] *Pan.* 59, 4, texte cité ci-dessus, p. 157.

[23] Il conviendrait probablement de restituer <τῆς> μιᾶς d'après les mots suivants, où Épiphane semble bien reprendre l'expression déjà employée.

[24] Épiphane rappellera la même règle dans la notice 61, 1, en l'incluant parmi les préceptes de la morale naturelle: μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ δευτερογαμεῖν (381, 19). H. Crouzel, *op. cit.* 220-221, n'est pas fondé à prétendre que cette expression proscrit tout remariage du vivant de la première femme. Épiphane précise que la pratique interdite consiste à contracter un deuxième mariage *en même temps* (ἐν ταὐτῷ) que le premier, ce qui n'est pas le cas lorsque l'homme a divorcé légitimement de sa première femme: le premier mariage n'existant plus, cet homme n'en contracte pas un second «en même temps» que le premier. Cette expression ne dit rien d'autre que ce que nous lisons ici: un homme ne doit pas «avoir deux femmes *en même temps*», mais, en cas d'adultère ou de tort grave, il peut «*une fois séparé de la première* en épouser éventuellement une deuxième».

[25] P. P. Joannou, *Fonti*, fasc. IX, t. I, 2, Grottaferrata, 1962: «Au sujet de ceux qui se sont unis en secondes noces délibérément et *légalement* (νομίμως) *au lieu de se marier clandestinement*, nous avons décidé qu'il faut, selon la règle de l'Église, les admettre par indulgence à la communion après avoir laissé s'écouler un peu de temps, qu'ils passeront dans la prière et le jeûne».

[26] Pour écarter ce témoignage, H. Crouzel, *op. cit.*, 220, invoque à tort la notice du *Panarion* sur les Ébionites, où Épiphane leur fait ce reproche (h. 30, 18; éd. Holl, t. I, p. 357, 21 s.): εἰ καὶ θελήσειέν τις τοῦ πρώτου γάμου διαζεύγνυσθαι, ἑτέρῳ δὲ συνάπτεσθαι, ἐπιτρέπουσι· πάντα γὰρ παρ'αὐτοῖς ἀδεῶς ἐφίεται ἄχρι καὶ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου καὶ ἑβδόμου γάμου, «Si quelqu'un désire même divorcer de son premier mariage et en contracter un autre, ils le lui permettent; car chez eux c'est un laxisme sans vergogne jusqu'à deux, trois et sept mariages». Mais ce passage ne vise pas le cas précis de ceux qui divorcent pour cause d'adultère du conjoint ou pour un autre motif grave; il n'y est question que de gens qui divorcent pour leur bon plaisir (θελήσειεν).

[27] Cf. P. Nautin, Divorce et remariage dans la tradition de l'Église latine, dans *Recherches de science religieuse*, 62 (1974) 7-54.

[28] Voir le début du même § 4 de la notice (367, 7 s.).

[29] Epiphane, *Panarion*, exp. fidei, 21 (Holl, t. III, 522, 3 s.).

[30] On remarquera au surplus qu'il a omis l'article devant ἀνδρὸς alors qu'Épiphane ne l'avait pas omis devant γυναικός.

[31] Édit. cit., 522, 16 s.

[32] Édit. cit., 522, 22: ἑρμηνευταὶ γλώσσης εἰς γλῶσσαν ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν ἢ ἐν ταῖς προσομιλίαις. Lectures liturgiques et sermons étaient en grec et il fallait les traduire pour les gens qui ne connaissaient que la langue locale.

[33] p. 522, 24 κωπιαταὶ οἱ τὰ σώματα περιστέλλοντες τῶν κοιμωμένων. Sur la toilette des défunts et les funérailles, voir l'art. Bestattung du *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, t. II, col. 208-212. En Occident, le *De septem ordinibus ecclesiae* d'un Pseudo-Jérôme (Vè siècle) mentionne pareillement les *fossores* parmi les ordres mineurs; cf. A. Faivre, *Naissance d'une hiérarchie. Les premières étapes du cursus clérical* (Paris 1977) 191, n. 40.

[34] Condamin, *art. cit.*, p. 20.

[35] Cf. Cyprien de Carthage, *Epist.* 34, 4 «... dum euangelica lectio de ore auditur, *lectoris* fidem quisque audierit imitatur»; 34, 5 «Hos tamen *lectores* interim constitutos sciatis, quia oportebat lucernam super candelabrum poni, unde omnibus luceat, et gloriosos uultus in loco altiore constitui, ubi ab omni circumstante conspecti incitamentum gloriae uidentibus praebeant».

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TWO TYPES OF CONVERSION TO EARLY CHRISTIANITY

BY

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What pagans saw *in* Christianity (in the sense of being drawn to it) depended greatly on what they saw *of* it. Self-evidently, their first allegiance could be inspired only by those parts and aspects of the faith that were openly displayed. So there is one topic to explore: exactly what *was* displayed, undeniably and demonstrably?

And displayed at the moment of conversion, so as to account for it—not when the process was well begun. I therefore exclude consideration of the converts made in Judaea or in or around Jewish communities in Greek cities.

But further: conversion depended greatly on the fit between Christianity and prevailing expectations regarding the world above us. No challenge on all fronts, nor a faith centered in some practice perfectly unacceptable (such as human sacrifice, let us say, or ritual prostitution), could have prevailed. There is a second topic to explore—relatively accessible, at least if we limit our exploration to our surviving texts, their writers, and their readers.

They immediately confine us within a circle constituting less than a tenth of the population. A cultural elite: even St. Paul almost a member, or on the fringes, since he like the pagan Celsus or the convert Justin had added years of further study to a training in mere literacy. The basic elements of their education are well known. In one part of the Greek-speaking world, Egypt, they are known through the whole accumulation of literary papyrus-fragments, in which the Iliad emerges as favorite, the Odyssey a good second; Demosthenes a poor third; Euripides next; then Callimachus, Hesiod, and Plato (and students who were aiming for law explain the popularity of the orator; but Plato's works, like the tenets of Stoicism and other chief doctrines, would circulate mostly in excerpts and condensations, and these would be commonly memorized if not discussed in advanced schools). The whole list makes specific the pair of words, "poets and philosophers," continually

used by the Christian Apologists to define the written basis of their opponents' beliefs. Tertullian (*Apol.* 14) in his attack on them looks at the Trojans and Achaeans, at Venus and Mars; moves on to Euripides; next to one of the lyric poets; and so to Plato—Tertullian, a *Latin* Apologist, exactly duplicating the list from Egypt. It was very much one world, that cultural élite we are considering.

Its theology (for pagans who ventured on such speculation) supposed a world above Olympus; at the top, some version, relation, or descendant of Plato's Supreme Being. Pagans could therefore be said, like Christians, to believe in one god, maker of heaven and earth.[1] Visions so abstract, like Immanuel Kant's 'categorical imperative' or Sartre's existentialism today, were more often mentioned, and nodded to in passing, than really understood. Yet the philosophers' notion of one god, perfection complete, above all things, needing nothing, not to be touched by Achilles' spear, Eros' arrows, or the worshipper's prayers, provided a theoretical base for very widespread ideas about the nature of divinity. It precluded whatever was capricious or trivial, deceitful, harmful, or vengeful, foul, wicked, or cruel. No divine being could be anything but beneficent.

The divine *dramatis personae* of literature and myth, however —where did they fit? They stood in sharp opposition to the ideas just outlined. Christian Apologists exploited the opposition between "poets and philosophers" to the full. The philosophers, as Tertullian says (*Apol.* 46.4) "openly destroy your gods and attack your superstitions with their treatises, while you cheer them on, forsooth!" He was quite right. There was Seneca in the Latin West, in a work *Against Superstition* (now largely lost); in the Greek East, there was Heraclitus, not the famous philosopher but a figure belonging to the generation or two before Seneca, writing on myths from a very rationalistic point of view; and both of these writers only summed up and gave greater circulation to convictions long common among the educated, convictions quite incompatible with a literal belief in the stories about the gods; and should not Christians join in the debate? As one of their tormentors sourly remarks, "This is the Christians' custom, to invent many foul calumnies against our gods."[2]

In trying to determine, however, what expectations or presuppositions about religion might await evangelists of Christianity, we should not assume that people's general ideas of godhead had made no broad advances since the days of Homer and Hesiod. Not at all: in the

days of Seneca or Tertullian, we do not find them expressing the belief that Apollo takes sides with one mortal against another, or that Zeus might defenestrate some second Hephaestus. The gods had grown up, in company with more advanced moral and intellectual standards than prevailed in the eighth century B.C. Attacks by Christian polemicists indeed made more public but they did not create the gulf that had long opened between literature and philosophy. They only struck at a bookish vulnerability, not at a living faith.

That living faith, if it had little room for a Supreme Being in its daily concerns, did commonly acknowledge some sort of supremacy of a more familiar, less remote figure, whether Zeus (or Jupiter) as king of all gods, directing them, or presiding over them in looser fashion in the way that Agamemnon had presided among the Achaean chiefs. Either view permitted the very widespread interpretation of local gods as no more than reflections, under various names, of some single one: Zeus was Sarapis was Jupiter was Helios,[3] and similarly Selene was Astarte was Artemis was Diana.

To repeat: none of these beings was harmful, all were kindly to each other—if they were thought to have any interrelationship at all—and kindly toward their worshippers. Prayers went up to them seeking benefits only, not to avert their wrath. We do not find in the non-Christian (and non-Jewish) world much evidence even of punishment by the gods for wicked behavior. It is attested, as we will see below, but not very commonly.

Which raises the question not easily solved by anyone, Christian or not: πόθεν τὸ κακόν; for if divinity is beneficent, where can afflictions and evil deeds originate? If there is any broadly shared view in the Roman world about this matter, it is that the gods, like ourselves though not in the same degree, inhabit a universe they cannot control. They can modify but not entirely direct events like death, disaster at sea, or drought. Sometimes only Chance, Tyche, Fortuna is to blame, sometimes the picture is a little sharper: we find a plague caused by a particular evil power.[4] It can be driven away, then. It is not a god but some lowlier being.

For underneath the gods lie *daimones*. It is best to leave the word in its Greek and, by adoption, its Latin form so as not to confuse it with our word 'demons'. No one asked a *daimon* for a favor (and if that is what is meant by prayer, then no one prayed to one), nor does any *daimon* have his temple or priest. From having been, in Homer and cer-

tain later writers, a word applied to the familiar Olympians, *daimon* had sunk down below Olympus to an intermediate though still superhuman and supernatural realm, denoting powers that fill the heavens, fill the air. They are beings without name or dignity but not without capacities that set them above us. Some are beneficent, some the reverse. It is the latter that are invoked or coerced by spells for purposes alien to divinity.[5]

Such, in loose outline, are the views that Christianity must fit or challenge. But in trying to understand in what light it might appear to the holders of those views, two difficulties arise. First, the new faith could only be judged by its visible, audible parts. Yet, as Tertullian says, "no one turns to our literature who is not already Christian"[6]—meaning that, in his opinion, the New Testament and apparently the Apologists like Tertullian himself, Justin, Origen, Minucius Felix and the rest should not be counted as either visible or audible to a pagan audience. Perhaps we should not take Tertullian's remark quite literally. The pagan Celsus in the later second century had read the Bible, if only to refute it. On the other hand, he himself was so instantly forgotten that one of the best-read men of a somewhat later day, Origen, could find no trace of him. Celsus appears to have been a quite minor oddity, then. A few generations later, a governor of Egypt, a man evidently unusually interested in religion, nevertheless shows that he knows almost nothing about Christianity—the judge of the martyr Phileas.[7] Other bits of evidence could be cited to the same effect. So when we speak of people observing and becoming acquainted with Christianity, we should be careful not to draw into our discussion too much detail regarding doctrine or practice. As a parallel, the widespread ignorance about Judaism is instructive.

And if we exclude from our discussion St. Paul's letters, the *Didache*, Clement's letter from Rome, in sum, the bulk of pre-Nicene Christian writings because they are not likely to have been read outside the Church, then as our second difficulty we confront a very puzzling poverty of sources. Just how *can* we discover what that outer face was, that the new religion showed to the unconverted?

The sources that can be used, I think, include three sorts. There are those parts of the Acts of the Apostles in which, at some moment around A.D. 90, the writer described how an earlier evangelist might have been expected to speak (we do not know, of course, what the evangelist really did say). We also have some early apocryphal acts.[8]

Second, from about the same period as these last—that is, from the last half of the second century—we have the bulk of the Apologists, to the extent that they really reached non-converts. Third, we have exchanges between the martyrs and their tormentors. As strictly as possible we should try to limit ourselves to things that were specifically and expressly said to non-believers. We should not use what was written for eastern pagans by Lucian or Galen or what was spoken to an audience in Rome by Fronto and Crescens: they are looking at Christians (at behavior, that is), not at Christianity (that is, at belief).[9]

In the canonical Acts, it may be recalled, there are from the very start some tell-tale mis-perceptions of Christianity, revealing both what people expected in the way of religion and what they were being actually shown. They supposed Peter, Barnabas, and Paul at various junctures to be gods come down to earth,[10] just as they thought Simon Magus the literal embodiment of divine force.[11] They would have better understood the reaction of Peter when he saw Moses and Elijah before him: Should he, he wondered, set up a tabernacle for each of the two on the spot?[12] Pagans also expected the apostles to offer their supernatural gifts for a price, because cures, exorcisms, and prophecies by itinerant wonder-workers evidently were for sale here and there from time to time.[13] These incidents takes us over a great span of the Greek-speaking world, incidentally, from Samaria to the coast, up into Anatolia, and beyond to northeastern Greece. It is in these same lands that we can best become acquainted with non-Christian circles and sources, too, to confirm in other ways the truth of the glimpses given us by the Acts.

In Philippi, the apostles are by error taken for servants of the All-High God, as a woman of the crowd terms him.[14] Some dominant male deity generally stands out in the worships of both Semitic and Asianic Greek-speaking lands. At Lystra they are taken for gods again. On this occasion, Zeus is thought to have his younger, lesser agent with him, Hermes,[15] just as would be expected—and just as God had Jesus, it might be said: for ditheistic confusion occasionally invades the relation between Father and Son, and would have to be cleared away.[16]

Ordinarily, however, pagans are presented by Christians with a God new but one they can understand: Creator, Lord, Ruler over all things.[17] They betray no uneasiness about the implied picture of a divine monarchy. To be sure, it does not resemble the picture of paganism that is seen from a distance, embracing many worshippers, cities, and regions. Rather, it resembles what could be discovered in the mind of

most single individuals. The distinction is important. In the daily practice of religion, they acknowledged some local deity as supreme without bothering about other people's preferences in the next county. It is this as much as the shadow of Plato's Supreme Being in their minds that allows Tertullian to say, "Do you not grant, from general acceptance, that there is some being higher and more powerful, like an emperor of the world, of infinite power and majesty?—for that is how most men settle divinity: with the enjoyment of the top command in the hands of one, subordinate tasks distributed among many."[18] So non-Christians in the world of St. Paul, Justin, or Origen were in reality both polytheist and monotheist.[19]

But those terms are in fact only a source of extraneous confusion when they are applied to the centuries and developments we are looking at. They did not exist in the ancient lexicon of debate.[20] What modern interpretation conceals and what ancient sources abundantly reveal is a struggle over the meaning of the word 'god', *theos, deus.*

Christians and non-Christians alike supposed there was a multitude of supernatural beings above them. Non-Christians acknowledged Supreme Gods, each one illogically *hypsistos* or *kratistos* or *invictus*; next, gods of the familiar order (Venus or Hermes) with *daimones* and lesser spirits beneath them. As to Christians, they proclaimed their own particular Supreme God; His ministers, angels; what non-believers probably saw as divinized heroes, Moses and Elijah; with hordes of *daimones* or more often little *daimonia* under *their* Supreme God the Devil, μέγας δαίμων as Origen calls him (*C. Cels.* 1.31) or Prince (ἀρχηγέτης, I *Apol.* 28) in Justin's term. A pagan governor need find nothing disturbing, then, in the picture a martyr explains to him, of "'Adonai the All-High seated above cherubs and seraphs.' Marcianus says, 'What are cherubs and seraphs?' Acacius answers, 'The agent of the All-High God and attendant on His lofty seat.'"[21]

There was thus no basis for conflict between the two structures of belief so long as the nature of 'god' remained undefined. But of course Christians could not tolerate *that.* In the first place, they must re-define other people's 'gods'. They called them mere objects, that is, idols. Very offensive, no doubt, but more for the manner of the accusation than its matter.[22] Pagan writers in the educated circles they moved in had been making the same accusation for centuries. There remained the deeds wrought through forces which pagans called by the name Apollo or Poseidon or Zeus—miracles beyond denial by Christians, wrought even

in their own day, but which they attributed to mere *daimones*;[23] for *theoi* were no more than gods so-called and in quotation-marks.[24] Tertullian asserts and makes use of the terminological argument: "If angels and *daemones* perform the very same feats as your gods, where then lies the superiority of their godhead? ... Is it not better to think, when they do what makes us believe in the gods, that they have *made themselves* gods, rather than that gods should be on a level with angels and *daemones*?"[25] Clearly the word *deus* was to be reserved for a being or beings of commanding power, truly sovereign, independent, superior. As Simon Magus proclaims to a crowd in Rome, "'He that has a master is not a god.' And when he said this, many said, 'You put it well.'"[26]

But how can superiority which thus defines the word be demonstrated save by measurement against every alternative? How can Christian 'monotheism' in the peculiar meaning of the term we have discovered be asserted save through proving the inferiority of everyone else's 'god'? Here, too, and in a second respect, Christians presented a new definition of divinity—but of their own God, not the pagan ones. Unlike the latter which had for centuries been hymned, acclaimed, portrayed in sculpture or praised in oratorical performances without ever a hint of hostility among them—in this respect as in others entirely departing from Homeric tradition—the focus of worship for Christians was a being perpetually in arms, a jealous God always to be feared.

It is in this light that we ought to understand the exceptional prominence accorded by Christians to their success in overcoming demons through Jesus' name. It could only be seen as a test of strength. The winner was the 'true' god; for truth in that regard must be established precisely through the demonstration of commands given by one and obedience yielded by another. Stories of Jesus' casting out of devils no doubt were among those parts of the faith first to be shown and talked about before unbelievers; exorcism was enjoined by Jesus upon his disciples when He sent them out to the Gentiles,[27] and was performed often by the apostles in their travels, too. Beyond all tales of such confrontations and triumphs, or others like them, found in the apocryphal second-century Acts of John and Peter, there were the boasts of the Apologists. One of them, Tertullian, makes clear what is at stake: through Christian exorcism "that spirit will own himself in truth a *daemon* just as he will elsewhere call himself a 'god', falsely."[28] Exorcism and mastery of spirits—not unknown among pagans but much more practiced and proclaimed before them by Christians—exorcism

thus was a demonstration of a theological position and thereby a missionary instrument. It made converts.[29]

Truly divine power also displayed itself in acts of dramatic punishment. That was common knowledge. But the Christian perception was far more dreadful than the pagan, so far at least as we can generalize about the latter. There was certainly no pagan match for the declaration with which Paul introduced his God to a pagan crowd: "The living God, the God of vengeance, the jealous God who has need of nothing ..." had sent him, Paul, to preach repentance from sin.[30] Non-Christians of course knew what they might expect if they defied a deity head-on, by breaking an oath taken in his name or by violating some tabu right in his sacred precinct.[31] They could have found the match for their own stories within the Christian community: the story of Ananias and his wife, for example, who were struck dead for cheating the poor-box. But there was a great deal more to it than that. What Christianity put forward was the fearful novelty of a God who would burn them alive in perpetuity for their very manner of life, spying out their transgressions wherever committed, as He would correspondingly reward the virtuous. Beginning with John the Baptist's and Jesus' preaching, on through Paul's acknowledgement of "the wrath to come," the flames of hell illuminated the lessons of Christianity quite as much as the light of Grace.[32] Actual scenes of speeches delivered to non-believing crowds show that the message was made plain, for example, by Paul at Iconium very much as Jesus had told His desciples to do;[33] and we know that it got through, at least to Celsus. He remarks that Christians "believe in eternal punishments" and "threaten others with these punishments."[34] Clearest of all is the scene in the amphitheater at Carthage where the martyrs, referring to their coming torment, tell the crowd by sign-language. "You, us; but God, you;" but Pionius had elaborated on similar comparisons and warnings of condemnation and suffering, in the city-square of Smyrna.[35] It is likely that this particular article of faith was as widely known as any outside the Church. Despite the Apologists' attempts, however, to make eternal hell-fire credible by reference to Tartarus or to Stoic predictions of universal conflagration, non-believers found it novel and hard to accept. That much we can tell from the way the Apologists handle the subject.

No source indicates that the unconverted saw a necessary connection between eternal torture and an eventual existence after death *in the flesh*. Perhaps the connection was seen, but forgotten in the surprise

and controversy roused by the latter proposition itself. "This very flesh will rise?" asks the judge of Phileas martyr, "astonished."[36] His astonishment reminds us once more of the gap that had opened between the poets and philosophers over the course of centuries: an after-life peopled with forms that were recognizably what they had been before death was indeed to be found in primitive Greek religion—for that matter, in Etruscan and therefore early Roman religion. But outside of literature, in the real Roman empire, and among real convictions throughout our period of study, there is hardly a trace of Tartarus, the Elysian Fields, or any such world beyond death. Even a belief in the immortality of the soul alone is hard to find—a fact reflected in the second-century Lucian's saying about Christians: "The poor devils have utterly persuaded themselves that they will be immortal and live forever."[37]

Christian certainty of a heavenly reward for the virtuous was known to pagans, though that knowledge is just barely attested.[38] It made a pair with eternal punishment, and was to be attained, so a non-believer might have heard, through acts of denial of the flesh.[39] This was a teaching often discussed by the Apologists, and the call to repentance had been earlier raised by St. Paul before crowds in Iconium and Athens.[40] Celsus declares all this to be familiar: pagans likewise, so he says, believed in divine retribution for wicked acts, because they were so taught by their initiators into certain cultic mysteries. He himself seems to espouse the view,[41] but it cannot be found anywhere else nor can we be sure what mysteries he is talking about.

Of course what we call paganism was an immensely rich, variform, criscrossed and, above all, a randomly reported world of beliefs, in which no doubt you could find almost anything somewhere. But when allowance has been made for the danger in any attempt at generalizing, there still remain some conclusions to be summed up at this point.

To begin with, we *can* determine what things most educated pagans thought they knew about their own gods, and what other things they were likely to know about the God of the Christians; and we can compare the two credos and find the novelty of the latter to lie in *the dramatic polarities it presented.* This is perceived by a pagan, charging that the Christian "impiously divides the kingdom of god and makes two opposing forces, as if there was one party on one side and another one at variance with it." He means, naturally, Satan and *daimones* that are falsely called 'gods', versus the real deity and His angels.[42] And a

Christian for his part points to "a certain rational agency, rival in its operations"[43]—again meaning the Satanic kingdom. Apologists echo such words very often. The dualism, the resulting warfare in supernatural realms, and the implied necessity that you should choose up sides and hate the one and love the other just as you were in turn loved or hated by the divine powers, was absolutely new and strange outside the Judaeo-Christian community; and it was perceived as such.

Moreover, the polarity expressed itself in the most savage terms, terms almost if not entirely novel: in an eternity of torture for the soldiers in the wrong camp, with corresponding bliss for those in the right. Right and wrong took on the starkest outlines. There was no escaping the choice between them, for neutrality counted against you; and this novelty, by which religious preference was for the first time demanded, then itself demanded a corresponding way of life. That, too—the moral implication in religious preference—was all but unheard-of among pagans. Cult and philosophy had been kept quite separate: prayer for benefits was one thing, a Stoic chaplain in one's house was another. But now the two came together. As Apollonius martyr said to his tormentor, it was through belief in "judgement after death, a reward for virtue in the resurrection, with God as judge ... through this above all we have learned how to live a fair life, in the expectation of the hope to come."[44]

Two warring camps above and all around us, life resumed after death in eternal bliss or agony; and a choice in conduct here on earth that was at every moment scrutinized and borne in mind against the day of judgement—these remarkable images in the harshest black and white were all entirely strange. They were presented to an audience that was conservative, perhaps no more than any other people in history, yet deeply and expressly conservative in matters of religious allegiance. That we know from countless proofs and testimonies of pagans addressing other pagans; we know it also from pagans addressing Christians, and from various Christian passages in reply.[45] By what possible means, then, could such aggressively novel novelties win any adherents?

The specific moments and details of conversion seem not to have been much studied. Perhaps it is assumed that the job of winning adherents would have been a rather easy one, given the intrinsic attractions of the new faith—if only it had been fully and fairly understood. However, persecutions intervened and thus the spread of Christianity was impeded unnaturally. The horrific crucifixions of A.D. 64 were only the first in a

series. From then on, even if thinly spread out in time and space, renewed attacks drove the evangelists off the streets of most cities.[46] All the more difficult to understand how the faith they preached could be communicated and diffused!

In addressing the difficulty, no doubt the first step must be to assemble some body of evidence. We may begin by excluding consideration of any rewards that awaited new recruits—rewards spiritual, social, emotional, and financial[47]—which came only *after* conversion; for it seems fair to define our topic, conversion, as that experience by which non-believers first became convinced that the Christian God was almighty, and that they must please Him.

The evidence includes a very limited number of persons who speak to us as Christians but were not always such.[48] "I came," says one, "to my faith [in the Scriptures] through the unpretentious style, the artlessness of the speakers, the clear explaining of Creation, the foreknowledge of what was to happen, the excellence of the precepts, and the single ruler over the whole universe. And my soul being taught of God, I have learned that [Greek] writings lead to our being judged and condemned, but that these others put an end to our slavery." Herein, the level of internal dialogue is obviously high, high enough to place the speaker in that uppermost tenth of the population or less that we have so far been dealing with. It is an eastern immigrant to Rome, Tatian, who is quoted. His remarks, except in their length and explicitness, may stand for the group as a whole. What *they* saw in Christianity that led them to adopt it is about what we might have predicted. Its style of thought we can easily understand.

We are also familiar with the view that martyrs made converts; but with this, we take leave of the élite and enter among the masses, who supply our second type of convert.

"The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church"—famous epigram, long afterward endorsed by the policy of the apostate emperor Julian. The fourth-century biography of the Egyptian monk Pachomius declares, "after Diocletian's and Maximian's persecutions, conversion of pagans increased greatly for the Church."[49] Why did this happen? Just how did pagan witnesses reason, when they saw martyrdoms and became converts? There are several plausible explanations but only one bit of evidence that I know of. In Carthage in A.D. 203, Christians were incarcerated, they behaved with splendid cheer and spirit, and the jailer "began to make much of us, realizing that there was a great power in

us," a great *virtus*. Shortly afterward he appears a convert.[50] His reasoning can only have been: their conduct is beyond nature, a real god must be at work—in short, they constitute a miracle.

To revert to the monk Pachomius: he himself was won over through a bargain he struck when he was held in close custody against draft-dodging. "If you set me free from this affliction," he prayed to God, "I will serve your will all the days of my life."[51] On a vastly more important scale, such was the basis for Constantine's conversion, a sort of *do ut des*, or perhaps *credo quia vinces*; and so on into the first of those early medieval conversions of entire nations for the same cause, that they might engage in war with better prospects of victory. The Burgundians in A.D. 430 decided that the God of the Romans must be a very superior one. They applied to a convenient bishop, fasted, were instructed, and within a week were all baptized.[52]

With these reports from the empire's jails, barracks, and frontiers, we have entered on calculations quite different from those of the schools, quite different from Tatian's that were quoted a little earlier. Tatian puts fear of damnation at the end of his list of considerations. By contrast, we know of a woman, also of Rome but a little earlier (the 140s) and of a lower class, who put it first: for, "coming to know the lessons of Christ" and thus being won over herself, subsequently she "recalled the teachings of Christ and warned [her husband] of punishment in the eternal flames for those who do not live modestly and according to right reason."[53] We do not know, and it is inconsequential, just who she was; but she does provide one of our very rare glimpses into someone's thought-processes. We have seen that pagans were informed of Gehenna and damnation; here we see those horrors used as the chief, perhaps the only, argument for conversion.

We also have a few scenes where the thoughts of persons not among the elite are anticipated by speakers trying to bring over whole crowds to belief. The fullest are naturally the speeches given by Paul and Stephen to Jews in Jerusalem. The setting is not comparable to those involving a pagan audience, but it is worth noting the emphasis in one of the speeches that is laid on the miracle on the road to Damascus. Since Paul often refers to it in his letters as something instantly familiar to his readers, it seems likely to have been a prominent feature also in his preaching generally.[54] He had seen God with his own eyes, and his being blinded was the proof. Very similarly, when Peter preaches in Rome, he recounts how he too thought he had been blinded by the revelation granted of God, for a moment, visible in His true form.[55]

But there is another scene of Paul addressing non-believers. He is in Ephesus. He tells his listeners how, in that same period when he had been in the Damascus area, he encountered and spoke with a lion, and won it over, and baptized it in a river. After that, the lion departed in peace, thereafter even eschewing lady-lions. It had become an ascetic. "And as Paul told this," our source declares, "a great crowd was added to the faith."[56] They were converted—why? Surely because the story, which audiences of the time could be credibly portrayed as believing, demonstrated *virtus* working through the man who was at that very moment addressing them.

If this scene may be taken as really written before A.D. 200 and really circulated among various churches in an interested and reverential fashion, as seems clear, then it matters not whether it transmits words actually spoken or behavior actually observed; for our concern is with the mentality of the audience—how they thought, how contemporaries who wanted to be believed would depict that thought, in short, what generally seemed familiar and credible. There is confirmation in just the same period from Tertullian's saying, "When were even droughts not ended by our going down on our knees, and fasting? At those times, too, the populace, hailing 'The God of Gods, who alone prevails!' have been witnesses to our God."[57] He is reminding his own living audience of moments of mass conversions upon the working of wonders by prayer, even if the conversions are along quite unreconstructedly pagan, "Great-is-God" lines. And there is confirmation, too, in the account Eusebius gives of the successors to the Apostles, evidently toward the turn of the first century in the Aegean area: addressing audiences who "had heard nothing at all of the word of faith, they moved about with God's favor and help, since in that time, too, many wonderful miracles of the divine spirit were wrought by them, with the result that whole crowds, every man of them upon the first hearing, eagerly espoused piety toward the Maker of all things" (*H. E.* 3.37.3).

The most precious scenes prior to the triumph of the Church under Constantine are to be found in the *Life of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus*, strangely enough, never translated into a modern tongue and therefore relatively little known. Its author Gregory of Nyssa makes clear that he had been in the region of Gregory's mission and had heard, passed down orally over the span of some hundred and thirty years, a wealth of stories which he transmits to us.[58] Through them all runs the theme of supernatural force displayed and, for no other reason and without need

of any further word, conversions wrought.[59] The Wonder-worker puts an end to an outbreak of plague, for example, and the pagans thereupon turn to his God, "whom they acclaimed the One True God and ruler of all things." We can almost hear them shouting, like those around Carthage in Tertullian's day at the end of a drought, "The God of Gods!", or in Rome, beholding Peter's miracles, "One is the God, One God of Peter!"[60] The *Acta Petri* develops the same theme repeatedly and at length: a miracle is wrought and thereby the onlookers are made Christians on the spot.[61]

That this is how it really happened, and the Church really grew in historically significant numbers through demonstrations, or the report of demonstrations, that seemed beyond all but divine *virtus*, I do not doubt. In evaluating the evidence, we must of course bear in mind all that has been said about the religious habits and expectations of the world evangelized. For other explanation of that great growth, there is no evidence—no mass meetings, no great sermons, no speaking in tongues or dramatic inner spiritual crisis. But our view can be confirmed from two further sorts of information: first, information about conversions to belief in pagan deities, in just the same ways that availed to make Christians, in the same period and regions, that is, through proofs of power;[62] and second, information about conversions to Christianity post-Constantine. There is a small corpus of sketches giving us the specific moment and reason that belief was inspired.[63] What they reveal is just what is found also in earlier parallels, that is, religious allegiance following upon displays of divine efficacy.

Words and logic unassisted by wonderful deeds did sometimes have the same effect among ordinary folk as we have seen them having among the élite, and they are so reported;[64] but the surviving evidence does not show them to be any considerable factor, whatever rationalists might prefer. Celsus, representing that latter view, tries to discountenance the Church by his ridicule of the supernatural element in Christian expansion; but Origen defends it head-on as operating and absolutely essential in the time of Jesus, of the Apostles, and down into his own day near the mid-third century.[65] Both he and his opponent are at one in assuming that it is an element at work only among simple folk. Both writers, like the Apologists generally, distinguish between what should be shown to the educated and the uneducated.[66]

What is shown naturally determines what is seen, and seen to be good. So we return to our subject and starting-point. The devotees of

other gods saw in Christianity what could be accommodated in their level of perception. Among them, among the most highly articulate and intellectual, we ourselves feel not too ill at ease. They both produce and tend to occupy the pages of our sources. We can see how they think, we can generally understand them, and we are inclined instinctively to explain the rise of the Church in terms of these elite figures. But if we are rather to estimate Christianity as an historical force, that drew in scores of thousands, we must take account (even if we cannot quite enter the thoughts) of Everyman as well.

NOTES

[1] See *Acta Pionii* 19.11 p. 162 of the edition of H. Musurillo, *Acts of the Martyrs* (1972), by which I cite most of the martyr-acts from here on; also see my *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (1981) 83, adding from later times Aug., *Ep.* 16.1: a pagan's doubts about Olympus, while believing in *salutaria numina* (but also in "the one god all-high, without beginning or offspring, a grand and magnificent father").

[2] See my *Paganism* 76 and P. A. Brunt in *Studies in Latin Literature*, ed. C. Deroux (1979) 512, on pagan skeptics; on the Christians' involvement, see *Acta Acacii* 2.7 p. 58 of the edition of R. Knopf, *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten*, ed. 3 by G. Krüger (1929).

[3] *POxy.* 1382 (mid/late 2nd cent.), in an aretalogy; on a 3rd cent. gem, A. Dimitrova-Milceva in *Vorträge des 10. int. Limeskongresses* (1977) 285; more examples in my *Paganism* 186; and the interesting scene in the *Acta Petri* 26 p. 73 of the edition of R. A. Lipsius, *Acta Apostolorum apocrypha* 1 (1891), where the crowd in Rome shouts *unus deus, unus deus Petri.*

[4] Plin., *Nat. Hist.* 2.5.22, *Fortuna, toto mundo et omnibus locis ... Fortuna sola invocatur ... et cum conviciis colitur.* For demons causing plague etc., cf. Philostr., *Vita Apoll.* 4.10, the same view being Origen's at *C. Cels.* 1.31 and 8.31, and in Just., II *Apol.* 5 or Tert., *Apol.* 22.4.

[5] See sources cited in my *Paganism* 185.

[6] *Test. animae* 1, cf. A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (1933) 192.

[7] Orig., *C. Cels.* 1.8; *PBodmer* 20 cols. IV-V, cf. Just., II *Apol.* 3.

[8] Caution dictates the use of only a few. See W. Schneemelcher in E. Hennecke, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*[3], Eng. trans. (1965) 2.275, dating the *Acta Petri* to the 180s and, pp. 261ff., showing its use by the *Didascalia* and Origen; ibid. 351, the *Acta Pauli (et Theclae)* dated to ca. 185-195; and texts in Lipsius, *op. cit.*

[9] Lucian, *Peregrinus* 11-13; Galen, in R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians* (1949) 15; Min. Fel., *Octavius* 9.6, given maximum proportions by P. Frassinetti, *Giornale ital. di filol.* 2 (1949) 238-54; and Just., II *Apol.* 3.1.

[10] Acts 10.25 (Peter) and 14.11-12 (Barnabas and Paul) and 28.6, cf. Musurillo 348 and *Acta Petri* 28 p. 78 Lipsius (Peter worshipped). For a wholly pagan parallel, see Philostr., *op. cit.* 4.44 and 7.32, Apollonius saluted as a god.

[11] Acts 8.11.

[12] Lk 9.33.

[13] Acts 8.19 and 16.16.

[14] *Hypsistos* in Acts 16.17.

[15] Acts 14.12.

[16] E.g. Musurillo 148 and 158 (*Acta Pionii* 9.9 and 16.4), cf. Celsus supposing Jesus would be an angel, in a Jew's eyes, or anyone else's, *C. Cels.* 2.9.1 and 2.44, and pointing out the flaw in Christian monotheism, 8.12. Further, pagans could only have understood θεοῦ παῖς as "God's slave", at Musurillo 42, cf. Acts 3.26 and elsewhere.

[17] E.g. Musurillo 162, Zeus *basileus* compared with Christ *basileus*, *ibid.* 8 and 188, or Paul to the Areopagus, Acts 17.24, Christ *kyrios*.

[18] *Apol.* 24.3ff., cf. Min. Fel., *Octavius* 20.1, and Athenagoras, *Leg.* 6, attributing a widespread belief in One God to pagans generally, or to "the philosophers" (as does Clement, *Protrepticus* 5, PG 8.164ff., and meaning especially Plato, *Protr.* 6, PG 8.172ff.). Further, see my *Paganism* 86ff. and above, n. 1.

[19] As H. Chadwick says in his translation of the *Contra Celsum* (1965) p. xvii: for subscribers to a sort of Platonism, "monotheism and polytheism are not mutually exclusive". But my own interpretation includes not only philosophers.

[20] Eusebius (*H. E.* 2.3.2) says the disciples induced people to reject δαιμονικὴ πολυθεΐα, but I find no other uses of the term in Christian sources before A.D. 337 (nor the word *monotheia*).

[21] *Acta Acacii* 1.9ff. p. 58 Knopf-Krüger.

[22] E.g. Acts 17.29 and 19.26 and Musurillo 24, 94, and 296; often in the Apologists, e.g. Theophilus, *Ad Autolycum* 1.1 and 2.2 and Athenag., *Leg.* 15.

[23] *Daimones* = pagan "gods" in Tert., *Apol.* 23.11, Just., I *Apol.* 56, 58, and 62-4, *Acta Claudii* et al. 1.4 and 8 p. 107 Knopf-Krüger, or Musurillo 22 (or in Jewish sources like Jos., *A. J.* 8.2.5), more often *daimonia* (regularly in NT, also Musurillo 306 and *Acta Claudii* et al. 5.2 p. 108 Knopf-Krüger); demons, not gods, in idols do miracles, cf. Athenag., *Leg.* 23 and 26; Orig., *C. Cels.* 8.62; Tert., *Apol.* 22.8ff.; and pagan predecessors in these views, in my *Paganism* 82. For *daimonia* as a derogatory term, see Acts 17.18 and Jn 10.21.

[24] I Cor. 8.5: εἴπερ εἰσὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ ... ὥσπερ εἰσὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς θεός, cf. Gal. 4.8, and perhaps some reflection of the point of dispute in Celsus' calling Hecate along with other powers "*daimones*", *C. Cels.* 1.9, or angels, "gods", 5.4.

[25] *Apol.* 23.2.

[26] *Acta Petri* 23 p. 71 Lipsius.

[27] Mt 10.8.

[28] *Apol.* 23.4, trans. T. R. Glover (Loeb ed.), where *dominus* = "god" like Gr. *Kyrios*.

[29] See passages quoted in my *Paganism* 168 n. 4, and conversions wrought upon seeing exorcisms, in Euseb., *H. E.* 5.7.4 = Iren., *C. haer.* 2.32.4 (Gaul in the 180s). They continued to exert their power later, e.g. in Augustine's world, *Civ. dei* 22.8 CSEL 40, 2, pp. 602ff.

[30] *Acta Pauli* (*et Theclae*) 17 p. 246 Lipsius, Paul addressing the throng at Iconium.

[31] Tert., *Apol.* 17.6; Orig., *C. Cels.* 8.45; and more evidence in my *Paganism* 32. For Christian stories of divine punishment, cf. for example Acts 4.5-10 and 13.10-11 (compare I Tim. 1.20); Tert., *Ad Scap.* 4.3; *Acta Petri* 15 p. 62 Lipsius (the wicked are stricken dumb); *Acta Andreae* narr. 36 (Ep. Gr. 15) (the wicked a suicide); Euseb., *H. E.* 6.9.5, comparing Acts 12.23 and more famous victims among the persecutors, e.g. in Lactantius. For God as spyer-out of wickedness, see Min. Fel., *Octavius* 10.5: Christians "would have Him a hostile figure, restless, shameless and inquisitive", etc., repeated at 23.9.

[32] Lk 3.9 and 17; 10.12 and 12.5; I Thess. 1.10; and, as general impression, A. von Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity* (1961) 90.

[33] Above, n. 30, and Mt 10.7 and 15 (cf. Lk 3.7-9; 10.12; 12.5; 19.27; and elsewhere); at Thessalonica, warning of God's wrath, *Acta Andreae* 12; but not at Lystra, Acts 14.15ff., and barely at Athens, 17.31.

[34] *C. Cels.* 8.48, trans. Chadwick; cf. Just., I *Apol.* 8 and 68, offering the parallel of Rhadamanthus and Minos (as do Theoph., *Ad Autol.* 37, and less clearly Min. Fel., *Octavius* 35) which he expects to be told is incredible. On divine retribution threatened in martyr-scenes, see Musurillo 10, 22 and 32 (bare mentions only, by Polycarp, Carpus and Pamphilus) and the *Acta Acacii* 1.8 p. 107 Knopf-Krüger.

[35] Musurillo 126, cf. the preaching to the populace on the night before, p. 124, and 14-44 (Pionius, at length and explicitly), and implied at lines 8ff. of the *Passion of Phileas*, *ibid.* p. 332.

[36] Musurillo 332, similar to the pagan's challenge, *ipso corpore*? etc., in Min. Fel., *Octavius* 11.7; cf. also Acts 17.32, the Athenians hearing of the raising of the dead "jeered"; and among the Apologists conscious of the difficulty of the doctrine, notice Theoph., *Ad Autol.* 1.8; Tat., *Ad Graecos* 6; Origen meeting Celsus' protests, *C. Cels.* 4.56ff., 5.14, 5.18 (Celsus' ridicule), and 8.49; and special treatises on the resurrection by Athenagoras, Justin, Tertullian and others.

[37] *Peregrinus* 13; and, for the rarity of beliefs in immortality, my *Paganism* 53-57. C. B. Welles in *Excavations at Dura-Europus, Prelimin. Report* IX (1944) 179, reports the Durene epitaph containing the wish, "may the ψυχαί θεαί receive him", but can find no parallel to this thought. I am also struck by the evidence in W. Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften* 1 (1955), where, among many hundreds of epitaphs of the Roman period, only a handful (among nos. 1755-1777, passim) offer the distinction, "the earth holds the body but the Aether (or Heaven, the Gods, the Muses, etc.) hold the soul." All the rest are silent about eternity, or they urge the reader to "drink up, you see what you will come to" (e.g. no. 378), or they refer to the soul in its earthly existence (no. 540).

[38] Origen, *C. Cels.* 2.5 and 6.11, knowledge less stated than hinted at by Celsus; knowledge declared, by Justin to his tormentors, Musurillo 52; and indicated, by imagined pagans, ibid. 206 (the *Passio SS Mariani et Iacobi* 8.7) and Min. Fel., *Octavius* 11.5; preached to the unconverted only by Apollonius martyr (not a source to be pressed), Musurillo 100.

[39] *Acta Pauli* (*et Theclae*) 11 p. 243 Lipsius.

[40] Ibid. 17 p. 246 Lipsius; Acts 17.30-31; and taught by Peter in Judea, *Acta Petri* 17 p. 64 Lipsius.

[41] *C. Cels.* 3.59 and 8.48-49, cf. 4.10; above, n. 31. As to punishment after death, I find almost nothing. F. Cumont in *Afterlife in Roman Paganism* (1923) cites outright denials of it (p. 83), discounts the unusable (pp. 84f.), and is left with only the Syrian novel, Heliod., *Aeth.* 8.9, and the *Apocalypse of Peter.* The pictures they present claim no generality and their origin is unknown. S. G. F. Brandon, *The Judgement of the Dead* (1967), Chap. 4, adds nothing from the centuries A.D. except (p. 93) Lucian's *Menippus*, which is surely a *jeu d'esprit* and nothing more (like the *Catabasis*, e.g. § 3 and 13). In Plutarch's *De sera num. vind.* a company of the widely learned, including a high Roman, discuss divine punishment of the wicked after death; they enjoy the idea as a novelty (566f.); but it seems to me decisive (cf. esp. 555D) that they know no such living faith anywhere.

[42] *C. Cels.* 8.11, trans. Chadwick.

[36] Tert., *Apol.* 2.18, trans. Glover—cf. "our fight is not against human foes but against Cosmic Powers, against the authorities and princes of the dark world", etc. (Ephes. 6.12).

[44] Musurillo 102.

[45] On the overwhelming respectability (to say no more) of worshipping in the way of one's fathers, see my *Paganism* 3ff.; on Christians' consciousness of their innovating predicament, see e.g. Clem. Alex., *Protrepticus* 10, or Just., I *Apol.* 12.

[46] Though without any thorough search, I find only one possible active evangelist attested in post-Biblical times, outside of Asia: a certain Alexander in Gaul, Euseb., *H. E.* 5.1.49. I discount another possibility, see my *Paganism* 98 and J. Reynolds et al., *JRS* 71 (1981) 136; I also discount teachers one-to-one, inside private homes, such as Origen's (Euseb., *H. E.* 6.3.1 and 5) or such as Celsus describes, *C. Cels.* 3.55, and teachers against heresies in public but only a Christian public, in Euseb., *H. E.* 5.16.4, 6.37, and 7.24.7; and I discount Justin in a public setting at Ephesus, *Dial.* 122.4, since the interested bystanders are apparently Jews or *sebomenoi*, and in Rome as well, where Eusebius (*H. E.* 4.16.1: Justin "in debates with listeners present often refuted him", i.e. Crescens) seems only to draw out the implications of Just., II *Apol.* 3, δημοσίᾳ, and 5, προθέντα με καὶ ἐρωτήσαντα αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσεις τινάς. But the mob in Smyrna does know Polycarp as "the teacher of Asia ... teaching many not to offer sacrifice nor venerate the gods," Musurillo 10; and see further below, p. 186.

[47] It was not cynical in Julian the Apostate to stress the importance of the eleemosynary factor: notice the consternation in the Roman Christian community when its chief patron withdrew support, *Acta Petri* 8 p. 55 Lipsius.

[48] For example, Just., *Dial.* 8 (but so elaborate in setting—a dialogue within a dialogue—and so indebted to Plato, e.g. *Symp.* 201ff., that I cannot take it as truly autobiographical); Tat., *Ad Graecos* 29 (quoted); Theoph., *Ad Autol.* 1.14 (brief mention of prophecies); Tert., *De paenit.* 1.1 (conversion unexplained); Greg. Thaumat., *Paneg. to Origen* (hints hidden in the verbiage, esp. chaps. 5, 13, and 15). From the fourth century I can add, besides Augustine, only two cases: of Victorinus briefly described by him, *Conf.* 8.2.3f., cf. C. Monceaux, *Hist. littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne* 3 (1905), pp. 377f., and Synesius, cf. J. Bregman, *Synesius of Cyrene* (1982), Chap. I and passim—both coming to Christianity through Neoplatonism, and doing so as philosophers.

[49] *Vita Pachomii* 2 p. 4 Athanassakis, cf. Just. II *Apol.* 12, observation of martyrs discredits slanders about their vices (but here there is no connection with conversion).

[50] Musurillo 116 and 124 (*Passio S. Perpetuae* 9.1 and 16.4), recalling the terrified jailer's conversion through the miracle at Philippi, Acts 16.25-34, and a disciple's deepening of belief in his teacher's divinity, Philostr., *Vita Apoll.* 7.38.

[51] *Vita Pachomii* 5 p. 6 Athanassakis.

[52] Soc., *H. E.* 7.30 (they promptly won the battle, destroying three times their weight in enemies).

[53] Musurillo 38 (*Passio SS Ptolemaei et Lucii* 2), cf. the *Acta S Dasii* 4.2 p. 93 Knopf-Krüger.

[54] Acts 22.3-21, esp. 6-13; and in letters, Gal. 1.16, I Cor. 9.1 and 15.8, and Phil. 3.12.

[55] *Acta Petri* 20 p. 67 Lipsius.

[56] Schneemelcher in Hennecke 2.389.

[57] *Apol.* 4.6.

[58] Notice φασί, PG 46.916B, λέγεται at 917B, etc., and caution at 957D.

[59] *Ibid.* 917Aff. (of the *neokoros*), 920Cff. (of the Neocaesarian crowds), 924D (the same, plus countryfolk), and 957B (relief of plague). Compare above, n. 29; and the last pre-Constantinian scene I find, of Agapetus (s.v., in Suidas) making conversions "through miracles", e.g. raising the dead and moving mountains, and so, ca. 300 A.D., "won over many pagans to enroll themselves in Christianity" (Philostorgius, *Hist. eccl.* pp. 19f. Bidez).

[60] Above, nn. 3 and 58, and Marc. Diac., *Vita Porphyrii* 21 and 31, the pagans exclaim at the miracle, ὁ Χριστὸς μόνος θεός, and μέγας ὁ θεὸς τῶν χριστιανῶν.

[61] *Acta Petri* 10 p. 57 Lipsius; 12 p. 60 (the call, *alium signum nobis ostende ut credamus*); 13 p. 61 (*secuti sunt plurimi hoc viso et crediderunt in domino*); 17 p. 63 (*propter hoc enim factum credent*).

[62] Tert., *Apol.* 21 and 31, paganism wins devotees: *quibusdam signis et miraculis et oraculis fidem divinitatis operatur.* Also material in my *Paganism* 95ff.

[63] I know of no collection of the evidence. As a beginning, notice Soz., *H. E.* 5.15 (in Gaza ca. A.D. 350, instantly upon seeing a devil exorcized); Soc., *H. E.* 1.20 (PG 67.129ff. = Theodoret, *H. E.* 1.23, PG 82.971ff. = *H. E.* 1.24 in GCS ed. 2, 1954), in the reign of Constantine; *ibid.* 5.21.7 (PG 82.1244), in A.D. 388, pagans burst into hymns to God at a miraculous temple-destruction; Jerome, *Vita Hilarionis* 25 (PL 23.41), of the A.D. 380s near Gaza; Rufinus, *H. E.* 2.4 (PL 21.512Cff.) of A.D. 373 or a little later, near Nitria in Egypt (cf. Soc., *H. E.* 4.24); and, of date ca. A.D. 400, Marc. Diac., *Vita Porphyrii, locc. citt.* and elsewhere. For the nature of that work, likely to be least distorted in its descriptions of miracle scenes, see the Introduction in H. Grégoire and M. A. Kugener's edition (1930). Miracles often change the minds of persons already Christian, of course, e.g. Soz., *H. E.* 6.27 (PG 67.1369B) and 8.1 (1509B).

[64] On the simple folk, see *C. Cels.* 3.44 and 55, and *Acta Petri* 1 p. 44 Lipsius; on the highly educated, see Min. Fel., *Octavius* 40.1.

[65] *C. Cels.* 1.46, "even if Celsus, or the Jew that he introduces, ridicule what I am about to say ..." (trans. Chadwick); cf. also 8.47, and compare Augustine's views: the foundations of Christian faith were laid through miracles, for we find in Scripture *quae facta sunt, et propter quod credendum facta sunt*, etc. (*Civ. dei* 22.8, CSEL 40, 2, p. 596).

[66] *C. Cels.* 1.9 and 18; 5.15, 19, and 29; and elsewhere; also among Apologists, e.g. Min. Fel., *Octavius* 19.15, or *Jnl. Theol. Stud.* 17 (1966) 111, and cf. Clem. Alex., *Stromat.* 1.12, PG 8.753, care taken to avoid guffaws of the masses, like the warning by Menander Rhetor, p. 14 Russell-Wilson, not to "look unconvincing and ridiculous to the masses" through subtlety of theological argument.

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THE APOCRYPHAL ACTS OF THE APOSTLES

BY

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With reference to: Fr. Bovon, M. van Esbroeck, G. Goulet, E. Junod, J.-D. Kaestli, Fr. Morard, G. Poupon, J--M. Prieur, Y. Tissot, *Les Actes des Apôtres. Christianisme et monde païen.* Publications de la Faculté de Théologie de l'Université de Genève, 4. Genève 1981, and
E. Junod et J.-D. Kaestli, *L'histoire des Actes Apocryphes des Apôtres du IIIe au IXe siècle. Le cas des Actes de Jean.* Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et Philosophie, 7. Genève-Lausanne-Neuchâtel 1982.

The two books are the first fruits of an important project on the Apocryphal Literature of the New Testament.[1]

About ten years ago Fr. Bovon took the initiative to organize the edition of the *Apocrypha* of the New Testament in the original text, accompanied by translation, introduction and commentary. An impressive team of scholars from Suisse Romande, France and Italy participate in the project. In general the Swiss will be working on the Acts and the French on the Gospels.

Although the limits of this project have not been established, the following works are in progress: the Acts of Peter by G. Poupon, the Acts of Paul by W. Rordorf, the Acts of John by E. Junod and J.-D. Kaestli, the Acts of Andrew by J.-M. Prieur, the Acts of Thomas by P.-H. Poirier and Y. Tissot and the Acts of Philip by Fr. Bovon and B. Bouvier. Further the Acts in the Armenian version will be translated by L. Leloir and those in Coptic edited by F. Morard, P. Geoltrain will work on 5 and 6 Ezra, A. Desreumaux on the various traditions of the Legend of Abgar and the Italian team on the *Ascensio Isaiae*. In addition to this a *Clavis Apocryphorum* will be composed by M. Geerard. The complete edition will be published by Brepols in the Series *Corpus Christianorum, Series Apocryphorum.*

The entire group meets normally once a year to discuss the progress of the project and further plans. In addition to text editions these scholars

will produce collected studies such as those mentioned above and articles on related subjects.[2]

To improve the editions of Lipsius and Bonnet,[3] they are searching for new manuscripts and versions although this has apparently resulted in only a few discoveries so far. These include a small fragment with a part of the Acts of John,[4] the final part of the Acts of Andrew[5] and a part of the Acts of Philip.[6]

We sincerely hope that this project will be successfully completed and that the first part, the Acts of John which will appear in 1983, will be the beginning of a new era in the study in this field.

The first book referred to above is a general introduction into the problems related with the Acts of the Apostles. The work examines the origin and tradition of these writings and deals with some typical aspects of their contents. It ends with a survey of secondary literature and sources about the five main Acts and the Acts of Philip. The second book partially overlaps with the first and exclusively deals with the Acts of John. It tries to illuminate traces of their existence, the development and transmission of this work until the eleventh century.

From both works it appears again that the study of background and development of the Apocryphal Acts is very complicated. However, we may conclude that finally the five oldest Acts were used among the Manichees. The latest orthodox writer who read them was Photius in the ninth century. He viewed them as a collection of five writings written by a certain Leucius, and called them "the source and mother of all heresies".[7]

The beginnings of the Apocryphal Acts are still veiled in darkness. Contrary to Photius' idea the Acts certainly did not originate at the same time and in the same region. They were originally written in various languages, viz. Greek and Syriac, and show deviating theological and ethical conceptions. On the other hand, however, they share certain elements which suggest that one can speak of a common tradition. This means that everyone studying the individual Acts of some Apostle has to refer to the other ones and who deals with the Acts as a group continuously notices that each of them shows its own character.

Now we will go into the ideas of the various authors of the books mentioned above. We will leave aside the matter of the Manichaean use of these Acts since this has been dealt with sufficiently in recent times.[8]

The oldest witness for the existence of some of these Acts is Eusebius, who mentions the Acts of Paul, ἐν τοῖς νόθοις, with the Pastor of Hermas, the Apocalypse of Peter, the Letter of Barnabas, Didachè, the Apocalypse of John and the Gospel of the Hebrews. According to Eusebius heretics were responsible for the Gospels of Peter, Thomas and Matthias as well as for the Acts of Andrew, John and the other Apostles. One can conclude that Eusebius rejected the Acts as being heretical apart from the Acts of Paul which is disputed.[9]

Epiphanius seems to be better informed about the use of these Acts. He writes that the Origenians (ὠριγένιοι) use apocryphal Acts "especially the Acts of Andrew and of others", the Encratites use those of Andrew, John, Thomas and of others and the *Apostolici* (ἀποστολικοί) or Apotactici (ἀποταχτικοί) especially use the Acts of Andrew and Thomas.[10] These various groups are related to the Encratites and are located mainly in Asia Minor. It can be seen that especially the Acts of Andrew, John and Thomas were assumed to be heretical.

We may suppose that the Acts were popular among Encratites groups. The Encratites were generally known for their rejection of marriage, wine and meat but apart from this it appears that the various groups also possessed specific, sometimes gnostic, ideas.

In their book about the Acts of John, Junod and Kaestli want to trace the early history of this work. They refer to some passages in the Acts of Philip which have been discovered recently. However, "pour ne pas déflorer le sujet, nous nous bornerons à signaler l'importance de ce témoignage, sans en apporter la démonstration".[11] We must wait until the forthcoming edition of the Acts of Philip which will be edited by Bovon and Bouvier. It seems, however, that from these newly discovered passages it appears that the author or editor of the Acts of Philip adopted ideas from the Acts of Paul, Peter, John, Andrew and Thomas.[12] Since it is known that the Acts of Philip originated "d'un rédacteur directement rattaché aux cercles encratites asiates du IVe siècle",[13] the authors conclude that the five Acts were not only known but also highly favoured among Encratites.

Since we can not check the evidence we can only say that this conclusion seems to corroborate the remarks of Epiphanius mentioned above. It also shows again that the Acts of Philip originated among the Encratites. However, the origin of the five main Acts remains a mystery.

Junod and Kaestli devote a chapter in their book to the presence of the Acts of John in Syria.[14] Much significance is attached to the word ἀρούβατον which can be found in ch. 97 of the Acts of John. It can be explained from the Syriac *ʿrwbtʾ*, the Syriac rendering of the Greek παρασκευή (cf. Matth. 27, 62). This together with other evidence leads them to the conclusion that ch. 94-102 of the Acts of John were added in Syria. They promise to give the detailed arguments for this in their forthcoming edition of the Acts of John. The presence of these Acts in Syria is also suggested by the supposed dependence of the final prayer in ch. 112-114 on the prayer in the Acts of Thomas ch. 144-148.[15] This argument, however, is generally based upon similarities of genre and structure. Apart from this they refer to seven minor points which are supposed to prove that the Acts of John are dependent on the Acts of Thomas. Since full evidence has not been given we refrain from a final verdict. Even if these similarities have to be explained by influence on the part of the Acts of John, we must not underestimate the many divergencies in these two very extensive writings.

In this connection Junod and Kaestli tackle the problem of a possible presence of these Acts in Bardesanite circles. This idea is based upon a casual remark in Ephrem's commentary on the apocryphal III Corinthians in which he says that the contents of this letter have to do with the doctrine of Bardaisan and his followers who also "themselves have written Acts". Fortunately Junod and Kaestli avoid drawing definite conclusions from this passage.[16]

Finally we may discuss Junod's and Kaestli's ideas about the acceptance of the Apocryphal Acts by Mani. It is an established fact that the Manichees used the Apocryphal Acts. But how did they become acquainted with these writings? The authors refer to the Cologne Mani Codex[17] which shows that Mani spent the first twenty four years of his life among a Baptist sect which was supposed to be founded by Elchasai. According to Junod and Kaestli this "secte judéo-chrétienne" was related with the Ebionites. For this they depend upon Epiphanius' description of the Ebionite heresy in which he speaks about the influence of Elchasai on the Ebionites. In this passage about the Ebionites it is also said that they used the *Periodoi* of Peter and the *Anabathmoi* of James and "other Acts of the Apostles". From all this they conclude: "Que Mani ait eu accès à ces écrits pendant sa période elkhasaïte, nous paraît certain".[18]

To this hazardous construction we may add a few remarks. The argument is based upon a supposed Jewish Christian character of the baptist sect mentioned in the Cologne Mani Codex. But is it possible to come to this conclusion on the contents of this work itself? It is simply based upon the assumption that since Elchasai was a Jewish Christian also the sect which he is supposed to have founded must also be Jewish Christian. But the idea that Elchasai was a Jewish Christian is merely based upon some distorted descriptions of Hippolytus and Epiphanius and is far from being established. Elchasai himself has a Jewish background although it cannot be denied that his followers adopted some Christian ideas.[19]

The following step in the argument deals with the supposed relation between Elchasai and the Ebionites with their Acts of the Apostles. The following can be said. Epiphanius used—roughly speaking—two sources for his description of the Ebionites, viz. Irenaeus' remarks on this sect and a number of writings which he assumed to be Ebionite and of which are the most important the *Periodoi* of Peter and the *Anabathmoi* of James. Since his two sources were of different contents, Epiphanius has to give an explanation. Noticing some similarities between the *Periodoi/Anabathmoi* and traditions about Elchasai he concluded that Elchasai influenced the Ebionites after the time of Irenaeus.

This supposed influence is an hypothesis for which only Epiphanius is responsible. Similarities between the *Periodoi/Anabathmoi* and traditions about Elchasai exist but it are the Christian baptists responsible for these writings who influenced the Elchsaites. This means that if we speak about influence it is the other way round. Epiphanius has no idea about the origin of *Periodoi/Anabathmoi*. The same applies to his remarks about "other Acts of the Apostles"[20] and about books under name of James, Matthew and "other disciples"[21] in his chapter about the Ebionites.

We hope that we were able to show that the conclusion: "Ces témoignages sont fort intéressants, car ils nous montrent que des traditions apocryphes sur les apôtres faisaient autorité dans le milieu judéo-chrétien où Mani a passé sa jeunesse",[22] is rash.

We are glad that the Apocryphal Acts are in the centre of scholarly interest at the moment. Again it appears that their origin and tradition is still hidden in darkness. The complex state of this origin is, apart from the above, shown by an article written by Y. Tissot who studied the

present text of the Acts of Thomas. He had to conclude that behind this text are a number of sources which can be detected in spite of the efforts of a final redactor.[23] On the other hand other articles show that the Acts can also be studied as a group of writings with a number of common characteristics.[24] We hope that the readers of *Vigiliae Christianae* will be kept informed about the progress of this work.

NOTES

[1] We wish to thank Professor W. Rordorf, Neuchâtel, for the information he graciously gave to the author about the project.

[2] Cf. J. Junod et J.-D. Kaestli, Un fragment grec inédit des Actes de Jean: la guérison des fils d'Antipatros à Smyrne, *Museum Helveticum* 31 (1974) 96-104; E. Junod et J.-D. Kaestli, Les traits caractéristiques de la théologie des Actes de Jean, *Revue de Théol. et de Phil.* 25 (1976) 125-145; J.-D. Kaestli. L'utilisation des Actes apocryphes des apôtres dans le manichéisme, *Gnosis and Gnosticism*, edited by M. Krause, Nag Hammadi Studies VIII (Leiden 1977) 107-116, and W. Rordorf, Die neronische Christenverfolgung im Spiegel der apokryphen Paulusakten, *New Test. Studies* 28 (1982) 365-374.

[3] *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*, ediderunt R. A. Lipsius et M. Bonnet I (Lipsiae 1891) II 1 (Lipsiae 1898) et II 2 (Lipsiae 1903) (reprint Darmstadt 1959).

[4] E. Junod et J.-D. Kaestli, Un fragment grec inédit.

[5] F. Bovon e.a., *Les Actes,* 51.

[6] F. Bovon e.a., *Les Actes,* 51 and 301-304, cf. Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 30.

[7] See Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, ch. 8, 133-145: 'La Notice de Photius et la Question de Leucius'.

[8] See P. Nagel, Die Apokryphen Apostelakten des 2. und 3. Jahrhundert in der manichäischen Literatur, *Gnosis und Neues Testament*, herausgeg. von K.-W. Tröger, Gütersloh, 49-182, and J.-D. Kaestli, L'utilisation.

[9] Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* III 25, 4-6.

[10] See for the Origenians Epiphanius, *Pan.* 63.2.1, the Encratites 47, 1, 5 and the *Apostolici* or *Apotactici* 61, 1, 5. Junod-Kaestli also refer to the Severians, 45, 4, 1, but here is only spoken of "some apocryphal writings".

[11] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 30.

[12] F. Bovon will publish a long study on the Acts of Philip in one of the forthcoming volumes of *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt.*

[13] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 30.

[14] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, ch. 4, 35-47: 'Les Actes de Jean dans l'Église de Syrie et le témoignage d'Éphrem sur les Actes écrits par les Bardésanites'.

[15] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 38-39. The Acts of Thomas are supposed to have been written in Syria.

[16] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 43-47, see also H. J. W. Drijvers, *Bardaiṣan of Edessa* (Assen 1966), 111-112.

[17] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 77-81. It is not necessary to refer to the numerous articles about this work, but see R. Cameron and A. J. Dewey, *The Cologne Mani Codex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780) "Concerning the Origin of the Body"*. S.B.L. Texts and Translations Number, 15. Scholars Press 1979.

[18] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 79.

[19] See A. F. J. Klijn and G. J. Reinink, *Patristic Evidence for Jewish Christian Sects.* Supplem. to Nov. Test. 36 (Leiden 1973) 28-38; A. F. J. Klijn and G. J. Reinink, Elchasai and Mani, *Vig. Christ.* 28 (1974) 277-289, and K. Rudolph, Antike Baptisten. Zu den Überlieferungen über frühjüdische und -christliche Taufsekten, *Sitzungsber. der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissensch. zu Leipzig*, phil.-hist. Kl. Bd. 121, Heft 4 (Berlin 1981) 14: "Es scheint sich aber (*scil.* the sect of Elchasai) um eine häretisch-jüdische Sekte gehandelt zu haben, die sich bald auch christlicher, besonders judenchristlicher Akkomodationen befleissigte, wie sie die Quellen seit Anfang des 3. Jh. bezeugen".

[20] See Epiphanius, *Pan.* 30, 16, 6-7.

[21] See Epiphanius, *Pan.* 30, 23, 1-2.

[22] Junod-Kaestli, *L'histoire*, 79.

[23] Y. Tissot, Les Actes apocryphes de Thomas: exemple de receuil composite, in: Bovon e.a., *Les Actes*, 223-232.

[24] In Bovon e.a., *Les Actes*, some interesting articles deal with this subject: G. Poupon, L'accusation de magie dans les Actes Apocryphes, 71-93, and Fr. Morard, Souffrance et martyre dans les Actes Apocryphes, 95-119.

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Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983) 200-208, E. J. Brill, Leiden

REVIEWS

G. H. R. Horsley, *New Documents illustrating early Christianity. A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1976.* The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University 1981. V, 155 pp. Pr. $ 22.00 (Hard-cover); $ 12.50 (Soft-cover).

Few subjects in religious studies are more interesting than that of the relationship between the world of the Old and New Testament and pagan civilisation. Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East* and Moulton-Milligan's *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament illustrated from the Papyri and other non-literary Sources* were hallmarks in the study of the context of the world around the N.T. On the one hand increasing knowledge of pagan vocabulary at large and of pagan religious mentality in particular has enabled scholars to interpret various N.T. passages much better, on the other hand the study of the reception of Christianity among the various social strata of the Roman imperial population was clearly furthered by that same knowledge. The first part of the *instrument de travail* under review is devoted to the "New Testament context". The author presents 29 new documents (inscriptions, papyri) published in 1976 and thought to be useful for students of the N.T. Each entry has the Greek (or Latin) text, an English translation, a full commentary and a bibliography. Constant references to N.T. passages show the predominant concern of the author; the result is that N.T.-exegetes will immediately become aware in the most concrete way of the use of comparative study of pagan and Christian texts. A number of "Minor Philological Notes" on specific words and proper-names serve the same object of providing a common background to the pagan world and that of the N.T.

The three remaining rubrics concentrate on Christian and Jewish religion as such, without focussing on the *Begegnung* between these and paganism. One rubric presents a number of "Biblical and Related Citations" on record in recent finds; another offers a number of new Jewish inscriptions, the third deals with recent documentary evidence on phenomena within the Christian Church. The book concludes with a short list of Varia.

In the present stage of increasing specialization, overproduction of scholarly literature and increasing new epigraphical and papyrological finds one cannot but welcome this Australian initiative to bring up to date Deissmann and Moulton-Milligan. The survey is competently made, the commentaries are concise and to the point.

A few minor points. In his commentary on Θεὸς Ὕψιστος the author points out that this is not an exclusively Jewish formula. I miss a brief discussion of the significance of the use of this formula by pagan worshippers; the desire for one strong High-God far above, though not at variance with, the gods of polytheism perhaps was a reflection of the immensely hierarchical nature of Roman Imperial society. It may have facilitated the conversion to monotheistic Christianity, though the transition from heno- to monotheism certainly was not easy. On pp. 84-85 the author has a good discussion of the term μέτοχοι, denoting a mostly transitional and hardly formal business partnership. The use of the word in Luke 5, vs. 7 is clarified by the pagan background of the term. In this paragraph an epitaph from Ioppa is discussed: "(Tomb of) Paregorios and of Kyra, belonging to the fishing association of Lysias" (τῆς ἐσ τὸν βόλον συνγενικῆς τοῦ Λυσιᾶ). The author rightly remarks that LSJ or LSJ Suppl. do not give the required sense for βόλος and συνγενική. As to βόλος *SEG* XXVIII 561-562 may give the solution. Συνγενική has a connotation of "group of relatives" rather than of "association". It reminds one of the συνγενεῖς erecting epitaphs for deceased relatives in Lydia. On p. 71 the author provides background material to the ἁγνὴ παρθένος, on record in 2 Cor. 11.2, the "pure bride" betrothed to Christ, viz. the Church. He mentions some examples of ἱεραὶ παρθένοι in pagan inscriptions but rightly points out that ἁγνή may well refer here to sexual purity. Parallels for ἁγνή/ἁγνεία, as epithets of women, would have been more relevant than the *hierai parthenoi* in various cults. I am not sure that such sacred virgins were regarded as "brides of the god they worship". To support such a conclusion it seems indispensable to differentiate between temporary service of such *parthenoi* in cult ceremonies and long, perhaps even life-long, service of a virgin-priestess consecrated to the deity (cf. the example of a priestess of Artemis Ephesia in Macedonia apud J. and L. Robert, *Bulletin Épigraphique* 1950 no. 135 on p. 173). On p. 137 *pantokratōr* as divine epithet is said to have been "largely a Jewish usage". For some nuances cf. my contribution in H. S. Versnel (ed.), *Faith, Hope and Worship* (1981) 171-172.

Useful indices (biblical passages, words, subjects and Texts discussed) conclude the book. The initiative deserves warm support all over the world.

2341 EH *Oegstgeest*, Willem de Zwijgerlaan 47 H. W. PLEKET

Irénée de Lyon, *Contre les hérésies*, Livre II. Édition critique par Adelin Rousseau et Louis Doutreleau. Tome I: Introduction, notes justificatives, tables, 409 pp. Tome II: Texte et traduction, 372 pp. (Sources Chrétiennes, 293, 294). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982.

This is presumably the last pair of volumes of the text, translation, and textual commentary for each of the five books of Irenaeus' great anti-Gnostic treatise. Turning away from Sagnard's 1952 edition of Book III, the editors began with Books IV (1965) and V, then redid Book III and ended with Books I and II. Theirs is a remarkable achievement, for which we owe warm thanks not only to them but with them to *Sources chrétiennes* (above all, Pere Mondésert) and for support to the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, for Books IV and V also to the Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian. The publishers have produced an impeccable text. This is a genuine triumph of patristic scholarship in this generation. It now remains for historical theologians to build on this foundation, aided by the indispensable *Lexique comparé* of B. Reynders (CSCO 141-142, Louvain, 1954). The importance of the bishop of Lyons lies in his advance beyond the first steps, necessary but not sufficient, taken by the apologists, as well as in his devotion to scriptural tradition and common sense—the latter being preeminent in Book II.

Preliminary chapters deal with the inordinate influence of Erasmus on Harvey's edition of 1857; with the excerpts to be found in a Salamanca manuscript (stemma, p. 43), copied by "un homme cultivé, mais inexperimenté" (p. 45); and with the argumenta (separate lists) and capitula (in the text), copied with startling errors in some Latin manuscripts and based on Greek originals. A collection of fragments at Strasbourg happens to contain bits of Book II from the eleventh century in a text close to Q (Vatic. lat. 187) and S(almanticensis).

Few fragments of Book II exist in Greek. Perhaps later theologians, trained in rhetoric and logic, did not need the authority of Irenaeus on

these matters. Eusebius squeezed a little history out of the book, while John of Damascus cited it on the function of reason, the transcendence of God, and the falsity of transmigration-doctrine. There are fewer fragments in Armenian, only two in Syriac, one in Arabic. This last (p. 111) passes from Mind not to Thought (Iren. ii. 13. 1) but via thought to Vision—suggesting summarization related to the description of God in ii. 13. 3 (*totus...oculus*, ultimately from Xenophanes; cf. *totus visio* in ii. 13. 8).

A valuable chapter sets forth the plan of Book II and reminds us how far we have come from the confused writing of Justin. All one might add is a reference to B. Reynders, La polémique de S. Irénée, *RTAM* 7 (1935) 5-27. Naturally one must mention the full and important "notes justificatives", with many Greek retroversions and discussions approaching the fullness of a commentary. Appendices deal with mediaeval and Byzantine survivals. There are indices of scripture, manuscripts, and important Greek words.

One could discuss or supplement the notes but hardly ever disagree with them. Something should be said, however, on p. 288 about Irenaeus' view of the age of Jesus, a subject Eusebius discreetly neglects; on pp. 336-37 about the non-liberal arts which Irenaeus also lists; on p. 338 about dreams rather than sleep. Every reviewer has his own hobbies, and the new Irenaeus offers a rich field for enjoyment. One should also bear in mind his main anti-Gnostic thesis in an era when Nag Hammadi is being treated with such deference.

The translation is clear and flowing as well as accurate. Only one point seems to require correction. This is the translation of *femina* (ii. 10. 3, 22. 2) as "femme." (The Valentinians call Achamoth "femme issue de femme".) In the *First Apocalypse of James* (p. 35, 12-13; cf. 34, 4 Böhlig-Labib) ⲥϩⲓⲙ should be translated "female" as by W. R. Schoedel in J. M. Robinson (ed.), *The Nag-Hammadi Library*, 246. Note that the Greek formula θήλεια ἀπὸ θηλείας appears in Iren. i. 21. 5 (there too the translation should not be "femme"; see G. W. H. Lampe, *Lexicon of Patristic Greek*, 650-51—in spite of F. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne*, 277-78, arguing that Irenaeus uses "femme" for comic effect. Sagnard's judgement on this point varied (compare his 554-55 with the index, 643) and in any case he did not know the *First Apocalypse of James*, where "femme" is impossible. At this point Irenaeus was reporting, not just ridiculing.

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Basile de Césarée, *Contre Eunome*, suivi de Eunome, *Apologie*. Introduction, traduction et notes de Bernard Sesboüé, s.j., avec la collaboration pour le texte et l'introduction critiques de Georges-Matthieu de Durand, o.p. et Louis Doutreleau, s.j. Tome I: Contre Eunome I (Sources Chrétiennes, 299). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 274 p. 167 F.

La controverse entre Basile et Grégoire de Nysse d'un côté et Eunome de l'autre nous enseigne sur les problèmes fondamentaux qui ont dominé les Églises d'Orient dans la deuxième moitié du IVe siècle. En deux volumes on va publier ici la première manche de cette controverse, c'est-à-dire l'*Apologie* d'Eunome et les trois livres *Contre Eunome* de Basile. Le présent volume comprend, à part une introduction extensive, le premier livre du *Contre Eunome*, le deuxième volume comprendra les deux autres livres et l'*Apologie*. Un cas particulier d'un *hysteron-proteron*.

Dans l'introduction le Père Sesboüé situe les textes dans leur cadre historique d'environ 360 et dépeint les deux personnalités. Il défend la thèse que l'*Apologie* d'Eunome est un exposé de justification et d'explication de foi au concile de Constantinople de 360, quand il a reçu l'évêché de Cyzique. L'auteur se base ici sur les conclusions d'une étude récente de L. R. Wickham. Une telle thèse fait comprendre comment Eunome peut donner à son exposé le titre d'*Apologie* et comment Basile peut soulever des objections contre ce titre en disant qu'Eunome n'avait pas été attaqué et donc n'avait pas besoin d'une apologie, mais qu'il résume son enseignement sous la forme d'une apologie pour ne pas donner l'impression qu'il a pris l'initiative d'exposer les doctrines d'impiété (cf. *Contre Eunome* I 2).

L'auteur discute aussi les influences d'Origène et des grandes écoles de la philosophie grecque dans l'ouvrage de Basile.

Le texte critique a été établi par le Père de Durand. Il se base sur 17 manuscrits antérieurs au XIVe siècle. Dans son introduction il décrit la tradition directe et indirecte du *Contre Eunome* et fait la revue des éditions antérieures. Le texte grec, qui a été imprimé d'une façon impeccable (seulement lire ἐπινοίᾳ en I 6.57), ne diffère profondément de celui publié en 1721 par Dom Julien Garnier. On ne pouvait guère attendre autre chose. Toutefois on s'étonne parfois de la ponctuation. En plusieurs lieux on trouve des virgules qui ne me semblent pas contribuer à la compréhension du texte. En I 4.5 une virgule sépare le participe et son objet; en I 8.45 elle sépare le verbe auxilaire (δύνασθαι) et l'infinitif; I

10.2 présente un cas comparable; en I 21.14 elle sépare le sujet et le verbe.

La traduction (la première en français) est exacte et bien lisible. (Dans la traduction de I 17.18 il faut lire 'engendré' au lieu de 'inengendré'.)

Quelques petites observations. En I 10.11 Basile dit que, quand nous nommons Dieu incorruptible, nous disons δυνάμει à nous-même ou à qui nous entend: "ne crois pas que Dieu soit sujet à la corruption". Le traducteur rend δυνάμει par 'en substance'. Je voudrais proposer de traduire 'd'une façon implicite' Basile fait usage d'une catégorie ontologique pour exprimer une réalité épistémologique.

En I 19 Basile cite un texte de l'Apologie d'Eunome disant sur le temps: ὅ τε χρόνος ἀστέρων ποιά τίς ἐστι κίνησις. Le père S. traduit: «Le temps est un indéfinissable mouvement des astres». Ici l'adjectif 'indéfinissable' ne me semble pas être correct. Le temps est qualifié de ἀστέρων ποιά τις κίνησις, c'est-à-dire le temps n'est pas le mouvement des astres tout court, mais le mouvement des astres en tant que mesuré, en d'autres termes «une certaine mesure (ποιά τις) du mouvement des astres». Cette mesure peut être longue ou brève, et alors elle n'est pas définie. Mais elle n'est pas indéfinissable.

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Eusèbe de Césarée, *La Préparation Évangélique*, Livre XI. Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Geneviève Favrelle; texte grec revisé par Édouard des Places, s.j. (Sources Chrétiennes, 293). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 406 p. 364 F.

Dans les livres XI-XV de la *Préparation Évangélique* Eusèbe fait une comparaison entre la philosophie grecque et la doctrine de Moïse, pour conclure que la dernière est préférable à la première. Il fait cela par sa méthode bien-connue: il fait parler les philosophes grecs eux-mêmes et se restreint, pour sa part, à quelques observations introductoires ou concluantes. Dans les livres XI-XIII Eusèbe montre que la philosophie grecque a de grands mérites, en tant qu'elle ressemble à la doctrine hébraïque. Il trouve ces aspects positifs dans le platonisme. C'est pourquoi ces livres consistent surtout en une série de documents empruntés à Platon lui-même ou aux platoniciens postérieurs, chez qui il rencontre un éclairement de la doctrine du maître. Dans le préambule au livre XI

Eusèbe explique sa méthode. Nous reviendrons sur ce préambule dans la suite de ce compte-rendu.

Dans son introduction Mlle Favrelle situe le livre XI dans l'ensemble de la *Préparation Évangélique* et discute spécialement la comparaison qu'Eusèbe y fait entre Platon et Moïse.

Le commentaire qui suit le texte a un caractère spécial. Il n'est pas un commentaire dans le sens normal, mais une étude sur «Le platonisme d'Eusèbe», qui *peut servir de commentaire* sur les livres XI, XII et XIII, comme le dit le Père Mondésert dans une note (p. 239).

Les sentiments d'Eusèbe à l'égard de Platon peuvent être déduits d'une part de ses observations introductoires, d'autre part de la recension du texte de Platon qu'il choisit. Mlle F. discute ces deux sources d'information d'une façon très précise.

L'établissement du texte grec était, comme dans les tomes précédents, dans les mains expertes du Père des Places qui pouvait se baser sur l'édition de Mras.

La traduction française me semble être d'une bonne qualité. Je voudrais seulement faire deux petites observations sur celle du préambule. Parce qu'il s'agit, comme il est dit dans l'Introduction (p. 7), d'«une introduction soigneusement rédigée, qui indique clairement le projet de l'auteur et souligne de plus l'importance du sujet qu'il s'apprête à traiter», une version précise est d'autant plus importante.

Eusèbe commence par constater que dans son livre précédent il avait montré que les Grecs n'ont rien apporté de leur cru à la science — à part leur habilité verbale et leur facilité d'élocution —, mais qu'ils ont tout pillé chez les Barbares. C'est pourquoi il est vraisemblable que les Grecs n'ont pas ignoré non plus les oracles des Hébreux ... καὶ τούτων δὲ ἐν μέρει καθάψασθαι. On traduit: «dont bien au contraire ils se sont emparés *à leur tour*»; cela n'est pas impossible. Mais il me semble que l'expression ἐν μέρει signifie ici 'en partie'; cf. la traduction latine dans Migne PG 21, 843 *ex parte*. Eusèbe retrouve la sagesse des Hébreux chez les philosophes grecs, mais *ex parte tantum*.

Ensuite Eusèbe dit qu'il va montrer «l'accord de philosophes grecs avec les oracles des Hébreux, ὧν (= des philosophes) τοὺς περιττοὺς παραιτησάμενος τὸν κορυφαῖον ἁπάντων ἀναχαλεῖται» (le sujet est le livre XI, c'est-à-dire Eusèbe lui-même). On traduit: «Il fait appel aux plus éminents de ceux-là et cite leur chef à tous (= Platon)». La même traduction se trouve dans l'introduction p. 18. Ici on comprend mal les mots τοὺς περιττοὺς παραιτησάμενος. A mon avis Eusèbe dit qu'il *omet* les autres phi-

losophes, les considérant comme sans importance et donc *superflus*, parce qu'un appel à Platon suffit. Cf. *Prép. Év.* I 3,5,6 τὰς ἀπατηλὰς καὶ σοφιστικὰς πιθανολογίας παραιτούμενος; et I 3.7 1 Πλὴν ἀλλὰ περιττοὶ λόγοι πάντες, ὧν ἐνεργέστερα ... τὰ ἔργα. De même que dans ce dernier texte les œuvres parlent pour elles-mêmes et les discours sont donc superflus, ainsi, dans le cas présent, les autres philosophes sont sans importance, quand on peut faire appel au 'coryphée' de tous, Platon.

Dans les cinq tomes déjà parus on a publié les livres I-VII (voyez les comptes-rendus *Vig. Chr.* 29 (1975) 149-151; 32 (1978) 304-307; 35 (1981) 435-438).

Les auteurs présents ont ajouté un volume excellent à cette série impressionnante.

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Hilaire de Poitiers, *Sur Matthieu*. Tomes I-II. Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes par J. Doignon (Sources Chrétiennes, 254). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1978, 303 and 297 pp.

Professor Doignon's knowledge of Hilary became abundantly clear in his great book *Hilaire de Poitiers avant l'exil* (1971). The present edition of Hilary's commentary on the Gospel according to St. Matthew takes up much of the material provided in the first book providing an even more detailed discussion. The book opens with a list of the most important literature on the subject, in an Introduction the origin and the method of the commentary are discussed, furthermore Hilary's sources, especially Tertullian, Cyprian and Cicero. Then doctrinal matters (especially the doctrine of salvation and ethics) are analysed. The Introduction closes with a discussion of problems concerning the tradition of the text and linguistic matters. To the lucid translation explicative notes are provided throughout in which Hilary's thoughts are placed against the background of Christian and Pagan Latin literature. In a review of P. Smulders' edition of the *De Trinitate* (*Études augustiniennes*, 28, 1982, p. 151) Doignon writes *inter alia*: "Par l'étendue des informations qu'elle apporte, en particuliers dans son apparat critique, par la minutie qui a présidié à leur mise en œuvre, ce monument consacré à l'*opus magnum* de Hilaire est l'une des pierres angulaires de la

science patristique de notre temps''. Hilary's commentary on the Gospel according to St. Matthew may be less important than the *De Trinitate*, the words of praise which Doignon uses for Smulders' book apply to his own work as well.

2341 CA *Oegstgeest*/Netherlands, Oranjelaan 11 E. P. MEIJERING

BOOKS RECEIVED

The inclusion of a book in this list, which contains all books received by the editors, does not guarantee its subsequent review.

Les règles des saints Pères. Tome II: Trois règles du VIe siècle incorporant des textes lériniens. Introduction, texte, traduction et notes par Adalbert de Vogüé. Index et tables (Sources Chrétiennes, 298). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. p. 407-684. 169 f.

Ronald W. Graham, Women in the Ministry of Jesus and in the Early Church. Lexington Theological Seminary Lexington, 1983. 42 p.

Josef Kürzinger, Papias von Hierapolis und die Evangelien des Neuen Testaments (Eichstätter Materialien, 4. Abteilung Philosophie und Theologie). Regensburg, Friedrich Pustet, 1983. 250 S.

Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie. Herausgegeben von H. D. Blume und Fr. Mann (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 10). Münster Westfalen, Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983. XV, 358 S. geb. DM 128,— kart. DM 120.

Studi Storico Religiosi. Nuova serie di Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religione. Vol. VI (1982) fasc. 1-2. Fascicolo doppio dedicato alla memoria di Ernesto Buonaiuto, nel centenario della nascita. L'Aquila, Japadre Editore. 446 p.

Cyril of Alexandria, Selected Letters, edited and translated by Lionel R. Wickham (Oxford Early Christian Texts). Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1983. LV, 226 p. £ 15.00.

George W. E. Nickelsburg and Michael E. Stone, Faith and Piety in Early Judaism. Texts and Documents. Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1983. XIV, 234 p. $ 19.95 cloth.

V. V. Nalimor, Realms of the Unconscious: The Enchanted Frontier. Edited by R. G. Colodny, Philadelphia, Isi Press. 320 p.

Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier (IIIe-Ve siècles). Vol. I: Les travaux des Pères grecs et latins sur le psautier. Recherches et bilan (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 219). Roma, Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1982. 357 pp. (36 planches).

John T. Fitzgerald and L. Michael White, The Tabula of Cebes (Graeco-Roman Religion Series, 7. Texts and Translations, 24). Chico, California, Scholar Press, 1983. 226 p. $ 14,25 (Member price $ 9.50).

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THE WORLD OF IDEAS IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

AN INTERPRETATION OF DE OPIFICIO MUNDI 24-25

BY

J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

To Philo the one true source of philosophical activity is the Bible, and in particular its first five books, the Law. Moses, the Jewish lawgiver, has attained "the very summit of philosophy" (*Opif.* 8), and the only task of a philosopher is to study and to explain Moses' words, which embody a beauty of ideas transcending human capacity of speech and hearing (*Opif.* 4).

In explaining Moses' words Philo makes use of his knowledge of Greek philosophy. And in explaining the creation story of Genesis he uses in particular Plato's 'creation story' as told in the *Timaeus*.

In *Tim.* 28 Plato introduces the imagery of a craftsman who, looking at the eternal ideas, makes the sense-perceptible world. Philo explains the creation story of Genesis in such a manner that it depicts the making of two worlds, a world of ideas which he calls the *kosmos noētos*, and the sense-perceptible world, as we know it.

Philo is quite well aware of the fact that such an interpretation of the Genesis text is not self-evident. That is why he devotes to this matter an extensive preliminary section of his commentary (*Opif.* 13-25).

Genesis says that the world was created in six days. But, Philo remarks, this does not mean that the maker needed a length of time for his work. God made the whole world at once, whereby planning, commanding and creating coincide. But since things that come to existence require order, and order involves number, and the number six is the number most suitable to productivity, Moses declared that the world was created in six days.

On the other hand, at the end of the first day of creation Genesis says: καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο πρῶ, ἡμέρα μία. Thus it does not speak of 'the first day' but of 'one day', or as we perhaps should say 'day one'. In Philo's view this expression shows that here Moses does not deal with the sense-perceptible world but with the noetic world which has the

nature of oneness (τὴν μονάδος φύσιν, *Opif.* 15). This replacement of the expected πρώτη by μία—which in fact is a hebraism—is a sufficient pretext for Philo to discover in Genesis the creation of ideas.

In *Opif.* 15-25 Philo elaborates his view of this noetic world. He compares God with an architect who is going to build a city. Just as this architect cannot work without a plan of that city in his mind, so God, wishing to create this sense-perceptible world, knew that it would not be faultless unless it was made in the likeness of an impeccable, *i.e.*, intelligible, pattern. Evidently Philo is walking here in Plato's footsteps, although he does not follow him in his terminology: instead of ζῷον νοητόν he speaks of the κόσμος νοητός.

Among the disciples of Plato there was much dissension about the interpretation of the imagery of the *Timaeus*. Those who chose for a more or less literal interpretation and understood the Demiurge as representing the highest principle had to meet the problem of the location of the world of ideas. There was a tendency among these thinkers to put those ideas within the highest principle and to interpret them as its thoughts.

Philo's solution to this problem is as follows: the world which consists of ideas has no other location than the divine logos who has ordered this world. Thus the noetic world is *in* the logos of God (*Opif.* 20).

After discussing some other problems concerning the world of ideas Philo comes to a final observation, which runs as follows in the critical edition of L. Cohn and P. Wendland:

[24] εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσειε γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ νοητὴ πόλις ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἢ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος λογισμὸς ἤδη τὴν [νοητὴν] πόλιν κτίζειν διανοουμένου.

[25] τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο Μωυσέως ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐμόν· τὴν γοῦν ἀνθρώπου γένεσιν ἀναγράφων ἐν τοῖς ἔπειτα διαρρήδην ὁμολογεῖ, ὡς ἄρα κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ διετυπώθη (Gen. 1, 27). εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν εἰκόνος [δῆλον ὅτι] καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶδος, σύμπας οὗτος ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, εἰ μείζων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστίν, μίμημα θείας εἰκόνος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς, ὃν φαμεν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη [τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν] ὁ θεοῦ λόγος.

This passage has been dealt with in numerous works on Philo, but its exact meaning is still remarkably elusive. In particular Philo's way of arguing in ch. 25 has remained unclear. Obviously this state of affairs has influenced the tradition of the text and its problematic constitution in the critical edition.

To start with, it must be said that the general structure of the whole passage is clear. One discerns three steps: 1. First Philo puts forward his thesis, *viz.*, that the noetic world is nothing else than the logos of the creating God. 2. Then this thesis is illustrated by the example of the human architect. 3. Finally Philo shows that this thesis is not his own invention but is already present in Moses' words in Genesis 1, 27.

Each of these three steps asks for some further explanation. Hence I will now discuss successively Philo's thesis, its illustration and the Mosaic testimony.

Philo's thesis—In the previous discussion Philo had reached the conclusion that the noetic cosmos was *in* the logos of God. His intention now is to make an attempt at giving this conclusion a greater degree of precision. So he says: 'If one would wish to say it in a more simple way, the noetic world <is not only *in* the logos but> *is* the logos of God in His very act of creating'. In other words, in the creative act of God His logos and the noetic cosmos coincide.

One should observe that this more simple way of speech is not a simplification. On the contrary, because it is more precise, it is nearer to the truth. *Simplex sigillum veri.* For a comparable use of the term γυμνός, see *Probus* 43, *Contempl.* 78, *Sacrif.* 30.

The illustration.—Plato illustrates his thesis by referring to the case of the human architect. The plan of the future city (*i.e.* in the mind of this architect), he says, is nothing else than the *logismos* (intellectual faculty) *of the architect* in his very act of planning the city. In the same way the noetic world is nothing else than the *logos of God* in his very act of creating.

Here one should not be misled by the fact that in the case of the human architect Philo speaks of the act of planning, in the case of God of the act of creating. This difference reflects the difference between the creative activity in man and that in God. In God, as was said above, planning and creating coincide, in man these are different phases of the process.

But this difference is of no consequence in the present comparison. Philo compares the coinciding of the planned world (= noetic cosmos) and the logos of God with the coinciding of the planned city and the logismos of the human architect.

Moses' testimony—This thesis, Philo continues, is not an invention of mine but is an implication of what Moses says in Genesis 1, 27, *viz.*, that man was made after the image of God. This statement must surely

amaze the reader. How can the doctrine of Moses that man was made after God's image be an argument in favour of the coinciding of God's logos and the world of ideas?

The text containing the explanation of this statement has been handed down in a form which the German editors of a critical edition found unacceptable. They eliminated two elements: δῆλον ὅτι at the start, τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν at the end. They were followed by C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, nr 1293, and R. Arnaldez in the Lyon edition of Philo (*Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, vol 1). Colson in the Loeb series does not delete δῆλον ὅτι, as will appear below.

Arnaldez gives the following French translation: "Or si la partie est image d'image, et si la forme tout entière, totalité de ce monde sensible, puisqu'elle est plus grande que l'image humaine, est imitation de l'image divine, il est clair que le sceau archétype, que nous disons être le monde intelligible, ne saurait être que le Logos de Dieu".

J. Cohn's German translation runs as follows: "Wenn aber schon der Teil Abbild eines Bildes ist, *also* auch die ganze Gattung, diese ganze sinnlich wahrnehmbare Welt, da sie ja grösser ist als das menschliche Abbild, eine Nachahmung des göttlichen Bildes, so ist klar, dass das ursprüngliche Siegel (das Urbild), wie wir die gedachte Welt nennen, die Vernunft Gottes selbst ist".

The only difference between these two renderings is the word *also* in the German translation (which I have italized). This word has no basis in the *textus receptus*, which obviously was accepted by the translator. On the other hand, it indicates a consequence which is fundamental for Philo, as will appear in what follows.

A new attempt at interpretation is clearly called for. Philo begins this argumentation as follows: εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν εἰκόνος, ... For the understanding of this protasis it is vital to know that Genesis 1, 27, (God created man) κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ, was interpreted by Philo in a peculiar manner. According to him, these words do not mean that "man was made an image of God" but that he "was made *after* the image of God". In other words, there is an image of God and man was made after that image, so that he is "an image of an image".[1] Philo says this *disertis verbis* in *Her.* 231 "ἐποίησε", γάρ φησι, "ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον" οὐχὶ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ "κατ' εἰκόνα". If εἰκὼν εἰκόνος is said of man, one may conclude that the subject of this protasis, τὸ μέρος, indicates man.

Before going further one must recall to mind that the image after which man was made is the image *of God* (κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ), and,

moreover, that *the image of God is the logos.* This is a vital element in the argumentation. See for this equivalence *Fug.* 101: αὐτὸς (sc. ὁ λόγος θεοῦ) εἰκὼν ὑπάρχων θεοῦ, and *Conf.* 147: θεοῦ γὰρ εἰκὼν λόγος ὁ πρεσβύτατος.

Now one may circumscribe the content of the protasis as follows: 'If it is true what Genesis 1, 27 says, *viz.*, that man, being part of a whole, was created as an image of the image of God, *i.e.* the logos of God, ...'. Here the right way of arguing requires that now the consequence of Moses' statement is given. The *textus receptus*, however, adds another protasis which is not a statement of Moses. See the French translation: "*et* si la forme tout entière ...". The German rendering adds an *also*, thus drawing a conclusion—which must be an conclusion drawn from Moses' words—and makes the argumentation coherent, but the *textus receptus* does not give this *also* a textual foundation.

All the manuscripts, however, do give a conclusion here, in the form of an apodosis: δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ...

Let us now read that part of the text concerning which we no longer have any serious doubts: εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν εἰκόνος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ὅλον ... "If the part is an image of an image, then it is evident that the whole is so too". From what follows it is manifest that 'the whole' means here 'the whole sense-perceptible world'. Thus the argument is: 'if man as part of the cosmos is an image of God's image (= an image of the logos), then the whole cosmos is so too". The value of this argument will be discussed later, but from a formal point of view the reasoning looks sound.

But what about εἶδος? All manuscripts and all editions except one read τὸ ὅλον εἶδος. From a formal point of view, however, this reading is hardly acceptable. The argument 'from the part to the whole' is a kind of *a fortiori* argument, but how could one argue from 'the part' to 'the whole *form*'? Moreover, what does 'form' mean here? From what follows it must indicate the sense-perceptible world. But does this term give a proper indication of that world? Our suspicion is that εἶδος does not belong to what precedes. But could it belong to what follows? I think it could. One finds there another δῆλον ὅτι καὶ. This seems to be an indication that Philo continued his argumentation with another conditional period. This means that before σύμπας οὗτος ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος Philo started another protasis: εἰ δ' ὁ σύμπας. Now the first five letters make εἶδος, and this is, as it seems, the origin of that strange εἶδος, in the manuscripts.

An analysis of Philo's train of thought had brought me years ago to this conjecture, when I discovered that Colson-Whitaker in their Loeb edition presented the same solution. (They do not say a word about it, neither in a footnote at the text nor in "the supplementary list of cases, not mentioned in the footnotes, where the text printed is not vouched for by any manuscript of ancient authority" (in Vol V, p. 613-4). Perhaps they considered this conjecture as one of the cases which they did not mention, *viz.*, that of a "wrong division of words, in which the actual letters are correct". But this is not completely true here. The manuscripts have a sigma too many. Moreover, the conjecture is in itself deserving of mention.

If one accepts this conjecture Philo's argumentation consists of two steps which from a formal point of view are parallel:

εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος ..., δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ...
εἰ δ' ὁ σύμπας ..., δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ...

The second step of the argument runs as follows: "If this entire sensible world, which is greater than man (this must be the meaning; the actual text will be discussed below), is an image of a divine image, it is evident that ..." One observes that this protasis takes up the conclusion which was formulated in the previous apodosis, just as the first protasis took up the statement of Moses in Genesis 1, 27. Thus Philo says: "If it is true that the whole sense-perceptible world is an image of a divine image (μίμημα θείας εἰκόνος is the equivalent of εἰκὼν εἰκόνος; the 'divine image' is, of course, the divine logos), then it follows that ... But what follows then?

Philo says: "then it is evident that the archetypal seal, which we declare the noetic cosmos to be, is the logos himself". Or to say it in a more simple manner "then it is evident that the noetic cosmos *is* the logos of God". *Quod erat demonstrandum*!

This conclusion asks for some further explanation because Philo jumps to a conclusion without formulating all the steps of the argument.

In the previous sentence Philo has come to the conclusion that the visible world is an image of God's image; in other words the visible world is made after God's image, the logos of God. Now one should bear in mind that earlier (*Opif.* 16) Philo had already shown that the visible world was made after the pattern of the noetic world. Thus he has reached two conclusions: 1. The visible cosmos is an image of the noetic cosmos. 2. The visible cosmos is an image of the logos of God.

These two conclusions allow Philo to draw his final conclusion: the noetic cosmos and the logos of God coincide. Herewith he has shown that the thesis proposed at the beginning of *Opif.* 24, *viz.*, that in the act of creating νοητὸς κόσμος and λόγος θεοῦ coincide is supported by Moses' authority and, in consequence, is valid and true.

The argumentation of *Opif.* 25 can be summarized as follows: — man, being part of the cosmos, has been created as an image of God's image (= the logos); — then *a fortiori* the whole cosmos has been created as an image of God's logos; — now it was shown earlier that the cosmos was created as an image of the noetic cosmos; — Ergo: noetic cosmos and logos of God coincide (in the act of creating).

The previous analysis has made the structure of the argumentation perfectly clear. But it does leave the reader with some problems: 1. with regard to the contents of the passage, 2. with regard to the constitution of the text.

ad 1. With regard to the contents two questions arise: a) how could Philo make the first step of his argumentation? How could he argue from the part to the whole, from man to sense-perceptible world? Elsewhere Philo states that man was created after the image of God, not as a whole consisting of body and soul, but only in so far as he has a rational part, a soul. The *a fortiori* argument should presuppose that the world, too, is a composition of body and soul. But Philo does not subscribe to such a theory; he in fact does not believe in a world-soul. How are we to understand Philo's argument in this context? One knows that he speaks sometimes of man as a micro-cosmos. Is this idea perhaps behind the present argument? Notwithstanding the fact that the relation between micro- and macro-cosmos is not one between part and whole, I am inclined to think that this relationship has led Philo to argue in the way he does here, thus making an argument which at first sight seems to be solid enough; but at a closer view it appears to be a weak link in the argumentation. b) The second question concerns Philo's thesis itself. Why does he endeavour to identify the world of ideas with the logos of God? The answer, I think, should be: because Philo tries to reduce as far as possible the multiplicity in his system. There is not a logos of God *and* the ideas within him, but these two are one and the same reality. One should bear in mind that Philo does not deal here with the relationship between God and his logos. Thus it is not his intention to stress the "fundamental unity of the divine", as Nikiprowetzky suggests in his admirable book, *Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie*,

p. 250, where he writes: "Ainsi, en dépit de la pseudo-multiplicité que les notions de Cause première, de monde intellectuelle et de Logos y instaurent, l'unité fondamentale du divin est finalement sauvegardée". In my view the unity concerns the noetic cosmos and the logos only, not the 'First cause'. In *Opif.* 16 Philo stated that God, before making the sense-perceptible world, *created first* (προεξετύπου) the noetic cosmos. If the noetic cosmos was created and logos and noetic cosmos coincide in some respect, the logos was created too. Thus there is no fundamental unity in the divine reality. Indeed, Philo does have in view a fundamental unity, but only that between ideas and logos. This is for him a considerable step in the direction of making his system more simple, an ideal which every philosopher strives for.

ad 2. Two textual problems are still to be dealt with.

a) The subordinate clause, which in the critical edition is a conditional one: εἰ μείζων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστίν. This reading stems from the indirect tradition of this Philonic text in Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XI 24. The whole direct tradition has a relative clause: the pronoun may be masculine (ὅς μείζων) feminine (ἥ μείζων) or neuter (ὅ μεῖζον).

If the reconstruction of Philo's argument given above is correct, an εἰ-clause is almost impossible here. It inserts a condition which is not included in Moses' statement and in so doing weakens the force of the argument. Thus from a logical point of view the insertion of another εἰ-clause would be unbearable. On the other hand, the emergence of such an εἰ-clause became less offensive as soon as the reading εἶδος instead of εἰ δ' ὁ had obscured Philo's way of arguing.

Thus one has to assume that the text originally had a relative pronoun. But which one? The masculine ὅς refers to κόσμος; the feminine ἥ anticipates the feminine substantive supposed in τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, *viz.*, εἰκών; the neuter ὅ anticipates μίμημα. But there are two arguments in support of the feminine: (1) the most important manuscript (V) has this reading; (2) the reading εἰ of the indirect tradition is easier to explain if the original had ἥ than if it had ὅς or ὅ (iotacism).

b) The seclusion of τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν. Here the German editors were followed by Colson in the Loeb series and Arnaldez in the Lyon edition. But is it necessary? It is evident that the words αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ θεοῦ λόγος are an excellent conclusion of the whole argument: "The archetypal seal (= the noetic cosmos) is the logos of God himself". Moreover αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη followed by τὸ παράδειγμα seems to be awkward Greek.

Nevertheless all manuscripts have a couple of expressions here which are qualifications of the divine logos and which one finds in many places elsewhere throughout Philo's oeuvre. Is it not possible to maintain these striking qualifications here?

One should bear in mind that 1. in *Opif.* 24-5 Philo is demonstrating the coincidence of the noetic world and the logos *himself*, and 2. that the logos is permanently present in the course of the argumentation (κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ, εἰκὼν εἰκόνος, μίμημα θείας εἰκόνος.

When Philo then at the end of the argument has written the words αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη, the reader already understands what he intends to say: "the noetic world is *he himself* (*sc.* the logos)". But instead of mentioning immediately the name of the logos, Philo introduces an element of tension to his statement by summing up first some epithets of the logos. One could indicate this by printing a little stroke after αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη.

One final remark on these epithets: the reading given above is that of the manuscript V and of Eusebius; all other manuscripts have τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν. Philo speaks many times of the logos as ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα (*Opif.*70; *Poster.* 105; *Congr.* 8; *Somn.* I 126; *Spec.* I 279, 327; *Virt.* 70; *Aet.* 15) and several times as ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα (*Ebr.* 133; *Mutat.* 135, 146; leg. I 22; *Her.* 280). But ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν seems to me hardly acceptable, because the formula ἰδέα (τῶν) ἰδεῶν, just like τὰ ἁγία τῶν ἁγίων or ᾆσμα ᾀσμάτων, does not admit any further qualification of greatness. It indicates already in itself the highest degree. In *Migr.* 103 Philo, explaining the σφραγίς of *Ex.* 28, 22, says: 'Αλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ σφραγὶς ἰδέα ἐστὶν ἰδεῶν, καθ' ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐτύπωσε τὸν κόσμον. The logos is ἰδέα ἰδεῶν, the highest idea, the ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα. 'Αρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν is in fact a conflation of these two expressions. In this case I would prefer to follow the other manuscripts.[2]

NOTES

[1] In a footnote at his German translation of *Opif.* 25 Cohn draws attention to the fact that one finds a similar idea in the Midrash.

[2] I am sincerely thankful to Mr. D. T. Runia (Kampen, Netherlands) for reading this article and making several useful observations as well as for correcting the English of this article. I am also indebted to Professor V. Nikiprowetzky (Paris), who kindly read the manuscript of this article and wrote me a letter with several helpful suggestions.

2312 GD *Leiden*, Haarlemmerstraat 106

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RESURRECTION ADDED: THE INTERPRETATIO CHRISTIANA OF A STOIC DOCTRINE

BY

JAAP MANSFELD

1. *Hippolytus*

Von Arnim's scissors have cut up the chapter on the Stoics in Hippolytus' doxography (*Ref.* I 21) into several pieces, distributed rather haphazardly over *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II. In the present paper, I am concerned with the second part of this chapter, *Ref.* I 21, 3-5 = *SVF* II 807 + 598 + 469; pp. 25, 22-26, 9 of Wendland's edition of the *Refutatio*:

> [*Ref.* I 21, 3 = *SVF* II 807] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν λέγουσιν ἀθάνατον, εἶναι δὲ σῶμα καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς περιφύξεως τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος, διὸ καὶ καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν. ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ καὶ μετενσωμάτωσιν γίνεσθαι ὡρισμένων οὐσῶν τῶν ψυχῶν. [I 21, 4 = *SVF* II 598] προσδέχονται δὲ ἐκπύρωσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ κάθαρσιν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, οἱ μὲν παντός, οἱ δὲ μέρους, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αὐτὸν καθαίρεσθαι λέγουσιν· καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν φθορὰν καὶ τὴν ἑτέρου ἐξ αὐτῆς γένεσιν κάθαρσιν ὀνομάζουσιν. [I 21, 5 = *SVF* II 469] σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος μὲν χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι καὶ πεπληρῶσθαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν. [*omis.* Arn.] ταῦτα καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοί.

In the first section, Hippolytus speaks of the Stoic doctrine of the soul. He states that the soul is a body (cf., e.g., *SVF* I 137, II 790), refers to the explanatory etymology of ψυχή (cf. *SVF* II 806), but combines this impeccable information with the attribution, to the Stoics, of the theory of the immortality of the soul and of its transmigration, which goes rather oddly with its *genesis* through refrigeration. The Stoics, of course, believed that the cosmic cycle must repeat itself *in infinitum*, down to the details: our own lives will be repeated infinitely many times.[1] The first—and, I believe, only known—Stoic to speak of the transmigration of the soul in favourable terms is Seneca, *Ep.* 75, 20; 76, 10-11; 78, 34; 108, 17-22. Seneca, however, tells us this sympathy is due to the influence of his Pythagorean teacher Sotion. In Seneca's case,

therefore, the idea of the transmigration is a Pythagorean plant, only marginally present in his Stoicism. There may have been other Stoics after Seneca who embraced the Pythagorean theory more wholeheartedly; however, Hoven's thesis[2] that the attribution, to the Stoics in general, of the theory of *metensomatosis* as found in Hippolytus and other late sources more probably amounts to an *interpretatio pythagorica*[3] of the theory of the cosmic cycle must be right. It is not, at any rate, an *interpretatio christiana*, although its corollary, *viz.*, that the soul is immortal, may have had its appeal for Christian authors.

In the second section, Hippolytus mentions the Stoic theory of total conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις), which, he says, is a "purification". Although he is not explicit about the cosmic cycle, it is clear that this is what he has in mind: "they call this destruction and the generation of another [sc., world] out of this [destruction] a purification". It is interesting to note that he states that some Stoics believed this purification ~ conflagration to be total, and that others assumed that it was only partial. If I am not mistaken, the idea—in a Stoic context—that cosmic catastrophes are only partial cannot be paralleled before the first cent. CE: Dion Chrysost., *Or.* 36, 47-9. This may represent a conflation of Stoic ideas with notions derived from Plato and Aristotle.[4] Possibly, also an *interpretatio stoica* of Heraclitus' theory of the Great Year is involved,[5] about which we have some meagre information, not only in Aetius II 32, 3 (*Vorsokr.* 22 A 13), but also in Cens., *De die nat.* 18, 11 (partly at *Vorsokr.* 22 A 13). The chapter in Aetius and the paragraph in Censorinus both list the computations by various persons of the Great Year. Censorinus' information is fuller (although not about Heraclitus); the passage as a whole is Stoicizing,[6] but ambiguous in as far as it is not clear that a distinction between partial and total cosmic catastrophes is made. The *De die nat.* was written 238 CE, 10 to 15 years later than the date of the *Ref.*, but Censorinus of course used older sources, in part doxographic.[7] Aet., II 32, 4 (= *SVF* III, Diog. Bab. 28) tells us that Diogenes said—this information is not found in Censorinus—that the Great Year is Heraclitus' Great Year multiplied by 365—so Diogenes' Great Year must represent a cosmic period. It cannot be excluded, therefore, that each of what we may call his Great Days (= Heraclitean Great Years) began or ended with a partial catastrophe, but there is no evidence to prove this. Phil., *Inc. mu.* 15 (= *SVF* III, Diog. Bab. 27) tells us that Diogenes accepted the *ekpyrosis* in his youth, but had his doubts about it in his old age and suspended judgement.[8] We do not

know to which period of his life his computation of the Great Year belongs, but if it belongs to (or was not rejected in) his old age, the possibility that he thought in terms of partial catastrophes is slightly greater. Other heterodox Early Stoics rejected the *ekpyrosis* (Zeno of Tarsus, *SVF* III 5; Boethus of Sidon, *SVF* III 7), but we do not know anything about their views concerning cosmic catastrophes. The Middle Stoic Panaetius (frr. 64-69 van Straaten) is both said to have rejected and to have doubted the *ekpyrosis*; nothing more is known. It is, of course, difficult to gauge what our second-hand reports in these cases mean by "doubt". Marcus Aurelius, who wrote about half a century before the date of the *Ref.* and may be taken to be representative of the Stoicism of his time, may also be said to be in doubt, for his work contains both passages which presuppose the cosmic cycle and passages which do not presuppose it; there is even a passage which explicitly leaves the matter undecided.[9] I have not found a reference to partial catastrophes in the *Meditations*.

Hippolytus' report about a diversity of opinion among 'the' Stoics as to the extent of *ekpyrosis* may be assumed to reflect a discussion which has scarcely left any traces in our other sources, and the heterodox Stoics, who believed that catastrophes were partial only, must for us remain anonymous. If, that is, one assumes that Hippolytus here reports what he found in a doxography. I can see no reason, however, why he would add this reference to the difference of opinion on his own authority, for elsewhere in the *Ref.* only total *ekpyrosis* is at issue.

Another, more important, element of Hippolytus' account is the assumption that the destruction of the universe *by fire* amounts to a *purification*. This idea is comparable to (but far from identical with) the suggestion of Sen., *N.Q.* III 28, 7 (cf. *Cons. ad Marc.* 26, 6) that God destroys the world because he wants to replace the old with a better one—but things will go wrong again soon enough; cf. also Plut., *Comm. not.* 1067 A = *SVF* II 606; and Dion Chrysost., *o.c.*, 58f., partly printed at *SVF* II 662.[10] I have argued elsewhere that, even to the Early Stoics, *ekpyrosis* is a positive event.[11] Yet I think that the assumption that the final conflagration is a κάθαρσις is Christian (Paul, *I Cor.* 3, 13), not Stoic; cf. Clem., *Strom.* V I 9, 4 (a text to which I shall return below[12]): οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος [sc., Heraclitus, just as we, Christians, do] ... τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, ἣν ὕστερον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ Στωϊκοί ...[13] One should add, of course, that the idea of ἐκπύρωσις, or at least the term itself, was popular among early Christian

authors, who incorporated it into their own eschatology—rejecting, naturally, the cyclical aspect.[14] Hippolytus is no exception.[15] Justin, *Ap.* 20, 3 (= *SVF* II 614, second text) already points out that it is a common assumption that the Christian doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις is Stoic.

Thus, it is clear that the Stoic theories as expounded by Hippolytus in the first two sections are by no means unadulterated. This also holds for what is reported in the concluding section, *Ref.* I 21, 5 = *SVF* II 469; here, an unimpeachable statement concerned with corporealism and its implications, *viz.*, the theory of total blending[16] and its corollary that there is no vacuum, has been combined with the attribution, to the Stoics, of the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body*: καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος μὲν χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι ...

Without any exception known to the present writer, scholars have argued that because the Stoics did *not* believe in the resurrection of the body the word ἀνάστασιν *must* be corrupt. In his edition of *Ref.* I in the *Doxographi graeci*, p. 570, 24, Diels daggered the word, cited several conjectures in his apparatus, and added a splendid one of his own: ἀντιπαρέκτασιν. Von Arnim, in *SVF* II, did not dagger the word, but stated, in his apparatus *ad* II 469, that it is corrupt, and proposed ἀποκατάστασιν, "ut de restitutione corporum mixtione[17] absumptorum cogitaverit". Wendland, in his edition of the whole *Refutatio*, GCS Bd. 26, p. 26, 8, borrowed Diels' dagger and said, in his apparatus, that Diels' emendation is "wohl richtig". But emendation here can only be *Schlimmbesserung*. Beyond any reasonable doubt, ἀνάστασιν is what Hippolytus really wrote,[18] and there are only two possibilities: (1) that the text he copied out or excerpted already attributed the resurrection of the body to the Stoics, or (2) that he interpolated this idea himself. A possible combination of these two possibilities would be that the source mentioned the resurrection somewhere else in this context, and that Hippolytus saw fit to insert it here.

Now *Ref.* I 21, 3-5 as a whole is not just a report on Stoic doctrines, or a list of such doctrines; as we have noticed, there is some system in this section of the chapter in that a version of Stoicism is given which brings out its affinities with Christian dogma: the soul is immortal, the *ekpyrosis* is a purification. In this way, a statement of the Stoic doctrine of *body* going through body may easily come to be associated with the idea of the resurrection of *the* body, an idea which itself is associated with those of the immortality of the soul and of the final consummation through fire.

In other words, μὲν + ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι are an *interpolatio christiana* in a Stoic doctrine, comparable to the *interpolatio* (deriving from an *interpretatio*) *pythagorica* of the *metensomatosis* in the same chapter, at *Ref.* I 21, 3. I assume that the point of connexion is the same in both cases. The theory of the cosmic cycle, which entails that Socrates will confront his accusers infinitely many times, is believed to imply that not only the soul, but also the individual body of Socrates will be here again. Christian thinkers were in a position to interpret the Stoic theory as a bastard form of the true doctrine.

The pattern of the *Ref.* has been excellently described by Koschorke.[19] The Gnostics and Christian heretics attacked by Hippolytus are said to have derived their views from the Greek philosophers, who, through the mediation of the Egyptians, are said to have derived theirs from the Jews.[20] Koschorke has also shown that Hippolytus doctors the documents he uses whenever this suits his argument, and has briefly discussed his fraudulent handling of Josephus' account of the Jewish sects (*B.J.* II VIII 2-14) at *Ref.* IX 18-29.[21] Without acknowledgement, of course, Hippolytus copies out the entire section of Josephus, but makes several changes and additions, some of which it is worthwhile to consider in some detail.

Josephus tells us that the Essenes said that the body is corruptible, but the soul immortal; after death, virtuous souls depart to an abode beyond the ocean, which may be compared to the Greek isles of the blessed, whereas base souls are sent to a murky dungeon, comparable to the Greek Hades. In *Ref.* IX 27, p. 260, 28-261, 4 this is 'reported' as follows: ἔρρωται δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγος· ὁμολογοῦσι γὰρ καὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀναστήσεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ἀθάνατον, ὃν τρόπον ἤδη ἀθάνατος ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. But Josephus had written, *B.J.* II VIII 11 (154): καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν. Thus, the resurrection of the body is brazenly ascribed to the Essenes, whose views preclude its acceptation. The same fraud is perpetrated in relation to the Pharisees, who according to Jos., *B.J.* II VIII 14 (162-6) held that "every soul is imperishable, but the soul of the good alone passes into another body, while the souls of the wicked suffer eternal punishment". Not a word about the resurrection; yet Hippolytus writes, IX 29, p. 262, 9f. W.: οὗτοι καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ὁμολογοῦσιν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ... Finally, the Sadducees, according to Jos., *B.J.* II VIII 14 (165), deny that the soul persists after death. Hippolytus does not hesitate to write, IX 29, p. 262,

16f. W.; ἀνάστασιν δὲ ἀρνοῦνται οὐ μόνον σαρκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχὴν μὴ διαμένειν νομίζουσι ...

There is system in this sleight-of-hand. Those sects who, according to Josephus, hold that the soul is immortal and who believe that it is either rewarded or punished after death, are credited with the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh. The one sect which, according to Josephus, denies the immortality of the soul is said to deny the resurrection of the flesh.

Furthermore, it should be observed that a doctrine of ἀνάστασις is attributed to the Jews in general at *Ref.* IX 30, p. 264, 10f. W. The Jews in general are also said there to believe in the ἐκπύρωσις, p. 264, 16 W.; for the importance Hippolytus attached to the "judgement through fire" cf. *Ref.* X 34, p. 292, 15 W. Although nothing of the sort is to be found in Josephus, Hippolytus' Essenes (p. 261, 12 W.) and Pharisees (p. 262, 10 W.) are said to believe in the ἐκπύρωσις. In Hippolytus' version of Josephus, the idea of the immortality of the soul (which *is* in Josephus) is closely bound up with the ideas of the final conflagration and of the resurrection (which are *not* in Josephus). This concatenation of ideas is the same as that to be found in the second part of the chapter on the Stoics, *Ref.* I 21, 3-5. What is more, Hippolytus is explicit that the Stoics (and Pythagoras), through the mediation of the Egyptians, derived their theories from the Essenes, i.e., from the Jews, *Ref.* IX 27, p. 261, 10f. W.; ὧν μάλιστα Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις τούτοις μαθητευθέντες παρέλαβον.[22]

So the words ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι in *Ref.* I 21, 5, the concluding section of the chapter on the Stoics, are not there by accident. They are indispensable in the context of the grand design of the *Ref.*, *viz.*, the proof that the heretics depend on the Greeks who got their own views, ultimately, from the Jews. It is difficult to imagine a body of 'philosophical' ideas more important to an Early Christian writer than those concerned with the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and the final purification through fire.

There is another instance in Hippolytus of the attribution of the resurrection to a Greek philosopher—again in connection with the simultaneous attribution of the idea of the final judgement through fire. This is in the chapter on Heraclitus, who is, of course, represented as a proto-Stoic.[23] G. S. Kirk has argued that the section at issue, to be quoted below, sits awkwardly in its context, which would be about the Heraclitean doctrine of the opposites, and suggests that Hippolytus may

have thrown in this block of text as an afterthought.[24] I do not think this suggestion is tenable,[25] and may refer to Marcovich's interpretation of this section. Also Marcovich, however, argues that this particular piece forms a *unity*; at any rate, he points out—and I entirely agree—that Hippolytus here quotes Heraclitean fragments to be connected with his own views about *resurrection* and *fire*.[26] I quote *Ref.* IX 10, 6-7 (= *Vorsokr.* 22 B 63 + B 64 + B 65), omitting part of the exegesis of B 65; Marcovich's suggestion—following Fränkel—that the order of quotations should be B 66-B 64-B 65, though not implausible, is irrelevant to the present argument;[27] moreover, his contention that the reversed order would better fit Hippolytus' exegesis is somewhat doubtful in view of Hippolytus' amazing powers of reading things in texts which are not there. The Heraclitean fragments, at any rate, are firmly embedded in an *interpretatio christiana*,[28] pp. 243, 19-244, 1 W.:

> λέγει [*sc.*, Heracl.] δὲ καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ταύτης <τῆς> φανερᾶς ἐν ᾗ γεγενήμεθα, καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἶδε ταύτης τῆς ἀναστάσεως αἴτιον οὕτως λέγων· [*Vorsokr.* 22 B 63] "ἔνθα δ' ἐόντι[29] ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζῶντων καὶ νεκρῶν". λέγει δὲ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου κρίσιν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ πυρὸς γίνεσθαι λέγων οὕτως· [*Vorsokr.* 22 B 64] "τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κέραυνος" ... καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ [*sc.*, τὸ πῦρ: *Vorsokr.* 22 B 65] "χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον" ..., ἡ δὲ ἐκπύρωσις [*sc.*, ἐστιν] κόρος· [*Vorsokr.* 22 B 66] "πάντα γάρ", φησι, "τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται".

It is important to note that the second of the Heraclitean texts quoted in the above section contains the word ἐπανίστασθαι, thus affording a natural point of departure for the *interpretatio christiana* in the sense of the resurrection of the flesh; perhaps νεκρῶν, "corpses", is also involved. This may have coincided with the *interpretatio christiana* of the Stoic cosmic cycle. I assume that a person like Hippolytus had two arguments in favour of the attribution of the resurrection to the Stoics, *viz.*, (1) the implications of the cosmic cycle; (2) the precedent in Heraclitus, seen as a proto-Stoic.

The fact that Hippolytus *interpolated* the ἀνάστασις in his account of the Jewish sects may seem to favour the hypothesis that, in order to be consistent, he also interpolated it into his account of the Stoics in his doxography. It must be admitted that the words ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι impress one as if they had been rather forcefully inserted into the account of the Stoic theory of total blending. However, I have pointed out

above[30] that the source followed in *Ref.* I 21 could have contained a reference to the resurrection. It is at any rate certain that, if Hippolytus put in the resurrection himself, he did so because he knew that this idea had been fathered on the Stoics: the attribution is already found in Christian authors earlier than Hippolytus.

2. *Clement*

Confirmation for the above interpretation of Stoic ἀνάστασις in Hippolytus is provided by a passage in Clement[31]—subsequent to Clement's quotation of a Heraclitean fragment (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 28), viz., *Strom.* V I 9, 4:

> οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος [*sc.*, Heracl.] ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, ἣν ὕστερον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ Στωϊκοί· καθ' ὃν καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν ἀναστήσεσθαι δογματίζουσι, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν ἀνάστασιν περιέποντες.

Vorn Arnim, at *SVF* II 630, quotes this text, not only omitting ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας and τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, but also the important final clause: τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν ἀνάστασιν περιέποντες.

Clement tells us that the Stoics, like Heraclitus, believed in a final purification by fire, which they, not Heraclitus, had called ἐκπύρωσις. According to him, Heraclitus' insight derives from the barbarian, i.e., Jewish, philosophy. He also tells us that they *followed* Heraclitus (καθ' ὃν) in declaring that the *individual person* (ἰδίως ποιός, a Stoic technical term; cf. e.g., Chrysippus *ap.* Alex., *In A.Pr.* p. 180, 31f. Wallies = *SVF* II 624) will *rise again*. Clement, of course, thinks of the Stoic cosmic cycle, which he also attributes to Heraclitus, see *Strom* V XIV, 104, 1-105, 1, with its quotation and interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 30 and B 31.[32] In Clement, as in Hippolytus, the ideas of the final conflagration ~ purification and of the resurrection are closely bound up with one another. He is explicit about the connection between the Stoics and Heraclitus as to the doctrine of the resurrection, which Hippolytus was not. What is even more important, however, is that Clement gives us the *argument* which made the *interpretatio christiana* feasible: (*a*) the Stoics believe that the individual person will rise again, entailing (*b*) their honouring of the doctrine of the resurrection. What, in relation to Hippolytus' account, could only be surmized, is found here in the form of an explicit statement. It is the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence, in-

cluding that of individual persons, which is interpreted as an adumbration of the true Christian doctrine.

Later on in the same book of *Strom.* (I have already referred to part of this passage *supra*[33]), Clement returns to these doctrines, combining—like Hippolytus[34]—Empedocles, Heraclitus, and the Stoics, *Strom.* V XIV 103, 6-105, 1 = *SVF* II 590 (where 103, 6 is omitted): Empedocles said all things will return to fire; Heraclitus [a Stoicized Heraclitus] agreed; [105, 1:] παραπλήσια τούτῳ [*sc.*, Heracl.] καὶ οἱ ἐλλογιμώτατοι τῶν Στωϊκῶν δογματίζουσι περί τε ἐκπυρώσεως καὶ κόσμου διοικήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἰδίως ποιοῦ κόσμου τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου[35] καὶ τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν ἐπιδιαμονῆς.

K. Reinhardt, whose interpretation of both passages from Clement is exemplary,[36] has missed the significance of ἀνάστασις, which he believes to be synonymous with ἐκπύρωσις;[37] *quod non.*

The *Strom.* can be dated to ca. 20-25 years before the *Ref.* One need not suppose, however, that Hippolytus' views had been derived from Clement, because Clement is not the first Christian author to profess this interpretation of Stoic thought.

3. *Athenagoras and Tatian*

Ch. 36 of Athenagoras' *Legatio*[38] (a pamphlet published ca. 20 years before Clement's *Strom.*) briefly defends the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the human body against its pagan critics. Two of his arguments are of special interest. The first is that not only the Christians, but many (Greek) philosophers have taught the resurrection of the body. The second argument is that there is nothing in the teachings of "Pythagoras and Plato" which stands in the way of bodies' being reconstituted from the same elements once their dissolution to that from which they arose has taken place.

To take the second argument first: Athenagoras does not *ascribe* a theory of the resurrection of the body *to* Pythagoras and Plato; he only claims that their view of the origin of the body from, and its dissolution into, the elements does not preclude its reconstitution. J. Geffcken has plausibly argued that Athenagoras found his information about the elemental theories of Pythagoras and Plato in a handbook such as Aetius.[39] I assume that Athenagoras had another reason as well to refer to Pythagoras and Plato: he may have been thinking of *metensomatosis*, the transmigration of souls, which, as we have noticed, is

closely associated with the resurrection of the body in another Christian author, Hippolytus.[40] It should be noted that, in this context, Athenagoras spins out a somewhat intricate argument concerned with the priority of the incorporeal over the corporeal.

Since the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is not attributed to Plato and Pythagoras, the "many philosophers" mentioned in Athenagoras' first argument cannot include these two. Athenagoras writes: ὅτι μέντοι οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς μόνον ἀναστήσεται τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων, περίεργον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δεικνύειν. I submit that he thinks of the more famous Stoics and, perhaps, of Heraclitus, who are cited in this context by later writers such as Clement and Hippolytus. Or rather, I assume that these are the only philosophers to which his statement can pertain, for Athenagoras' silence is puzzling. Christian apologists, as a rule, are very pleased when they are in a position to adduce Greek precedents *nominatim*. Athenagoras may have thought that the addressees of his pamphlet, the philosophers[41] Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, would be able to take up his hint; Marcus, after all, was a Stoic. Another possibility, of course, is that Athenagoras, whose learning is not too impressive, had heard or read about the Greek philosophical antecendents of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, but simply did not remember names and hid his ignorance behind a grandiloquent "many".

That the *interpretatio christiana* of the Stoic doctrine existed before Athenagoras' days is, at any rate, proved by two references in Tatian, whose *Oratio ad Graecos* may be somewhat earlier than Athenagoras' little work. Tatian speaks of what he believes to be the Stoic doctrine of the resurrection in very critical terms—which entails that he did not construct this interpretation of the Stoic view of eternal recurrence himself, but had read or heard about it elsewhere. Tatian, too, couples the notion of resurrection with that of final conflagration. Of the two texts I shall quote, the second is not in *SVF*, the first only partly, which is why I quote it in full:

> *Or.* 3, 1-2, p. 270, 15-24 Goodspeed = p. 6, 22-31 Whittaker: τὸν γὰρ Ζήνωνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίστασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγω δὲ Ἄνυτον καὶ Μέλητον ἐπὶ τῷ κατηγορεῖν, Βούσιριν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ξενοκτονεῖν καὶ Ἡρακλέα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀθλεῖν, παραιτητέον· [this is where *SVF* I 109, first text, ends.] ὅστις ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν λόγῳ πλείονας τοὺς μοχθηροὺς τῶν δικαίων

εἰσηγεῖται, Σωκράτους ἑνὸς καὶ Ἡρακλέους καί τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων, γεγονότων ὀλίγων καὶ οὐ πολλῶν. οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ πάνυ πλείους εὑρεθήσονται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, [what follows is printed at *SVF* I 159] καὶ ὁ θεὸς κακῶν ἀποδειχθήσεται κατ' αὐτὸν ποιητής, ἐν ἀμάραις τε καὶ σκώληξι καὶ ἀρρητουργοῖς καταγινόμενος.

It is to be regretted that von Arnim did not print this 'fragment' as a whole;[42] clearly, it presents us with one consistent argument. Socrates' name only appears in the part omitted by Pearson and von Arnim, the names of his accusers only in the part found in *SVF* I 109. Heracles' name is found in both parts, that of one of his evil opponents only in the first part. It is also essential to note that, in the second part, Tatian speaks of Zeno's "argument" or "theory", "exposition" (*logos*), "concerned with the *ekpyrosis*"; at first blush, this strikes one as a reference to a book, or a portion of a book, by Zeno.[43] Both Socrates and Heracles were Stoic heroes.[44] The argument that something is wrong with the *Stoic* theodicee because of the fate of *Socrates* is found, e.g., in Cic., *N.D.* III 83, and in Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1051 C and *Not. comm.* 1065 C (where Meletus' name occurs as well.[45] One cannot, of course, be certain that the doctrine referred to by Tatian really goes back to Zeno, for 'Zeno' here, as so often, may represent the Stoics in general; for the present argument, this is irrelevant. On the other hand, there is no reason why Zeno himself, in his argument concerned with *ekpyrosis*, could not have said that there will be another—or rather the same—Socrates all over again, just as there will be another, or rather the same, Heracles. Tatian argues that this entails God's responsibility for a predominance of evil over good; as we have noticed, a similar argument (not involving *ekpyrosis*) is used by Cicero and Plutarch.[46] I therefore infer that Tatian's argument, inclusive of its reference to Zeno, is not based upon a pure fancy, but attempts to stand a thought actually expressed by Zeno, or at least 'the' Stoics, on its head. Marcus Aurelius, VII 19, says: πόσους ἤδη ὁ αἰὼν Χρυσίππους, πόσους Σωκράτεις, πόσους Ἐπικτήτους καταπέπωκεν.[47]

For our present discussion, the most important aspect of this passage from the *Or.* is that Tatian uses the word ἀνίστασθαι quite naturally, and in a close connection with ἐκπύρωσις. That this is not an accident follows from a critical passage a few pages further down, in which he draws a sharp and definite boundary line between the Christian linear view and the Stoic, cyclical view:

Or. 6, 1, p. 272, 28-31 G. = p. 10, 15-18 Whitt. (not in *SVF*): καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν ἔσεσθαι πεπιστεύκαμεν μετὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων συντέλειαν, οὐχ ὡς οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δογματίζουσι κατά τινας κύκλων περιόδους γινομένων ἀεὶ καὶ ἀπογινομένων τῶν αὐτῶν ...

I think that it is not an accident that the majority of Stoic 'fragments', or texts dealing with the come-back of individual persons in each successive cosmic period, are derived from Christian authors. The Stoic doctrine could be linked up with the Christian dogma of the resurrection of the flesh, so often ridiculed (or just not understood: already *Act.* 17, 18) by pagan thinkers.

Appendix: Eusebius

The word ἀνάστασις also occurs in Arius Didymus fr. 37 Diels *ap.* Eus., *PE* XV 19, 1 (*DG* p. 469, 14-5; *SVF* II 599, p. 184, 34). The fragment describes the cosmic cycle, and begins at the end of a period: the common *Logos* and common Nature grow "more and bigger"; Nature dries up everything and takes back all things unto herself, unites with substance as a whole, and so reverts to the *Logos*. The text continues, *DG* p. 469, 14-16:

... καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ' ὃν ἀπ' αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις.

"... (Nature returns to the ... *Logos*) and to that resurrection which produces the Greatest Year, in the course of which the restoration from herself alone unto herself takes place again".

There is something wrong here. The returning to the *Logos* at the time of conflagration can hardly be said to be tantamount to a "resurrection" which can only begin *after* the grand unification. It is, moreover, odd that the "resurrection", which occurs during a cosmic period *before* there is another conflagration, could be said to "produce" such a period as a whole, a 'Greatest Year'. Years, even Greatest Years, are computed from one moment of time to another such moment, not by means of a process which only partly fills up such a period. Both Diels and von Arnim, in their apparatus, refer to Zeller's suggestion κατάστασιν for ἀνάστασιν, Mras does not. I, for my part, have no doubt that it was Eusebius (rather than a copyist anticipating the subsequent word ἀποκατάστασις) who wrote ἀνάστασιν; I have argued in the previous pages that, to a Christian writer, the Stoic cosmic cycle

could suggest the Christian doctrine of resurrection. Reinhardt[48] suggested that ἀνάστασις here is another word for ἐκπύρωσις, but this just is not true. Now, if we assume that Eusebius wrote ἀνάστασιν, does it also follow that Arius Didymus did? We should note that Arius begins, in this fragment, by telling us that *Logos* and Nature grow *more and bigger* in the process of *ekpyrosis* (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ <ἡ> κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη). I therefore suggest that we read ἀνά[σ]τασιν: Nature returns to the maximum "*extension*", and it is this moment of maximal extension which is the point at which the Greatest Year begins, and ends. For the expansion of the cosmos at *ekpyrosis* see, e.g., *SVF* II 615, 618, 619.[49]

NOTES

[1] *SVF* I 109 (cf. *infra*, pp. 227f.); II 623-628; see R. Hoven, *Stoïcisme et Stoïciens face au problème de l'au-delà* (Paris 1971) 29ff.; D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus, Oh. 1977) 185f.; J. Barnes, La doctrine du retour éternel, in: J. Brunschwig (ed.), *Les Stoïciens et leur logique* (Paris 1978) 3ff.; J. Mansfeld, Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, in: M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic Religions*, EPRO 78 (Leiden 1979) 163ff., 179.

[2] *O.c.*, 91, 158; on Seneca, 122f.

[3] Cf. also Eudemus fr. 88 Wehrli = *Vorsokr.* 58 B 34, for a Pythagorean cycle inclusive of the return of the individual. On the topic in Middle Platonism see H. Dörrie, Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus, in: *Hermes* 85 (1957) 414ff.—It should, moreover, be noted that, in Hippolytus, Empedocles and Heraclitus are *Pythagoreans* and the Stoics followers of Pythagoras and Heraclitus; see *Ref.* I 3, I 4, IX 27, and *infra*, n. 23

[4] *Tim.* 22 c f.; *Mete.* I 14. Cf. EPRO 78, 147 n. 52 (also for *SVF* II 1174). Note that Clem. *Strom.* V I 9, 5, quotes *Tim.* 22 c 1-3 in order to prove that Plato knew that τὴν γῆν χρόνοις τισὶ διὰ πυρὸς καθαίρεσθαι καὶ ὕδατος ... In the passage quoted by Clement, Plato indeed mentions both water and fire; but he uses the verb "to purify" only in connection with water (see *infra*, n. 13).

[5] For the Stoic interpretation of the Heraclitean Great Year and its possible link with Diogenes of Babylon see G. S. Kirk's version of an argument originally propounded by K. Reinhardt: G.S.K., *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge ²1962), 300f., who however does not discuss the possibility that Diogenes used Heraclitus in order to account for partial conflagrations.

[6] Cf. Kirk, *o.c.*, 300. Some comments on the passage may be found in G. Rocca-Serra, Censorinus: *Le jour natal* (Paris 1980) 63f. Cf. also Hahm, *o.c.*, 196 n. 2; and EPRO 78, 145f. n. 49.

[7] Cf. Rocca-Serra, *o.c.*, VIII-IX; some references at J. Mansfeld, *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract* Περὶ ἑβδομάδων *Ch. 1-11* (Assen 1971) 185f.

[8] On Diogenes and Boethus cf. also EPRO 78, 186f.

[9] *Ekpyrosis*—eternity of the world an open matter: X 7, 2. Cycle presupposed: VII 19 cf. *infra*, text to n. 47; XI 1, 2. No suggestion of personal survival: XII 5; survival as another sort of being: VIII 58; both these passages presuppose that there is no cosmic cycle, and taken together represent the two views discussed in Cic., *Tusc.* I.

[10] Cf. EPRO 78, 182f., n. 173. On *N.Q.* III 28, 7, see also F. P. Waiblinger, *Senecas Naturales Quaestiones: Griechische Wissenschaft und römische Form* (München 1977) 46, 48.

[11] EPRO 78, 173ff.

[12] Pp. 225f. For the Christian background see K. Reinhardt, Heraklits Lehre vom Feuer, in: K. R., *Vermächtnis der Antike* (Göttingen ²1966), 45, 47f.

[13] This text is cited by D.-K. *ad Vorsokr.* 22 B 28 (Clem., *Strom.* V I 9, 3), I p. 157, *in app. crit.* Cf. *supra*, n. 4. Plato, *Tim.* 22 d 6-7, says: ὅταν δ' αὖ θεοὶ τὴν γῆν ὕδασιν καθαίροντες κατακλύζωσιν ... This purification by water also at Phil., *Quod det.* 170.

[14] See M. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères d'Église* (Paris 1957) 358f. Cf. *infra*, p. 229, Tat. *Or.* 6, 1, and, e.g., Orig., *C. Cels.* IV 12 = *SVF* II 628. Cf. also R. M. Grant, *After the New Testament* (Philadelphia 1967) 154. Dr. P. W. van der Horst reminds me of 2 *Petrus* 3:10.

[15] See D. G. Dunbar, *The Eschatology of Hippolytus*, diss. Drew Univ. 1979 (facs. ed. Ann Arbor-London 1981) 131f.

[16] I do not agree with the view of R. B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics* (Leiden 1976) 29ff., 73ff., according to whom there was no such general Early Stoic theory; see Mnem. 1982, 388f.

[17] Note that he prints the fragment in *SVF* II, Pars II, Cap. I, § 11: *De mixtione.*

[18] On the place of *anastasis* in Hippolytus' eschatology see Dunbar, *o.c.*, 128f., and already M. Marcovich, Hippolytus and Heraclitus, in: F. L. Cross (ed.), *Studia patristica* VII (Berlin 1966) 262, on several passages from Hipp., *De universo*. See also the article 'Auferstehung' in *RAC* I, 933f., on the theme in Jewish and in Early Christian thought; and 930f., on the evidence that, as a *general* notion, *anastasis* is foreign to Greek thought.—Cf. also the argument of the "younger Stoics" at Sext., *M.* VII 256: ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἀνίσταται κτλ

[19] K. Koschorke, *Hippolyt's Ketzerbekämpfung und Polemik gegen die Gnostiker: Eine tendenzkritische Untersuchung seiner "Refutatio omnium haeresium"* (Wiesbaden 1975).

[20] Koschorke, *o.c.*, 22f., 76f., 80f. (81 on the rôle of the Egyptians). For this Greek 'theft' as a favourite theme of Philo, Justin, and Clement, see S. R. C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford 1971) 9ff.; cf. also A. le Boulluec, in: Clément d'Alexandrie, *Les Stromates: Stromate V*, t. I, SC 278 (Paris 1981) 13f. For Numenius' contribution see J. H. Waszink, Some Observations on the Appreciation of the 'Philosophy of the Barbarians' in Early Christian Literature, in: *Mélanges Chr. Mohrmann* (Utrecht-Antwerpen 1963) 52ff.

[21] Koschorke, *o.c.*, 22-4. I cannot enter here into the general problem of Hippolytus' reliability in the use of his sources, and can only say that I believe his 'method' varied: he *both* copied out things faithfully *and* made arbitrary changes.

[22] Cf. Koschorke, *o.c.*, 24.—M. Marcovich, One hundred Hippolytean Emendations, in: K. Bosl (ed.), *Gesellschaft . Kultur . Literatur: Beitr. L. Wallach gew.* (Stuttgart 1975) 127, suggests an emendation through interpolation: τούτοις μαθητευθέντες, <τὰς ἀρχὰς> παρέλαβον; not implausibly: he confers p. 261, 9.

[23] By Hippolytus, this is taken for granted rather than stated. *Ref.* I 4, p. 9, 19f. W., it is said that Heraclitus agreed with Empedocles; I 3, p. 9, 6f. W., that Empedocles held that συνεστάναι ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυθήσεσθαι [cf. Clem., *Strom.*, V XIV 103, 6] ᾧ σχεδὸν καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ συντίθενται δόγματι, ἐκπύρωσιν προσδοκῶντες. See further H. Diels, *DG*, 145; J. P. Hershbell, Hippolytus' Elenchus as a Source for Empedocles Reconsidered, I, in: *Phronesis* 18 (1972) 100f.; W. Burkert, Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles, in: J. Mansfeld-L. M. de Rijk (eds.), *Kephalaion: Studies ... de Vogel* (Assen 1975), 137ff. For Hippolytus' Stoicized Heraclitus see also Kirk, *o.c.*, 349ff.

[24] *O.c.*, 349-50.

[25] The theme of the resurrection links up well with the immediately preceding *Vorsokr.* 22 B 62: "immortals mortal, mortals immortal, living the death of those, dying the life of those". And the passage at issue is a sort of *finale*.

[26] Marcovich, *o.c.*, 261f.

[27] Hippolytus' (or his source's) order need not, of course, be Heraclitus'. In his *Heraclitus: Editio Maior* (Merida, Ven. 1967), Marcovich prints B 63 as fr. 73, B 64 as fr. 79, B 65 as fr. 55, B 66 as fr. 82. Ch. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1979), prints B 63 as fr. CX, but sticks to Hippolytus' order for B 64-B 65-B 66 = frr. CXIX-CXX-CXXI. C. Diano, in: C. Diano-G. Serra, *Eraclito: I frammenti e le Testimonianze* (Milano 1980), prints a Hippolytic cluster with a change of order: B 63 = fr. 115, B 65 + B 66 = fr. 116, B 64 = fr. 117. In my own little edition with comments in Dutch, *Heraclitus: Fragmenten* (Amsterdam 1979), the order is: B 63 = fr. 117, B 64 = fr. 74, B 65 = fr. 71, B 66 = fr. 73; i.e., I have separated what I assumed to be an eschatological fragment from what I supposed to be cosmological, or rhather 'physical', fragments.

[28] See Reinhardt, *o.c.*, 63f., who however has missed the point about the *anastasis*; cf. *infra*, n. 37.

[29] I agree with Kahn, *o.c.*, 254, that the beginning of the fragment, or at least the word ἐόντι, must be corrupt, and shall publish an emendation in *Elenchos* 4, [2](1983).

[30] P. 221.

[31] Partly quoted *supra*, p. 220. Cf. also *supra*, n. 13.

[32] Cf. Kirk, *o.c.*, 307ff., 325ff.; *infra*, p. 226.

[33] P. 225.

[34] See *supra*, n. 23.

[35] One misses a substantive here (there are substantives going with the other genitives, viz., διοικήσεως and ἐπιδιαμονῆς). Possibly, ἀναστάσεως has dropped out.

[36] *O.c.*, 47f.

[37] *O.c.*, 47: "... die stoische Bedeutung der ἀνάστασις als Weltbrand ..."; cf. *ibid.*, 48 n. 9, on Ar. Did. fr. 37 Diels = *SVF* II 599, for which see *infra*, p. 230.

[38] I exclude the *De resurrectione*, whose authenticity is in doubt; see R. M. Grant, Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 47 (1954) 121ff. M. Pohlenz, Die griechische Philosophie im Dienste der christlichen Auferstehungslehre, in: *Zt. wiss. Theol.* 47, N.F. 12 (1904) 241ff., deals with *Res.* only. Pohlenz claims that the Greek philosophical idea alluded to by the author of *Res.* is the Peripatetic theory of the συναμφότερον of soul and body.

[39] J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig-Berlin 1907) 235-7; he quotes Aet. I 17, 4; 24, 3; IV 8, 3. See also Grant, *After the N.T.*, 159, on Athenagoras' learning.—The same idea is expounded, at greater length, at ps. Justin, *De resurr.* c. 6.

[40] See *supra*, p. 218.

[41] Cf. the first sentence of the *Leg.*, the dedication to the emperors: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον φιλοσόφοις. See further *supra*, n. 9 and text thereto; *infra*, text to n. 47.

[42] The only reason for von Arnim's neglicence seems to be that Pearson (A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891), prints the same texts as Zeno frr. 55 and 47. Note that Hoven, *o.c.*, 32, only quotes and translates the portion which = *SVF* I 109.

[43] Presumably, the Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου (Diog. Laert. VII 4 = *SVF* I 41, p. 14, 35): see Diog. Laert. VII 135-6 and 142, printed at *SVF* I 102, and cf. EPRO 78, 147ff., 148 n. 57 (also for the argument attributed to Zeno at Alex. Lyc. XII, p. 19, 2f. Brinkmann (not in *SVF*)).—Note that Tatian's εἰσηγεῖται suggests that Zeno himself "introduced" Socrates and Heracles.

[44] I see no reason to reject the anecdote about Zeno's liking for Xenophon's *Mem.*, Diog. Laert. VII 2 (*SVF* I 1); for other Stoics see H. Cherniss' note *e* to Plut., *Not. comm.* 1065 C, and esp. K. Döring, *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum* (Wiesbaden 1979), 5f., 45f., 49, 145. Döring does not discuss the passage in Tatian and its parallels. For Heracles see Cherniss' note *b* to *Not. comm.* 1065 c.

[45] Cic., *loc. cit.*, and Plut., *Not. comm.* 1065 C, share a number of *exempla*; the argument will be traditional. Cf. also Döring, *o.c.*, 145.

[46] Plutarch is concerned with the balance of good and evil.

[47] Cf. *supra*, n. 9 and text thereto; Marcus thinks of the cosmic cycle.

[48] *O.c.*, 48 n. 9.

[49] Cf. Hahm, *o.c.*, 244f.—The corruption occurs in one *ms* at Sext., *M.* IX 197: for ἀνάτασιν ἀέρος (in a Stoic context) *L* has ἀνάστασιν ἀέρ.

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ATHEISM, APOLOGETIC, AND NEGATIVE THEOLOGY IN THE GREEK APOLOGISTS OF THE SECOND CENTURY

BY

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In the second century A.D., negative definition of deity appears occasionally and incidentally among the apostolic fathers;[1] it is prominent in the writings of the gnostics and their opponents; and it is also a significant feature in the apologists. But the Greek apologists of the second century have no concern for the *theory* of negative attributes.[2] And in practice they do not follow the negative way of Middle Platonism, in the sense of gradual elimination of positive attributes.[3]

What are the sources of the apologists' negative definition of deity? Daniélou, referring to Norden, has claimed that "according to one earlier school of thought this negative theology represented 'oriental' influence."[4] However, Norden ascribes to oriental influence not negative theology in general, but only the concept of the unknown god;[5] indeed, he finds the attribute "unknown" exceptional, since other negative terms for deity have been common in philosophical writers since Plato.[6] Again, in investigating the origin of Justin's negative theology, Barnard states: "Goodenough is quite sure that his God is the God of Hellenistic Judaism and particularly that of Philo."[7] However, on the one hand, there may be greater justification for Goodenough's view than Barnard allows;[8] on the other hand, Goodenough also sees the philosophical background of Middle Platonism, especially Albinus, as particularly relevant for the appreciation of Justin's theology.[9]

The most widely held view has been that the apologists take over their negative theology from contemporary Middle Platonism.[10] This view is correct, as far as it goes. But some recent scholars have given attention to other immediate and remote sources for the apologists' negative theology. Thus Daniélou shows that Hellenistic Judaism is also a valid source.[11] In addition, Theophilus's extended quotation from the *Sibylline Oracles* shows that the negative theology of Middle Platonism was sometimes channeled through Hellenistic Judaism into the apologists.[12] But the background to such negative definition extends to the early Presocratics.

> The idea of an unbounded, unlimited, indefinite element in the nature of things goes back to the very beginnings of Greek philosophy. Already in Anaximander (sixth century B.C.) we meet the *apeiron*, the unbounded, inexhaustible reservoir of living stuff from which all things come and to which they return: and in the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition the Unlimited is the inseparable correlative of Limit ... In the later thought of Plato a formless, indefinite element ... appears as one of the ultimate constituents of the World of Forms itself. But the idea that the first principle of things, the supreme divinity, is itself in some sense infinite, does not seem to appear clearly and unmistakably in the Greek-speaking world before Philo of Alexandria.[13]

Another strand of negative theology derives from Xenophanes (sixth century B.C.), who criticizes the gods of Hesiod and Homer on the grounds of their immorality and anthropomorphism.[14] In contrast he postulates:

> One god, greatest among gods and men, in no way similar to mortals either in body or in thought.
> Always he remains in the same place, moving not at all; nor is it fitting for him to go to different places at different times, but without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.[15]

Xenophanes's negative statements about deity arise from the argumentative context of his discussion. This factor continues to operate in the development of Presocratic definition of deity.

> Therefore, from the very beginning, philosophers expressed the fact that they disagreed by searching for and choosing new terms that were essentially, or at least to a considerable degree, negative terms. Thus Anaximander contradicted Thales, and at the same time tried to invent a more nearly perfect definition of the supreme god, by saying that the supreme god was the Apeiron, the Infinite and Indeterminate divine substance.[16]

While many negative terms may be traditional by the time the apologists use them, the polemical context of apologetic is still seen to exercise an influence. "Christians did not hesitate to accept the negative theology that logic required; for they wanted to destroy other gods and to insist that their God was unique."[17] And with regard to Justin in particular: "Half his account of God is atheistic or negative. The 'gods' of the established religion, who beget and are begotten, who speak and are spoken of and who see and are, as idols, seen—these gods do not exist. God is unbegotten, ineffable and invisible."[18]

Against this background, one should not be too ready to play down the negative significance of negative theology. Prestige, for example, writes: "The negative forms are enriched with an infinite wealth of positive association."[19] Indeed, it is not only the apologists who are

defended from the negative implications of their own formulae; the same had already been done for the Presocratics.

> We may also note that these negative terms by which the search for perfection was expressed did not long remain mere negations, and therefore did not long remain practically devoid of significance and of positive meaning; either the philosopher himself, or his successors, proceeded to use these negations as if they were full of positive data, upon which he could construct the rest of his system, or his successors could construct their own denials.[20]

However, such claims may be reversed, as they are by Wolfson with reference to later Platonists: "Moreover, to both Albinus and Plotinus, God may be described not only by predicates which are negative in form, such as 'indivisible,' but also by predicates which, though positive in form, are understood to be negative in meaning, as when, for instance, the term 'simple' is understood to mean 'indivisible.'"[21] One need not ignore these cautionary remarks, but it remains true that there are historical reasons for the apologists' deliberate use of negative theological terms.

When modern scholars have given attention to the apologists' use of negative theology, they have frequently fitted it into a systematic framework, which is not in keeping with the method and purpose of the apologists themselves. In this approach, later doctrinal categories are imposed upon the material of the apologists. The method can be seen in a standard work from the middle of the nineteenth century.[22] A classic treatment from the early twentieth century takes basically the same approach.[23] And more recently, with regard to Justin, it has been said: "Although he never sets out to give a single, succinct statement of his beliefs, it is possible to piece together a mosaic providing a clear and surprisingly full account of his doctrines of God, Creation, Incarnation, Atonement, the Church, the sacraments of baptism and eucharist, and the Last Things."[24] Such an approach may miss the significance of the apologists' use of negative theology.

Modern scholars also tend to take a synoptic view, drawing evidence for an apologist's theology from any part of an apology. And when an apologist wrote more than one work, a composite picture of his theology is formed on the basis of his various, and not necessarily apologetic, works. This is the case with Justin's two *Apologies* and his *Dialogue with Trypho*;[25] and with Athenagoras's *Plea for the Christians* and *On the Resurrection*, when the latter work is regarded as authentic.[26] While modern scholars must be allowed to put their own

questions to ancient texts, it remains to be seen whether negative theological language tends to be concentrated in particular contexts in each apology, and whether it plays a particular role in the structure of the apologetic argument.

It is conventional and convenient to treat Aristides, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras and Theophilus as the main Greek apologetic writers of the second century. The works of other Greeks, who are known to have produced apologetic writings in this period, are too fragmentary to be used in the present enquiry. After the main second-century Greeks, later apologists both Greek and Latin speak to a perceptibly different situation, despite a degree of continuity.[27] Even among the main group of writings, the form, structure and contents are never exactly the same. And there is no constant correlation between the manner of treatment and the type of addressee, whether imperial authorities, a pagan inquirer, or people of Greek culture in general. With the main group of apologies it is justifiable to associate the fragmentary and apparently early *Preaching of Peter*, and the so-called *"Epistle" to Diognetus* of disputed date, each of which shares some significant motifs with the apologies.

For present purposes, it is not important to decide whether any of the apologies was actually delivered as a public address, and to its designated addressees. One may readily agree with Keresztes's view, that the apologies are not to be regarded as belonging purely to forensic rhetoric.[28] At the same time, one may not be convinced that Justin's *First Apology* is solely "an *advice* which has both the form and the atmosphere of the deliberative *rhetoric*."[29] In the case of Athenagoras, Malherbe found it "useful to compare the structure of the *Supplicatio*, and in particular the exposition in chapters IV-XII, with the structure of the summary of Plato's philosophy found in a handbook like that of Albinus."[30] But this illuminating analysis does not lead one to regard Athenagoras's *Plea* as a whole as a philosophic treatise. Again, while there is no denying that some apologies are ostensibly addressed to imperial authorities, it is perhaps too narrow a view to conclude that "most of these writings are legal documents, petitions to the state for careful investigation of what Christianity really was."[31] Rather, the debt of the apologists to Hellenistic culture is manifold, woven from various strands of rhetoric and philosophy.

In order to assess the use of negative theology in the Greek apologies of the second century, these writings will be considered in their probable

chronological order. The earliest, proto-apologetic work is the *Preaching of Peter* (c. 110 A.D.?). This writing is preserved only in fragmentary form, mainly in Clement of Alexandria's *Miscellanies*. "The scanty remains of the (*Preaching of Peter*) that have come down to us do not permit us to make precise statements of any sort about the composition of the work."[32] However, at least the passages in Clement, *Miscellanies* 6, 5, 39-41 appear to be quoted in their original order.[33] Here negative definition of deity occurs in the context of an emphasis on monotheism. Thus "the one God who created the beginning of all things" is described as "the Invisible who sees all things; the Incomprehensible who comprehends all things; the One who needs nothing, of whom all things stand in need" etc.[34] The creation context helps to account for the series of reversals in the description: God is "invisible" but "sees all things" etc.[35] This God is not to be worshipped in the manner of the Greeks, nor of the Jews, but in the manner of the Christians under the new covenant who constitute a third race.[36] Greek worship is rejected on the ground that it is offered to material images of wood or metal,[37] or to animals which God intended as food for mankind. Thus the reason for the rejection of pagan worship is that its objects are the opposite of the true God: they are visible, created, perishable, etc., whereas God is invisible, uncreated, imperishable. The contrast, of course, points back to the beginning of the rationalist Greek criticism of the gods, and the origins of negative theology.

The so-called *"Epistle" to Diognetus* seem not to be an epistle; and, despite its appearance among the apostolic fathers in modern editions, "the basic theme, the plan, the argument, the doctrine, the vocabulary relate the *Ad Diognetum* much more closely to the group of surviving writings attributed to the Apologists."[38] Concerning the date of the writing, there has been much discussion, and many different alternatives have been proposed.[39] Arguments for an early date in about the third decade of the second century seem to me the most compelling.[40] *Diogn.* announces a series of questions (1), and then, parallel to *Preaching of Peter*, discusses pagan (2), Jewish (3-4) and Christian religion (5-9); ch. 10 constitutes a conclusion.[41] Like *Preaching of Peter*, *Diogn.* follows Jewish precedent in arguing against pagan deities as being mere images made of physical substances and, as such, perishable (2, 2-3). The writer uses a sort of inverted negative theology, when he asks rhetorically whether the pagan deities are not "dumb" (i.e. without speech), "blind" (i.e. without sight), "without life, without perception,

without movement" (2, 4). The implications of this critique for a Christian concept of God—namely, that God is immaterial, imperishable, etc.—are not spelled out. Nor is there any clear evidence of a charge of atheism being made against the Christians. But the writer at least indicates the connexion between the Christian rejection of pagan deities, and the consequent hatred of Christians by pagans: "You call these things gods, you serve them, you worship them, and finally you become like them. That is why you hate Christians, because they do not regard them as gods." (2, 5-6)

Whereas the *Preaching of Peter* merely described God as being in need of nothing, *Diogn.* uses the same attribute as the ground for rejecting the sacrificial ritual of Judaism.[42] Thus, although it is acknowledged that Jews and Christians worship the same God, the Jews "ought to regard it as foolishness, not reverence, that they offer these things to God as though he were in need" (3, 3).[43] In its presentation of the Christian religion, *Diogn.* first deals with Christians as a social group in relation to the rest of the world (5-6), then defines Christians as those who are entrusted with Jesus (7-9). Jesus as the truth or word of God is the representative of the invisible[44] God, the creator and ruler of the world (7). "For before he came, what man had any knowledge at all of what God is?" (8, 1) A brief digression rejects Greek philosophical interpretations of deity as one of the elements: fire, water, etc. (8, 2-4). Then the writer returns to the idea of God's self-revelation in Jesus:

> No man saw God nor made him known, but he revealed himself; and he revealed through faith, through which alone it has been made possible to see God (8, 5-6).

In this paradoxical expression, the God who is unseen and unknown has made himself known and visible to faith. The negative theology of God's transcendence has been converted to positive theology by the incarnation.

So far as our limited evidence goes, it seems that the *Preaching of Peter* begins with God and moves on to mankind, which is subdivided into Greeks, Jews, and Christians. Similarly *Diogn.*, after announcing several questions at the outset, deals in turn with pagan, Jewish and Christian religion. The *Apology* of Aristides (addressed to Antoninus Pius c. 140 A.D.)[45] elaborates this pattern: after presenting the deity (1), the writer turns to mankind in general (2), which he then treats under the headings of barbarians (3-7), Greeks (8-11, 13), Egyptians (12), Jews (14) and Christians (15-17).[46] The main concentration of negative

theological language occurs in ch. 1, which quickly moves from the evidence of creation to the nature of the creator God.[47] This God is incomprehensible,[48] unbegotten, uncreated, without beginning, without end, immortal, incomprehensible (again); he has no needs, no name, no form nor composition of members; he is not male nor female; the heavens do not contain him; he has no adversary; he does not possess anger nor resentment; ignorance and forgetfulness are not in his nature; he requires no sacrifice nor libation, nor anything visible; he does not require anything from anyone.[49] Thus Aristides defines his concept of God at the outset, and uses negative theology to reinforce his positive idea of God the creator.

In ch. 2 Aristides makes an abrupt transition from God to mankind, which he divides into those who participate in the truth about which he has spoken (in ch. 1), and those who stray from it. In assessing mankind against this criterion, he deals first with the barbarians, who worshipped created things instead of the creator, especially man-made idols composed of elements (3). But the elements, like mankind, are destructible; God is imperishable, unchangeable, invisible (4). Therefore the earth is not a god (4). Similarly water, fire, wind and sun are not gods (5-6). Nor are men of the past gods—an anti-Euhemeristic statement. Man is composed of the four elements together with soul and spirit, and has a beginning and an end. But this is not the case with God, who is uncreated and incorruptible (7). In this section negative theology is employed to distinguish God from man and from man-made idols, and to reject barbarian worship of such idols.

In subsequent chapters (8-13), Greek and Egyptian deities are rejected on moral grounds, as well as because they do not measure up to the standard of ch. 1. Towards the end of this section, Aristides brings against Greek gods the usual argument, that they are "dead idols and senseless images." Even the poets and philosophers go wrong in maintaining that they are gods, and in trying to make them like God. But "no man has ever seen to whom He is like; nor is he able to see Him." Moreover, when they say that God accepts various sacrifices and temples, they attribute deficiency to him. "But God is not needy and none of these things is sought for by Him."[50] Here Aristides has only moved from the practical to the theoretical level, as he uses negative theology to reject the positive ideas of Greek thinkers concerning their deities. Aristides proceeds to reject the claim of Greek poets and philosophers, "that the nature of all their gods is one." He allows for

the sake of argument the notion that the Greek gods deserve admiration, but only in order to argue *a minori ad maius* for his own idea of God.—"If then it is proper that we should admire a god who is visible and does not see, how much more is this worthy of admiration that a man should believe in a nature which is invisible and all-seeing!" (13, tr. Harris) Here negative definition of the Christian God is used in an artistic double contrast with Greek deities—visible: does not see; invisible: all-seeing.

The treatment of Judaism and Christianity which follows does not contribute directly to the present enquiry.[51] In summary, then, Aristides begins with God, whose nature is defined largely in negative terms (1). He then moves on to the races of mankind, but only in order to assess their various conceptions of God. Besides the main concentration of negative theological language in ch. 1, such language is also used in arguing against barbarian worship of perishable, man-made idols (3), against the divinization of the natural elements themselves (4-6), and hence against divinized human beings composed, in part, of the four elements (7). Negative theology is used in a similar way in arguing against idolatrous and mythical conceptions of deity among the Greeks (13).

Justin's *First Apology* was addressed to Antoninus Pius and his two adopted sons c. 150 A.D.[52] "The effort to find a clear outline in the First Apology has baffled commentators ..."[53] However, the wide variety of issues with which Justin deals can perhaps be subsumed under a few broad headings: address (1), appeal for fair hearing (2-5), defence against charge of atheism (6-29), defence against anticipated objection that Christ was only a human being (30-60), Christian liturgy (61-67), conclusion (68).[54] The main use of negative theological terminology occurs at particular stages within Justin's defence against the charge of atheism—a topic which appears here for the first time in Christian apologetic literature. Justin announces the charge and makes an ironic confession.[55] After a digression he picks up the accusation, and reinterprets it, so that it becomes a rejection of pagan deities, which are said to be corruptible and in need of care.[56] Conversely, Christian tradition maintains that "God does not need any material offering from men."[57] And this God is "called by no set name."[58]

According to Justin, "it is Jesus Christ who taught us these things, who was begotten for this purpose," and whom Christians rank second after the Father and before the Spirit (1 *Apol.* 13, 3). Opponents of

Christianity, it is acknowledged, declare that this is madness, "saying that we give second place after the unchangeable and eternal God and begetter of all to a crucified man" (1 *Apol.* 13, 4). However, new converts to Christianity now "follow the unbegotten God alone through his son; those who once ... used magic having now devoted themselves to the good and unbegotten God" (1 *Apol.* 14, 1-2). Justin brings Jesus into his discussion in this section as the one who taught Christians the true worship of the true God, which shows that Christians are not atheists. The particular terms of negative theology which here occur are determined by the context in Justin's apologetic argument. Thus Justin rejects any discrepancy between the "unchangeable and eternal" Father and the "crucified man," who is his son. Justin would agree with his opponents, that this God is the "begetter of all" and is himself "unbegotten;" but God is also the father of the one was "begotten for this purpose."

Having introduced Jesus as the source of Christian teaching, Justin allows himself to elaborate the (primarily ethical) teaching of Jesus for its own sake (1 *Apol.* 15-17). The reporting of a particular dominical saying[59] leads Justin into a digression on the state of persons after death and on eschatology (1 *Apol.* 18-20). Justin returns to Jesus in chh. 21-22, and speaks of his divine birth and ascension as analogous to Greek beliefs. The analogy leads to two further points: first, though Christians make similar claims to those of the Greeks, they alone are hated because of the name of Christ (1 *Apol.* 24, 1); secondly, Christians who once worshipped the so-called gods of the Greeks, now through Jesus Christ despise them, though threatened with death, and have dedicated themselves to the unbegotten and impassible God (1 *Apol.* 25, 1-2). In the present context the negative epithets (unbegotten, impassible) have particular relevance to the Greek deities just mentioned (Dionysos, Apollo, Persephone, Aphrodite, Adonis, Asklepios), who did not share these attributes. More generally, Justin uses his negative definition of deity in the oppressive socio-political situation of hatred and the threat of death, in order to reject the old gods and to express his commitment to the transcendent God of Christian belief.[60]

Tatian's apology (177 A.D.?)[61] is addressed neither to Roman officials nor to an individual pagan inquirer, but to "the Greeks" in general. In an introduction (1-3) he commands the Greeks not to be so hostile towards the barbarians (1, 1), and rhetorically asks them what noble thing they have produced by their philosophizing (2, 1).[62] The

doctrinal section of the apology (4-20) begins with Tatian's concept of God (4-5), and proceeds to discuss resurrection and judgment (6), the fall of man (7), and demonology (8-20). The second half of the apology consists of an attack on Greek culture (21-30), and a demonstration that the Christian "philosophy" is older and better than the systems of the Greeks (31-41).[63] Tatian's autobiographical conclusion (42) emphasizes his basic concern with God,[64] and so points back to the beginning of the body of the apology.

Although the apology is not addressed to the political authorities, the opening sentence of the body of the writing shows that the political and forensic dimension is certainly in the author's mind. For Tatian asks why the Greeks want to create a clash between the Christians and the authorities as in a boxing match (4, 1). He claims to be ready to perform his political duties. "Only when I am being ordered to deny (God), I will not obey, but will rather die, so that I may not be shown to be false and ungrateful" (4, 1). The issue of the denial of God—clearly in a political, not philosophical, context[65]—is directly related to Tatian's definition of God. God is not visible, not comprehensible by human skill; he does not have any origin in time; he alone is without beginning; he is spirit but does not pervade matter; he is intangible, unnamable, and not in need of anything (4, 1-2). God is known from his creation, but Tatian is not willing to worship things created by God (sun, moon) or by man (images of wood and stone) (4, 2). "The unnamable God is not to be bribed with gifts; for he who is not in need of anything should not be misrepresented by us as in need" (4, 2-3). Tatian thus uses negative theology in standard ways, in order to reject both the pagan deification of material objects and the material offerings of cult.

Athenagoras's *Plea for the Christians* (c. 177 A.D.) is addressed to the joint emperors, Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus. Among the second-century apologies it has not only the most irenic tone but also the neatest structure. After an introduction requesting a fair hearing (1-2), Athenagoras in a summary statement (division of topics) rejects the three basic charges of atheism, cannibalism and incest (3), before making an extended defence against the first charge (4-30). The charges of immorality receive much briefer treatment (31-36). The concluding chapter (37) balances the introduction. As in Justin's *First Apology*, Athenagoras uses negative theological language to define his concept of God in the context of his defence against the charge of atheism.

Athenagoras divides the accusation of atheism into two parts, defending Christians first against the charge of theoretical atheism (4-12), and secondly against the charge of practical atheism (13-30). At the outset Athenagoras regards it as ridiculous to have to defend Christians against the charge at all; it is irrational that people should apply the term "atheism" to Christians, who distinguish God from matter; for the divine is uncreated and eternal and is seen only by mind and reason, whereas matter is created and perishable (4, 1). To this point Athenagoras adds the Christian commitment to monotheism.[66] But he then proceeds to distil a spiritual and monotheistic understanding of God from a series of Greek poets and philosophers (5-6). The mixture of positive and negative attributes of deity which emerges from these sources is selected by Athenagoras for his present purpose. Thus, negatively, God is found to be ineffable, uncreated, unmoved.[67] "If, then, Plato is not an atheist, when he thinks of the uncreated God, the maker of the universe, as one, neither are we atheists, when we know and affirm as God him by whom all things have been made through the word and sustained through the spirit which comes from him" (6, 2). In the course of presenting rational arguments for the unity of God, Athenagoras maintains that God, unlike man, is "uncreated, impassible and indivisible; therefore not consisting of parts" (8, 3). After supporting reason by scripture (9), Athenagoras uses a conglomeration of negative terms to sum up the monotheistic aspect of his defence against the charge of atheism: "It has been adequately shown by me, that we are not atheists, since we believe in one God, uncreated, eternal, invisible, impassible, incomprehensible and illimitable, comprehended by mind and reason alone ..." (10, 1).

In maintaining that Christians are not guilty of practical atheism, Athenagoras first responds to the charge of failure to sacrifice. He presents the usual argument, that God has no needs.[68] Secondly, in replying to the charge of rejecting the gods of the cities, Athenagoras gives a selective list of the multiplicity of gods of the various cities, before summarizing his defence: "If, then, we are impious, because we do not show the same piety as they, all cities and all nations are impious; for they do not all believe in the same gods" (14, 3). Athenagoras then picks up from ch. 4 his distinction between the divine, which is uncreated and eternal, and the material, which is created and perishable. Most people, being unable to appreciate the great difference between God and matter, resort to material idols (15, 1). But Athenagoras rejects

idolatry with the usual argument against worshipping the creature rather than the creator—an argument which he applies both to idols made by man from materials provided by God (15, 2-4) and to the elements which were made directly by God (16).[69] More precise than some apologists, Athenagoras allows a distinction between idols as being only statues, and the allegedly real gods they represent (18, 1). But against those who claim that these gods really exist, Athenagoras argues that the gods of myth came to be and are perishable, and therefore do not exist, whereas the true God is uncreated and eternal (19, 1-2). Athenagoras further complains that the gods of Greek myth are corporeal, and illustrates the point with the worst possible examples of anthropomorphic and monstrous deities drawn especially from the cosmogonic myths. But "if they do not differ from the lowest beasts, they are not gods; for clearly the divine must be differentiated from what is earthly and derived from matter" (20, 5). The Greek gods not only are corporeal, but have passions of anger and desire, which is ridiculous; for in God there is neither anger nor desire (21, 1). Throughout this section of his apology, Athenagoras has been defining his concept of God in negative terms in polemical contrast to the pagan concepts of deity which he rejects. At the same time, this whole argument functions as a defence against the charge of atheism, since the gods whom the Christians reject are shown not to deserve the status of God.

But the argument continues. According to Athenagoras, it is not satisfactory to interpret the gods of Greek myth as natural forces; for, if we follow Empedocles, "we shall without realizing it make perishable, fluctuating and changeable matter equal to the uncreated, eternal and constantly self-consistent God" (22, 3). Athenagoras would acknowledge the Stoic view that the supreme God is uncreated and eternal, but he rejects the consequences of pantheism, since elements of the physical world are to be destroyed in the conflagration according to Stoic belief (22, 5). Against the allegorical interpretation of the succession myth of Kronos and Zeus, Athenagoras objects: "if Kronos is time, he changes; if he is season, he alters; but the divine neither changes nor varies" (22, 7). Thus negative theology is used to counter not only the gods of Greek myth, but also the philosophical interpretations of myth and Stoic religious philosophy.

After arguing against the alleged power of idols on the ground that it is demonic (23-27), Athenagoras concludes his defence against the

charge of practical atheism by presenting a Euhemeristic view of the pagan gods (28-30). With reference to a fragment of Euripides and a passage of Pindar, Athenagoras claims that gods would not have concerned themselves with gold, since the divine is not in need and is above desire; nor would they have died (29, 3). As his final example, Athenagoras treats two lines of Callimachus's *Hymn to Zeus* with some sophistication.

> "The Cretans are always liars; for your tomb, O Lord,
> The Cretans devised; but you did not die."
> Although you believe in the birth of Zeus, Callimachus, you do not believe in his tomb; and although you think you are obscuring the truth, you are actually proclaiming to those who do not know it the death (of Zeus). And if you look at the cave, you recall Rhea's childbirth; but if you see the tomb, you obfuscate the fact of his death, not realizing that the uncreated God is eternal. (30, 3)

In short, worship of the pagan gods is unnecessary, since they do not exist if the usual myths are unreliable; but if the myths are true, then these gods have ceased to be and no longer exist, just as they came into being from non-existence (30, 4).

Thus in his defence against the charge of practical and theoretical atheism, Athenagoras criticizes the pagan gods with a series of attributes describing their inadequacy. This critique is balanced by a corresponding series of negative attributes which Athenagoras applies to the Christian God. Christians are not to be considered atheists on the ground that they do not believe in the pagan gods, since these beings do not deserve divine status. Conversely, since Christians do believe in the transcendent deity whom Athenagoras describes in negative terms, they cannot be regarded as atheists on this ground either.

Theophilus of Antioch addressed his *Apology* to an individual pagan acquaintance, Autolycus, c. 180 A.D.[70] The main purpose of Book 1 is announced in the introduction (1, 1-2) as being the presentation of the Christian idea of God.[71] After treating the attributes of God (1, 3-4), Theophilus shows how God is seen through his providence and works (1, 5-7). There follows a preliminary discussion of resurrection (1, 8). From the Christian God Theophilus turns to criticism of the Greek gods (1, 9-10) and rejection of worship of the Roman emperor (1, 11). Then he picks up from 1, 1 Autolycus's ridicule of the name "Christian" (1, 12), before reverting to resurrection and judgment (1, 13-14; cf. 1, 8). In Book 2 Theophilus undertakes to show Autolycus more accurately the pointlessness of his own religion (2, 1). So he proceeds to a more

extended criticism of the Greek gods (2, 2-8; cf. 1, 9-11), dealing first with the material images made by men and the anthropomorphic myths (2, 2-3), and secondly with philosophic and poetic views of God (2, 4-8). By contrast, prophetic inspiration provided the true idea of God (2, 9-38); Theophilus first treats the creation story in general as prophetically inspired (2, 9-11), then proceeds to an extended exegesis of parts of Genesis, especially Gen. 1-4 (2, 12-32); this exposition leads to an extensive series of conclusions (2, 33-38). In Book 3 Theophilus intends to show the antiquity of the Christian (i.e. Old Testament) scriptures and the nonsense of "the rest" (3, 1). Taking the latter point first, he rejects the validity of pagan writings (3, 2-3). His main concern here is that pagans have been misled about the nature of Christianity. So he proceeds (3, 4-15) to defend Christians against the charges of cannibalism (3, 5) and sexual immorality (3, 6), and to treat the question of God's existence (3, 7-8) and the ethics commanded by God (3, 9-15). Only then does he return to the issue of the antiquity of Christian teaching,[72] which he attempts to demonstrate by his long chronology (3, 16-29). The last chapter is a conclusion to Book 3 and to the whole work (3, 30).

While introducing the main topic of Book 1, Theophilus claims that Autolycus has attacked him by boasting of his own gods of wood and stone, "which neither see nor hear, since they are idols and the work of men's hands" (1, 1). Thus in passing Theophilus rejects the pagan gods by describing them in the terms of the Psalmist.[73] In describing the Christian God, Theophilus begins with negative attributes which are mostly related to a positive quality. Thus the form of God is ineffable and inexpressible; he is in glory uncontainable, in greatness incomprehensible, in height inconceivable, in strength incomparable, in wisdom unequalled, in goodness inimitable, in kindness indescribable (1, 3). The mode of expression then changes to a series of conditional sentences containing positive attributes: "If I call him light, I speak of his creature;" etc. The point seems to be that these attributes, though complimentary, are all inadequate.[74] This description may be regarded as an exercise in negative definition by remotion: God (it is implied) is not light, etc., not in the sense that he is darkness, but rather God is excluded "from the sphere of discourse of the predicate in question."[75] Theophilus's mode of expression changes again to a series of causal clauses or phrases: God "is without beginning, because he is uncreated; he is unchangeable, because he is immortal" (1, 4 *init.*; positive attributes then follow). All these negative attributes set the Christian God in contrast to the pagan gods of whom Autolycus has boasted (1, 1).

Theophilus has already made considerable use of the idea of man's ability or inability to see God, in order to express the distinction between Christian and pagan.[76] Against this background, he uses the attribute of invisibility[77] to introduce his next point: "For as the soul in man is not seen, being invisible to men, but the soul is perceived through the motion of the body, so it would not be possible for God to be seen by human eyes, but he is seen and perceived through his providence and works" (1, 5 *init.*). To conclude his discussion of this point, Theophilus uses the same negative attribute, invisibility, together with immortality: "If you perceive these things ..., you can see God ... When you put off mortality and put on imperishability, then you will see God as you deserve ... And then, having become immortal you will see the Immortal ..." (1, 7 *fin.*).

This eschatological reference leads Theophilus into a preliminary discussion of resurrection (1, 8; cf. 1, 13-14). His last argument for resurrection proceeds *a minori ad maius*: if Autolycus believes that statues made by *men* are gods and perform miracles, then he ought to believe that *God* who created the living will be able to recreate the dead (1, 8 *fin.*). After this incidental reference to the statues of the pagan gods, Theophilus launches into a critique of pagan gods on various grounds. Greek and oriental mystery deities are rejected on Euhemeristic and moral grounds (1, 9). The mere mention of Egyptian worship of animal deities is sufficient criticism; while the gods of Greece and other nations are rejected as made of stone, wood and other material substances (1, 10 *init.*; cf. 1, 1). The multiplicity of types of Zeus is an argument against his real existence. In short, the pagan deities are only man-made idols (1, 10 *fin.*). Theophilus's basic, if implicit, objection to pagan religion is that it involves worship of the creature rather than the creator—a standard apologetic theme. This appears more clearly in the objection to emperor-worship which follows immediately: "Therefore I shall rather honour the emperor, not worshipping him, but praying for him; but God I worship as the real and true God, knowing that the emperor has been created by him" (1, 11 *init.*). This rejection of pagan religion (1, 9-11) is subordinate to the presentation of the Christian God in Book 1, but does not involve any further use of negative theology, nor any explicit defence against the charge of atheism.

Further criticism of the Greek gods is the main topic of Book 2. Once again they are rejected as man-made, material objects (2, 3; cf. 1, 1 and

10); and their existence is questioned on the ground that their genesis, once prolific (according to the myths), is no longer evident (2, 3). In discussing the views of the philosophers, Theophilus criticizes the (alleged) atheism of Stoics and Epicureans (2, 4 *init.*). Platonists acknowledge that God is uncreated; but, since they assume that matter is also uncreated, the sole supremacy of God is thereby denied; if matter is uncreated, it is unchangeable and equal to God, since the uncreated is immutable and unchangeable (2, 4). Thus Theophilus approves the Platonists' negative definition of deity, but rejects the similar status which they allow to matter.

The error of Greek philosophers and poets in general arose because they were inspired by demons, not by a pure spirit (2, 8). By contrast, the (Old Testament) prophets were truly inspired by the Holy Spirit (2, 9 *init.*). According to the prophetic account of creation, God was without need, since the Uncreated needs nothing (2, 10 *init.*). As his exegesis of Genesis proceeds, Theophilus anticipates an objection to the expression that God was "walking in paradise," since God must not be confined in a place; God is indeed unconfined and is not found in a place (2, 22, with reference to Gen. 3, 8). Later Theophilus gives an anti-polytheistic interpretation of the creation of Eve. So that it would not be presumed that Adam was made by one deity and Eve by another, God made the two together, forming Eve from Adam's side; in fact, the words of the serpent, "You will be like gods," already show a tendency to polytheism (2, 28, with reference to Gen. 2, 22 and 3, 5). When Theophilus begins to draw conclusions from his biblical exegesis, he repeats the anti-polytheistic comment.[78]

Other repetitions occur as Theophilus draws further conclusions. It has been shown from the pagan writers themselves that the names of the so-called gods are names of men (2, 34; cf. 1, 9). And Theophilus complains that the majority of people still worship man-made idols (2, 34; cf. 1, 1 and 10; 2, 2). Moreover, the divine law forbids the worship not only of idols but of the heavenly bodies (2, 35 *init.*). The prophets grieved over mankind's atheism (2, 35). Treating the Sibyl as a representative of pagan prophecy in general, Theophilus no doubt aims to refute Autolycus from his "own" prophetic writings (2, 36 *init.*). In the first fragment which Theophilus quotes, negative theology is used in support of the uniqueness and transcendence of God: he is uncreated (vv. 7 and 17), invisible (v. 8), immortal (v. 11) and unerring (v. 28).[79] A second quotation criticizes the so-called created gods: if anything created also

perishes, no god can have been formed from the loins and womb of man (vv. 1-2); no mortal can know the full account of creation—only God himself, the immortal, eternal creator, knows (vv. 15-17); created things, whether animals (vv. 22-28) or inanimate objects of stone and wood (vv. 29-31), do not deserve to be treated as gods. Here negative theology contrasts the creator with created things. Theophilus next draws on Greek poets to support the Sibyl (2, 37-38); and as he brings the Book to an end, he again contrasts polytheism and monotheism, intending to show the pagan writers' inconsistency: "Therefore although the writers spoke about a multitude of gods, they came back to monotheism (*monarchia*)" (2, 38; cf. 2, 28 and 33).

At the beginning of Book 3 Theophilus rejects the validity of major Greek writers and thinkers, including Empedocles and his teaching of atheism (3, 2). In summary, Theophilus's rhetorical questions concerning all these figures are intended to illustrate their useless and atheistic thinking (3, 2 *fin.*). The various writers contradict each other, or even themselves; so, for instance, they spoke about gods, but later taught atheism (3, 3 *init.*). Attempting to write about purity, they declare that the gods were the first to join in unspeakable unions and unlawful meals (3, 3). Here is an implicit but clear rejection of pagan gods on moral grounds, which involves a double irony. For the charges made against the pagan gods are the same as those against which Theophilus will defend Christians in 3, 5-6. And one of the negative epithets used here in criticism recalls the negative theology of other contexts: "unspeakable" (*arrētos*) has elsewhere been used as "ineffable."

Theophilus attributes the charges of cannibalism and sexual immorality to "atheistic mouths falsely libelling us, the pious, who are called Christian" (3, 4). On these issues Theophilus seems to think attack the best means of defence. So instead of defending Christians against the charge of cannibalism, he turns the charge against the pagans. Here atheism is not a separate charge, but cannibalism is denounced as atheistic.[80] The charge of sexual immorality is also turned back against the Greek philosophers; in the case of Epicurus, his alleged advocacy of incestuous intercourse is disapproved by being associated with his teaching of atheism (3, 6). While Theophilus does not formally claim to defend Christians against the charge of atheism, he does move from the issues of cannibalism and sexual immorality to that of the existence of God and pagan atheism; so again it must be presumed that Theophilus's attack on paganism constitutes his defence of

Christianity.[81] As elsewhere, Theophilus alleges the inconsistency of the pagan writers: "For having said that the gods exist, they again reduced them to nothing" (3, 7 *init.*).[82] In summary, "those who produced such philosophy are by their own precepts convicted of atheism, or indeed of promiscuity and unlawful intercourse. Moreover, even cannibalism is found among them according to their own writings, and they describe the gods whom they have honoured as the first to have done these things." (3, 8 *fin.*)[83]

Theophilus's is by far the longest of the extant second-century Greek apologies, and the only one which is organized by its author in more than one book. Within its overall structure, its style is often rambling and repetitive. It may, therefore, be as well to draw together the main issues of the foregoing discussion, which has examined the three Books in sequence. Theophilus rejects pagan gods as material idols (1, 1; 1, 10; 2, 2; 2, 34; 2, 36 [second Sibylline fragment, vv. 29-31]). He rejects Greek and oriental mystery deities on Euhemeristic (1, 10; 2, 34) and moral grounds (1, 10; 3, 3). The many types of Zeus argue against the reality of the supreme deity of Greek myth (1, 10). The Roman emperor, a mere creature, is not to be worshipped as divine (1, 11). The real existence of Greek gods is rejected on the grounds that the once plentiful births of gods (in myth) are no longer reported (2, 3). And Theophilus argues against polytheism in general by his interpretation of the story of Eve's creation (2, 28; cf. 2, 33 and 38). Apart from these arguments, divine law forbids the worship both of idols and of heavenly bodies (2, 35). By contrast with this picture of pagan gods, Theophilus describes the Christian God in negative terms (especially 1, 3-4; cf. 1, 5-7; 2, 10; 2, 22; and the two quotations from the *Sibylline Oracles* in 2, 36). Besides criticizing the gods of Greek myth and cult, Theophilus also attacks the alleged atheism of major Greek thinkers, including Platonists, Stoics and Epicureans (2, 4; 3, 2-3 and 6). But his attack on pagan atheism seems also to be intended as a defence of Christianity against the same charge (3, 7-8). Even the associated charges of cannibalism and sexual immorality are attributed to pagan atheism (3, 4).

The Greek apologists of the second century make significant use of negative theology, which they take over from other sources. The main source is no doubt contemporary Middle Platonism. But the influence of Middle Platonism itself has sometimes been mediated by Hellenistic Judaism. Moreover, the apologists' use of negative theology is selective. Particular terms are chosen in order to oppose pagan concepts of deity.

This polemic-apologetic function of negative theology recalls its origin in Greek philosophy as far back as the early Presocratics. On the other hand, the choice of negative theological terms is also determined by the Christian concept of God which the apologists wish to convey.[84] The apologists' criticisms of the pagan gods show that Christians are indeed atheists as far as those gods are concerned. And this becomes a charge against which the apologists defend Christianity. The charge may be ironically admitted by Justin, but it is also firmly rejected both by Justin and by subsequent apologists. And they turn the charge, if not directly against their pagan accusers, then at least against a strand of Greek philosophical thought. The apologists use negative theology at particular stages of their argument; but the variety of ways in which they organize their argument makes it difficult to generalize, despite the common features. However, broadly speaking, there is an interrelation of atheism and negative theology in the apologetic argument. The atheism of the Christian apologists with respect to the pagan gods is expressed in criticism on various grounds, while the Christian God is defined in negative terms in opposition to the concepts so criticized. At the same time the definition of God in negative terms allows the apologists to reject the charge of atheism against the Christians.

NOTES

[1] Ign. *Pol.* 3, 2 (God is above season, timeless, invisible, impalpable, impassible); *Herm. Man.* 1 (uncontained). Cf. also Acts of Martyrs of Vienne and Lyons in Eusebius, *H.E.* 5, 1, 52 ("God has no name as a man has").

[2] H. A. Wolfson began his article, Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides (*HTR* 50, 1957, 145-156), by saying: "By the time the Fathers of the Church began to offer negation as a solution to the problem of divine attributes, the theory of negative attributes had already been dealt with by Philo, Albinus, and Plotinus." But Wolfson deals mainly with a period later than the second century, treating Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century), pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (c. 500) and John of Damascus (eighth century).

[3] "We shall achieve the first idea of God by making successive abstractions, just as we get the conception of a point by abstraction from what is sensible, removing first the idea of a surface, then that of a line, till finally we have a point." (Albinus, *Epitome* 10, 5, as translated in H. Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum*, Cambridge 1953, 429, n. 4.) Cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5, 11, 71; R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge 1937) 132-133. There is perhaps one example of remotion in Theophilus, *To Autolycus* 1, 3; see below at n. 75.

[4] J. Daniélou, *A History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea, II: Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture* (London 1973) 323, with reference to E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Leipzig 1913).

[5] *Agnostos Theos* 113.

[6] *Ibid.* 84, where Norden cites as examples *aoratos*, *atheōrētos*, *akatalēptos* and *aphanēs*.

[7] L. W. Barnard, *Justin Martyr. His life and thought* (Cambridge 1967) 81, with reference to E. R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr* (Jena 1923).

[8] See Daniélou, *Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture* 323-328.

[9] Thus the summary quotation from Goodenough (*Theology of J.M.* 130) in Barnard (*Justin Martyr* 81) needs to be balanced by another: "For the purpose of this brief review only one school, the later Platonic, needs any detailed examination, for in matters metaphysical it was the philosophic school which most influenced Christianity" (Goodenough, *Theology of J.M.* 20).

[10] A. Puech, *Les Apologistes Grecs du IIe Siècle de notre ère* (Paris 1912) 185 (with reference to Athenagoras), cf. 292 (apologists generally); R. A. Norris, *God and World in Early Christian Theology* (London 1966) 49 (Justin, "following the Middle Platonists and Philo"); Barnard, *Justin Martyr* 34-35; *id.*, *Athenagoras* (Paris 1972) 84-85, 88; R. M. Grant, *Theophilus Ad Autolycum* (Oxford 1971) xv; E. F. Osborn, *Justin Martyr* (Tübingen 1973) 14; *id.*, *The Beginning of Christian Philosophy* (Cambridge 1981) 35 (Justin's term "ineffable").

[11] *Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture* 323-328.

[12] Theophilus, *Ad Autolycum* 2, 36.

[13] A. H. Armstong and R. A. Markus, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy* (London 1960) 10-11.

[14] Fragments 169-172 in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957) 168-169. The common, anthropomorphic view of the gods considers that they are born (frag. 170); but their consequent mortality is not mentioned.

[15] Fragments 173-174 (Kirk and Raven, *Presocratic Philosophers* 169). Cf. the recent discussion by F. M. Young in W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (edd.), *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition in honorem Robert M. Grant* (Paris 1979) 49.

[16] R. K. Hack, *God in Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates* (Princeton 1931) 145-146.

[17] Osborn, *Beginning of Christian Philosophy* 31.

[18] Osborn, *Justin Martyr* 17.

[19] G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London 1936) 4; quoted with approval by R. Braun, *Deus Christianorum. Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien* (Paris ²1977) 45. Cf. Prestige, *op. cit.* xix: "The terms used are often, though not wholly, negative in form, but they convey a sense which is definite and positive;" cf. *id. ib.* 41: "The philologically privative terms connote ultimate self-dependency and universal responsibility, and their connotation is therefore positive rather than negative." Cf. Osborn, *Justin Martyr* 17, 21; *id.*, *Beginning of Christian Philosophy* 37.

[20] Hack, *God in Greek Philosophy* 146-147.

[21] Wolfson, Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers 146. Cf. Osborn, *Justin Martyr* 17: "Nor did Justin's negative theology fight with his positive theology; even the negative attributes of God were shown to have positive consequences such as the exclusion of certain kinds of worship."

[22] J. Donaldson (*A Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine from the death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council* 3 vols.; London 1866) considers the teaching of each

apologist concerning God, Christ (the Logos), Holy Spirit, angels and demons, man, church and sacraments, eschatology, scriptures, morality.

[23] Puech (*Les Apologistes Grecs*) treats the teaching of the various apologists under the headings of God, the Word, matter, demonology, destiny of the human soul, freewill, sacraments. Cf. Goodenough (*Theology of J.M.*), who treats God, the Logos, the Holy Spirit and the Lower Powers, the Created World (Matter, Man, Sin), Christ, Redemption and the Christian Life, Eschatology.

[24] H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (Oxford 1966) 18-19. Cf. Barnard (*Justin Martyr*), who treats Justin's doctrine of God; the Logos; the Holy Spirit, Trinity, and Angelic Powers; Creation, Incarnation and Redemption; Church and Sacraments; Christian Life; and Eschatology. Cf. also Barnard's *Athenagoras*, where he follows a similar dogmatic outline.

[25] See the discussion in Goodenough, *Theology of J.M.*, ch. IV, esp. 124-133; Barnard, *Justin Martyr*, ch. VI, esp. 79-80; Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, ch. I, esp. 20-26.

[26] Both Ubaldi and Pellegrino, and Barnard, treat the *Plea for the Christians* and *On the Resurrection* together, when outlining Athenagoras's doctrine of God. See Atenagora, *La Supplica per I Christiani*; *Della Resurrezione dei Morti*, ed. P. Ubaldi and M. Pellegrino (Turin 1949) XXI; Barnard, *Athenagoras* 85-89. However, these writers do not actually draw any negative theological language from *On the Resurrection*. (They could have referred to *Res.* 12, 3: "God did not make man ... for his own use; for he is not in need of anything, and for one who needs nothing, nothing at all of what has been made by him would contribute anything to his own use;" cf. 12, 4: "the immortals being in need of nothing.")

[27] Cf. Puech (*Les Apologistes Grecs* 209) writing of the time of Theophilus: "The apologetic genre loses its true nature by trying to expand, and thus reveals a certain exhaustion just at the time when the Latins, Minucius Felix and Tertullian, are going to borrow it from the Greeks and renew it. One foresees that the third century is going to feel new needs, to which a whole new literature will respond."

[28] P. Keresztes, The Literary Genre of Justin's First Apology, *VC* 19 (1965) 99-110, at 100.

[29] Keresztes, Literary Genre 108; cf. 109: "All the places scattered throughout the Apology, that could possibly suggest a missionary-protreptic purpose on Justin's part are rhetorical devices and, in the context, serve the one and only purpose of advising the Emperor to change the current course of justice in Asia." Keresztes stretches the evidence in a different direction when he argues that Tertullian in his *Apology* "produced this *display* following the devices and the style of the classical *epideictic* rhetoric;" see P. Keresztes, Tertullian's Apologeticus: A Historical and Literary Study, *Latomus* 25 (1966) 124-133 at 133.

[30] A. J. Malherbe, The Structure of Athenagoras, 'Supplicatio pro Christianis,' *VC* 23 (1969) 1-20 at 3.

[31] R. M. Grant, The Chronology of the Greek Apologists, *VC* 9 (1955) 25-33 at 30.

[32] W. Schneemelcher in E. Hennecke and W. Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha, II* (London 1965) 96.

[33] Cf. Clement's connecting clauses: "Then he adds" (*Strom.* 6, 5, 39, 4); "Peter himself will make clear, adding" (6, 5, 40, 1); "Again he will add something like this" (6, 5, 41, 1); "Then he further adds the finishing touch to the enquiry" (6, 5, 41, 4).

[34] Part of frag. 2 (a), Hennecke and Schneemelcher, *N.T. Apocrypha II*, 99 (Clem. Alex.

Strom. 6, 5, 39, 2-3). Daniélou (*Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture* 325) briefly discusses the attribute "having no need" as it occurs in Plato (*Timaeus* 33D) and Albinus (*Ep.* 10, 3) and in the context of "the critique of the pagan gods, where it is a commonplace of Jewish missionary style" (*Letter of Aristeas*; Josephus; Philo). For more detailed discussion, see B. Gärtner, *The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation* (Lund 1955) 215-218.

[35] But cf. in a "redemption" rather than a "creation" context, Ign. *Pol.* 3, 2: "the Invisible, who for us (became) visible, ... the Impassible, who for us (became) subject-to-suffering."

[36] Continuation of frag. 2 (a) (Hennecke and Schneemelcher) (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6, 5, 39, 4-41, 6).

[37] The argument against pagan deities, on the grounds that they are merely material idols, is Jewish: e.g. Isa. 44, 9-20; Jer. 10, 1-16; Ps. 115, 1-8. Marrou goes further and claims that "this irony with regard to the idol comes not only from the *Preaching of Peter*, and through it from the Psalmists and Prophets of Israel, it also belongs to the most authentic classical tradition from Heraclitus or Herodotus down to Horace or Lucian" (*À Diognète*, ed. H. I. Marrou, Paris ²1965, 108). However, the concern of the Greek and Roman writers, who deal with idolatry, seems rather different to that of Judaism. The Jews aimed to reject pagan deities as being merely material. The pagan writers, when they were not merely making a joke, wished to distinguish between mere images and true deity. Within the pagan context, some supported and some opposed the use of images as an aid to worship. For a fuller treatment, see B. H. W. von Borries, *Quid veteres philosophi de idololatria senserint* (Göttingen 1918). The Christian apologetic purpose is the heir to Judaism rather than Hellenism in this respect. Cf. also Gärtner, *Areopagus Speech* 219-228.

[38] *À Diognète*, ed. Marrou, 245.

[39] See the table in *À Diognète*, ed. Marrou, 242-243; cf. *The Epistle to Diognetus*, ed. H. G. Meecham (Manchester 1949) 18-19.

[40] Marrou sees the writing as having "an undoubted relationship and points of contact, partial but numerous, with the group of apologetic and protreptic writings of the years 120-210, but these connexions are particularly close with the two extreme groups, that is, on the one hand with the earliest surviving apologies, fragments of the *Preaching of Peter* and Aristides, and on the other hand with the latest writers of the period under consideration, namely Hippolytus of Rome and Clement of Alexandria" (*À Diognète* 260). While acknowledging arguments for the earlier extreme, Marrou himself prefers the later limit. Considerations which favour an appreciably earlier date in the second century may be found in Meecham's careful introduction, esp. 19 and 58 ff. However, a date in the 120's A.D. should not be accepted on the grounds of Andriessen's theory, that *Diogn.* constitutes the lost apology of Quadratus. See P. Andriessen, The Authorship of the Epistula ad Diognetum, *VC* 1 (1947) 129-136; and Marrou's counter-arguments in *À Diognète* 256-259.

[41] After a gap in the manuscript, chh. 11-12 probably belong to another work by a different writer. Marrou, opting for a date in the last decade of the second century, includes chh. 11-12 in the same writing with chh. 1-10 (*À Diognète* 263). L. W. Barnard (The Epistle ad Diognetum, Two Units from One Author?, *ZNW* 56, 1965, 130-137) dates chh. 1-10 about 130 A.D. or a little earlier, and regards chh. 11-12 as part of a Paschal homily from the same author about 140 A.D.

[42] Gärtner (*Areopagus Speech* 216-218) distinguishes an abstract philosophical use of this attribute, and a more polemical use in relation to cult; he finds both uses both in Judaism and in Graeco-Roman literature.

[43] The point is emphasized as the passage continues: "For he, who made the heaven and the earth and all that is in them and who provides us all with what we need, would himself need none of these things which he himself supplies to those who think they are giving them ... and they seem to supply to him who is in need of nothing" (3, 4-5).

[44] The term seems incidental here, anticipating the significant use of this attribute below (8, 5-6).

[45] Grant (Chronology 25) gives reasons for preferring the more precise date of 143 A.D.

[46] This outline follows the Syriac version. The publication of Greek fragments of the *Apology* of Aristides in 1922 and 1923 showed that the Syriac was closer to the scope of the original Greek than had previously been believed. See B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XV (London 1922) 2-3 (No. 1778); H. J. M. Milne, A New Fragment of the *Apology* of Aristides, *JTS* 25 (1923-24) 73-77; this papyrus has the British Museum Inv. No. 2486. There remains the difficulty, that the correspondence between the division of races in ch. 2 and the actual treatment in chh. 3 ff. is more plausible in the Greek of *Barlaam and Josaphat* than in the Syriac. See R. Raabe, *Die Apologie des Aristides*. Texte und Untersuchungen 9, 1 (Leipzig 1892) 27-29. For present purposes, what Aristides actually does is more important than what he says he will do.

[47] The *Apology* of Aristides is more or less fully extant in two versions: one in Syriac, and one in Greek embedded in the medieval romance of *Barlaam and Josaphat* (hereafter *BJ*); see J. R. Harris and J. A. Robinson, *The Apology of Aristides*, Texts and Studies 1, 1 (Cambridge 1891). In ch. 1 the Syriac version is much more elaborate than *BJ*. However, in addition to *POxy* 1778 (covering chh. 5b-6) and British Museum Inv. No. 2486 (covering part of chh. 15-16), there exists for ch. 1 the control of two Armenian fragments; see Harris and Robinson, *Apology* 27-28, for a Latin translation of one, and *ibid.* 30-31 for an English translation of the other. On this evidence, the Syriac must be regarded as closer than *BJ* to the scope of the original Greek.

[48] "... He is incomprehensible in His nature—and that I should dispute concerning the stedfastness of His government, so as to comprehend it fully, is not profitable for me; for no one is able perfectly to comprehend it" (tr. Harris).

[49] Some of these negative expressions are balanced by reciprocal affirmative statements: "He stands in need of nought, but everything stands in need of Him;" "the heavens do not contain Him; but the heavens and all things ... are contained in Him;" "He asks not anything from anyone; but all ask from Him" (tr. Harris).

[50] Extracts from ch. 13 (tr. Harris). For Graeco-Roman philosophical background to this section, see e.g. the Academic-Sceptic criticisms of the Stoic position in Cic. *N.D.* 3, 20 ff. For Hellenistic-Jewish background, see e.g. Wis. 13; Philo, *Decal.* 53 ff.

[51] Aristides approves the monotheism of the Jews and admires their philanthropy, in which they imitate God; but to him their ritual, imperfectly observed, indicates that they worship angels, not God (14). Cf. *Preaching of Peter* 2 (a) (Hennecke and Schneemelcher) (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6, 5, 41). Aristides begins his treatment of the Christians with their concept of God the creator, but quickly moves on to Christian behaviour (15-16). The concluding chapter (17) summarizes the errors of the Greeks, and pleads for fair treatment of Christians.

[52] Grant (Chronology 26) prefers a date late in the period 149-154 A.D., the years of L. Munatius Felix's prefecture of Egypt (mentioned 1 *Apol.* 29, 2).

[53] E. R. Hardy in C. C. Richardson (ed.), *Early Christian Fathers* (*Library of Christian Classics*, I; London 1953) 236.

[54] For some alternative analyses, see A. W. F. Blunt (ed.), *The Apologies of Justin Martyr* (Cambridge 1911) lv-lvii; Goodenough, *Theology of J.M.* 82-83; J. Quasten, *Patrology*, I (Utrecht and Brussels 1950) 199-200; Hardy in *Early Christian Fathers* 236; Keresztes, Literary Genre 101-106; Barnard, *Justin Martyr* 15-17.

[55] "Hence we are actually called atheists; and we confess that we are atheists with regard to such beings as are commonly accepted as gods, but not with regard to the most true God ..." (1 *Apol.* 6, 1). Cf. Polycarp's deliberate misapplication of the cry "Away with the atheists" (*Mart. Pol.* 9, 2).

[56] Christians do not honour man-made objects called gods, since "these are lifeless and dead and do not have the form of God" (1 *Apol.* 9, 1); to give these objects the name of gods is considered "not only irrational, but an insult to God, who, though possessing ineffable glory and form, has his name applied to corruptible things in need of care" (9, 3).

[57] 1 *Apol.* 10, 1. This attribute appears again in the context of defence against the charge of atheism at 1 *Apol.* 13, 1: "Therefore ... we are not atheists, since we worship the creator of the universe, and say ... that he is not in need of blood, libations and incense, and praise him ... with the word of prayer and thanksgiving for all that we receive ..."

[58] 1 *Apol.* 10, 1. This attribute is not required by Justin's argument at this point, but does recall the epithet "ineffable" in 9, 3. These are common attributes of God in Justin; see Barnard, *Justin Martyr* 34-35, with reference to 1 *Apol.* 9, 3; 10, 1; 61, 11; 2 *Apol.* 6, 1-2; 11, 4; 13, 4; *Dial.* 126, 2; 127, 2-4.

[59] "Therefore pay what is Caesar's to Caesar, and what is God's to God" (1 *Apol.* 17, 2, quoting the form of the saying in Matt. 22, 21).

[60] Other negative theological terms occur incidentally with reference to the "ineffable" origin of Jesus (1 *Apol.* 51, 1; here only *anekdiēgētos* instead of Justin's usual *arrētos*) and to the "unnamable" God (1 *Apol.* 63, 1). In 2 *Apol.* Justin merely uses two of his standard terms, when he claims that Christians are innocent of the fabulous actions of the pagans, having "the unbegotten and ineffable God" as witness of their thoughts and actions (2 *Apol.* 12, 4).

[61] Grant (Chronology 28) put the apology early in 177 A.D., after the endowment of teachers of philosophy in Athens in autumn 176 A.D., but before Tatian heard of the accession of Commodus. M. Elze prefers an earlier date, but only specifies the broad limits from before the death of Justin to 176 A.D.; see M. Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (Göttingen 1960) 43-44.

[62] Tatian exploits a traditional Hellenistic opposition between Greek and barbarian wisdom. While "barbarian" is not simply synonymous with "Christian" for Tatian, the former is meant to include the latter in particular here. See J. H. Waszink, Some Observations on the Appreciation of "the Philosophy of the Barbarians" in Early Christian Literature, in L. J. Engels, H. W. F. M. Hoppenbrouwers and A. J. Vermeulen (edd.), *Melanges offerts à Mademoiselle Christine Mohrmann* (Utrecht 1963) 41-56.

[63] Tatian uses "philosophy" with reference to Christianity at 30, 1; 35, 1; cf. Justin, *Dial.* 8, 1; Melito, *Apology* frag. 3 *init.*

[64] "Finally, knowing who God is and what his creative activity is, I present myself to you ready for the examination of our doctrines, on the understanding that on my part there will be no denial of our life-style in accordance with God" (42 *fin.*).

[65] Cf. the terminology of the martyrdom accounts, e.g. *Mart. Pol.* 2, 4; 9, 2; Eus. *H.E.* 5, 1, 25; 33; 46; 47; 48; 50 (martyrs of Vienne and Lyons); also *Diogn.* 7, 7; 10, 7.

[66] "But since our teaching believes in one God, the creator of this universe, himself uncreated (for what exists is not created, but what does not exist), but having created all things through the word which comes from him, it is irrational that we suffer on both counts, being both slandered (i.e. accused of impiety) and persecuted" (4, 2).

[67] According to Athenagoras, Lysis the Pythagorean says that God is an "ineffable number" (6, 1); Plato thinks of "the uncreated and eternal God as one" (6, 2); the Aristotelian school believes that God's soul, although the cause of his body's motion, is itself "unmoved" (6, 3). Athenagoras's sources are not necessarily authentic nor correctly understood: "... the Pythagorean texts which he invokes, those of Philolaus, Lysis and Opsimus, are not authentic; but they were surely considered as such by almost everybody in the second century" (Puech, *Les Apologistes Grecs* 179; cf. J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, Leipzig 1907, 173); Barnard (*Athenagoras* 42) shows that Athenagoras has probably misunderstood his source for the Aristotelian concept of the body of God.

[68] "The maker and father of this universe does not need blood, nor fat, nor the fragrance from flowers and incense, since he is himself perfect fragrance and has no needs nor requirements" (13, 2).

[69] Cf. Tatian, *Address* 4, 2; for biblical background to the image of the potter and his clay, cf. Isa. 29, 16; 45, 9; 64, 8; Jer. 18, 1-12; Wis. 15, 7-13; Ecclus. 33, 13; Rom. 9, 21.

[70] Theophilus's chronology of the world terminates with the death of Marcus Aurelius (17 March 180 A.D.).

[71] Theophilus reports Autolycus as having asked: "Show me your God" (1, 2 *init.*; recapitulated 1, 14 *fin.*; cf. 2, 1, referring back to Book 1 as an exposition of the Christian religion (*theosebeia*).

[72] There has been a shift from the antiquity of the "scriptures" (*grammata*) in 3, 1 to that of the "teaching" (*logos*) in 3, 16.

[73] Cf. Ps. 115, 4-6; 135, 15-17. Among earlier apologetic writings, cf. *Preaching of Peter* frag. 2 (a) (Hennecke and Schneemelcher; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6, 5, 40, 1); *Diogn.* 2, 2-4; Aristides, *Apol.* 3; Tatian, *Address* 4, 2; Athenagoras, *Plea* 15.

[74] Their inadequacy is made clearer in Novatian's imitation of this passage: *siue enim illum dixeris lucem, creaturam ipsius magis quam ipsum dixeris; ipsum non expresseris* etc. (*De Trinitate* 2).

[75] Wolfson, Negative Attributes 146. A partly parallel list in *Diogn.* 9, 6 is used in a purely positive way.

[76] In 1, 2, in response to Autolycus's demand "Show me your God," Theophilus says: "Show that your eyes can see ...; for just as those who see with the eyes of the body observe the affairs of earthly life, distinguishing things that differ, whether light or darkness, etc. ..., so in the case of ... the eyes of the soul it would be possible to look at God. For God is seen by those who are able to see him ..." Just as those who are wholly or partially blind fail to see the light of the sun, "so you, sir, have your eyes covered over by your sins and evil actions ... When there is rust on a mirror, it is not possible to see a man's face in the mirror; so too, when there is sin in a man, such a man cannot see God ... So too your impiety, sir, shrouds you in darkness so that you cannot see God." In 1, 3 Theophilus relates the first negative attributes to the sphere of vision: "the form of God is ineffable and inexpressible, since it cannot be seen by human eyes."

[77] This attribute did not appear in its own right in the list in 1, 3.

[78] "Which, then, of the so-called philosophers, poets and historians was capable of telling the truth about these matters, having been born much later and having introduced a multitude of gods?" (2, 33 *init.*)

[79] G. W. H. Lampe (*A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, Oxford 1961, 185b) wrongly takes *aplanētos* (v. 28) as referring to *tribos* (fem., "way," v. 23), ignoring *houtos* (masc.) in v. 28.

[80] "Oh, the atheistic teaching of those who recorded, or rather taught, such things; oh, their impiety and atheism ... Those who laid down these doctrines filled the world with impiety." (3, 5 *fin.*)

[81] Cf. Athenagoras's *Plea*, where atheism, cannibalism and sexual immorality were treated as the three basic charges against Christianity; outside the apologists, cf. e.g. the account of the martyrs of Vienne and Lyons, Eus. *H.E.* 5, 1, 9-10 (atheism) and 14 (cannibalism and incest).

[82] Those criticized on this ground include the atomists, Plato, Pythagoras, Clitomachus the Academic, Sceptics and Euhemerus "the most atheistic' (3, 7). The claim of 3, 7 *init.* is reversed in 3, 8 *init.*: "For while denying that the gods exist they themselves acknowledge it again ..."

[83] Theophilus again rejects charges of sexual immorality and cannibalism, as he summarizes the ethics commanded by God (3, 15 *init.*); and again cannibalism is branded as "the most atheistic thing of all," though atheism is not here a separate charge (cf. 3, 5).

[84] Cf. Barnard, *Athenagoras* 88: "... Athenagoras ... takes from Middle Platonism only what will serve his Christian purpose."

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JEWISH-CHRISTIAN CHRISTOLOGY AND JEWISH MYSTICISM

BY

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Gilles Quispel lately has proffered the intriguing theory that the Jewish concept of God's *kāvôd*, the "likeness as the appearance of man" (*dĕmûth kĕmarʾê ʾādām*) first beheld by the prophet Ezekiel,[1] is the model of the Gnostic Anthropos and even of the Son of Man in Jewish apocalyptics and the heavenly Man in Pauline theology.[2] By focusing on Jewish-Christian evidence not dealt with by Quispel, the present article will support the view that the Jewish mysticism which centered around the man-like figure upon the heavenly throne was influential in shaping the saviour image in the first centuries of our era.

Elchasai, a Jewish-Christian sect-leader who is said to have arisen in the third year of Trajan's reign, *i.e.*, in 101,[3] based his authority on a certain book of revelation, which later was brought to Rome by the Elchasaite missionary Alkibiades. Hippolytus, who gives extracts from this book, says:

> It had been revealed by an angel whose height was 24 schoenoi, which make 96 miles, and whose breadth was four schoenoi, and from shoulder to shoulder six schoenoi, and the tracks of his feet extend to the length of 3½ schoenoi, which make 14 miles, while the breadth 1½ schoenos and the height half a schoenos. There should also be a female with him whose dimensions, he [*i.e.*, Alkibiades] says, are according to those already mentioned. The male is the Son of God, while the female is called the Holy Spirit.[4]

This representation of the enormous angel of the Son has been compared to the description of God in his appearance upon the throne of the Merkabah found in *Šiʿûr Qômâ*, "the Measurement of the Body", *i.e.*, the Body of the Kabod, the man-like manifestation of God.[5] A typical fragment of *Shiur Qomah* which is put into the mouth of R. Ishmael, a pillar of orthodoxy, and quoted in *Sefer Raziel* reads:

> I have seen the King of kings, sitting upon a very high and lofty throne, and His hosts standing and facing Him at His right side and at His left side. The prince of the presence, whose name is Metatron, said to me: "Rabbi Ishmael, I am going to tell you what is the measure of the Holy One, blessed be He, that is hidden from all His

creatures. The soles of His feet are all the worlds, as has been said: 'The heavens are My throne and the earth My footstool' [Is. 66, 1]. The height of His soles is three times ten thousand leagues. From the sole of His feet unto His ankle there are thousand times ten thousand and four hundred times hundred miles. From His ankles unto His knees there are nineteen thousand times and four leagues in height. From His thighs unto His neck there are twenty-four thousand times ten thousand leagues. His neck is ten thousand times ten thousand and eight hundred leagues. His beard is ten thousand and thousand and five hundred leagues. The black in His right eye is ten thousand and thousand and five hundred leagues, and so is the left one. His right hand is twenty-two times ten thousand and two leagues, and so is the left. From His right shoulder to His left there are ten thousand and two leagues. From His right arm to His left arm there are twelf thousand times ten thousand leagues [...]."[6]

The fragments of *Shiur Qomah* cannot be dated to a time prior to the 6th century, when they were known to the poet Eleazar ha-Kallir, but the monotonous enumerations of the figures (and even the names) of each and every part of the divine Body which are contained in them must have developed from a mysticism which is considerably older. In the 3rd century, Origen reports that the Song of Songs as well as the first chapter of Ezekiel was not among those parts of Scripture that the rabbis expounded before those who had not reached full maturity.[7] As G. Scholem has pointed out, the reason for this was that the description of the beautiful body of the Lover in Song of Songs 5, 11-16 was made the Scriptural prop of the representation of the divine Body in the Shiur Qomah mysticism.[8]

In support of the protestation of the high age of the Shiur Qomah speculation, Scholem also cites the Jewish-Christian doctrine of the *Pseudo-Clementine Homilies* that God has a beautiful bodily form (*sōma* and *morphē*) with all the limbs of a body.[9] Before Scholem, M. Gaster had seen that the description of the divine "Body of Truth" (*sōma tēs alētheias*) given by the Gnostic Marcus in the 2nd century apparently derives from Jewish Shiur Qomah traditions.[10] Finally, Scholem has discovered "a clear reference" to the Shiur Qomah doctrine in a passage from the short version of 2 (the Slavonic) *Book of Enoch*, which in all probability is pre-Christian.[11] In this passage, which "reflects the precise Hebrew terminology", Enoch—the prototype of the mystics who ascended to heaven and beheld the man-like figure upon the throne—says: "I have seen the measure of the height of the Lord, without dimension and without shape, which has no end."[12]

It is evident that the idea of the unbelievably vast measurements of the Lord purports that God really is immeasurable. Still, and this is the

paradox of this kind of mysticism, the visionary actually is able to *behold* the divine *Body* in ecstasy. This is apparent throughout the tradition running from 2 *Enoch*, "I have *seen* the *measure* of the *height* of the Lord," to *Shiur Qomah*, "I have *seen* (*rā'ithî*) the King of kings, sitting upon a high and lofty throne."

That the measurements in the fragment relating Elchasai's vision are meant to be literal figures is not very likely; they apparently are meant to convey the idea that the person of the Son (and that of the Holy Spirit) is an otherwordly being. This issues from Elchasai's statement that, although the Son was seen by him and "is a figure *similar to men*, [he is] *invisible to men* (*einai ti androeikelon ektypōma aoraton anthrōpois*), with a length of 96 miles, that is 24 schoenoi, and a breadth of 6 schoenoi, 24 miles, and with a thickness of other dimensions."[13] Thus, Elchasai, like the prophet Ezekiel and the later Merkabah mystics, had a vision of the generally invisible godhead in the form of a man. Although the measurements of the divine Body in *Shiur Qomah* greatly surpass those of the Son in Elchasaitism, there can be no doubt that Elchasai in relating his vision is dependent upon traditions similar to those which were developed by the Merkabah mystics.

As has been implied above, the divine Body in Jewish mysticism is not that of the essential godhead. Scholem states: "The theory does not imply that God in Himself possesses a physical form, but only that a form of this kind may be ascribed to "the Glory", which in some passages is called *guf ha-Shekhinah* ("the body of the Divine Presence")."[14] Thus, a plausible inference would seem to be that the angel of the Son in Elchasaitism was conceived of as the Kabod, the Glory of God.

It has often been doubted that the Christian elements in Elchasaitism are part of the original doctrinal make-up of the movement.[15] Hippolytus does not mention the name of Christ when relating the fragment of the vision of the prophet, but Epiphanius' account states that Elchasai called the gigantic angel of the Son by the name of Christ. On the other hand, Epiphanius also states that, although Elchasai confesses Christ by calling him "the Great King" (*ho megas basileus*), it is difficult to find out whether the book of the false prophet speaks of "our Lord Jesus Christ".[16] I will not enter into this discussion, and still less maintain that the singular Christological epithet "the Great King"—which obviously pertains to "the Son of God" of the vision[17]—is to be explained from the "basileomorphism" of *Shiur*

Qomah, which relishes in calling the figure upon the throne "King" (*e.g.*, "[...] King of Truth, Mighty King, Blessed King, Sole King, First and Last King, Lord of Kings, [...] *Great King* [...]").[18] For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that Elchasai swept a great following among the Jewish-Christians in Transjordanian country, and that this inevitably would imply that the Son of God appearing together with the Spirit was identified as Christ. This, then, would seem to mean that the Jewish-Christians regarded Christ as the Kabod, the heavenly Makranthropos.

There is firm evidence that Christians in the 2nd century could conceive of Christ as the Glory. The author of the Nag Hammadi writing known as the *Tripartite Tractate* (NH I, 5), showing clear affinities with the teaching of the Valentinian Gnostic Heracleon, states that the Son possesses all the names which commonly are referred to the Father:

> He [also], without falsification, is all of the names, and he is in the proper sense, the sole first one, [the M]an ([*p-r*]*ōme*) of the Father. He it is whom I [call] the Form (*t-morphē*) of the Formless (*-morphē*), the Body (*p-sōma*) of the Bodiless (*-sōma*), the Appearance (*p-ho*) of the Invisible (*-new araf*), the Logos of the Ineffable, the Nous of the Inconceivable [...].[19]

That the Son is the Man of the Father is paraphrased by his being called God's *morphē*, *sōma* and *ho*, the last of which can be used in translations of *opsis*, *eidea* and even *morphē*, as well as of *prosōpon*. This apparently means that the Son is the Glory, the man-like appearance of God, who is "formless", "bodiless" and "invisible" in his essence.

That this is the purport of the text becomes palpable when we note that *morphē* is used interchangeably with *doxa*, the Greek translation of *kāvôd*, in Old Testament theophanies. In Job 4, 16, the *tĕmûnâ*, "form", "appearance", of the divine spirit (*rûaḥ*) which revealed itself to Eliphas is rendered by *morphē* in the LXX. In Num. 12, 8, however, the LXX translates God's *tĕmûnâ*, which is beheld by Moses, with *doxa*. In the same way, Psalm 16, 15 renders God's *tĕmûnâ*, which the psalmist expects to be revealed unto salvation, by *doxa*.[20] We also ought to note that, in the Christologically important text of Is. 52, 14, the *toʾar*, "form", "appearance", of the Servant is rendered by *morphē* by Aquila, but by *doxa* by the LXX.

The close association or even equivalence of *morphē* and *doxa* is also seen clearly in the following text of the apologist Justin Martyr, who states that the statues of the gods found in the pagan temples

> are soulless and dead, and do not have the Form of God (*theou morphēn*), for we do not consider that God has such a form (*tēn morphēn*) as some say that they imitate to His honour [...], which we consider not only senseless, but even to be insulting to God, who, having ineffable Glory and Form (*arrēton doxan kai morphēn*), thus gets His name attached to things that are corruptible and require constant service.[21]

The true manifestation of God's "Glory and Form" obviously is his Son. This is perceived clearly from another passage, where Justin shows influence from a type of Judaism like that of Philo—though less philosophical—by asserting that the Old Testament witnesses the existence of an intermediary bearing the names of all the divine attributes and modes of manifestation in the Old Testament.[22] The Christian apologist says:

> God has begotten as Beginning before all His creatures a kind of rational Power from Himself that is also called by the Holy Spirit "the Glory of the Lord" (*doxa Kyriou*), and sometimes "Son", and sometimes "Wisdom", or "Angel", or "God", and "Lord" and "Word".[23]

Several passages in the Bible report that, when men experience a theophany, they see God's Kabod, by which is usually suggested a splendour of light by which God is both revealed and concealed. The prophet Ezekiel, however, adds that the Kabod had a form like a man, and Justin obviously must have Ezekiel's vision in mind when counting "the Glory of the Lord" as one of the names of the Son under the old dispensation.

That Justin took the Glory of man-like form in Ez. 1, 26 to be Christ is positively evidenced by another enumeration of the names of the Son in the Old Testament:

> [...] he is called at one time "the Angel of great counsel" [Is. 9, 6], and "Man" (*anēr*) by Ezekiel, and "like the Son of Man" by Daniel, and "Child" by Isaiah [...].[24]

As in the *Tripartite Tractate*, the Son is called "Man". While the Gnostic tract expounds this name by designations which undoubtedly suggest the figure of the Glory in Ez. ch. 1, Justin even gives a clear reference to the Biblical source.

The name "the Glory" is not expressly given to Christ in Jewish Christianity, but there is other evidence which corroborates the inference that the Jewish-Christians regarded the Son as the man-like figure enthroned in heaven. In the first place, we must pay heed to the "Ebionite" teaching that God has a Body:

> For He has a Form (*morphēn*), and He has every limb primarily and solely for the sake of beauty (*kallos*), and not for use. For He does not have eyes in order that He may see with them, for He sees on every side, since He is incomparably more brilliant (*lamproteros*) in His Body (*sōma*) than the visual spirit which is in us, and He is more splendid (*phōtos*) than everything, so that in comparison with Him the light of the sun may be reckoned as darkness. Nor has He ears that He may hear, for He hears, perceives, moves, energizes, [and] acts on every side. But He has the most beautiful Form (*kallistēn morphēn*) on account of man, so that the pure in heart may be able to see Him [...].[25]

This text contains terms and concepts which make it justified to ask whether it is a description of the Glory. It has been seen that "Form" (*morphē*) is a word which is closely associated or even synonymous with "Glory" (*doxa*), and Justin uses both together with apparent reference to the Son. The Jewish-Christian text uses "Form" and "Body" (*sōma*) alternately of the physical appearance of God, as does the *Tripartite Tractate*, where these terms appear as names of the Son, who obviously is identified as the Glory. Furthermore, the assertion in the "Ebionite" text that the elect actually are able to behold the bodily Form of God is an idea which we have found throughout the tradition about the Glory.

The text contains a fresh element in that it says that the Form of God is very beautiful. This is a motif which we also meet in a couple of the texts where Quispel has discerned Gnostic versions of the Kabod. In the so-called Naassene Homily, summarized by Hippolytus, the celestial Adamas is called the "great and most beautiful and perfect Man" (*megalou kai kallistou kai teleiou Anthrōpou*).[26] In *Poimandres*, the first tract of *Corpus Hermeticum*, it is said that Anthropos, the heavenly Man, "was exceedingly beautiful (*perikallēs*) and wore his Father's image (*eikona*), and God really loved His own Form (*morphēs*) [...]."[27] Again, when Anthropos looked down through the harmony of the spheres, "he showed to Physis below the beautiful Form of God (*tēn kalēn tou theou morphēn*)," and Nature "saw the appearance of the beautiful Form of Anthropos (*tēs kallistēs morphēs tou Anthrōpou to eidos*) [reflected] in the water [...]."[28] Thus, *Poimandres* teaches that God has a beautiful Form which is hypostasized in the form of a celestial Man.

The "Ebionite" text introduces us to another new element in the picture of the divine Body in that it emphasizes its luminous nature. It is not difficult to find a precedent for this representation. The prophet Ezekiel gives the following description of the heavenly Man:

> I saw that from what appeared to be his waist up he looked like glowing metal, as if full of fire, and that from there down he looked like fire; and brilliant light surrounded him. Like the appearance of a rainbow in the clouds on a rainy day, so was the radiance around him. This was the appearance of the likeness of the Glory of the Lord.[29]

Quispel has evinced that the Gnostics, with a pun on *phōs*, meaning both "light" and "man", identified the heavenly Man with the light which was brought into being on the first day of the creation: "And God said: 'Let there be *phōs*!' and *phōs* came into being."[30] A brief survey of a couple of texts will make this point clear. The *Letter of Eugnostos* from Codex III of the Nag Hammadi library relates that the highest deity beheld himself within himself as in a mirror and "was manifested in His image (*eine*) as Self-Father [...]."[31] In a later passage, we read:

> In the beginning, He [*i.e.*, God] decided to let His image (*eine*) come into being as a Great Power. Immediately, the *archē* of that light was manifested as an immortal, androgynous Man.[32]

Later on, this Man is called "Adam of the Light".[33] There can be no doubt that this celestial Man of light who is God's hypostasized Form must be the Glory.

In *On the Origin of the World* from Codex II of the same Gnostic library, the light which shone forth on the first day is said to have enclosed the Man: "When this light appeared, an image (*eine*) of Man, which was marvellous, revealed itself within it."[34] Later on, this being—who is encompassed by light in a way recalling the description of the Glory in Ez. 1, 27-28—is called "Light-Adam".[35] As is the case in both the "Naassene Homily" and *Poimandres*, the earthy man is made after the image of this heavenly Man.[36]

It would seem that the Jewish-Christians also identified the Son with the *phōs* in Gen. 1, 3. J. Zandee, demonstrating that the non-Gnostic *Teaching of Silvanus* from Codex VII of the Nag Hammadi library is saturated with Jewish-Christian concepts, points out that the characterization of the Son as *Phōs ek Phōtos* in the Nicaenum is foreshadowed in this tractate, where Christ is called "the Light of the Eternal Light".[37] That this expression derives from some exegesis of Gen. 1, 3 is possible. Moreover, it may have been derived from Jewish sources. Quispel has showed that Philo, when describing the Logos as the celestial Man and the image after which the earthy man was fashioned, reveals influence from heterodox Jewish traditions such as

those found in *On the Origin of the World*.[38] Philo actually would seem to know the exegesis which found the Kabod in the *phōs* in Gen. 1, 3, for he identifies this light as the Logos:

> God is light, for there is a verse in one of the Psalms, "The Lord is my illumination and my saviour" [Ps. 27, 1]. And He is not only light, but the archetype of every other light, nay, prior to and high above every archetype, holding the position of the model of a model. For the model or pattern was the Logos that contained all His fullness—even light (*phōs*), for as the lawgiver tells us, "God said: Let light (*phōs*) come into being," whereas He Himself resembles none of the things which have come into being.[39]

Like the Son in *Silvanus*, Philo's Logos is light of the self-originated and transcendental light that is God, and it thus turns out to be possible that the phrase in the Nag Hammadi writing is based upon an exegesis of Gen. 1, 3. This hypothesis is corroborated by an enumeration of some of the names of Christ at the bottom of the preceding leaf, where we find "the Firstborn, the Wisdom, the Prototype, the First Light."[40] By the last name, *Silvanus*, which was written in Greek in the late 2nd or early 3rd century, probably indicates the primal *phōs* which was brought into being on the first day. This identification would carry the implication that the Son was the celestial Man, even the Kabod.[41]

Since the beautiful and brilliant bodily Form of God in the *Pseudo-Clementine Homilies* obviously is to be recognized as the Glory, it is not unreasonable to query whether the "Ebionites" took this to be the Son. This is in fact an identification which appears to be deducible. As is well known, "the Pseudo-Clementines [...] let Christ, the true Prophet, be identical with Adam."[42] The primal man is the first incarnation of the true Prophet, "so Adam and Christ are interchangeable; they are as 'true Prophet' identical."[43] That the true Prophet or the Son is older than the creation is stated outright in the *Recognitions*:

> Although he indeed was the Son of God and the beginning of all things, he was made man (*filius dei et initium omnium, homo factus est*). Him first God anointed with oil which was taken from the wood of the Tree of Life. From that anointing, therefore, he is called "Christ".[44]

Adam-Christ is the pre-existent "Form" or "Appearance" of the true Prophet incarnate:

> But after all these things [*i.e.*, those made prior to Adam], He [*i.e.*, God] made man (*hominem*), on whose account He had prepared all things, whose internal Form is older (*cuius interna species est antiquior*), and for whose sake all things that are were made [...].[45]

This internal and pre-existent *species* of Adam is given as *dĕmûthâ* in the Syriac translation of the *Recognitions*, and W. Frankenberg renders it by *eikōn* in his reconstruction of the Greek original.[46] The reconstruction, however, is not necessarily right. The LXX does not translate *dĕmûth* by *eikōn*, but mostly by *homoiōma*, which means "form" as well as "similarity" (infrequently by *homoiōsis*, "likeness", which is not a very common word).[47] In the Peshitta, the divine *eikōn* of Christ in 2 Cor. 4, 4 and Col. 1, 15 is translated by the Syriac cognate for *ṣelem*, "image". But rendering the divine *morphē*, "form", of Christ in Phil. 2, 6—where Quispel persuasively argues that the Son is seen as the Kabod[48]—the Peshitta uses *dĕmûthâ*. Moreover, we have seen that *Poimandres* teaches that Anthropos, the celestial model of earthy man, wore God's *eikōn* and was his *morphē*, and this obviously carries an allusion to Gen. 1, 26, where we have *ṣelem/eikōn* and *dĕmûth/homoiōsis*. Finally, let us note that the *Sibylline Oracles* use *eikōn* and *morphē* together with clear reference to the same Biblical text.[49] All this shows that *dĕmûth*, which means "form" or "appearance" as well as "copy" or "imitation", was seen as a Semitic equivalent of the Greek *morphē*.

The internal and pre-existent "Form" of Adam corresponds to Adamas in the "Naassene Homily" and Anthropos in *Poimandres*. The "Homily" relates that the first earthly man was the "image" (*eikōn*) in his outward appearance of the heavenly Adamas, and that the creators of the former managed to make Adamas a slave under the laws of the astrological universe through the capture and enclosure of his soul or spirit in this material image.[50] *Poimandres* tells that Anthropos fell in love with his own "form" (*morphē*) which was reflected and hypostasized in matter, and thus "came to inhabit the irrational form (*morphē*)."[51] Later on, it is told that "Physis produced bodies after the form (*eidos*) of Anthropos."[52] In the material body, Anthropos is said to be present as the higher element, "soul and spirit".[53]

Quispel has pointed out that there are both Jewish and Greek elements in the anthropogonic myth of the Gnostics.[54] The Jewish concept of the celestial Man, the Kabod, has become the Platonic idea or archetype of man, and the Orphic allegorization of the myth of the severance of Dionysos as the dispersion of the world soul into all men has been adapted to explain the presence of the Man in all men. But it is a thoroughly Jewish idea that it is the *body* of man which was made on the model of the Man, who is now present in all men as the spiritual

element. The "Ebionites"—true to their heritage—continued this genuinely Jewish exegesis. Thus, *Hom.* 3, 7, 2 says that God is "He whose form (*morphēn*) the body (*sōma*) of man bears,"[55] while 11, 4, 1 expounds the statement that "the image of God (*eikōn theou*) is man" by saying that "the body (*sōma*) of man bears the image of God (*eikona theou*)."[56] Since *morphē* and *eikōn* are used synonymously, it really does not matter which of the two is the original of *species* and *dĕmûthâ* in *Rec.* 1, 28, 4. The important point to note is that Adam apparently is the bodily "form" or "image" of his pre-existent "Form".

In a chapter of the *Homilies*, it is argued that Adam did not sin and fall, and it is spoken the following of him who would deny this:

> For he who insults the Image (*eikona*) (and the things belonging to the Eternal King) has the sin reckoned as committed against Him after Whose likeness (*homoiōsin*) the image (*eikōn*) was made.[57]

That Adam was created "after" (*kata*) God's *homoiōsis* obviously refers to Gen. 1, 26, so it is perhaps not allowable to argue that the author by this word had mystical connotations—*e.g.*, the *dĕmûth kĕmarʾê ʾādām/homoiōma hōs eidos anthrōpou* of Ex. 1, 26—in mind. That Adam *was* "the image", however, is not stated in the Bible, and since the concept of *eikōn* always involves an archetype, this representation must mean that Adam was the manifestation of God or of a divine aspect. If Adam is an "image" of God, there must be a way in which God or a certain aspect of him is human-like, and in an "Ebionite" context this can only refer to man's physical being. The divine archetype of Adam thus obviously corresponds to his pre-existent "Form" in *Rec.* 1, 28, 4 and must be identical with the beautiful and bright bodily Form (*morphē, sōma*) of God described in *Hom.* 17, 7, 2-4. Furthermore, since Adam is an incarnation of Christ, his pre-existent and internal "Form", even the Form or Body of God and thus the Kabod, must be the Son.

The divine "form" or "image" carried by the body of every man of course is inherited from Adam, the first of men, in the manner which is assumed in Gen. 5, 1-3.[58] Unlike the Gnostics, however, the Jewish-Christians did not use the idea of the indwelling of the celestial Man to illustrate an anthropological dualism; being anti-dualists, they framed it soteriologically as the prerogative of the true Prophet, who is called fittingly the "Son of Man" in some passages.[59]

When Epiphanius reports that some of the "Ebionites" said that Christ "clothed" himself with the body of Adam, he apparently refers

to a notion being analogous to the Clementine doctrine that the divine Form, even the Glory, was within Adam. After having stated that some of the "Ebionites" said that Christ is a spirit who was created before all things, he goes on to relate that these people said:

> He [*i.e.*, Christ] comes into the world when he wishes, for he came into Adam (*hōs kai en tō Adam ēlthe*) and appeared to the patriarchs clothed with a body. He is the same who went to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and who came at the end of time and clothed himself with the body of Adam (*auto to sōma tou Adam enedysato*), and who appeared to men, was crucified, raised, and returned on high.[60]

This account actually seems to be a veracious reproduction of the Christological view of the group behind the Clementine romance, for only Adam and Jesus appear to have been conceived of as real incarnations of the true Prophet, whereas the other manifestations of the true Prophet were regarded as mere conveyors of the divine revelation.[61]

According to the bishop of Salamis, the Elchasaites also taught that Christ "put on" the body of Adam:

> They confess Christ in name, believing that he was created and that he appears time and again. He was formed for the first time in Adam, and he puts off the body of Adam and assumes it again whenever he wishes (*kai prōton men peplasthai auton en tō Adam, ekdyesthai de auton to sōma tou Adam kai palin endyesthai, hote bouletai*).[62]

Epiphanius in fact maintains that the "Ebionites" became influenced by the Elchasaites in Christological matters and began to split up in factions,[63] but A. F. J. Klijn and G. J. Reinink probably are right that this assertion must be seen as an attempt to explain why the Christology of the *Grundschrift* of the *Pseudo-Clementines* did not agree with the adoptionist Christology of the "Ebionites" reported by the Patristic sources and found in the *Gospel of the Ebionites*.[64] Since Hippolytus merely notes the idea of the frequent appearances of the Elchasaite Christ,[65] several scholars—presenting respective reasonings in support of their contention—even have argued that Epiphanius' account is modelled upon his description of the "Ebionite" Christ figure.[66]

But the source-critical approach does not seem to allow any clear-cut solutions. Blindly trusting Hippolytus does not seem wise. Already W. Brandt had to admit that Hippolytus' report that Christ recently had been born of a virgin could not have been founded upon Elchasai's book, since Epiphanius says that it is impossible to make out whether Elchasai speaks about "our Lord Jesus Christ".[67] Hippolytus states that the notion of the frequent appearances of Christ was a Pythagorean

idea adapted by Elchasai, and he uses Pythagorean concepts and terms (*metensōmatoumenon*, *metaggizesthai*) in describing it. It is well known that the "bishop" of Rome held the opinion that all heresies derived from Greek philosophy,[68] and he may very well have altered Elchasai's teaching of the method of the reincarnations of the Son in order to make it look like a Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis in ever different bodies.

Furthermore, upon careful reading of Epiphanius, it transpires that while the Elchasaite Christ *always* manifests himself in the body of Adam, only the first and the last manifestation of the "Ebionite" Christ are clothed with the body of Adam. Thus, the one account is not simply a copy of the other. Nor are Klijn and Reinink right that, "according to Epiphanius, the *identification* of Adam and Christ is a typical Elkesaite doctrine,"[69] so that the description of the Elchasaite Christ had a guideline in his antecedent account that some of the "Ebionites" said: "Christ is also Adam, who was the first man created and into whom God's breath was blown."[70]

This form of "Ebionite" Christology, however, appears to be quite similar to that of the presumably Jewish-Christian Symmachians,[71] who are reported by Marius Victorinus to have said that "he [*i.e.*, Christ] is also Adam and a general soul."[72] There obviously was a conspicuous tendency among the Jewish-Christians to associate and even identify Christ and Adam, and it is not improbable that the Elchasaites conceived of this association of the two as an incarnation of Christ in his earthly *eikōn*. In any case, that Christ "put on" the body of Adam is not a phrase which was invented by Epiphanius when describing "Ebionite" Christology, for it occurs in a source which has been taken to reveal a considerable amount of Jewish-Christian influence and thus evidences that its presence in the account of Elchasai's Christology is not necessarily to be explained as a derivation from the report on the "Ebionites". In ch. 10 of the Syriac version of the *Acts of Thomas*, Christ is eulogized thus:

> You are the Beginning, and you put on the first man. You are the Great Power, and the Wisdom, and the Knowledge, and the Will and the Rest of your Father [...].[73]

Similar to the representation of the Son in Justin's works, this passage from the encratite *Acts* describes the Son by many names, a pattern which was adopted from a certain Jewish tradition about the agent of God, as can be seen from Philo. The idea that the intermediary had been

present in Adam is possibly derived from Judaism; this would explain its occurrence in different Jewish-Christian quarters.

A new point to be taken up from the passage from the *Acts* is that Christ is called "the (Great) Power". This name is also found in Justin, who says:

> It is, therefore, wrong to understand the Spirit and the Power of God (*dynamin theou*) as anything else than the Logos, who is also the Firstborn of God, as the foresaid prophet Moses declared.[74]

Among the many names of the intermediary, we also find "the Power".[75] The idea of the power of God in the Old Testament expresses the characteristic of the will of the personal God who guides personal life and history. In rabbinic literature, *ha-gĕvûrâ* even occurs as a name of God. In Jewish-Christian tradition, however, it is the Son who is named "the Power". Pointing out a parallel to the enumeration of names in the passage from the *Acts of Thomas*, Zandee cites the following "enumeration of aspects of Christ" in *Silvanus*:

> For the Tree of Life is Christ. He is Wisdom. For He is Wisdom. He is also the Word. He is the Life, *the Power* and the Door. He is the Light, the Angel, and the Good Shepherd.[76]

Already in the Pauline corpus, Christ is both "the Power of God and the Wisdom of God",[77] and the apostle goes on to relate that the princes of the world did not know the hidden "Wisdom of God" and therefore crucified "the Lord of the Glory" (*ton kyrion tēs doxēs*).[78] Quispel argues that this means that Christ is identified with the Glory, since it can be established that "the Power" was a name of the Glory in Jewish mysticism.[79] Thus, in *Maasseh Merkabah*, R. Aqiba says: "When I ascended and beheld the Power (*ha-gĕvûrâ*), I saw all the creatures that are to be found in the pathways of heaven."[80] In the *Visions of Ezekiel*, we read: "The Holy One, blessed be He, opened to him [*i.e.*, to Ezekiel] the seven heavens, and he beheld the Power."[81] Some lines below, the sentence is repeated with the following variation: "[...] and he beheld the Glory (*kāvôd*) of God."

The Gnostics could also use "the Power" as a name of the Glory, for we have seen that the *Letter of Eugnostos* characterizes the heavenly "Adam of the Light" who is God's "image" as "Great Power" (*noc n-com*). Whatever is the explanation of "the Power" as a name of Christ in Paul and Justin, the Jewish-Christians carried on the esoterical use of the term. A passage from *Silvanus* which is not quoted by Zandee

reads: "A Great Power (*noc n-amahte*) and a Great Glory (*noc n-eŏų*) has made the universe known."[82] The name "the Great Glory", *hakāvôd ha-gādôl* or *megalē doxa*, is well known from the Merkabah tradition; it occurs as a name of the figure upon the heavenly throne in the very early version of heavenly journey in 1 *Enoch* ch. 14, which clearly recalls Ez. ch. 1. In the Hekaloth literature, its Aramaic counterpart, *zîwâ rabbâ*, is one of the names of Metatron, the chief angel.[83] The name "the Great Power" is obviously evolved on the analogy of "the Great Glory", just as "the Glory" and "the Power" are appearing as interchangeable in the esoterical texts.

Thus, when the Jewish-Christians called the Son "the (Great) Power", they obviously identified him as the Glory. When the *Acts of Thomas* say that the Great Power "put on" the first man, we apparently are meeting with the same idea as that expressed by the *Pseudo-Clementines* in the statement that Adam carries his pre-existent "Form" within his body, for "the Form" as well as "the Power" is a synonym of "the Glory".

That "the (Great) Power" even could be used as a designation of the *earthly* manifestation of the Glory, the Body of God, is deducible from the title given to Simon Magus, who was hailed as *hē megalē dynamis*.[84] This term has often been compared to the name of Elchasai. Epiphanius, giving the prophet's name as "Elxai", writes:

> They [*i.e.*, the Elchasaites] hold illusory ideas, calling him [*i.e.*, Elxai or Elchasai] "Hidden Power" (*dynamin apokekalymmenēn*), since *ēl* means "power" and *xai* "hidden".[85]

The Semitic original of Elchasai's name, *ḥêl kĕsāy*, is also found in the Syriac translation of the *Pseudo-Clementines*; here, *ḥaylâ kasyâ* denotes the highest God who is incomprehensible to all.[86] This concept is permeating the *Shiur Qomah* mysticism as well as Gnosticism. The Merkabah mystic thus grasps an incognizable secret: "God who is beyond the sight of His creatures and *hidden* to the angels who serve Him, has revealed Himself to R. Aqiba in the vision of the Merkabah."[87]

The *angelus interpres* says to R. Ishmael: "I am going to tell you what is the measure of the Holy One, blessed be He, that is *hidden* from all the creatures."[88] Paradoxically, the visionary learns the "hidden" measures of God, which really pertain to the divine Glory.

Another *Shiur Qomah* passage says: "His [*i.e.*, God's] *dĕmûth* is *hidden* from everyone."[89] Still, as we have seen, God does reveal his

"hidden" *dĕmûth*, for this term denotes the Glory, the hypostasized Form or Body of God, which could be beheld by the mystics.

The visionary speaks thus about this mystery: "He is like us, as it were, but greater than everything, and this is His Glory which is *hidden* from us."[90] The statement that the Glory is "like" men, but "greater than everything" and "hidden" from men, has a striking parallel in the account that the "Ebionites" received their "imagination" from Elchasai,

> so that they suppose that the Christ is a figure similar to men, invisible to men (*einai ti androeikelon ektypōma aoraton anthrōpois*), with a length of 96 miles, that is, 24 schoenoi, and a breadth of 6 schoenoi, 24 miles, and with a thickness of other dimensions.[91]

Yet, like the "Hidden Glory" reveals himself to the mystics, the "invisible" Christ revealed himself to Elchasai.

Since "the Power" is a term which is interchangeable with "the Glory", it is apparent that Elchasai's name, the "Hidden Power", alludes to the concept of the Hidden Glory which we find in the later *Shiur Qomah* texts. Elchasai, then, apparently regarded himself as a new manifestation of the Adamic Christ, the Glory of God, who had appeared to him in a vision.

That the Elchasaites held the idea of continual incarnations of Christ is recounted by Hippolytus, who gives it a Pythagorean tinge:

> And he [*i.e.*, Elchasai] asserts that Christ was born a man in the same way common to all, and that he was not at this time born for the first time of a virgin, but that both previously and frequently again he had been born and would be born, would appear and exist, undergoing alterations of birth and moving from body to body (*touton de ou nyn prōtōs ek parthenou gegennēsthai, alla kai proteron, kai authis pollakis gennēthenta kai gennōmenon pephēnenai kai phyesthai, allassonta geneseis kai metensōmatoumenon*).[92]

Since Elchasai prophesied the outbreak of an eschatological battle involving the cosmic powers in the third year after the Parthian war, but still under Trajan's rule,[93] it would seem that he thought that he was the final manifestation of Christ. In this respect, Elchasai is comparable to Simon Magus, who—according to the system transmitted by Irenaeus—claimed to have been present in Jesus and then to have returned before the world was about to be destroyed.[94]

The self-consciousness of Elchasai explains the prayer in the form of an anagram which has been preserved by Epiphanius: "Let none seek

after the interpretation, but let him only say in his prayer these words [...]: Abar anid moib nochile daasim ane daasim nochile moib anid abar. Selam."[95] The explanation of this anagram has been known since 1858, when two Jewish scholars independently of each other realized that if we read from the middle outwards in either direction, the result is an Aramaic sentence meaning: "I am witness (*mshd'*) over you on the day of the great judgement." Behind this prayer which Elchasai imparted to his followers, we discern his self-assertion of being the Paraclete, the "advocate" of "helper" of the believers before the forum of God on the day of judgement.[96]

To be true, Elchasai styled himself as a "witness", and not as a "paraclete", but "*martys* and *paraklētos* are so related concepts that they actually can be interchanged."[97] G. Kretschmar accordingly places the concept of the two "witnesses" in Rev. ch. 11 in the Jewish tradition of the joint appearance of two Messiahs or two angels, for both of these pairs can be conceived of as paracletes. Kretschmar also views Elchasai's vision of the Angel of the Son and the Angel of the Spirit against this background,[98] but the Son and the Spirit are not described as paracletes, and the Elchasaite prayer knows only one witness before God. The Aramaic word for this "witness" occurs in the translation of *ʿed* (LXX: *martys*) in the Targum to Job 16, 19, which uses *mĕsahdâ* to describe Job's witness in heaven who endeavours to vindicate man before the throne of God. In the next verse as well as in 33, 23, the Targum calls this personage *pĕraqlêṭâ*.[99] Although cherishing the idea of two or even several angels acting as *paracletes*, Judaism also continued this tradition of only one guardian angel, and this singular angel, usually identified as Michael, could be conceived of as the paraclete of *all* Israel.[100]

In Christianity, of course, the heavenly advocate was Christ,[101] and the notion of Christ being the *eschatological* Paraclete is found already throughout the New Testament.[102] Thus, according to a Jewish-Christian sentiment, Elchasai's promise of being the eschatological "witness" of the believers would imply that he took himself to be the final manifestation of Christ. The meaning of his name, the Hidden Power, undoubtedly suggested this identity and is another piece of evidence that the Son in Jewish Christianity was seen as the Glory of God, since "the Power" appears as interchangeable with "the Glory" in the mystical texts.

Appendix

Kretschmar thinks that the personification of the Holy Spirit in Christianity must be explained as "a consequence of the fact that the exalted Christ is and remains a person."[103] "To speak of an 'Angel of the Holy Spirit' as in the 'Ascension of Isaiah' and the 'Shepherd of Hermas' [...] has, according to my knowledge, no parallel in late Judaism."[104] G. Stroumsa, however, recently has tried to resolve the idea of the joint appearance of the masculine Angel of the Son and the feminine Angel of the Spirit in the *Ascension of Isaiah* and the Elchasaite tradition as deriving from the image of the two cherubim upon the Ark of the Covenant, which was conceived of as the divine throne.[105] There does seem to have been a Jewish tradition which explained the two cherubim as manifestations of God, and it is true that there were Jewish-Christians who identified them as the Son and the Spirit, the latter having a feminine gender on Semitic soil; but evidence for the *Jewish* identification of one of the cherubim as the feminine Angel of the Spirit seems to be lacking.[106] Furthermore, although the cultic derivation may be relevant in the case of the *Ascension*,[107] the background of Elchasai's vision seems different. As a conclusion of the present article, I will suggest a theory of derivation which sticks to the same provenance which appears to have been determinative for the conception of the Son as the heavenly Man.

In the argument to the effect that Adam did not sin, the *Pseudo-Clementine Homilies* say:

> If any one denies that the man (*anthrōpos*) who came from the hands of God the Creator of all things possessed the Great and Holy Spirit of divine foreknowledge, but acknowledges that another, born of a spurious stock, did this, how does he not commit a grievous sin? [...] But then, he says, the Divine Spirit left him when he sinned. In that case, [the Spirit] sinned along with him; and how can he escape peril who says this? But perhaps he received the Spirit after he sinned? Then it is given to the unrighteous; and where is justice? But it was afforded to the just and the unjust [alike, he says]. This would be the most unrighteous of all.[108]

The theme is taken up again three chapters below, where it is affirmed that the true Prophet alone possessed the Spirit. Adam, who was the first incarnation of the Prophet, thus had the Spirit of God. We must note that the Holy Spirit in this Jewish-Christian literature is feminine, for she is identified with Sophia.[109]

The personification of the Spirit is not emphasized in the *Homilies*, but this changes when we look into the tradition behind the Jewish-

Christian notion that Adam possessed the Spirit and did not sin. In one of Philo's works, we find the following passage:

> Quite excellently does Moses describe the bestowal of names also to the first man; for this is the business of wisdom and royalty, and the first man was wise with a wisdom learned from and taught by Wisdom's own lips, for he was made by divine hands. He was, moreover, a king, and it befits a ruler to bestow titles on his several subordinates. And we may guess that the sovereignty with which the first man was invested was a most lofty one, seeing that God has fashioned him with the utmost care and deemed him worthy of the second place, making him His own viceroy and lord of all others.[110]

This text appears to have preserved traits of a myth telling that Adam was conducted and counselled by Wisdom. In the *Book of Wisdom*, there are a couple of passages to the same effect. In the beginning of ch. 9, we read that God through his Wisdom equipped man (*en tē Sophia sou kataskeuasas anthrōpon*), so that he became the ruler and judge of the world.[111] In a parallel in the next chapter, we even read:

> She [*viz.*, Wisdom] guarded to the end the first-formed father of the world (*prōtoplaston patera kosmou*) that was created alone, and delivered him out of his transgression (*exeilato auton ek paraptōmatos idiou*), and gave him power to get dominion over all things.[112]

The Jewish-Christian idea that Adam did not sin obviously derives from the Jewish tradition which is reflected in this text. In the Jewish text, Wisdom appears as a personal force consorting with Adam and even protecting him, and the "Ebionites" would seem to have availed themselves of this notion when teaching that Adam possessed the Spirit and therefore could not have sinned. It is true that the Jewish text speaks about Wisdom and not about the Spirit, but it is well known that Sophia and the Spirit are identical in the *Book of Wisdom* and other Hellenistic Jewish works as well as in the *Pseudo-Clementines*.[113]

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Throughout this line of tradition, we have discerned an assimilation of the first earthy man to the celestial Man, which, in fact, is a trend to be distinguished in several branches of Jewish and Judaized literature.[114] As regards the Philonic text, it is obvious that features used in the description of the heavenly Man have been transferred to his earthy image. The "Ebionite" text goes a step further in taking Adam to be an *incarnation* of the celestial Man. The text from *Wisdom*, however, goes still further, since it actually ascribes *pre-existence* to the Man by calling him the "father of the world" (*patēr kosmou*), which was a well-known title of the demiurge in the Hellenistic age.[115] Later on, the rabbis had to maintain: "Adam was created on the eve of the Sabbath [*i.e.*, at the last moment of the sixth day of the first week]. And why? Lest the *minim* should say: 'The Holy One, blessed be He, had a partner in His work of creation.'"[116] The Adam figure renounced by the rabbis obviously was identical with the *phōs* that was brought into being on the first day, for the Merkabah mystics actually named the Glory, the heavenly Man, *Yôṣer Bĕre'šîth*, the "Creator in the Beginning".[117]

For unequivocal evidence of the association of the celestial Man and Wisdom, 1 *Enoch* is a prime source. The patriarch Enoch relates a vision of the future abode of the elect:

> And in that place I saw the fountain of righteousness which was inexhaustible. And around it were many fountains of wisdom. And all the thirsty drank of them and were filled with wisdom, and their dwellings were with the righteous and holy and elect.[118]

The elect, then, are going to be satisfied with wisdom in the age to come. Then the "Son of Man", an idiom meaning simply "man", is introduced and described as a pre-existent personage:

> And at that hour, the Son of Man was named in the presence of the Lord of Spirits, and his name before the Head of Days. Yea, before the sun and the signs were created, his name was named before the Lord of Spirits [...].[119]

When the Son of Man is met with for the first time, he is depicted as one "whose countenance had the appearance of man,"[120] a characterization which—as pointed out by Quispel[121]—clearly alludes to Ez. 1, 26 and identifies the Son of Man as the Glory. Although the Son of Man has been hidden from men in general, he has been revealed to the elect by Wisdom:

> [...] he has been chosen and hidden before Him before the creation of the world and for evermore. And the Wisdom of the Lord of Spirits has revealed him to the holy and righteous, for he has preserved the lot of the righteous.[122]

The heavenly Man in 1 *Enoch* is closely associated with the divine wisdom. The beginning of the next chapter praises him thus:

> For wisdom is poured out like water, and the glory fails not before him evermore. For he is mighty in all secrets of righteousness [...]. And in him dwells the spirit of wisdom, and the spirit of understanding and of might, and the spirit of those who have fallen asleep in righteousness.[123]

In this representation of the Glory, which employs Is. 11, 2, we find the now familiar association of the Spirit and Wisdom. To be true, the divine wisdom or spirit in 1 *Enoch* chs. 48-49 cannot be defined as a personal force, but—in the vein of Proverbs ch. 8 and the apocrypha—Wisdom is described as a hypostasis in the interpolated part in ch. 42, where she is said to be a heavenly figure who once came down to earth, but was disconcerted and ascended to take her place among the angels. If, with this picture in mind, one also sees that, in the Bible, the presence of the Spirit is a mark of the messianic age,[124] and that the apocrypha imply that Wisdom "will return in Messianic times,"[125] then it is easy to see that a reader of 1 *Enoch* could draw the conclusion that the heavenly Messiah, the Kabod, when he should manifest himself, would be accompanied by Sophia or the Spirit.

NOTES

[1] See Ez. 1, 26-28.

[2] See Hermetism and the New Testament, especially Paul, *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II. 22 (Gnostizismus und Verwandtes), ed. W. Haase (Berlin & New York [appearing, it is hoped, in the foreseeable future]); Ezekiel 1:26 in Jewish Mysticism and Gnosis, *Vigiliae Christianae* 34 (1980) 1-13.

[3] See Hipp. *Ref. omn. haer.* 9, 13, 4. Cf. Epiphan. *Pan.* 19, 1, 4. It seems that the majority of scholars accept the date given by Hippolytus. However, A. F. J. Klijn & G. J. Reinink, ed. & trans., *Patristic Evidence for Jewish-Christian Sects*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum XXXVI (Leiden 1973) 56 n. 1, 60, 66-67, connect the beginning of the Elchasaite movement with the events of the Parthian war (114-116), because Hippolytus quotes Elchasai as having said: "[...] when three years of the reign of the emperor Trajan are again completed from the time that he subjected the Parthians to his own sway—when three years have been completed, war rages between the impious angels of the north" (9, 16, 4 [Klijn & Reinink, 118]). In any case, since this prophecy was not fulfilled, it must have been fixed in literary form before the death of Trajan, *i.e.*, in 117. This compels us to date the origination of Elchasaitism to sometime during the first fifteen years of

the 2nd century; see G. Strecker, Elkesai, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* IV (Stuttgart 1959) 1173.

[4] *Ref.* 9, 13, 2-3 (Klijn & Reinink, 114). Cf. Epiphan. *Pan.* 19, 4, 1-2; 30, 17, 6; 53, 1, 9. For the vision, see W. Brandt, *Elchasai* (Leipzig 1912) 58-60.

[5] See M. Smith, Observations on Hekhalot Rabbati, *Biblical and Other Studies*, Philip W. Lown Istitute of Advanced Judaic Studies, Brandeis University Studies and Texts 1, ed. A. Altmann (Cambridge, Mass. 1963) 151.

[6] *Sefer Raziel* 37a. Translation in J. A. Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judentum* (Frankfurt 1700) 3, and in Quispel, Hermetism, chapter V. Several fragments with variant readings of the *Shiur Qomah* text in *Sefer Raziel* 37a-38b are found in S. Musajoff, ed., *Merkabah Shelemah* (Jerusalem 1921, reprinted 1971) 34a-43a.

[7] See *In Canticum Canticorum, Prologus.*

[8] See *Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition*, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America (New York 1960) 38-40.

[9] See 17, 7, 2-4. See below, 265.

[10] See Iren. *Adv. haer.* 1, 14, 3. See Gaster, Das Schiur Komah, in his *Studies and Texts* II (London 1927) 1344. G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York [3]1954 and reprints) 65, and *Kabbalah*, Library of Jewish Knowledge (Jerusalem 1974) 17, notes that this form of Jewish mysticism is also discernible in other Gnostic texts and in magical material from the 2nd and 3rd century.

[11] See Scholem, *Kabbalah* 17.

[12] Ch. 13 (A. Vaillant, ed. & trans., *Le livre des secrets d'Hénoch*, Textes publiés par l'Institut d'Études slaves IV [Paris [2]1952, reprinted 1976] 38).

[13] Epiphan. *o.c.* 30, 17, 6 (Klijn & Reinink, 186). Cf. Brandt, 60.

[14] *Kabbalah* 17.

[15] See Klijn & Reinink, 66-67 with n. 1 on 67.

[16] *O.c.* 19, 3, 4 (Klijn & Reinink, 156).

[17] Hipp. *o.c.* 9, 15, 1 reports that the Elchasaites baptize in the name of God and "his Son, the Great King" (Klijn & Reinink, 116).

[18] Musajoff, 35a-b. Christ is called "the Great King" in *Did.* 14, 3, but this is a quotation from Mal. 1, 14. In the Bible, it is God who is "the Great King".

[19] 66, 8-16 (R. Kasser, M. Malinine, H.-Ch. Puech, G. Quispel & J. Zandee, ed. & trans., *Tractatus Tripartitus* I [De supernis] [Bern 1973] 96).

[20] In view of the use of the Coptic word *ho* in 66, 14 of the *Tripartite Tractate*, it is worth noting that the parallel of *doxa* in LXX Ps. 16, 15 is *prosōpon.*

[21] 1 *Apol.* 9, 1-3 (E. J. Goodspeed, ed., *Die ältesten Apologeten* [Göttingen 1914] 31).

[22] See E. R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr* (Jena 1923) 147-148, 168-172. Cf. now A. F. Segal, *Two Powers in Heaven*, Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity XXV (Leiden 1977) 160-181, 221-225.

[23] *Dial. c. Tryph.* 61, 1 (Goodspeed, 166). Cf. *Diogn.* 9, 6; see below n. 37.

[24] *Dial.* 126, 1 (Goodspeed, 246). Quispel, Hermetism, chapter IV, and Ezekiel 2, cites Just. *Dial.* 128, 2 as evidence that Justin as well as his predecessors held that the intermediary was the Kabod of Ez. 1, 26-28, but the figure who is called *doxa* and said to appear in a vision in this passage would rather seem to be the Angel of the Lord, who manifested himself "in the glory of fire as at the bush" (Goodspeed, 249). Cf. Ex. ch. 3. Justin speaks about the angelophany at Sodom, "the vision in the bush", "the naming of Joshua", and the appearances of the Angel of the Lord to the patriarchs.

[25] *Hom.* 17, 7, 2-4 (B. Rehm, ed., *Die Pseudoklementinen* I [Homilien], GCS 42 [Berlin & Leipzig 1953] 232).

[26] Hipp. *o.c.* 5, 7, 7 (P. Wendland, ed., *Hippolytus, Werke* 3 [Refutatio omnium haeresium], GCS 26 [Leipzig 1916, reprinted Hildesheim & New York 1977] 80).

[27] 12 (A. D. Nock, ed., & A.-J. Festugière, trans., *Corpus Hermeticum* I [Traités I-XII], Collection des Universités de France, l'association Guillaume Budé [Paris 1945] 10).

[28] 14 (Nock & Festugière, 11).

[29] Ez. 1, 27-28b. Translation after *The Holy Bible. New International Version* (London *etc.* 1978).

[30] Gen. 1, 3. See Quispel, Hermetism, chapters X. 3 and XII; Ezekiel 6.

[31] 75, 5-6 (*The Facsimile Edition of the Nag Hammadi Codices* III, editorial board S. Farid *et al.* [Leiden 1976] 75).

[32] 76, 19-24 (*Facsimile Edition* III 76).

[33] 81, 12 (*Facsimile Edition* III 79).

[34] 108, 7-9 (*Facsimile Edition* II [Leiden 1974] 120).

[35] 108, 21 (*Facsimile Edition* II 120).

[36] See 112, 26-113, 10. For the "Homily" and *Poimandres*, see below, 268.

[37] 113, 6-7 (*Facsimile Edition* VII [Leiden 1972] 119). See Zandee, "The Teachings of Silvanus" (NHC VII, 4) and Jewish Christianity, *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions* (Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday), ed. R. van den Broek & M. J. Vermaseren, Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'Empire Romain 91 (Leiden 1981) 566. See also 106, 26 and 112, 36-37; see below 272 and 267. In a long list of names in *Diogn.* 9, 6, Jesus is both *phōs* and *doxa*.

[38] See Hermetism, chapter XII; Ezekiel 4-5.

[39] *De somn.* I. 75 (F. H. Colson & G. H. Whitaker, ed. & trans., *Philo* V, The Loeb Classical Library [London & Cambridge, Mass., 1934 and reprints] 336). In *De op. mundi* 29-31, the *phōs* in Gen. 1, 3 is the invisible light of reason and an image of the Logos.

[40] 112, 35-37 (*Facsimile Edition* VII 118).

[41] It is possible that this identification also is implied in the archaic Christological title "Day", for this name obviously derives from collections of Old Testament *testimonia* which may have included Gen. 1, 5, "And God called the *phōs* 'day'." For *hēmera* as a name of Christ, see J. Daniélou, *The Theology of Jewish Christianity*, The Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea I, trans. J. A. Baker (London 1964) 168-172.

Traditions such as those examined above are applied to Moses in Samaritanism, where the great prophet is identified with the primordial light and seen as the divine image. A generally apposite collation of some texts with Philonic and Kabbalistic evidence was made already by M. Heidenheim, Zur Logoslehre der Samaritaner, *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für theologische Forschung und Kritik*, 4/1 (1868) 126-128. Cf. further below n. 59.

[42] H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (Tübingen 1949) 99. Cf. 103: "Adam and Christ are thus in the end the same."

[43] G. Strecker, *Das Judenchristentum in den Pseudoklementinen*, TU 70 (Berlin 1958) 148. Syrian iconographic material shows Adam being seated upon a throne in Paradise and assimilated to Christ; see M.-T. & P. Canivet, La mosaïque d'Adam dans l'église syrienne de Ḥūarte (Ve S.), *Cahiers Archéologiques* 24 (1975) 49-69. Cf. below n. 114.

[44] 1, 45, 4-5 (B. Rehm, ed., *Die Pseudoklementinen* II [Rekognitionen in Rufins Übersetzung], GCS 51 [Berlin 1965] 34).

[45] *Rec.* 1, 28, 4 (Rehm, II 24).

[46] See *Die syrischen Clementinen, mit griechischen Parallelltext*, TU 48/3 (Berlin & Leipzig 1937) 36.

[47] The exception to the rule is Gen. 5, 1, where the *dĕmûth ʾelohîm* of man is translated *eikōn theou*, as is *ṣelem ʾelohîm* in Gen. 1, 27. In Gen. 5, 3, *idea* renders *dĕmûth* in the statement that Adam begot a son "after his form (*idean*), after his image (*eikona*)."

[48] See Hermetism, chapter XI; Ezekiel 8-9.

[49] See III, 8 and 27.

[50] See Hipp. *o.c.* 5, 7, 6-7.

[51] 14 (Nock & Festugière, 11).

[52] 17 (Nock & Festugière, 12).

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] See Hermetism, chapters II, VI, X. 4, XII *et passim*; Ezekiel 4-5.

[55] Rehm, I 59.

[56] *Ibid.* 155.

[57] 3, 17, 2 (Rehm, I 62).

[58] "[...] the transmission of the divine likeness is thought of in terms of the physical sequence of generations and therefore obviously in a physical sense" (G. Kittel, εἰκών, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* II, ed. G. Kittel & trans. G. W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids 1964 and reprints] 391). Cf. above n. 47.

[59] See C. Colpe, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* VIII, ed. G. Friedrich & trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids 1972 and reprints) 474. The Samaritans teach that the premundane light-image of Moses was transmitted from righteous to righteous in every generation, beginning with Adam and ending with Moses; see J. Macdonald. *The Theology of the Samaritans*, New Testament Library (London 1964) 162-179, 314-320. Cf. above n. 41.

[60] *O.c.* 30, 3, 5 (Klijn & Reinink, 178).

[61] See Schoeps, 106-110.

[62] *O.c.* 53, 1, 8 (Klijn & Reinink, 196).

[63] See *o.c.* 30, 3, 1-2.

[64] See *o.c.* 33, 37, 43, 65. Cf. Strecker, *Judenchristentum* 151-153.

[65] See *o.c.* 9, 14, 1; 10, 29, 2. See below, 274.

[66] See, *e.g.*, Brandt, 81 and 84; Strecker, Elkesai 1175-1176 and 1179; Klijn & Reinink, *loc. cit.* (see n. 64).

[67] See 81-82. Because Brandt misunderstood Epiphan. *o.c.* 30, 3, 5 to say that the "Ebionite" Christ "always appears solely with the body of Adam," he was able to postulate a dependence of the account of the Elchasaites upon that of the "Ebionites".

[68] See *o.c.* 1, preamble 11.

[69] *O.c.* 33. Italics mine.

[70] *O.c.* 30, 3, 3 (Klijn & Reinink, 176/178).

[71] For a survey of the sources, see Klijn & Reinink, 52-54.

[72] In *ep. ad Gal.* 1, 15 (Klijn & Reinink, 232).

[73] P. Bedjan, ed., *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum* III (Paris 1892) 11.

[74] 1 *Apol.* 33, 6 (Goodspeed, 49).

[75] Cf. the *logikē dynamis* in the passage from *Dial.* 61, 1 quoted above 264. In *Dial.* 128, 2, the intermediary manifesting himself on earth is called "the Power from the Father". Cf. above n. 24.

[76] 106, 21-28 (*Facsimile Edition* VII 112). Zandee, 552 quotes according to the translation of A. F. J. Klijn, trans., *The Acts of Thomas*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum V (Leiden 1962) 70, who bases himself on the text in W. Wright, ed., *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles* I (London 1871), which reads only "the Power" (179). Although it makes little or no difference, I have chosen Bedjan's text, which contains variations on the basis of a Berlin MS.

[77] 1 Cor. 1, 24.

[78] 2, 7-8.

[79] See Hermetism, chapters XI and XII; Ezekiel 10.

[80] § 2 (Scholem, *Jewish Gnosticism* 103).

[81] S. A. Wertheimer, ed., *Battei Midrashot* II (Jerusalem ²1954 [by A. J. Wertheimer]) 129.

[82] 112, 8-10 (*Facsimile Edition* VII 118).

[83] *E.g.*, in the early post-Talmudic tract called the *Alphabet of R. Aqiba*; see Wertheimer, II 354. Scholem, *Jewish Gnosticism* 67, asserts that even Matt. 26, 64 and Mark 14, 62, "You shall see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of the Power," allude to a vision of the Glory. This is certainly the interpretation in the *Ascension of Isaiah*, where the visionary says that he "saw him [*i.e.*, Christ] sit down at the right hand of that Great Glory" (11, 32). James the Just said that Jesus was sitting at the right of "the Great Power" (according to Hegesippus, quoted by Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 2, 23, 13).

[84] Acts 8, 10. Later, this form of the term was used of Melchizedek, who—although being regarded as a divine being—was known to have appeared on earth; see Hipp. *o.c.* 7, 36, 16; *et al.*

[85] *O.c.* 19, 2, 2 (Klijn & Reinink, 156).

[86] See *Rec.* 2, 50, 2; 2, 51, 6.

[87] *Hekhalot Zutrati* MS. Oxford 1531 45b (Scholem, *Major Trends* 364 n. 80).

[88] *Sefer Raziel* 37a.

[89] Musajoff, 41b.

[90] *Hekhalot Zutrati* MS. Oxford 1531 40b (Scholem, *Major Trends* 365 n. 92).

[91] Epiphan. *o.c.* 30, 17, 6 (Klijn & Reinink, 186). Cf. *Ps.-Clem. Hom.* 17, 16, which speaks of the "incorporeal" (*asarkos*) divine *morphē* or *dynamis*, which paradoxically can be seen by the just.

[92] *O.c.* 9, 14, 1 (Klijn & Reinink, 186). In 10, 29, 2, Hippolytus says that the Elchasaites taught that Christ "was manifested in many people at different times" (Klijn & Reinink, 122).

[93] See above n. 3.

[94] For Simon Magus as a novel manifestation of Christ, see Iren. *Adv. haer.* 1, 23, 1 and 3. For Simon's teaching about the imminent end, see *ibid.* 1, 23, 3 (at the end). The warning against the messianic pretenders in Mark 13, 6 may be directed against people claiming to be Jesus returning or incarnated anew; see, of late, R. Pesch, *Das Markusevangelium* II, Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament (Freiburg *etc.* 1977) 279. For a survey of exegesis, see V. Howard, *Das Ego Jesu in den synoptischen Evangelien*, Marburger theologische Studien 14 (Marburg 1975) 117-121.

Since Mandean and Syrian Christian texts designate the Spirit coming down upon the baptismal water as "the Power" or even "the Hidden Power", G. Widengren, *The Ascension of the Apostle and the Heavenly Book*, King and Saviour III, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift (Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis) 1950:7 (Uppsala & Leipzig/Wiesbaden 1950),

asserts that the names of Simon and Elchasai implied the claim of the prophets to be "the incarnate Spirit of God" (55). Moreover, there is some evidence to the effect that the Spirit was seen as the Glory of God; see E. Peterson, Das Amulett von Acre, *Frühkirche, Judentum und Gnosis* (Rome *etc.* 1959) 351-352. It is true that the *Gospel of the Hebrews* (quoted by Jer. *Comm. in Is.* 4, *ad* 9, 2) and the *Gospel of the Ebionites* (quoted by Epiphan. *o.c.* 30, 13, 7) relate that the Spirit united with Jesus when he came up from the waters of his baptism, and the *Acts of Thomas* do say that "the Hidden Power", that is, the Spirit, "dwells in the Messiah" (ch. 132). In this discussion, it would have also to be considered whether the so-called Melchizedekians taught that "the Great Power", that is, Melchizedek, was the Spirit which descended upon Jesus; this is at least what is suggested by later sources as Marcus Eremita, *De Melch.* ch. 4. To Monarchians of the adoptionist branch, the Spirit would naturally be identical with the Glory, but the group behind the *Pseudo-Clementines* and the Elchasaites taught the pre-existence of Christ and would rather regard the Glory and Christ as one.

[95] *O.c.* 19, 4, 3 (Klijn & Reinink, 158).

[96] "As regards the translation of παράκλητος [...], no single word can provide an adequate rendering. If we are to avoid the alien Paraclete, [...] "supporter" or "helper" is perhaps best, though the basic concept and sustaining religious idea is that of "advocate" " (J. Behm, παράκλητος, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* V, ed. G. Friedrich & trans. G. W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids 1968 and reprints] 814). The Melchizedekians took "the Great Power" that was Melchizedek to be an *advocatus*, though not for men but for the angels; see Ps.-Tert. *Adv. omn. haer.* ch. 8.

[97] G. Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 21 (Tübingen 1956) 104. Cf. 121 n. 3.

[98] See *ibid.* 98-99.

[99] See S. Mowinckel, Die Vorstellungen des Spätjudentums vom heiligen Geist als Fürsprecher und der johanneische Paraklet, *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 32 (1933) 109-110.

[100] See W. Lueken, *Michael* (Göttingen 1898) 7-12; Behm, 810.

[101] "In place of the many advocates which Judaism found to defend the righteous before the forum of the heavenly judge, primitive Christianity recognises only one advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ [...]" (Behm, 812). The Spirit is also a paraclete, though "not the defender of the disciples before God but their counsel in relation to the world" (*ibid.* 803-804). Cf. *ibid.* 813.

[102] See Matt. 10, 32-33; Luke 9, 26 and 12, 8-9; Rev. 3, 5. Cf. Mark 8, 38. See further Matt. 7, 21-23. Cf. Behm, 812.

[103] *O.c.* 122-123.

[104] *Ibid.* 123.

[105] See Le couple de l'ange et de l'esprit: traditions juives et chrétiennes, *Revue Biblique* 88 (1981) 42-61.

[106] The *Book of Sirach* 24, 10 tells that Wisdom was present in the Tabernacle and was established on Sion, obviously because she was identified with the Law, which was kept in the Ark in the Holy of Holies; and the figure of Wisdom is manifestly identified with both the masculine Angel of the Lord and the feminine Spirit of God in 24, 3-4. A midrash in *Yoma* 54a describes the two cherubim as two lovers, one male and one female. See Stroumsa, 47-48, 53, 54-55.

[107] The Son and the Spirit are sitting on the right and the left of the Great Glory on the divine throne. Cf. above n. 83.

[108] 3, 17, 1 and 3-5 (Rehm, I 62). For quotation of 3, 17, 2, see above, 269.

[109] See 16, 12, 1.

[110] *De op. mundi* 148 (F. H. Colson & G. H. Whitaker, ed. & trans., *Philo* I, The Loeb Classical Library [London & Cambridge, Mass., 1929 and reprints] 116).

[111] 9, 2 (J. Reider, ed. & trans., *The Book of Wisdom*, Dropsie College Edition, Jewish Apocryphal Literature 5 (New York 1957) 126).

[112] 10, 1-2 (Reider, 132).

[113] See *Sir.* 24, 3; *Wisd.* 1, 4-7; 7, 7 and 22; 9-10 and 17; Philo, *De op. mundi* 135 and 144; *De gig.* 22 and 27.

[114] See J. Fossum, *The Name of God and the Angel of the Lord* (Diss., Utrecht 1982) 171-172 with n. 427 on 466, 282-305 with relevant notes on 499-503. Especially important are the traditions in the so-called Adamic literature, where Adam is named the "image" of God and promised to regain his original lofty status and be enthroned in heaven at the end of times. As I have pointed out in the mentioned work, the apocalyptic vision of Adam in ch. 11 of the long recension of the *Testament of Abraham*, a Jewish writing which has been dated to the first century C.E., contains clear allusions to the figure of the Glory and thus indicates the provenance and high age of this imagery. The *Testament* describes Adam as an "all-marvellous Man" (*ho anēr ho panthaumastos*) seated on a golden throne in heaven watching the godly entering Paradise and the wicked going to hell, and it is said that "the appearance of the Man (*hē idea tou anthrōpou*) was terrible, like unto that of the Lord" (M. R. James, ed., *The Testament of Abraham*, Text and Studies 2/2 [Cambridge 1892] 88). There can be no doubt that this refers to LXX Ez. 1, 26, where the Kabod on the heavenly throne is described as *homoiōma hōs eidos anthrōpou*.

In my dissertation, I did not note that the *Testament* goes on to depict a "wondrous Man (*anēr*) shining like the sun," who sits on a fiery crystal throne and judges the souls of men (ch. 13 [James, 92]). This vision has pertinently been compared to that of "the Great Glory" in 1 *Enoch* ch. 14; see G. H. McCurdy, Platonic Orphism in the Testament of Abraham, *Journal of Biblical Literature* 61 (1942) 224. Ch. 10 of the short recension is also very interesting; it describes "the Man" as being of exceedingly great stature and wearing three golden crowns. The attribution of immense stature to "the Man" shows that the enormous dimensions of the Glory was an idea which was known at Elchasai's time. His three crowns are reminiscent of the three crowns of Adam in *Ps.-Clem. Rec.* 1, 46. This "Man", however, is not Adam but Abel; but it is on account of his father that he holds his lofty office: "For every man has sprung from Adam the protoplast, and therefore here first by his son all are judged" (ch. 13 of the long recension [James, 92]). Adam, then, is the original representation of the Glory, and his status has passed over to his offspring.

[115] See A. Dupont-Sommer, Adam. 'Père du Monde' dans la Sagesse de Solomon (10, 1.2), *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 119 (1939) 182-203.

[116] *Sanh.* 38a (L. Goldschmidt, ed. & trans., *Der babylonische Talmud* VII [The Hague 1933] 153). Parallel in *Tosefta Sanh.* 8, 7.

[117] See Scholem, *Major Trends* 65-66. Quispel, Hermetism, chapters X *passim* and XII *passim*, points out traces of the cosmogonic function of the heavenly Man in Gnostic texts.

[118] 48, 1 (M. A. Knibb, ed. & trans. [in consultation with E. Ullendorff], *The Ethiopic Book of Enoch* 1 [The Text] [Oxford 1978] 133-134). I reproduce the well-known translation by R. H. Charles, ed., *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* II (Pseudepigrapha) (Oxford 1913 and reprints) 216-217.

[119] 48, 2-3 (Knibb, 134).
[120] 46, 1 (Knibb, 128).
[121] See Hermetism, chapter III; Ezekiel 2.
[122] 48, 7a (Knibb, 135).
[123] 49, 1-2a and 3 (Knibb, 137).
[124] See Is. 32, 15; 44, 3; Ez. 36, 26-27; 39, 29; Joel 3, 1-2. Cf. *Jub.* 1, 23; 1 Q S 4, 21.
[125] Charles, 213 (note *ad* 42, 1-2) with references.

3721 CD *Bilthoven*, St. Hubertuslaan 18

Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983) 288-305, E. J. Brill, Leiden

VOM HEILIGEN THEODORUS ANATOLIUS

EIN DOPPELT ÜBERLIEFERTER TEXT (KOPTISCHES MANUSCRIPT UTRECHT 5)

VON

J. ZANDEE

Das Utrechter Manuskript

Es handelt sich um ein nicht eher veröffentliches koptisches Manuskript aus der Bibliothek der staatlichen Universität zu Utrecht. Der Text ist auf einem Pergamentblatt geschrieben, das zu einem Kodex gehört hat. Es ist jetzt verglast und trägt die Nummer fünf. Die Abmessungen des Blattes sind 27 zu 27 cm und die des Textes 18 cm in der Breite und 22 cm in der Höhe. Jede Seite umfasst zwei Kolumnen. Die ursprüngliche Höhe der Seiten könnte ungefähr 34 cm gewesen sein. Die Maximumzahl der Zeilen, von denen noch etwas sichtbar ist, beträgt 30. Die ursprüngliche Zahl könnte ungefähr 34 gewesen sein. Der grösste Teil der jetzt noch erhaltenen oberen Zeilen ist leider sehr lückenhaft. Das recto befindet sich auf der Haarseite des Pergaments und das verso auf der Fleischseite. Nur der untere Teil ist bewahrt, so dass die obere Hälfte mit der Paginierung fehlt. Die Datierung kann dem Schrifttypus gemäss auf das 9. oder 10. Jahrhundert gestellt werden, eine genaue Datierung nur auf Grund des Schrifttypus ist aber nicht möglich, da der Schrifttypus sich während mehrerer Jahrhunderte nicht änderte.[1] Vom Fehlen der oberen Hälfte des Blattes abgesehen, gibt es auch noch mehrere Löcher im Pergament, durch welche Lücken im übrigens fortlaufenden Text entstanden sind.

Die Ornamentik und die Interpunktion sind einfach. Satzteile werden bisweilen durch einen roten Punkt getrennt, meistens am Ende einer Zeile. Ein Abschnitt wird durch einen roten Punkt und einen Strich (.—) abgeschlossen. Ein neuer Abschnitt beginnt mit einer vergrösserten Majuskel von 2 bis 4 mal die Breite einer Zeile. Diese Majuskeln sind schwarz mit rotem ,,Rahmen''. Die Majuskeln der linken Kolumne sind grösser als die der rechten Kolumne, weil es dort mehr Raum gab. Unter den Majuskeln der linken Kolumne ist als Interpunktion eine Diple und

über den Majuskeln der rechten Kolumne ist ein Obelos geschrieben. Diese Interpunktion ist die gleiche wie in den griechischen Manuskripten.[2] Der Typus der Buchstaben ist von Stegemann als „schmaler Stil" bezeichnet.[3]

Bibliographie

Der Text handelt von einem der in der koptischen Kirche verehrten Militärheiligen, nämlich Theodorus Anatolius.[4] Das Utrechter Fragment konnte als ein paralleler Passus der Handschrift Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030 identifiziert werden.[5] Es stimmt mit fol. 34 b 1-35 a 2 überein. Die britische Handschrift ist datiert im Jahre 711 der Ära Diokletians (= Märtyrerära) = 995 n.Chr., was übereinkommt mit einer möglichen Datierung des Utrechter Fragments nach dem Schrifttypus. Die britische Handschrift besteht auch aus Pergamentblättern, die eine Abmessung von 30 zu 22 cm haben und einen Text enthalten in zwei Kolumnen von je 30 Zeilen.

Einleitung

Der Titel der britischen Handschrift erwähnt, dass es sich um ein encomium handelt (ἐγκώμιον, Lobrede) des Theodorus, Erzbischof von Antiochia, auf Sankt Theodorus, den Orientalen (Anatolius), seine Karriere als Heerführer (στρατηλάτης), und sein Martyrium (Datum 12 Tôbe = 7. Januar), zugleich handelnd von seinem Freund und Kommilitonen Claudius. Der Redner und Autor diente als Diakon zur Zeit des Gaius, Erzbischof von Antiochia unter der Herrschaft des Kaisers Diokletian. Bei dieser Art Heiligenliteratur ist es äusserst zweifelhaft, inwiefern dem Titel und dem Inhalt einiger Wert beigemessen werden kann.

Theodorus, Sohn des Soterichus, geboren zu Antiochia, entstammt dem regierenden Königshaus, was auch gilt von seinem Vetter Claudius, der in der Geschichte eine bedeutende Rolle spielt. Der Vater lässt seinen Sohn Theodorus eine Bildung zum Heerführer[6] empfangen. Erzbischof Gaius konfirmiert ihn als Mitglied der Kirche. Michael und Gabriel werden die Schutzengel beziehungsweise des Theodorus und des Claudius.

Die Gegend des Donauflusses ist der Kampfplatz eines Krieges zwischen den Römern und den Persern. Die Römer machen Crator, den Sohn des Perserkönigs, zum Kriegsgefangenen und Claudius wird von den Persern gefangen genommen. Es folgt ein langer Passus über das, was Claudius in persischer Gefangenschaft erfährt. Theodorus und Gai-

us knüpfen mit den Persern Unterhandlungen an über einen Austausch der Gefangenen. Der Perserkönig bietet Theodorus seinen Thron an. Unter dem Schutz des Michael und des Gabriel richten Theodorus und Claudius ein unwahrscheinlich grosses Blutbad unter den Persern an.[7] Sie kehren zusammen nach Antiochia zurück. Crator stirbt in Gefangenschaft. In diesem Teil fällt der Nachdruck auf Claudius.

Jetzt folgt eine neue Episode, wobei es sich wiederum handelt um die Gefangennahme eines persischen Königssohnes. Der Teufel hetzt Umerianus,[8] König von Antiochia, auf, einen jungen Ziegenhirt aus Ägypten,[9] mit Namen Agrippita, nach Antiochia zu holen und ihn zum General zu machen statt Theodorus und Claudius, die ihn betrügen werden. Die Königstochter beginnt ein Verhältnis zu Agrippita und macht ihn nach dem Tode ihres Vaters zum König.[10] Der Erzählung nach ist er derselbe als Diokletian. Das encomium stellt nach und nach Diokletian in ein ungünstiges Licht: er hat Angst, König zu sein, er fürchtet sich, dass Theodorus und Claudius es besser machen werden. Er verbirgt sich aus Angst, worauf Theodorus den Claudius König machen will, aber dieser weist diese weltliche Würde ab. Theodorus ist der Meinung, dass ein ägyptischer Ziegenhirt kein König sein kann. In einer schwierigen Lage bietet die Königin dem Theodorus den Thron an, Michael aber rät ihm, sich zu mässigen. Auch Diokletian bietet ihm den Thron an, Theodorus aber weigert sich. Erzbischof Gaius firmt Diokletian als Mitglied der Kirche. Viele Heiligenlegenden erwähnen, dass Diokletian anfänglich Christ war.

Die Königin hetzt Diokletian auf, Theodorus an einen gefährlichen Platz im Krieg zu stellen, damit er falle.[11] Hier fängt der Abschnitt an, in dem die Handschriften British Museum und ,,Utrecht'' zusammentreffen. Mehrmals bietet Diokletian dem Theodorus den Thron an, dieser aber beharrt bei seiner Ablehnung und sagt, dass der Thron dem Diokletian gehöre. Theodorus sagt zu Diokletian, dass Gott diesen Krieg mit den Persern gegen ihn verordnet habe.[12] Wiederum wird im Treffen ein Sohn des Perserkönigs gefangen genommen, mit Namen Nicomedes.[13] Diokletian vertraut den Gefangenen der Sorge des Erzbischofs Gaius an, der ihn gegen ein Bestechungsgeschenk entlässt.[14] Nicomedes wird im Kampf zum zweiten Male gefangen genommen. Inzwischen hatte der Erzbischof gelogen, dass Nicomedes bei ihm in Gefangenschaft gestorben war, und dem Diokletian den Leichnam eines andern gezeigt, dabei beschwörend, dass der Tote Nicomedes sei. Diokletian kommt hinter die Schliche. Theodorus und Gaius lügen, dass sie

einen Bruder des Nicomedes als Häftling hätten. Die Perser Panygerus und Leontius versuchen, Nicomedes wieder loszukaufen. Dieser wird vor Diokletian gebracht und enthüllt öffentlich die Wahrheit. Diokletian gerät in Zorn, lässt den Erzbischof umbringen[15] und ist von diesem Augenblick an kein Christ mehr. Diokletian wird mehrmals vom Teufel beschlichen, der ihm jede Hilfe verspricht, wenn Theodorus und Claudius getötet würden. Jetzt folgt das Martyrium des Theodorus, der sich freiwillig kreuzigen lässt auf einem Perseabaum, wobei er vom heiligen Michael gestärkt wird.[16]

Die koptische Kirche kennt mehrere Militärheilige wie Apater, Viktor, Iustus, Eusebius, Basilides, Sisinius, Menas und Georg. In der Beschreibung ihres Martyriums kommt es meistens vor, dass sie anfangs als Militär in der Armee des Kaisers kämpfen, in einem gewissen Augenblick aber die militia Christi dem weltlichen Militärdienst vorziehen.

Es ist verwirrend, dass in der koptischen Kirche mehrere Militärheilige mit dem Namen Theodorus verehrt werden. Neben Anatolius finden sich Theodorus Stratelates („der General") und Theodorus Tiro (Τύρων, „Rekrut"). Sie wurden schon in koptischen und griechischen Texten miteinander verwechselt.[17] Es zeigt sich, dass Stratelates und Tiro bisweilen identisch sind. Beide haben Beziehungen zur Stadt Euchaita und töten dort einen Drachen,[18] werden aber auch unterschieden, z.B. den Vätern nach[19] und auch bezüglich der Kaiser, unter denen ihr Martyrium stattfindet.[20] Es gibt auch Texte, in denen Anatolius und Stratelates zusammen auftreten.[21]

Zum Unterschied nur das Folgende: Theodorus Stratelates is ein Sohn des Ägypters Johannes, der als Rekrut zur Hauptstadt Antiochia gesandt wird. Dort vermählt er sich mit Straticia (oder Eusebia), der Tochter des Heerführers Anastasius, der den Abgott Chronus verehrt. Johannes, der Christ ist, kehrt nach Ägypten zurück, da seine heidnische Frau sich verweigert, ihr Kind Theodorus taufen zu lassen. Später, im Alter von 16 Jahren, lässt Theodorus sich selbst die Taufe geben. Zusammen mit Theodorus Anatolius wird jetzt Theodorus Stratelates an die Spitze des Heeres gestellt zum Kampf gegen die Perser. Der Teufel verwandelt sich in eine Kemelherde in der Wüste,[22] um Theodorus irrezuführen. Christus als das Lamm Gottes, später als ein leuchtendes Kreuz, erscheinend über einem strahlenden Hirsch,[23] kommt ihm zu Hilfe. Er reist nach Ägypten und begegnet dort seinem Vater Johannes. Nach einem dreijährigen Aufenthalt kehrt er nach Antiochia zurück. Es

folgt die bekannte Szene der Gefangennahme des Nicomedes, des Sohnes des Barboi, des Perserkönigs. Theodorus Anatolius tauft die beiden persischen Gesandten Leontius und Panygerus, wonach er als Märtyrer ums Leben gebracht wird durch Kreuzigung. Theodorus Stratelates wird Gouverneur der Stadt Euchaita. Dort besiegt er einen Drachen,[24] rettet zwei Kinder einer Witwe, die man im Begriff ist dem Drachen zu opfern, und zerschmettert das Idol des Götzen Onocentaurus. Diokletian erzürnt sich darüber und lässt Theodorus Stratelates enthaupten am zwanzigsten des Monats Epep = 14. Juli.[25]

Im folgenden Abschnitt werden die Handschriften Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030 und Utrecht Nr. 5 mit einander verglichen, besonders hinsichtlich der Textvarianten. Solch ein Vergleich könnte auch möglich sein zwischen dem Text eines bohairischen encomium auf die beiden Theodori und einem Fragment davon in einer anderen Handschrift.[26] In beiden Fällen gibt es neben grossen Übereinstimmigkeiten auch interessante Unterschiede.

Die koptischen Texte:

Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030, bezeichnet als BM; Utrecht koptische Handschrift Nr. 5, bezeichnet als Ut.

fol.34 verso, Kol.a	BM		ϵNϵϥTN̄NOOY Nⲁϥ N̄ϩⲁϩ NCOΠ·
	Ut		——— Lücke ———
	BM		ⲭϵ KOYⲰⲰ ϵTPⲁϩMOOC· ϵⲭM̄
recto, Kol.a	Ut	1,2	ⲭϵ / [KO]Y[ⲰⲰ ϵTPⲁ/ϩ]MOOC ϵ[ⲭM̄]
	BM		ΠϵθPONOC· ⟵
	Ut	3,4	[Πϵ]θPONOC Ⲱ̄/ΠCTPⲁTYⲗⲁ
	BM		⟵ⲭϵ KOYⲰⲰ· ϵTPⲁⲁNⲁ
	Ut	5,6	THC· ⲭϵ KOY/ⲰⲰ NTⲁⲁNⲁ
	BM		XⲰPϵI NⲁI ϵΠⲁKⲁϩ·
	Ut	7,8	XⲰPϵĪ NⲁĪ ϵϩPⲁĪ / ϵΠⲁKⲁϩ .—
	BM		ⲁYⲰ ⲰⲀPϵ θϵOⲗⲰPOC
	Ut	9,10	[ⲁ]YⲰ NϵⲰⲀPϵ Πϩⲁ/ΓĪOC θϵⲰⲗOPOC
	BM		ⲭOOY Nⲁϥ ⲭϵ ϩMOOC NⲁK ϩIⲭM̄
	Ut	11,12	ⲭOOC Nⲁϥ ⲭϵ ϩ/MOOC NⲁK ϵⲭM̄
	BM		ΠϵθPONOC· ⲭϵ ⲁTMN̄TPP̄O ϵP
	Ut	13,14	[Πϵ] θPONOC ⲭϵ / ⲁṬMN̄TP̄PO ϵṖ
fol.34 verso, Kol.b	BM		TⲰK· ⟵ M̄ΠϵPP̄/ϩO
	Ut	15,16	TⲰK .— /ⲁ[Y]Ⲱ M̄ΠPP̄ ϩO

Utrecht, Kopt. Ms. 5, recto.

Utrecht, Kopt. Ms. 5, verso.

BM ⲧⲉ ⲱ̄ ⲡⲣ̄ⲣ̄ⲟ· ⲙⲟⲛⲟⲛ ⲛ̄ ϯⲛⲁⲉⲣ ⲗⲁⲁⲩ ⲙ̄ⲡⲉ
Ut 17,18 ⲧ̣ⲉ̣ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟⲛ ⲛ̄ ϯ̄/ⲛⲁⲣ̄ ⲗⲁⲁⲩ ⲙ̄ⲡⲉ
BM ⲑⲟⲟⲩ ⲛⲁⲕ ⲁⲛ· ϣⲁ ⲉⲛⲉϩ·
Ut 19,20 ⲑⲟⲟⲩ ⲛⲁⲕ ⲁⲛ ⲛ̄/ϣⲁ ⲉ̄ⲛⲉϩ —
BM ⲉⲛⲉⲣⲉ ←——————→
Ut 21,22 ⲉⲛⲉⲣⲉ ⲡⲁⲉⲓ̄/ⲱⲧ ⲁ̄ⲡⲁ [ⲕⲁ]ⲓ̄
BM ←——→ ⲡⲁⲣⲭⲏⲉⲡⲓⲥⲕⲟⲡⲟⲥ· ⲃⲏⲕ
Ut 23,24 ⲟⲥ ⲡⲁⲣⲭⲏ̣ ⲉ ⲡ̣ⲓ̄ⲥ/ⲕⲟⲡⲟⲥ ⲡⲏ̣[ⲧ]
BM ϣⲁⲣⲟϥ·←——→ ⲙⲛ̄ ⲡⲉⲧ
Ut 25,26 ⲙⲙⲏⲛⲉ ⲉϥ[ⲉⲓ] ⲛⲉ/ⲙⲛ̄ ⲗⲁⲁⲩ ϣ̄
BM ⲕⲱⲗⲩ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟϥ· ←——→
Ut 27,28 [ⲁ]ⲛ̣ⲧⲓⲗⲉⲕⲉ ⲛⲁϥ / ⲡⲉ. —
BM ϩⲣⲁⲓ ⲇⲉ ϩⲛ̄ ⲛⲉϩⲟⲟⲩ ⲉⲧⲙ̄ⲙⲁⲩ·ⲁⲩ
Ut 29,30 ϩⲣⲁⲓ̄ ⲇⲉ ϩⲛ̄ ⲛⲉϩⲟ/ⲟⲩ ⲉ̄ⲧⲙ̄ⲙⲁⲩ ⲁⲩ
BM ⲛⲟϭ ⲙ̄ⲡⲟⲗⲁⲙⲟⲥ ⲧⲱⲟⲩⲛ·
recto, Kol.b Ut ——— Lücke ———
BM ⲉϫⲛ̄ ⲛⲉϩⲣⲱⲙⲁⲓⲟⲥ ϩⲓⲧⲛ̄ ⲙ̄ⲡⲉⲣ
Ut ——— Lücke ———
BM ⲥⲟⲥ· ⲁⲩⲱ ⲁⲡⲟⲩⲱ ⲧⲁϩⲉ
Ut ——— Lücke ———
BM ⲡⲣ̄ⲣ̄ⲟ · ϫⲉ ⲁⲙ̄ⲡⲉⲣⲥⲟⲥ · ⲉⲓ ϣⲁ ⲙ̄ⲙⲁ
Ut ——— Lücke ———
BM ⲛ̄ⲣⲟⲉⲓⲥ · ⲁⲩϣⲉⲗ ⲙⲁ ⲛⲓⲙ·
Ut ——— Lücke ———
BM ⲡⲣ̄ⲣ̄ⲟ ⲇⲉ ⲁϥϣⲧⲟⲣⲧⲣ̄ ⲙ̄ⲙⲁⲧⲉ
Ut 1,2 ⲡⲣ̣̄ⲣ̣̄ⲟ ⲇ̣[ⲉ ⲁϥϣⲧⲟⲣ]/ⲧⲣ̄ ⲉⲙⲁ̣[ⲧⲉ]
BM ⲡⲉϫⲁϥ·←——→ ϫⲉ ⲟⲩ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲁϩⲱⲃ·
Ut 3,4 ⲛⲉϥϫⲱ ⲙ̣̄[ⲙⲟⲥ]/ⲡⲉ · ϫⲉ ⲟⲩ ⲉ̄ⲣⲟⲓ̄ ⲧⲉ
BM ⲙⲛ̄ ⲧⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲣ̄ⲣ̄ⲟ· ←——————→
Ut 5,6 ⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲣ̄ⲣⲟ· ⲏ̄ ⲡⲟ/ⲗⲩⲙⲟⲥ. —
BM ⲧⲁⲑⲉⲟⲇⲱⲣⲟⲥ ←——————→ ⲙⲛ̄
Ut 7,8 ⲧⲁⲑⲉⲱⲇⲟⲣⲟⲥ ⲡⲁ/ⲛⲁⲧⲟⲗⲉⲟⲥ ⲙⲛ̄
BM ⲕⲗⲁⲩϯⲟⲥ ←——————→ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲣ̄ⲣ̄ⲟ·
Ut 9,10 ⲕ̄ⲗⲁⲩⲇⲓ̄ⲟⲥ ⲡⲉϥ/ⲥⲟⲛ ⲧⲉ ⲧ̄ⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲣ̄
BM ←——→
Ut 11,12 ⲣⲟ. —
BM ⲡⲉϫⲉ ←——→ ⲛⲉⲓϩⲁⲅⲓⲟⲥ ⲙ̄ⲡⲣ̄ⲣ̄ⲟ·
Ut 13,14 ⲡⲉϫⲁϥ ⲛⲁϥ ⲛ̄ϭⲓ̄/ ⲑⲉⲱ̄ⲇⲟⲣⲟⲥ ⲡⲁ
BM ←——————→ ϫⲉ
Ut 15,16 ⲛⲁⲧⲟⲗ[ⲉ]ⲟⲥ ⲙⲛ̄ / ⲕ̄ⲗⲁⲩⲇⲓ̄ⲟⲥ ϫ[ⲉ]

BM ⲦⲰⲔ ⲦⲈ ⲦⲘ̄ⲚⲦⲢⲢⲞ·
Ut 17,18 ⲦⲰⲔ ⲦⲈ/ ⲦⲘⲚ̄ⲦⲢⲢⲞ.—

fol.35 recto, Kol.a
BM ⲬⲈ ⲁⲨⲦⲁⲁⲤ ⲚⲁⲔ ⲈⲂⲟⲗ ϩⲚ̄ ⲦⲠⲈ·
Ut 19,20 ⲠⲬⲞⲈⲒⲤ ⲠⲈ ⲚⲦ̣[ⲁ]ⲩ/ⲦⲁⲁⲤ ⲈⲦⲞⲞⲦⲔ
BM ←——————————→
Ut 21,22 Ⲛ ⲁⲚⲞⲚ ⲁⲚ ⲠⲈ / ⲘⲠⲢⲢ̄ ϩⲞⲦⲈ ⲘⲰ
BM ←——————————→
Ut 23,24 ⲚⲞⲚ Ⲙ— Lücke — ⲞⲈⲔ/ ϩⲎⲦ— Lücke—
BM ⲚⲦⲈⲢⲈ ⲠⲢⲢⲞ ⲂⲰⲔ ⲈϩⲞⲨⲚ ⲫⲁ ⲦⲢⲢⲰ·
Ut 25,26 ⲚⲦⲈ[ⲢⲈ ⲠⲢⲢⲞ —— Lücke ————]
BM ⲁⲤⲚⲁⲨ ⲈⲢⲞⲩ· ⲈⲩⲞⲨⲰⲗⲤ̄ ⲚϩⲎⲦ·

verso, Kol.a
Ut ———— Lücke ————
BM ⲁⲨⲰ ⲈⲩⲫⲦⲢⲦⲰⲢ· ⲠⲈⲬⲁⲤ Ⲛⲁⲩ· ⲬⲈ
Ut ———— Lücke ————
BM ⲈⲦⲂⲈ ⲞⲨ· ⲈⲔⲞ ⲚⲃⲁⲂϩⲎⲦ·
Ut ———— Lücke ————
BM ⲚⲦⲈⲒϩⲈ ⲦⲎⲢⲤ̄·
Ut ———— Lücke ————
BM ⲈⲒⲞⲨⲰⲫ ⲈⲦⲢⲈⲔⲈⲢⲎⲦ· ⲚⲰⲈ ⲰⲈⲞⲁⲰ
Ut 1,2 ⲉ̣[ⲒⲞⲨⲰⲫ ⲈⲦⲢⲈⲔ]/ [ⲈⲢⲎⲦ ⲚⲰ]ⲈⲰⲁⲞ
BM ⲢⲞⲤ ⲘⲚ̄ ⲔⲗⲁⲨ
Ut 3,4 [ⲢⲞⲤ] ⲚϩⲚ̄ ⲚⲞⲃ Ⲛ̄/ⲦⲁⲒⲞ ⲘⲚ̄ ⲔⲗⲁⲨ
BM †ⲞⲤ· ⲚϩⲚⲚⲞⲃ ⲚⲦⲁⲈⲒⲞ ⲚⲒ̄ⲬⲞⲞⲨ ⲈⲠⲠⲞⲗⲁⲒⲘⲞⲤ·
Ut 5,6 ⲁⲒⲞⲤ ⲚⲒ̄ⲬⲞⲞⲨ/ ⲤⲞⲨ ⲈⲠⲠⲞⲗⲨⲘⲞⲤ
BM ←——————————→ ⲚⲤⲈ
Ut 7,8 ⲚⲒ̄ⲚⲞⲬⲞⲨ ⲈⲠⲤⲁ /ⲈⲦⲚⲁⲫⲦ ⲚⲤⲈ
BM ⲘⲞⲨⲞⲨⲦ ⲘⲘⲞⲞⲨ· ⲦⲁⲢⲈⲔⲗⲞ ⲈⲔⲫⲦⲢ̄
Ut 9,10 ⲘⲞⲨⲞⲨⲦ ⲘⲘⲞⲞⲨ / ⲚⲃⲗⲞ ⲈⲔⲫⲦⲢ̄
BM ⲦⲰⲢ ⲈⲦⲂⲎⲎⲦⲞⲨ· ⲚⲦⲈⲢⲈ ⲠⲢⲢⲞ ⲁⲈ
Ut 11,12 ⲦⲰⲢ ⲈⲦⲂⲎⲎⲦⲞⲨ.— / ⲚⲁⲒ ⲁⲈ ⲚⲦⲈⲢⲈ ⲠⲢⲢⲞ
BM ⲤⲰⲦⲘ̄ ⲈⲚⲁⲒ· ⲁⲩⲬⲞⲞⲤ ⲚⲤⲁ ⲠⲁⲢ
Ut 13,14 ⲤⲰⲦⲘ̄ ⲈⲢⲞⲞⲨ·/ ⲁⲩⲬⲞⲞⲨ ⲚⲤⲁ ⲠⲁⲢ
BM ⲬⲎⲈⲠⲒⲤⲔⲞⲠⲞⲤ· ⲁⲩ† Ⲛⲁⲩ ⲚϩⲚ̄
Ut 15,16 [Ⲭ]ⲎⲈⲠⲒⲤⲔⲞⲠⲞⲤ / [ⲁⲩ]† Ⲛⲁⲩ ⲚϩⲚ̄
BM ⲚⲞⲃ ←——————————→ ⲚⲬ
Ut 17,18 [ⲚⲞ]ⲟ̣ ⲚⲦⲁⲒⲞ ⲘⲚ̄ / [Ⲟ]ⲨⲘⲎⲎⲫⲈ ⲚⲬ
BM ⲢⲎⲘⲁ· ⲈⲦⲢⲈⲩⲦⲁⲁⲨ ⲚⲎⲨⲤⲒⲁ ⲘⲠ
Ut 19,20 ⲢⲎⲘⲁ ⲈⲦⲢⲈⲩ/ⲦⲁⲁⲨ ⲚⲎⲨⲤⲒⲁ ⲘⲠ

	BM	ⲭⲟϵⲓⲥ· ϵⲧⲃϵ ⲡⲟⲩⲭⲁⲓ ⲙ̄ⲡⲡⲟⲗⲁⲓⲙⲟⲥ·
	Ut 21,22	ⲭⲟϵⲓ̄ⲥ ⲥⲁ ⲡⲟⲩ/ⲭ[ⲁⲓ ⲙ̄ⲡ]ⲗⲁⲟⲥ·
	BM	ⲁⲩⲱ ⲁϥⲭⲟⲟⲩ ⲛ̄ⲥⲁ ⲛϵⲓⲥⲁⲣⲓⲟⲥ· ϵϥⲭⲱ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟⲥ ⲛⲁⲩ·
	Ut 23,24	ⲁ̣[ⲩⲱ ⲁϥⲭ]ⲟⲟⲩ ⲁϥ/[ⲭⲱ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟⲥ] ⲛⲁ[ⲩ]
	BM	⟷ⲭϵ ⲟⲩ ⲡϵ ⲡⲧⲱⲩ
verso,Kol.b	Ut 1,2	[ⲭϵ ⲟⲩ ⲡϵ ⲡⲁⲓ ?] /[ⲛ̄ⲧ]ⲁϥⲧⲱⲩ
	BM	ⲙ̄ⲡϵⲓ ⲡⲟⲗⲁⲓⲙⲟⲥ· ϵⲧ ⲥⲓⲭⲱⲛ· ⲡϵⲭⲁⲩ ⟷
	Ut 3,4	ϵ[ⲥ]ⲣ̣ⲁⲓ ⲉ̄ⲭⲱⲛ . [__] / ⲡϵⲭϵ ⲡ̄ⲥⲁⲣⲓ̄ⲟⲩ̣
	BM	⟷ⲛⲁϥ ⲭϵ⟷ⲡ
	Ut 5,6	ⲑϵⲱ̄ⲗⲟⲣⲟⲥ ⲛⲁ[ϥ]/ ⲭϵ ⲡ̄ⲧⲱⲩ ⲙⲡ̄
	BM	ⲡⲟⲗⲁⲓⲙⲟⲥ ⲡⲁⲡⲭⲟϵⲓⲥ ⲡϵ·
	Ut 7,8	ⲡⲟⲗⲩⲙⲟⲥ ⲡⲁⲡ̣/ⲭⲟϵⲓ̄ⲥ ⲡϵ.__
	BM	ⲛⲧⲟϥ ⲡϵⲧϥⲓ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟϥ ⲥⲓⲭⲱⲛ·
	Ut	⟷
	BM	ⲡϵⲭϵ ⲡⲣ̄ⲣⲟ ⲛⲁⲩ ⲭϵ ⲙⲁⲣⲟⲩⲥⲟϥ
	Ut 9,10	ⲡϵⲭϵ ⲡⲣ̄ⲣⲟ ⲛⲁϥ/ ⲭϵ ⲙⲁⲣⲟⲩⲥⲟⲃ̣
	BM	ⲧϵ ⲛ̄ⲥⲛ̄ⲕⲁⲣⲟⲩⲭⲓⲟⲛ· ⲙⲛ̄ ⲥⲛ̄
	Ut 11,12	ⲧϵ ⲛ̄ⲥⲛ̄ⲕⲁⲣⲟⲩ/ ⲭⲓ̄ⲟⲛ.ⲙⲛ̄ ⲥ̣[ⲛ̄]
	BM	ⲥⲁⲣⲙⲁ· ⲁⲗϵ ϵⲣⲟⲟⲩ· ⲙⲛ̄ ⲛϵⲧ
	Ut 13,14	ⲥⲁⲣⲙⲁ ⲛⲓ̄ⲁⲗϵ ϵ/ⲣⲟⲟⲩ ⲙⲛ̄ ⲕ̄ⲗⲁⲩ
	BM	ⲛϵⲣⲏⲩ· ⲭⲓ ⲙ̄ⲡϵⲧⲛ̄ⲙⲏⲏⲩϵ
	Ut 15,16	ⲁⲓⲟⲥ· ⲭ[ⲓ]/ⲙⲡϵⲧⲛ̄ⲙⲏⲏⲩϵ
	BM	ⲃⲱⲕ ϵⲡⲡⲟⲗⲁⲓⲙⲟⲥ·
	Ut 17,18	ⲛ̄ⲧϵⲧⲛ̄ⲃⲱⲕ / ϵⲡⲡⲟⲗⲩⲙⲟⲥ·
	BM	ϭⲱ ϵⲕ† ⲧⲱⲕ ⲛ̄ⲥⲏⲧ ⲛⲁⲩ· ⲥⲓ
	Ut 19,20	ϭⲱ ϵⲕ† ⲧⲱⲕ/ [ⲛ̄ⲥ]ⲏⲧ ⲛⲁⲩ ⲥⲓ̄
	BM	ⲡⲁⲥⲟⲩ· ⲩⲁⲛⲧϵⲕⲭϵϵⲣϵ ⲡⲡⲟ
	Ut 21,22	ⲡ̣[ⲁ]ⲥⲟⲩ ⲩⲁⲛ/ⲧ[ϵⲕ]ⲭϵϵⲣ ⲡ̄ⲡⲟ
	BM	ⲗⲁⲓⲙⲟⲥ· ϵⲃⲟⲗ· ⟷
	Ut 23,24	ⲗ[ⲩ]ⲙ̣ⲟⲥ ⲉ̄ⲃⲟⲗ.__ / ⲛ[ⲧ]ⲁϥⲣ̄ ⲡⲁⲓ̄ ⲁϵ ϵϥ
	BM	⟷
	Ut 25,26	ⲣ̄ⲥⲟⲧϵ ⲥⲏⲧϥ [ⲛ̄] / ⲑϵⲱⲁⲟⲣⲟⲥ ⲙ̣[ⲛ̄]
	BM	⟷ⲡϵⲭϵ ⲛϵⲓⲥⲁⲣⲓⲟⲥ
	Ut 27,28	ⲕ̄ⲗⲁⲩⲁⲓⲟⲥ.__ /ⲡϵⲭϵ ⲑϵⲱⲁⲟ
	BM	ⲙ̄ⲡⲣ̄ⲣⲟ · ⲭϵ ⲟⲩⲁϵ ⲥⲁⲣⲙⲁ·
	Ut 29	ⲣⲟⲥ ⲛⲁϥ. ⲭϵ ⲟⲩⲁϵ /

Übersetzung

(Ut recto a) Er (Diokletian) sandte oft (einen Bericht) zu ihm (Theodorus Anatolius) mit den Worten:[1] ,,Willst du, dass ich auf dem Thron sitzen bleibe (Ut+ ,, ,Oh Heerführer,''), oder willst[5] du, dass ich mich zurückziehe nach meinem Lande?'' Und (Ut+ ,,der heilige'')[10] Theodorus pflegte ihm zu berichten (Ut+ ,,ihm zu sagen''): ,,Bleibe auf dem Thron sitzen, denn das Königtum ist das deinige geworden[15], (Ut+ ,,und'') fürchte dich nicht, Oh König (Ut—,,Oh König''); allein (Ut ,,wahrlich''), ich werde dir niemals etwas übles[20] tun.''

Der Erzbischof kam zu ihm (Diokletian, der damals noch Christ war), ohne dass es jemand (oder ,,etwas'') gab, der (oder ,,das'') ihn hinderte. (Ut: ,,Mein (= des Autors, Theodorus, des späteren Erzbischofs von Antiochia) Vater, der Abt Gaius, der Erzbischof, ging[25] täglich zu ihm (und), wenn er [kam], gab es keinen, der ihm widersprechen konnte'').

In[30] jenen Tagen aber (hier folgt eine grosse Lücke in Ut an der oberen Seite der zweiten Kolumne; der Text ist nach BM: ,,brach ein grosser Krieg gegen die Römer aus von seiten der Perser, und die Nachricht erreichte den König: die Perser sind bis zu den Wachtposten gekommen (und) sie haben alle Plätze geplündert. Der König (geriet) (Ut recto b)[1] sehr in Ver[wirrung] (und) sagte: ,,Was habe ich mit dem[5] Königtum zu schaffen? (Ut; ,,Was ist das Königtum für mich anders als Krieg?'') Das Königtum gehört (buchstäblich: ,,ist das des...'') Theodorus und Claudius.'' (Ut: ,,Das Königtum ist das des Theodorus des Orientalen und seines[10] Vetters Claudius.'') Diese Heiligen sagten zum König: (Ut: ,,Theodorus,[15] der Orientale, sagte zu ihm, zusammen mit Claudius:'') ,,Das Königtum ist deines, denn es wurde dir vom Himmel geschenkt''. (Ut: ,,Es ist der Herr, der[20] es dir gegeben hat. Wir sind es nicht. Lasse dein Herz nur nicht...'')

[25]Nachdem (hier folgt eine grosse Lücke in Ut am oberen Ende der ersten Kolumne des verso; die Übersetzung des Textes ist BM gemäss: ,,der König zur Königin gegangen war, sah sie, dass er entmutigt und in Verwirrung war. Sie sagte zu ihm: ,,Weshalb bist du so zerschlagen?) (Ut verso a)[1] Ich will, dass du Theodorus und [5]Claudius grosse Ehrengeschenke versprichst und dass du sie in den Krieg sendest, (Ut+ ,,und dass du sie an die gefährlichste Seite aufstellst,'') so dass sie getötet werden,[10] damit du nicht länger ihretwegen in Verwirrung seist.''

Als der König diese Sachen gehört hatte, beschied er den[15] Erzbischof zu sich (und) gab ihm viel (Ut+ ,,Ehrengeschenke und eine grosse Summe'') Geld, damit er dem Herrn[20] ein Opfer darbringen möchte zum

guten Erfolg des Krieges (Ut: ,,zum Heil des Volkes''). Und er beschied diese Heiligen zu sich und sagte zu ihnen: (Ut, lückenhaft,: ,,Und er sandte (einen Bericht) und sagte zu ihnen'':) (BM: ,,Was ist die Bestimmung dieses Krieges, der uns (bedrückt)?'') (Ut verso b: [1,,Was ist dies, das (?)] über uns entschieden wurde?'') Sie sagten zu ihm: ,,Der Krieg ist der des Herrn (Ut: ,,Der heilige[5] Theodorus sagte zu ihm: ,,Die Bestimmung des Krieges ist die des Herrn''), er ist derjenige, der ihn über uns bringt.'' Der König sagte zu ihnen: (Ut: ,,zu ihm'')[10] Man rüste Lastwagen und Streitwagen aus. Besteigt sie mit euren Genossen (Ut: ,,und besteige sie zusammen mit Claudius'').[15] Nehmt (Plur.) eure Truppen und zieht in den Krieg. Bleibe (Sing.)[20] sie von hinten ermutigen, bis du (Sing.) den Krieg zunichte gemacht hast'' (Ut + ,,Er tat dies, weil er[25] Theodorus und Claudius fürchtete''). Diese Heiligen sagten zum König: (Ut: ,,Theodorus sagte zu ihm'':)[29] ,,Weder'' (BM, Ut bricht hier ab, ,,Streitwagen, noch Lastwagen werden wir besteigen, sondern wir werden wohl in den Krieg ziehen'').

Kommentar

Ein encomium ist eine Lobrede über einen Heiligen, bisweilen in eine liturgische Sammlung (*synaxarium*) aufgenommen zur Vorlesung in der Kirche an Gedächtnistagen. Der historische Wert ist gering und der Inhalt weist viele legendenhafte Züge auf.

Hauptperson ist Theodorus Anatolius, ein General, der unter Diokletian das römische Heer gegen die Perser anführte. Sein Beiname bedeutet ,,der Orientale''. In der Beschreibung einer Schlacht gegen die Perser, wobei der Sohn des Perserkönigs Nicomedes gefangen genommen wird, findet sich ein Passus, der sich auf den Namen Anatolius bezieht. ,,Als sie einander ansichtig wurden um zu kämpfen, richtete ein orientalischer (*anatoleos*) Bogenschütze sein Augenmerk auf Nicomedes, den Sohn des Perserkönigs. Er schoss einen Pfeil auf ihn ab und der Pfeil traf das Herz des Pferdes, auf dem der Sohn des Perserkönigs sass. Und es wurde sofort bewustlos und fiel. Und als es fiel, schrie das Heer der Perser und sie ergriffen die Flucht. Der orientalische (*anatoleos*) Jüngling aber, dessen Name Theodorus war, ergriff Nicomedes in der Verwirrung, die entstand, und stellte ihn lebendig vor den König.'' Diokletian gibt den Königssohn beim Erzbischof in Verwahrung, um ihn zu gelegener Zeit als Geisel benützen zu können. ,,Und er sandte sofort (einen Boten) und begegnete Theodorus Anatolius, legte eine goldene

Kette an seinen Hals und zwei Armbänder an seine Rechte, machte ihn zum Führer des römischen Heeres, beschenkte ihn mit grossen königlichen Geschenken und machte ihn sehr reich''.[27] Anderswo wird gesagt, dass ,,seine Mutter ihn ‚den Orientalen (*anatoleos*)' nannte nach dem Namen ihrer Stadt Anatolia''.[28] In Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65, fol. 53, CSCO 86,113 ist die Rede vom ,,Land des Ostens (*Anatole*)''. Mit dem Namen ,,Anatolius'' werden also mehrere Bedeutungen verbunden, die deshalb sich nur auf die Phantasie der Legendenschreiber gründen.

Diokletian gilt ganz besonders als Christenverfolger. Eine bestimmte Ära der koptischen Kirche (die Märtyrerära) fängt mit Diokletian an (= 284 n.Chr.). In der Märtyrerliteratur wird er so ungünstig wie möglich abgeschildert. Mehrmals wird in unserem encomium darauf angespielt, dass er von Geburt nur ein ägyptischer Ziegenhirt sei, zuerst unter dem Namen Agrippita bekannt.[29] Der König von Antiochia lässt ihn aus Ägypten holen, um ihm eine Ernennung zu gewähren. Noch in Ägypten zeigt sich sein grosser Blutdurst, weil er das Blut unschuldiger Lämmer vergiesst.[30] Vielleicht weist das schon auf die Verfolgung der Herde Christi hin. Die älteste Königstochter verliebt sich in ihn und bekommt es fertig, dass er nicht in den Krieg gesandt wird, sondern zum Stallmeister ernannt wird.[31] Nach dem Tode ihres Vaters setzt die Tochter Diokletian auf den Thron von Antiochia. Einer anderen Quelle gemäss[32] zeigt Diokletian sich beängstigt, die Königsherrschaft auszuüben. ,,Als es tagte, öffnete der Pförtner die Tür des Palastes und fand den König sprachlos sitzend, denn die Furcht vor der Königsherrschaft hatte ihn ergriffen.'' So versuchen die Legendenschreiber den Christenverfolger als einen nichtswürdigen Feigling abzumalen. Es entspinnt sich ein Gespräch zwischen Diokletian, Theodorus und Claudius, in dem sich wiederum die grosse Furcht des Diokletian vor dem Königtum zeigt: ,,Sie sagten zu ihm: ‚Wer hat dich zum König dieser Stadt gemacht?' Und Diokletian sagte: ‚Das (Königtum) gehört euch und euren Vätern. Ich bin der König nicht und ich wünsche das Königtum nicht zu besitzen' ''.[33] Statt Diokletian setzt Theodorus den Claudius auf den Thron, der sofort wiederum darauf verzichtet.

Antiochia gilt als Hauptstadt des römischen Reichs, denn es heisst, dass dort ,,der Thron der Römer'' steht.[34]

Die böse Königstochter, die sich selbst mit Herodias vergleicht,[35] hetzt neben dem Teufel ihren Mann zu allerhand Übel auf und bedenkt Listen, wie Diokletian sich von Theodorus und Claudius befreien könnte. Der Autor der beiden encomia,[36] Theodorus, Erzbischof von

Antiochia, hebt deutlich hervor, dass nicht Diokletian, sondern Theodorus Anatolius und Claudius, Mitglieder des alten Königsgeschlechts des Basilides,[37] Anrecht auf den Thron haben. Dieser Theodorus, Nachfolger des Erzbischofs Gaius, beschreibt sich selbst als Augenzeugen des Geschehens rundum Theodorus, Anatolius und Claudius.[38]

Das Thema, dass Diokletian auf den Thron verzichten will und diesen dem Theodorus und dem Claudius anbietet, findet sich mehrmals in der Geschichte. Der Perserkönig, von der Furcht vor den beiden Heerführern befangen, hat ihnen schon früher seinen Thron dargeboten, sie aber hatten diesen verweigert, weil, wie sie sagten, Gott ihnen ein besseres Königtum im Himmelreich versprochen habe.[39] Theodorus und Claudius werden als Heiligen mit asketischen Zügen abgemalt, die keine geschlechtlichen Begierden und keinen Hang nach weltlicher Macht haben. Der Erzengel Michael hat sie von diesen Makeln befreit.[40] Er rät ihnen auch, es ruhig hinzunehmen, dass Diokletian die Macht besitzt, mit dem Argument, dass Gott auch zugelassen habe, dass Herodes und Pilatus die Regierungsmacht ausübten, obwohl sie Christus kreuzigten.[41] Wie Diokletian vom Teufel inspiriert wird, so werden die beiden christlichen Generäle vom heiligen Michael als dem Gesandten Gottes oder des Christus geführt.

Es fällt auf, dass Diokletian in allen Dokumenten bezüglich Theodorus Anatolius anfänglich als ein Christ beschrieben wird.[42] Durch den Betrug des Erzbischofs von Antiochia, Gaius,[43] der sich bestechen lässt, um Nicomedes, den kriegsgefangenen Sohn des Perserkönigs, entweischen zu lassen, mit einem Eide aber bekräftigt, dass dieser gestorben sei, gibt Diokletian den christlichen Glauben auf, und wird auf Anstiftung des Teufels Verehrer der heidnischen Götzen. Die ungünstige Rolle des Erzbischofs ist merkwürdig. Könnte etwa eine verborgene Kritik auf die Geistlichkeit mit im Spiel sein?

Der Rat, den die böse Königin dem Diokletian gibt, dass er nämlich Theodorus und Claudius an eine gefährliche Stelle im Kampf einsetzen soll, erinnert an das, was David mit Uria tat.[44] Die Zahl von 153 Nägeln, womit Theodorus auf einem Baum gekreuzigt wirdt, stimmt mit der Zahl der Fische in der Erzählung des wunderbaren Fischfangs überein.[45] In dieser Weise sind mancherlei nicht-historischen Einzelheiten in christliche koptische Texte geraten, nur um der Erzählung ein biblisches Kolorit zu verleihen. Das Motiv, dass Gott Kriege verhängt und eben heidnische Heere,[46] etwa als Strafe, heranrücken lässt, ist ein bekanntes alttestamentliches Thema. Der Verzicht auf das Benützen von Kriegs-

wagen könnte eine Anspielung auf Psalm 20,8 sein, also hervorheben, dass die Heiligen nicht auf menschliche Kraft, sondern nur auf Gottes Hilfe vertrauen.[47]

Was einen Vergleich zwischen den beiden Versionen BM und Ut anbelangt muss viel hypothetisch bleiben. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass der koptische Text von einem griechischen Original herrührt. Nebst Varianten gibt es auch Übereinstimmungen. Bisweilen sind letztere so buchstäblich, dass sie auf eine gemeinschaftliche koptische Übersetzung zurückzuführen sind. Es gibt aber auch grössere Unterschiede, wie im Gebrauch verschiedener Zeiten des Verbs in parallelen Sätzen. Deren Zahl ist so gross, dass doch gewissermassen an eine selbständige Bearbeitung gedacht werden muss. Im Falle der Heiligengeschichten war man nicht so genau ans Original gebunden wie beim Abschreiben eines biblischen Abschnitts. Es ist durchaus möglich, dass ein Kopist bei seiner Arbeit das Bedürfnis hatte, einen bestimmten Passus etwas ausführlicher zu umschreiben. In Ut werden die Personennamen mehr betont, die bisweilen erwähnt werden wo BM sie auslässt. Beispiele: Gaius, recto, Kol. a 22-23; Hinzufügung Anatoleos, recto, Kol. b 7-8; Erwähnung von Claudius als „Vetter", Nachdruck auf Familienbeziehung, recto, Kol. b 8-9; Theodorus Anatolius-Claudius, wo BM „diese Heiligen" liest, recto, Kol. b 13-16; „der heilige Theodorus", verso, Kol. b 4-5, BM „er"; Claudius, verso, Kol. b 14-15, BM „mit euren Genossen"; der Passus, wo gesagt wird, dass Diokletian sich vor Theodorus und Claudius fürchtet, verso, Kol. b 24-27, der in BM fehlt; Theodorus, verso, Kol. b 28-29, BM „diese Heiligen". Die häufigere Anwendung von Personennamen weist auf eine bewusste Bemühung des Redakteurs hin, diese hervorzuheben und die Wichtigkeit des Theodorus Anatolius in ein helleres Licht zu stellen.

Der Gebrauch des Wortes ⲥⲟⲛ = „Bruder" in der Bedeutung von „Vetter", „Geschwisterkind" in Ut, recto, Kol. b 10 für Claudius ist vergleichbar mit dem Gebrauch des Plurals für die beiden Generäle in Brit. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030, fol. 8 a 2.[48] Der Gebrauch von verschiedenen griechischen Lehnwörtern könnte auf einen Unterschied im griechischen Originaltext hinweisen: κωλύειν, ἀντιλέγειν, recto, Kol. a 27; πόλεμος, λαός, verso, Kol. a 22. Ἀναχωρεῖν aber findet sich in den beiden Versionen, recto, Kol. a 6-7. Auf verschiedene Bearbeitungen, wenigstens auf einen etwas grösseren Abstand der beiden Versionen voneinander, weisen die Unterschiede in den Transkriptionen der griechischen Wörter hin: ⲡⲟⲗⲁⲓⲙⲟⲥ in BM, ⲡⲟⲗⲩⲙⲟⲥ in Ut; ⲕⲗⲁⲩⲑⲟⲥ in BM,

ⲕⲗⲁⲩⲁⲓⲟⲥ in Ut; ⲑⲉⲟⲇⲱⲣⲟⲥ in BM, ⲑⲉⲱⲇⲟⲣⲟⲥ in Ut (Griechisch Θεόδωρος). Übrigens ist eine ,,fehlerhafte'' Schreibweise der griechischen Wörter in koptischen Texten nicht ungebräuchlich. Das griechische μόνον in BM gleicht dem Klang nach dem koptischen ⲙⲙⲟⲛ (recto, Kol. a 17), hat aber eine andere Bedeutung. In solch einem Falle kann man an einen Hörfehler beim Diktieren von Handschriften denken. Vergleiche auch die Rechtschreibung ⲙⲱⲛⲟⲛ in einem Passus, der in BM fehlt.[49]

Bestimmte Gedanken und Motive aus BM und Ut finden sich auch in anderen Dokumenten der Theodorus-Überlieferung. Vergleiche mit dem Passus Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030, fol. 34 verso, Kol. a, Ut recto, Kol. a 1-18 einen Abschnitt aus Cod. Vatic. Coptic. 65, fol. 77 = CSCO 86, 135-136, encomium des Theodorus, Erzbischof von Antiochia, über Theodorus Anatolius und Theodorus Stratelates. Die beiden Theodori knüpfen mit Diokletian ein Gespräch über das Loskaufen des gefangen genommenen Sohnes des Perserkönigs an, und in diesem Zusammenhang wird gesagt: ,,Sofort erhob sich der König von seinem Thron und er übte an jeden einzelnen der Heiligen Andrang aus, ihn auf seinen Thron Platz nehmen zu lassen. Der König tat also, da er sich fürchtete vor ihrer grossen Kraft. Die Heiligen aber verlangten keine eitle Ehre dieser Welt, sondern sagten zum König: ‚Es ist nicht richtig, dass wir auf einem Thron sitzen, solange wir unter einem Krieg gebeugt gehen.' Die Würdenträger des Palastes wunderten sich über dasjenige, was der König seinen kräftigen Helden tat.''

Vergleiche mit Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030, Fol. 35 recto, Kol. b, Ut verso, Kol. b 5-8 den Passus Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65, fol. 74 = CSCO 86,132. Diokletian ermutigt die beiden Generäle zum Kampf. Zwischen ihnen findet das folgende Gespräch statt: ,,Theodorus Anatolius ergriff das Wort und sagte zu Theodorus Stratelates: ‚Mein Geliebter, werden wir in diesem Krieg siegen?' Er aber sagte: ‚Der Sieg ist nicht unser, sondern Gottes' ''.

Obgleich die Mitteilung im Titel, dass Theodorus, Erzbischof von Antiochia, der Autor der beiden encomia, Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030 und Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65, sei, historisch nicht richtig sein kann, lassen die beiden erwähnten parallelen Abschnitte trotzdem vermuten, dass sie von einer einzigen Quelle herrühren. Die Unterschiede werden dadurch bestimmt, dass in Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030 Theodorus Anatolius und in Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65 Theodorus Stratelates betont wird. Was in jeder der beiden Schriften von den zwei Generälen gesagt

wird harmoniert in der Regel. Mit der wichtigen Stellung des Claudius in Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 7030 stimmt in Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65, fol. 78 = CSCO 86,136 dasjenige überein, was von Diokletian zu den zwei Generälen gesagt wird: „Der König sagte zu den Heiligen: ‚Es ziemt sich nicht mit euch zu reden, während ich sitze und ihr steht, denn ihr beide und euer Freund Claudius sind der Ruhm meines Königreichs' ".

Mit dem Gespräch über das Anrecht auf den Thron in Ut recto, Kol. a 1-18 ist noch vergleichbar der Passus aus einem Fragment,[50] in dem der Teufel die Christengeneräle bei Diokletian verdächtigt: „Auch Claudius (erniedrigte) dich mit derselben Schmähung, sagend: ‚Das Königtum gehört mir, eher als dem Diokletian, da der Thron, auf dem er sitzt, meinem Vater gehört.' "

In verso, Kol. a 14 hat die Lesung von BM ⲁⲫⲭⲟⲟⲥ ⲛⲥⲁ = „er verleumdete" keinen Sinn und soll man mit Ut ⲁⲫⲭⲟⲟⲩ ⲛⲥⲁ = „er beschied zu sich" gelesen werden, wie es auch anderswo in dem Text vorkommt (verso Kol. a 23-24, Lesung BM).

ANMERKUNGEN

[1] Siehe Till, W. C., *Koptische Heiligen- und Märtyrerlegenden* (Roma 1935; Orientalia Christiana Analecta 102) I, ix; datierte Handschriften in Wallis Budge, E.A., *Miscellaneous Coptic Texts in the Dialect of Upper Egypt* (New York 1977) V, part 2, Tafel XII = Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental Nr. 6799, und Tafel XL = Nr. 7023, Handschriften vom 10. Jahrhundert; Stegemann, V., *Koptische Paläographie* (Heidelberg 1936) Tafel 18; Cramer, M., *Koptische Paläographie* (Wiesbaden 1964) Tafel 50, 54, 60, Handschriften vom 9. bis 11. Jahrhundert.

[2] Siehe Jansma, N. S. H., *Ornements des manuscrits coptes du Monastère Blanc* (Groningen 1973) 17.

[3] Stegemann, *Kopt. Paläogr.*, Tafel 18 = Ms. Pierpont Morgan Nr. 597, datiert 914, mit genau derselben Ornamentik mit Diple und Obelos.

[4] In der Literatur auch bekannt als Theodorus Orientalis.

[5] Wallis Budge, E.A., *Misc. Copt. Texts*, V, Teil 1, 1-48.

[6] Στρατηλάτης, n.b. zu unterscheiden von einem andern Militärheiligen, der nur den Beinamen Stratelates trägt.

[7] Einer der stark legendenhaften Züge.

[8] Numerianus gemäss Balestri, I. und Hyvernat, H., *Acta Martyrum* II (Louvain 1953); Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Vol. 86, Scriptores Coptici, Tomus 8, weiter abgekürzt CSCO, 103 = Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65, fol. 44.

[9] Das Motiv des Agrippita-Diokletian als Ziegenhirt findet sich auch im encomium über Theodorus Anatolius und Theodorus Stratelates, CSCO 86,97.

[10] In einem Martyrium des Theodorus Anatolius, Cod. Vatic. Copt. 63, *Acta Martyrum* I (Louvain 1961); CSCO 43,41, wird Agrippita zum Mitregenten des Maximinianus gemacht, der von der jüngsten Königstochter auf den Thron von Antiochia gesetzt ist.

[11] Vgl. II Sam. 11,15.

[12] Ende des Utrechter Fragments.

[13] Er wird von Theodorus und Claudius kriegsgefangen gemacht; in Cod. Vatic. Copt. 63, fol. 36 = CSCO 43,43 von Theodorus Anatolius und Leontius Arabs. Der Letztgenannte nimmt die Stelle des Claudius ein.

[14] Ein Zug, der in sämtlichen Theodorus-Erzählungen vorkommt.

[15] In Cod. Vatic. Copt. 63; CSCO 43,44 wird der Tod des Erzbischofs wie eine Strafe Gottes betrachtet und von den Königen Maximinianus und Diokletian vollzogen in dieser Weise, dass sie all das Gold des Bestechungsgeschenks schmelzen und in die Kehle des Erzbischofs giessen lassen.

[16] Cod. Vatic. Copt. 63 beschreibt dies in gleicher Weise.

[17] Siehe *Bibliotheca Sanctorum*, Rom, Artikel Teodoro, soldato, t. 12, col. 238-241, Teodoro l'Orientale, ibid. col. 259.

[18] Sei es unter einigermassen verschiedenen Umständen.

[19] Erythaios, Vater des Tiro; Johannes, Vater des Stratelates.

[20] Tiro unter Maximinianus; Stratelates unter Diokletian oder Licinius; Winstedt, E. O., *Coptic Texts on St. Theodore* (Amsterdam 1977), reprint of 1910 ed., IV; *Acta Sanctorum*, 7. Febr., Febr. Tom. II, 22-35: Stratelates; 9. Nov., Nov. Tom. IV, 11-89; Halkin, F., *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca* II (Bruxelles 1957; Subsidia Hagiographica, Nr. 8a) 277-279, 281-286.

[21] Z.B. das encomium über beide, Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65; CSCO 86, 90-156 = Winstedt, *op. cit.*, 1-133.

[22] Wohnort des Teufels, vgl. Evang. Matth. 4, 1-11.

[23] Vgl. Sankt Hubertus.

[24] Inkarnation des Teufels.

[25] Till, *Märtyrerlegenden* I, 106-111.

[26] Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65, fol. 73-76 und Ms. Tisch., fol. 30-31; Winstedt, *op. cit.*, 46-49, 111-113, 158-161.

[27] Cod. Vatic. Copt. 63, fol. 33; Balestri, I. und Hyvernat, H., *Acta Martyrum* I (Louvain, 1961); CSCO, Vol. 43, Scriptores Coptici, Tomus 3, 39-40.

[28] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 8 a 2, ed. Budge.

[29] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 29 a 1; 32 a 2.

[30] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 29 b 1.

[31] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 30 a 2.

[32] Cod. Vatic. Copt. 63; CSCO 43,38, Martyrium des Theodorus Anatolius.

[33] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 30 b 2.

[34] Cod. Vatic. Copt. 65; CSCO 86,103.

[35] Herodias hatte auch den Tod eines Märtyrers, nämlich des Johannes des Täufers, auf dem Gewissen; Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 31 b 1.

[36] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030 und Cod. Copt. Vatic. 65.

[37] Winstedt, E. O., *Coptic Texts on St. Theodore* (reprint Amsterdam 1979); Text and Translation Society 10, XX-XXVII, 10,81.

[38] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 27 a 2; b 1.

[39] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 25 b 2; 26 a 1.

[40] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 11 a 2.

[41] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 33 a 2.

[42] Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 34 a 2, „der König lebte im Glauben".

[43] Er spielt durch die ganze Geschichte hindurch eine Rolle, hat z.B. Theodorus und Claudius getauft, Brit. Mus. Ms. Oriental, Nr. 7030, fol. 8 a.

[44] II Sam. 11,15.

[45] Ev. Joh. 21,11, eine Zahl, die nach mehreren Exegeten sich möglicherweise auf die Kirche bezieht, während auch der Fisch ein christliches Symbol ist.

[46] Wie das Heer der Perser.

[47] Gideon-Motiv, Richter 7,2.

[48] Vgl. Crum, *Coptic Dictionary* 343 a.

[49] Recto, Kol. b 22-23.

[50] Paris, Bibl. nat., ms. copte 129[15], fol. 26, Seite 31 = Winstedt, *op. cit.*, 139,146.

KOLOPHON

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Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983) 306-312, E. J. Brill, Leiden

REVIEWS

Michael E. Stone, *Signs of the Judgement. Onomastica Sacra and the Generations from Adam* (University of Pennsylvania Armenian Texts and Studies, 3). Chico, Ca., Scholars Press, 1981. XVIII, 277 pp.

In this book the author presents four different texts, all relating to the field of apocrypha and pseudepigraphica in a more enlarged sense. The texts do not belong to the fixed canon of this type of literature but represent "crystallizations of traditions concerning biblical texts, personalities and events" that are important for our understanding of the development of these biblical traditions.

The first section offers new Armenian and Hebrew material to the textual tradition of the *Signs of the Judgement* (treating on the portents of the 15 days before Doomsday). Until the recent discovery of an Armenian version of this text in two Jerusalem manuscripts dating from the 17th and 18th centuries no witness of this tradition in an Oriental language was known. The author presents the two Armenian versions with an English translation, discusses their mutual relationship and compares them with two 12th century Latin versions. In a Commentary the relation of the Armenian texts with the European versions is discussed and parallels to each of the portents from older sources are adduced. The Armenian version probably is a translation but the language of its "Vorlage" cannot be established.

A 14th century Hebrew version of the *Signs* is published and translated here for the first time. It turns out to be a translation from a Latin source. Though neither the Hebrew nor the Armenian version is original, both texts are important in that they witness a textual tradition that cannot be derived directly from any of the existing European versions. As the author points out, the view that the *Signs* originated in Ireland from a body of material combining 10th century Old Irish writings (as the *Saltair na Rann*) and forms of the Latin version of the *Apocalypse of Thomas* should be rediscussed in view of the material presented here.

The second (most extensive) section of the book contains new material to the Armenian tradition of the *Onomastica Sacra* (lists of

biblical names with their etymologies) that goes considerably beyond the texts that were given by F. Wutz (Texte und Untersuchungen 40, 1914-1915). Whereas Wutz used eight manuscripts only, Stone lists 90 manuscripts of this text; samples from two of the texts edited by Wutz (*Onomastica Armena* I and III) are given with new information from other sources. Furthermore, Stone gives samples of new Armenian onomastica and the complete text of one of them. Part of this material found its way into one of the first printed Armenian dictionaries, the *Dictionary* of Eremia vardapet (1698 and 1728). The author here only intends to give preliminary material to a critical edition of the Armenian onomastica. As the author points out himself, his list of manuscripts is large but not exhaustive.

Indeed, one might mention here the manuscript Wrocław 21 whose *incipit* is similar to list I. For some of the entries of list VI one might refer to the critical edition of the above-mentioned *Dictionary* by H. Amalyan (Erevan 1975. E.g. on entries 17, 31, 32, 37, 40) where manuscript-material is included. From the general point of view, of course, those entries that are attested in the new texts for the first time are of most interest. Stone carefully notes these instances.

The last section of the book contains the Armenian text and translation of "*The Peoples of the Sons of Noah*" (enumerating the nations descending from the sons of Noah) and of "*The Generations from Adam*" (a genealogical table from Adam up to the 9th century AD, probably translated from Greek). Stone discusses the evidence of the Armenian text of "*The Peoples*" for the existence of a link between a similar list in the *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian and the *Chronicle* of Hippolytos.

Much care has been given to the presentation of the texts in this book; errors in the Armenian texts are rare. (A new textual problem is created on p. 110 ln. 36: if the manuscript reads *eraz* (as printed) the translation should be "dream"; if the translation "quick" (as printed) is correct the text should give *erag*). Indices are given at the end of the work.

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William C. Weinrich, *Spirit and Martyrdom. A Study of the Work of the Holy Spirit in Contexts of Persecution and Martyrdom in the New Testament and Early Christian Literature.* Washington, University Press of America, 1981. XIV und 320 S.

In der Forschung zum frühchristlichen Martyriumsverständnis ist wiederholt der Versuch unternommen worden, den Märtyrer vom Propheten her zu verstehen. Der Verf. dieser Studie, einer 1977 der Theologischen Fakultät Basel vorgelegten und leicht überarbeiteten Dissertation, verweist im Vorwort (XII) auf Karl Holl und Marc Lods, denen andere an die Seite gestellt werden könnten. Nach Holl war es Überzeugung der urchristlichen Gemeinde, daß der Märtyrer in der entscheidenden Stunde die prophetische Gabe erhält, »die überirdische Welt und den Herrn, zu dem er sich bekannte, mit Augen zu sehen« (*Ges. Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte* II, Tübingen 1928, 71). Sein Bekenntnis sei so ein Reden aus unmittelbarer Anschauung. Diese Vorstellung habe das Christentum aus dem Judentum übernommen. Demnach wäre der Märtyrer also durch eine ganz spezielle prophetische Gabe, die ihn von den anderen Christen abhebt, ausgezeichnet. Gerade das aber hat den Verf. gereizt, sich erneut mit der Frage nach dem Wirken des Heiligen Geistes in der Verfolgungssituation zu beschäftigen. Er kommt dabei zu der Auffassung, daß im Verständnis der frühen Christen gerade nicht Ekstase und Vision kennzeichnend sind für das Wirken des Geistes in der Verfolgungssituation. Vielmehr wird dieses in christologischer und ekklesiologischer Begrifflichkeit beschrieben: »The major presupposition of all talk concerning the persecution and martyrdom of the Christian believer was the resurrection of Jesus and his Lordship over the Church. The early Church understood this Lordship of Jesus to be exercised through the Spirit who in the power of the resurrection made the way of the disciples of Jesus to be that of Jesus himself« (XIII).

Der Verf. geht in einem 1. Kapitel zunächst auf das Alte Testament und die zwischentestamentliche Literatur ein und bespricht kurz Dan 3 u. 6; 2 u. 4 Makk und das Martyrium des Jesaja. Es fällt auf, daß die einschlägige Studie von O. H. Steck, *Israel und das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten. Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung des deuteronomistischen Geschichtsbildes im Alten Testament, Spätjudentum und Urchristentum*, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1967, nicht berücksichtigt wird. Eine Beschäftigung mit ihr hätte zu größerer Differenziertheit geführt. Als Ergebnis wird festgehalten, daß im jüdischen Bereich, abgesehen vom

Mart. Is., nicht vom Wirken des Gottesgeistes in der Verfolgungssituation gesprochen wird. Im *Mart. Is.* soll die entsprechende Aussage Jesaja als Propheten und nicht besonders als Märtyrer charakterisieren. Der Verf. erkennt hier nur »martyrologische Obertöne«. Das umfangreiche 2. Kap. behandelt die neutestamentliche Thematik. Der Reihe nach werden die synoptischen Evangelien, das Johannesevangelium, die Apostelgeschichte, die paulinischen Briefe, 1 Petrus, Hebräerbrief, 1 Johannes und die Apokalypse besprochen. Die Durchmusterung der entsprechenden Stellen ergibt, daß Ekstasen und Visionen in ihnen fast nicht vorkommen oder anderen, nicht martyrologischen Interessen dienen. Die »übernatürlichen« Elemente der Stephanusgeschichte beziehen sich nach dem Verf. nicht auf den Märtyrer Stephanus, sondern sollen ihn als Propheten Gottes zeigen, dessen Verkündigung dadurch bekräftigt wird. Vor allem an Paulus kann der Autor den christologischen Charakter, den der Geist dem christlichen Leiden verleiht, deutlich machen. In der Schwachheit und im Leiden des Apostels übt der gekreuzigte Christus seine Herrschaft aus. In den weiteren Kapiteln werden Ignatius von Antiochien, das Polykarpmartyrium, der Brief der Gemeinden von Lyon und Vienne, die *Passio Perpetuae* und schließlich Tertullian untersucht. Der Verf. sieht sein im Neuen Testament gewonnenes Bild im wesentlichen bestätigt, bemerkt aber vor allem bei Tertullian eine Akzentverschiebung zu einem ethischen Verständnis des Martyriums, in dem die ursprüngliche christologische und eschatologische Dimension verloren gegangen sei und das Martyrium vor allem als Akt menschlichen Gehorsams gegenüber dem göttlichen Willen verstanden werde. Im abschließenden Überblick konstatiert der Autor: »Christian reflexion on martyrdom has reverted to the Jewish view represented by the Maccabean literature« (280). Es folgen eine Bibliographie und ein Stellenregister der besprochenen Literatur.

In manchen Einzelfragen kann man sicher anderer Meinung sein. Doch darauf soll hier nicht eingegangen werden. Für gravierend halte ich es, daß der Verf. nirgendwo darüber reflektiert, warum er seine Untersuchung gerade mit Tertullian enden läßt. So wie er schließt, suggeriert er einen vor allem mit diesem Autor beginnenden »Abfall« von der ursprünglichen Höhe des christlichen Martyriumsverständnisses. Doch sähe das Bild anders aus, wenn der Verf. etwa auch Clemens Alexandrinus in seine Untersuchung einbezogen hätte. Zudem würde sich schon zum 2. Jahrhundert ein differenzierteres Bild ergeben, wenn z.B. auch Justin berücksichtigt worden wäre. Die Position Tertullians wird in der

abschließenden Zusammenfassung m.E. überzeichnet. Kann man wirklich zu *Ad mart.* 6 sagen: »Death in the arena is no different than death at the hand of a highway robber, or by a sudden fire, or by a beast met by chance in the forest« (280)? Tertullian will doch sagen: Wenn es schon so viele Möglichkeiten gibt, das Leben vorzeitig zu verlieren, um wieviel mehr müssen dann Christen zum Martyrium bereit sein. Die Art des Wirkens des Geistes wird meist treffend beschrieben. Doch meine ich, daß man ruhig einen Unterschied zwischen dem Wirken des Geistes im »normalen« christlichen Leben und in der Verfolgungssituation machen kann (vgl. XII). Der Geist wirkt jeweils den Umständen entsprechend. Im normalen Alltag braucht er nicht dem Christen die Worte einzugeben; doch dem vor Gericht Gestellten ist eine solche Hilfe verheißen (Mk 13, 11 und Parallelen). Die Geisterfahrung der Gemeinde ist eine andere als die des Ignatius auf dem Weg zum Martyrium. Von hier aus wird es dann verständlich, daß die *Traditio apostolica* des Hippolyt bestimmt, daß den Bekennern nicht die Hand zum Diakonat oder Presbyterat aufgelegt werden soll, da sie die Würde des Presbyterats bereits aufgrund ihres Bekenntnisses haben (Rekonstruktion von B. Botte, *La tradition apostolique de saint Hippolyte*, Münster ³1966, 28).

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Maximi Confessoris *Quaestiones et Dubia*, edidit José H. Declerck (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, 10). Turnhout, Brepols/Leuven, University Press, 1982. CCLIV, 256 p. 4950,00 b. Fr.

De nouveau la série grecque du Corpus Christianorum présente un texte qui était jusque maintenant pour la plupart inaccessible. En 1675 le dominicain Fr. Combefis publia les œuvres de S. Maxime le Confesseur. Après les *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* (dont on a édité la première partie, c'est-à-dire les *Quaestiones* I-LV, dans le numéro 7 de la même série; cf. *Vig. Chr.* 35, 1981, 438-9) on y trouvait une collection de 79 ἐρωταποκρίσεις, que l'éditeur a intitulées *Quaestiones et dubia* (*QD*). La présente édition contient 239 questions. On doit ce progrès surtout à C. Gianelli qui, en préparant un catalogue des manuscrits grecs de la bibliothèque vaticane, découvrit dans un codex du Xe siècle, le *Vat. gr. 1703*, une 'editio maior' des *QD* de S. Maxime.

On connaît le genre littéraire des ἐρωταποκρίσεις. Il consiste en un nombre de petites unités, dont chacun se compose d'une interrogation et d'une réponse. Évidemment cette forme littéraire ne demande pas un grand talent d'organisation de la part de l'auteur. Mais un tel genre a des conséquences pour la tradition du texte. On peut facilement faire des transcriptions incomplètes, des sélections. On peut aussi détacher des 'questions' de l'ensemble et les insérer dans une autre collection, comme c'est le cas pour les 'Chaînes'.

Cette forme de tradition pose de grands problèmes à un éditeur. Dans le présent cas on discerne, à part les 'questions' isolées, quatre sélections dont celle du *Vat. gr. 1703* est la plus grande. Après le texte complet de cette première sélection on fait suivre les trois autres, c'est-à-dire on donne le texte lui-même, s'il ne fait pas partie d'une collection précédente, on donne un renvoi si le texte est conforme à celui d'une des collections précédentes.

Une introduction très détaillée (250 pages) donne toutes les informations souhaitées sur tradition compliquée de ces collections et sur les 'questions' isolées.

Le texte grec est imprimé d'une façon impeccable. On admire toujours les qualités artistiques de cette série.

Par le caractère incohérent de cet ouvrage on ne peut pas donner une indication des choses traitées. Je me restreint à constater que l'étymologie et l'allégorie jouent un rôle important dans la pensée de S. Maxime.

A la fin du livre on trouve des concordances et des index. L'*index verborum*, qui est complet, comprend 3264 lemmes. Ce livre excellent mérite une félicitation sincère.

2312 GD *Leiden*, Haarlemmerstraat 106 J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

François Halkin, *Le Corpus Athénien de saint Pachôme*. Avec une traduction française par André-Jean Festugière, O.P. (Cahiers d'Orientalisme, 2). Genève, Patrick Cramer Éditeur, 1982. 168 p.

Deux célèbres spécialistes dans le domaine hagiographique, le P. François Halkin, Bollandiste, éditeur de la *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca*, et le P. André-Jean Festugière, traducteur des écrits concernant les moines d'Orient, ont coopéré à ce volume qui publie les quatre documents sur saint Pachôme comme on les trouve dans le codex *Atheniensis*

1015 — d'où le titre du livre. Quand le P. Halkin, en 1932, publia trois de ces documents, la *Vita prima*, l'*Epistula Ammonis* et les *Paralipomena*, il ne disposait que d'un seul manuscrit, le *Laurentianus* XI.9 de Florence, qui présentait une recension moins soignée de point de vue stylistique.

Le *Corpus Athénien* contient les trois documents mentionnés et en outre un opuscule incomplet qui paraît être une imitation fidèle des chapitres 32-34 de l'*Histoire Lausiaque* de Pallade.

Le P. Halkin publie ici une édition critique des quatre documents de l'*Atheniensis*. Le P. Festugière donne une traduction des *Paralipomènes* et de la *Lettre d'Ammon*. Pour les deux autres textes le lecteur est renvoyé à une traduction déjà existante.

Le texte grec a été imprimé d'une façon très soignée. La traduction est d'une qualité exceptionnelle. En la parcourant on se rend compte du fait que bien traduire est une activité vraiment créative. Dans un seul cas seulement je pense que le traducteur a négligé un pronom qui n'est pas sans importance. En *Paralipomènes* 3 l'auteur parle d'un moine, nommé Silvain, qui après sa conversion ne cessait de pleurer. Ses frères, ne pouvant endurer ces larmes, lui conseillaient τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ ξένων προσώπων ἢ ὅλως τινῶν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. On traduit: «de ne pas le faire devant des étrangers ou de cesser complètement». A mon avis les frères ne lui conseillaient pas de cesser ses larmes complètement, mais de ne pas les montrer aux étrangers ou tout court en présence d'autrui (τινῶν). Les τινές comprennent les frères aussi. A lui seul, dans sa cellule, il pourrait pleurer.

Le lecteur ne peut que se réjouir de cette édition précieuse.

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THE DELAY OF THE PAROUSIA IN HIPPOLYTUS

BY

DAVID G. DUNBAR

In the exegetical writings of Hippolytus of Rome we meet perhaps the most detailed exposition of biblical eschatology to be found among the fathers.[1] There is little that is innovative in his exposition, and most of it can be shown to be directly dependent on his second century predecessors, especially Irenaeus.[2] At one significant point, however, he parts company with the earlier traditions: he is the first writer to reject explicitly the hope of an imminent Parousia. In this paper we shall examine the historical context and theological significance of Hippolytus' contribution.

Historical Context

The eschatological writings of Hippolytus were composed during the opening years of the third century. The two works of primary interest, the *Commentary on Daniel* (c. 202-204) and the slightly earlier treatise *On Christ and Antichrist* (c. 200), reflect the widespread concern among Christians over the events and chronology of the end times.

Many members of the church during the early centuries shared an expectation of the imminent return of Christ which was grounded on the conviction that their generation was the one upon which "the end of the ages" had come (1 Cor. 10:11; cf. 1 Pet. 4:7), that history had presently entered upon its "last hour" (1 John 2:18), and that the promise of Jesus—"Yes, I am coming quickly" (Rev. 22:20)—would shortly be fulfilled. If the effects of the delay of Christ's return have been exaggerated by Martin Werner,[3] it is nonetheless clear that the extension of history was cause for various sorts of reflection and controversy. The NT itself witnesses to the unbelief provoked among some by the delay. Thus 2 Pet. 3:3-4 warns Christians against mockers who raise the question: "Where is the promise of his coming?" Clement of Rome, while himself affirming the imminent hope,[4] also records the doubts of some

who said, "We have heard these things even in the days of our fathers, and behold we have grown old, and none of these things has happened to us."[5] Likewise the *Ascension of Isaiah* reveals the dissension among Christians over the non-appearances of the end: "... and afterwards, when he is at hand, his disciples will foresake the teaching of the twelve apostles and their faith, their love and their purity, and there will arise much contention about his coming and his appearing."[6]

Several possibilities were available for dealing with the problem of delay. One was the radical recasting of the historical-eschatological categories of the bible which took place in Gnosticism. Whether the actual stimulus to certain forms of Gnosticism was the failure of Jewish apocalyptic hopes is debatable;[7] nevertheless, Gnosticism represented an outright rejection of biblical eschatology. The metaphysical dualism which was the presupposition of the various Gnostic systems was inevitably pessimistic in regard to the physical world and thus to the historical process. Gnosticism did not look for the final intervention of God in the created world but for an escape of the spiritual element in humanity from the evils of material existence. The language of biblical apocalyptic could only be employed by a spiritualizing reinterpretation which was "forever severed from history, society, and men."[8]

There were, of course, many in the church who maintained the traditional faith. For them delay was handled merely by a revision of the chronology and a reaffirmation of the imminent end. In the latter part of the second century Montanism played its part in stressing the imminent return of Christ. Montanist prophecies specified Pepuza and Tymion, villages in Phrygia, as the place of the appearing of the New Jerusalem.[9] Hippolytus himself mentions a church leader in Pontus who convinced his followers that the final judgment would occur within a year with the result that believers sold their possessions and ignored cultivating their fields. Another preacher in Syria led believers into the desert to meet Christ, and tragedy nearly occurred when governmental authorities mistook them for brigands.[10] Although Montanism was condemned in Rome before the end of the second century, its continuing influence in the city drew forth the radical opposition of the learned churchman Gaius who denied the authenticity of the Apocalypse of John, presumably because of its role in Montanist propaganda.[11]

Contributing to this heightened eschatological anticipation was the relationship of Christianity to the empire at the turn of the century. Following the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180, a period of relative

freedom from state persecution had ensued. However, the situation changed quickly with the renewal of persecution in the tenth year of Septimius Severus (either August 201 to August 202 or April 202 to April 203).[12] W. H. C. Frend notes that "the Severan persecution was the first coordinated worldwide move against the Christians. ... Perhaps because of the relatively high social standing of the vicitims, it produced a profound impression on the Christians themselves."[13] This "profound impression" registered itself in part in the renewed interest in apocalyptic themes. Eusebius tells of a certain Christian writer named Judas who composed an exposition of the Seventy Weeks prophecy of Daniel. He interpreted the fulfillment of the prophecy to coincide with the tenth year of the reign of Septimius Severus, and he believed that the appearance of the Antichrist was near at hand.[14] Nor did these events pass without their effect on Hippolytus: a good number of passages in the *Commentary on Daniel* indicate that it was written "in the midst of persecution, or when its memory was still vivid."[15]

It is in this context that we find Hippolytus' argument for the necessary delay of the Parousia. Christians ought not to think that the present sufferings of the church are the eschatological woes signalling Christ's return, for that return is not imminent. In support of this argument Hippolytus employs the creation-week typology widely accepted in the west until Augustine.[16] According to this typology, which developed in intertestamental Judaism, history will run a course of six one-thousand year "days" after which Christ will return to usher in the eschatological sabbath. It is with the early Christian chronographers that we find the first evidence for the development of this theme in a distinctly Christian (as opposed to Jewish) direction. Julius Africanus placed the incarnation in the middle of the sixth millennium of world history, 5500 years after Adam.[17] It would appear that the same basic chronology was used at an earlier period by Theophilus of Antioch although he does not supply an exact date for the incarnation.[18]

Hippolytus adopts the earlier chronological framework and with elaborate spiritualizing exegesis provides biblical support for dating the Christian era from 5500. The Apostle John refers to seven kings of whom "five have fallen, one is, the other has not yet come" (Rev. 17:10). We are told that the one yet to come is the seventh day, the repose of the eschatological kingdom. More exact proof is found in the dimensions of the ark of the covenant which yield a total of five-and-a-half cubits. This symbolizes the five-and-a-half millennia at the end of

which the Savior was born. That the Savior appeared at the end of 5500 years, with the incorruptible ark of his body, is demonstrated also by John when he says "it was about the sixth hour," that is, one half a day. Now a day for the Lord is 1,000 years, and a half of this is 500 years.[19] His advance upon earlier writers is that he uses the chronology to set the date of the Parousia specifically at 500 years after the birth of Christ—the end of the sixth day. Such a dating was implied to be sure in the earlier occurrences of this scheme, but Hippolytus is the first to make it explicit. He does so with a plainly expressed reserve, "But what is it to you to be overly concerned about the times and to seek out the day of the Lord, when the Savior has hidden this from us?" Yet he feels it necessary to make some concessions to human curiosity, and thus he will speak "what it is not lawful to speak."[20] In spite of the biblical warnings against any prediction of the day or the hour of the Parousia, he projects the date nearly three centuries into the future.

Clearly the immediate concern of Hippolytus is pastoral. Adventist preachers were tempted to equate belief in their own prophecies of the end with belief in the scriptures themselves.[21] In order to protect Christians from disillusionment and loss of faith, he argues that the problem is not at all with scripture but with those who trust in visions rather than scripture.[22]

Thus far the role and purpose of the delay hypothesis is obvious. We must now explore the extent to which this idea may have influenced the larger theological outlook of Hippolytus.

Theological Significance

1. Philosophy of history

The significance of the theory of a necessary delay of the Parousia is seen first in regard to the church's developing understanding of history. It is a scholarly commonplace to speak of the historical character of the Christian religion over against the quasi-historical (mythical) nature of other ancient religions or the basically anti-historical character of Greek philosophical thought.[23] The church's interest in history had its roots in the very center of the Christian faith: the fact of Jesus Christ. Heirs of both the OT prophets and the traditions of the apostles, the Fathers viewed history as an interlocking scheme of events, divinely arranged, and centering on the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. Through Christ God had brought the old aeon to a close. And if Chris-

tians knew that "the world is passing away" (1 John 2:17), they recognized also that in Jesus the new creation had come (2 Cor. 5:17).

But it was precisely this newness that was the central concern of the Christian philosophy of history prior to Hippolytus. This stemmed in part from the dialogue with Judaism over the church's claim to be the true Israel of God. How could Christianity maintain its continuity with the OT and recognize Abraham as the father of all those who believe and at the same time proclaim that in Christ God had established a New Covenant which made Judaism obsolete? While the *Epistle of Barnabas* and Justin Martyr argued the case somewhat differently, both were agreed that it was the church, not Judaism, which stands in continuity with God's purposes.[24] The continuity-discontinuity issue was also at the heart of the confrontation between Irenaeus and his Gnostic and Marcionite opponents. For them the discontinuity between OT and NT was so great that they concluded that a different God was revealed in each. Irenaeus maintains the continuity. It was not one God who spoke to the Jews in the OT and another who revealed himself in Jesus Christ; rather, there is only one creator-God and "the author of the law and the gospel is shown to be one and the same."[25] By stressing the unity of OT and NT Irenaeus focuses attention on the significance of God's action in human history.

> The point at which Irenaeus takes up Gnosticism is the point at which its mythology becomes a physics of redemption... He substitutes for the Gnostic redemption-physics a Christian redemption-history. The Gnostics had seen their salvation as *by* nature, *from* history: Irenaeus sees salvation as *by* history, *in* nature.[26]

The newness of Christianity was also problematic in the conflict with paganism. There was in pagan thought a high regard for the antiquity of belief, and any teaching which lacked a substantial historical pedigree was under suspicion. Because Christianity proclaimed not timeless truths but the relatively recent historical events of the life of Christ it might be rejected as a novelty.[27] Again, the response of the church was to assert, as it had against Judaism and Gnosticism, its continuity with the OT. Theophilus of Antioch may be taken as representative of those many apologists who replied to paganism by turning the argument from antiquity on its head. Arguing from the "antiquity of the prophetic writings" he concludes that the Christian message "is not recent in origin, nor are our writings, as some suppose, mythical and false. They are actually more ancient and more trustworthy."[28] It was the desire to support such reasoning that lay in part behind the early Christian in-

terest in chronology and the development of the concept of universal history which reached maturity in the works of Eusebius.[29]

Hippolytus himself shares the concern of the larger church with the meaning and pattern of history. For the larger structure of history he employs, as we have seen, the common creation-week typology. His *Chronicle* is a detailed attempt to chart the 5738 years of world history from creation to the thirteenth year of Alexander Severus; it is probably indebted to the similar treatises of Theophilus of Antioch and Julius Africanus. Significant too for Hippolytus are the historical patterns established by his exegesis of the book of Daniel: the dream of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 2:31-49), the vision of the four beasts arising from the sea (Dan. 7:1-28; cf. 8:1-27),[30] and the prophecy of the Seventy Weeks (Dan. 9:24-27).[31]

The advance made by Hippolytus on earlier Christian thinkers is that he focuses attention on the time between the first and second advents. Like his mentor Irenaeus he is committed to affirming the significance of redemptive history as a whole, but by the concept of a necessary delay he affirms the particular significance of the interim history of the church. Against this position both Montanism (and similar adventist movements) and Gnosticism threatened in their own ways to deny the significance of the interim. For the one (Montanism) there was no *place* for the continuation of history; for the other (Gnosticism) there was no *purpose* for the continuation of history. By contrast Hippolytus stresses the time before the end. The problematical delay of the eschaton is recognized to be not only an historical possibility, but indeed it is a necessity. Now that explicit justification has been given for the period of waiting Christians would have more cause to reflect on what the relationship between the church and her environment ought to be during this extension of history.[32] We recall that for Hippolytus history follows a pattern corresponding to God's six-day work in creation. Rest can come only on the seventh day. By implication then the interim belongs to the period of labor. The church has been left in the world "in order that in the remaining half time the gospel might be preached in all the world."[33]

We note also that for Hippolytus the interim time is qualitatively distinct from that of Christ and apostles. The church up to this time had tended to understand the inter-advent period as merely an extension of the New Testament age. Thus Montanism could claim a restoration of the primitive charismatic existence of the church, and with it the renewal

of the gift of prophecy. Such claims in the eyes of Hippolytus are necessarily false, for history has now entered a distinctly new phase. "The title 'prophet' is already limited to the prophets of scripture, the last of which he sees in John the author of the Apocalypse."[34] The task of the church in the present age is not to proclaim fresh revelation but to be a faithful steward of the truth delivered once for all by the Lord and his apostles. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hippolytus should have bequeathed to later generations his *Apostolic Tradition* "so that they who have been well trained, may, by our instruction, hold fast that tradition which has continued up to now."[35]

2. Church and state

If the idea of a necessary interim focuses attention on the role of the church in the world, it has potentially great significance for the development of a positive and optimistic view of the church's relationship to the state. The extent to which Hippolytus exploited this potential must now be explored.

The writings of the Fathers of the second and third centuries display a variety of attitudes toward the Roman empire which run the gamut from a favorable view of the empire as the God ordained means for preserving peace in the world to an antagonism which saw it as the blasphemous oppressor of God's people.[36] The polarity in the Christian conception of the state is found already in the NT—the more favorable view in Romans 13 and the less favorable in Revelation 13—and most of the Fathers reflect this polarity even if they tend to emphasize one aspect at the expense of the other. However, it was the positive evaluation of the Roman empire which was to become the dominant theme among the early Fathers. The peak of such optimism was reached in the years immediately following the conversion of Constantine and is evidenced in the writings of Eusebius. Yet the actualization of a "Christian" empire had long been anticipated and hoped for. The prayers of the Christians on behalf of the empire are "probably the clearest proof that, in the early church, we may not speak of an antipathy or indifference in principle to the earthly authority."[37] Thus *1 Clement*, written shortly after the persecution of Domitian, contains a long prayer on behalf of the very state which inaugurated persecution.[38] But the courtship of the state by the church is evidenced even more clearly in the generally conciliatory approach of the Apologists toward Rome. Quite optimistic is Melito of

Sardis who parallels the history of the church and the empire. Both took their rise under Augustus, and the success of Rome is the result of its protection of the church.[39] Justin Martyr, both in his first *Apology* and in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, cites OT passages prophesying the submission of earthly kings to Christ.[40] The objection of Celsus to the hypothesis of a Christian emperor[41] may be taken as evidence that such ideas were being discussed among Christians already in the second century.[42] To be sure, an undercurrent of criticism toward Rome is present even in literature which may be generally positive in its treatment of the empire. The persecution of Christians leads to an oft-repeated censure of such injustice.[43] Yet even here the indictment is not general: the aversion of Rome to Christianity came to be regarded by the church as the exception to the rule—it was only wicked emperors like Nero and Domitian who had persecuted the people of God.[44]

What then is Hippolytus' view of the state? The concept of the necessary delay of the Parousia seems to open the possibility here for one of the strongest endorsements of the state in any of the literature prior to Eusebius. Yet at this very point we are surprised, for of all the Fathers, none offers a more thorough-going condemnation of Rome than does Hippolytus. Like many before him he cites Rom. 13:1ff and 1 Pet. 2:14, 20 which command the obedience of Christians to human governments on the ground that all government is established by God himself.[45] In Hippolytus, however, such acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the temporal order does not lead to any rapprochement with the civil authorities. Rather, he sees a basic antagonism of government toward its subjects: the rulers of the world slay and cook men as a cook slays and kills animals.[46] The tree in the vision of Daniel 4 is interpreted as an elaborate allegory of Nebuchadnezzar's kingdom; the beasts which live under the tree are the warriors who execute the orders of the king, "always ready to make war, destroy, and tear men apart like wild animals."[47] At another point Hippolytus compares earthly empires in general to beasts which devour humanity.[48] His judgment of Rome is particularly severe. Though Rome is understood as the κατέχον (2 Thess. 2:6) which retards the appearance of the Antichrist, the Empire is still to be reckoned as "Babylon," the eschatological opponent of the people of God.[49] Wheras Melito of Sardis and Origen saw the concurrent rise of Christianity and the Roman Empire as providential and beneficial,[50] Hippolytus interprets the same phenomenon as the evidence of a Satanic purpose to counterfeit God's true kingdom.[51]

What reasons lie behind this harsh critique of the empire? How is it that Hippolytus formulates a view of church and state which is just the opposite of what his theory of a necessary interim might lead us to expect? The answer lies in two factors: the recent persecution of the church by Rome and the realism[52] which marks Hippolytus' aproach to biblical prophecy. The Severan persecution itself would have constituted a powerful but not insurmountable obstacle to a favorable view of Rome. But to this must be added the effects of his exegesis of such apocalyptic writings as Daniel and Revelation. His realistic exegesis found in these works a basic mistrust of the empire which dovetailed perfectly with the existential situation of the church. While he does not regard the present tribulation as the beginning of the eschatological woes, there is a correlation between the two. Hippolytus argues that "that which has happened in part, ought to give us an idea of that which will come."[53] But if he understands the future in terms of the present, the reverse is also the case: he reads the present relationship of the church to the state in light of the expected oppression of the church by the Antichrist. It appears then that for the earlier exegetical writings of Hippolytus the two factors of persecution and eschatological outlook combined to silence all the positive implications of his delay hypothesis.

Because this outlook was so radically negative, it attracted few followers and was not destined to last. As noted above the church tended toward a favorable view of the empire; generally then a strongly anti-Roman perspective like that of Hippolytus would find no widespread sympathy except in those periods when the advances of the church toward the state were rebuffed most directly, namely, in times of intense persecution. It is not inappropriate to ask whether the views of Hippolytus himself may have changed to make allowance for a positive assessment of Rome once the threat of persecution became more remote. The question has been answered affirmatively by A. Donini who argues that in his later years Hippolytus abandoned or at least attenuated his hostility to the empire as a result of the increasingly favorable political situation at Rome. Certainly his later writings (particularly the *Refutation of All Heresies* and the *Chronicle*) contain little of the apocalyptic outlook or the anti-Roman fervor of the earlier exegetical treatises. That he dedicated his work *On the Resurrection* to Julia Mammaea, the mother of Alexander Severus, suggests that by the end of his career Hippolytus was not wholly adverse to the favors of one in a position of high political influence.[54]

If the foregoing reconstruction is correct, it would indicate that within the eschatological system of Hippolytus there was an unresolved tension between the negative views of the state which arose from his apocalyptic sources and the (potentially) positive view of the church's relationship to the empire which derived from his theory of a necessary interim. The deciding factor in this tension was the attitude of the state toward the church: during times of persecution the positive note was completely subordinated to the themes and imagery of biblical apocalyptic; but in happier times apocalyptic played a lesser role in the work of Hippolytus and the way was opened to a more optimistic view of the empire, a view which would find fullest expression a century later in Eusebius.

3. Ethics

On the basis of Hippolytus' view of the non-imminence of the Parousia, one might be tempted to conclude a priori that his eschatology could have little positive bearing upon Christian ethics: What lies three centuries in the future can have no relevance for the present.[55] However, the actual situation is different. G. Bardy has observed that two basic ideas dominate Hippolytus' conception of the Christian life: "the approach of the end of the world [and] the necessity of courage in persecutions."[56] This is only to say that, as with Hippolytus' conception of the relationship of church and state, we may detect here the influence both of eschatology and the church's experience of persecution.

For the Christian under persecution he advocated a courageous witness to faith. When delivered up to the tribunal, the believer should seek a martyr's death: "What is your concern, O man? Is it to undergo martyrdom and to depart from this world covered with glory, or to escape and remain here to commit sin?"[57] As in the case of many who remain faithful in times of persecution, the difficulties of the time produced in Hippolytus a moral austerity which has little toleration for weaker members of the flock. He regards the church as "the holy assembly of those who live in righteousness."[58] As when Adam disobeyed God and ate of the tree of knowledge, he was excluded from paradise, so the believer who does not keep the commandments is deprived of the Holy Spirit, being excluded from the church.[59] The profession of Christian faith is incompatible with a sinful life: "If someone

calls himself a believer and acts like an unbeliever, he will receive a double condemnation, even if he remains concealed in this world."[60]

This rigor which had developed in the context of the Severan persecution finds a support in the Hippolytean exegesis of biblical apocalyptic. Occupation with the Christian hope will keep believers from sin,[61] for they will realize that the kingdom belongs only to the righteous.[62] Especially in times of persecution the saints should keep before their eyes the judgment of God so that when the bridegroom appears they may be ready to go in to the wedding feast.[63] The book of Daniel is particularly suited to the needs of Hippolytus, because it blends history and eschatology in somewhat the same fashion that he does. Thus, from the standpoint of the early third century, Hippolytus can reach backward into history for such fruitful examples as Susanna, Daniel, and the three Hebrew children; and the lessons from these examples can be applied directly to the suffering church. On the other hand, the same literature can supply information about the eschatological persecutions (and ultimate deliverance) of the people of God which in turn can also be brought to bear on the present existence of believers. This blending of past, present, and future is clearly related to the realism which marked Hippolytus' approach to apocalyptic language. Because his eschatology is developed in categories of concrete historical expectation, the eschatological teachings of scripture have direct relevance for the present.

However, we find here a dialectical tension between the eschatological realism of Hippolytus and his theory of the necessary delay of the Parousia not unlike that which we found in his understanding of church-state relationships. The idea of delay does not rob eschatology of its parenetic value because "the chronological imminence" of the consummation "was less significant than its psychological imminence."[64] Nevertheless, we sense a certain blunting of the cutting edge of his ethics: if the bridegroom certainly delays his coming for another three centuries, is it really so important to be ready today? The reserve shown in speaking "what it is not lawful to speak" and the rebuke of those who, fearing martyrdom, sought "to escape and remain here to commit sin" suggest that Hippolytus himself was aware of the tension caused by the notion of a delay of the Parousia. It is a tension which could be resolved only by a modification of one or both sides of the dialectic. In Hippolytus it is never resolved, but as it worked itself out in the succeeding life and thought of the church the

resolution took place in favor of the idea of non-imminence. Thus, the church experienced a gradual dimming of the reality of the eschatological hope; and as it settled itself for a longer stay in the world, it moved not only toward a position of closer alignment with the state, but also toward "its inevitable concomitant, the secularization of the church."[65] The realistic eschatology of Hippolytus, his rigorous ethical stance, and his radically negative disposition to the state expressed in his earlier writings, would have few true successors.

NOTES

[1] For a detailed treatment of Hippolytean eschatology see my Drew University dissertation, *The Eschatology of Hippolytus of Rome* (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1979); see also the relevant sections of A. d'Alès, *La Théologie de saint Hippolyte* (Paris 1906) and K. J. Neumann, *Hippolytus von Rom in seiner Stellung zu Staat und Welt* (Leipzig 1902).

[2] See my diss., 143-152.

[3] M. Werner, *The Formation of Christian Dogma*, transl. S. G. F. Brandon (New York 1957). For critique of Werner's thesis see J. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: 1 The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)* (Chicago 1971) 123ff; H. E. W. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth* (London 1954) 20-23; W. C. van Unnik, Der Ausdruck "in den letzten Zeiten" bei Irenaeus, in *Neotestamentica et Patristica*, ed. W. C. van Unnik (Leiden 1962) 293-304.

[4] *1 Clem.* 23, 5.

[5] *1 Clem.* 23, 3; cf. *2 Clem.* 11, 2. Cited in Werner, *op cit.*, 42.

[6] *Asc. Is.* 3, 21-22.

[7] R. M. Grant, *Gnosticism in the Early Church* (New York 1959) 27-38, has argued that the origins of Gnosticism are to be found in the disillusionment of Jewish apocalypticists with the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70. For discussion of the problem see E. Yamauchi, *Pre-Christian Gnosticism* (Grand Rapids, Mich. 1973) 156-58 and the literature cited there.

[8] S. Laeuchli, *The Language of Faith* (New York 1962) 82.

[9] Eusebius, *H.e.* 5, 18, 2.

[10] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 18-19 (GCS 1/1, 230-234).

[11] P. de Labriolle, *La crise montaniste* (Paris 1913) 278-285.

[12] T. D. Barnes, Legislation Against the Christians, *Journal of Roman Studies* 58 (1968) 41.

[13] W. H. C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church* (Oxford 1965) 321.

[14] Eusebius, *H.e.* 6, 7.

[15] Frend, *op. cit.*, 343, n. 167.

[16] For the origin and development of this typology, see J. Daniélou, La typologie millenariste de la semaine, *Vigiliae Christianae* 2 (1948) 1-16.

[17] See the discussion of Africanus' use of the creation-week typology in H. Gelzer, *Sextus Julius Africanus und die Byzantinische Chronologie* 1 (Leipzig 1880-85) 24ff. Martin Werner, *The Formation of Christian Dogma* (New York 1957) 38 has argued that Christian usage originally placed the death of Christ at 6000 and that the displacement of the birth (and death) of Christ to the earlier date was the necessary result of the delay of the

Parousia. However, the evidence offered in support of this "early" view—Ps. Cyprian, *De monte Sina et Sion* 4 and Adamantius, *Dial.* 2, 3—is probably from the third century. The first of these is dated *circa* 210-240 by A. Harnack, *Geschichte der Altchristliche Literatur bis Eusebius* 2 (Leipzig² 1893-1897) 383-385. The second is probably from about 300; see J. Quasten, *Patrology* 2 (Westminster, Md. 1964) 146-147; Harnack, *op. cit.*, 2, 149-151.

[18] Theophilus, *Autol.* 3, 28, gives the total years from creation to the death of the Roman emperor Aurelius Verus as 5695 years. He gives no specific date for the birth or death of Christ, but according to his totals for the length of reigns of the various emperors the incarnation would fall somewhere near the exact middle of the sixth millennium.

[19] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 23-24 (GCS 1/1, 242-246).

[20] Ibid., 4, 22-23 (GCS 1/1, 238-240).

[21] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 19 (GCS 1/1, 234) reports on a preacher who stated, "If it does not happen as I have said, then no longer believe even the scriptures, but each one of you do whatever you please."

[22] Ibid.

[23] On the patristic understanding of history see R. Bainton, Patristic Christianity, in *The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East*, ed. R. C. Denton (New Haven 1955) 215-236; A. Chroust, The Relation of Religion to History in Early Christian Thought, *The Thomist* 18 (1955) 61-70; R. P. L. Milburn, *Early Christian Interpretations of History* (London 1954); L. G. Patterson, *God and History in Early Christian Thought* (New York 1967); C. A. Patrides, *The Grand Design of God* (London 1972) 13-27.

[24] *Barn.* 14, 1-4; Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 14.

[25] Irenaeus, *Haer.* 4, 12, 3 (Roberts/Rambaut 1, 410); cf. 3, 10, 2 (Roberts/Rambaut 1, 283): "men were taught to worship God after a new fashion, but not another God."

[26] R. A. Markus, Pleroma and Fulfillment: the Significance of History in St. Irenaeus' Opposition to Gnosticism, *Vigiliae Christianae* 8 (1954) 219; see also O. Cullman, *Christ and Time*, transl. F. V. Filson (Philadelphia 1950) 56-57.

[27] Pelikan, *Christian Tradition*, 34.

[28] Theophilus of Antioch, *Autol.* 3, 29 (Grant 145); cf. 3, 16 (Grant 121). Similar arguments may be found in Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 59; Tatian, *Or.* 31; Tertullian, *Marc.* 2, 17; Hippolytus, *Ref.* 10, 30; Origen, *Cels.* 6, 7; Eusebius, *H.e.* 1, 4, 1; *P.e.* 10, 14; *et passim*.

[29] R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946) 50-51.

[30] The dream of Nebuchadnezzar and Daniel's vision are interpreted concordantly both in *Anti.* 23-25 (GCS 1/2, 16-17) and *Dan.* 4, 2-5 (GCS 1/1, 186-196). Both visions depict the rise and fall of four great empires: Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome. The visions are understood eschatologically in so far as Rome is understood as "the restrainer" (κατέχον, 2 Thess. 2:6) which delays the appearance of the Antichrist.

[31] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 30-35 (GCS 1/1, 262-282). Hippolytus understands the first sixty-nine "weeks" (483 years) as beginning with the twenty-first year of the exile and terminating with the death of Christ. He follows Irenaeus in relating the seventieth week to the reign of the Antichrist. See further my diss., 72-77; on the history of exegesis of Dan. 9:24-27 see F. Fraidl, *Die Exegese der siebzig Wochen Daniels in der alten und mittleren Zeit* (Graz 1886).

[32] That related conceptions of the postponement of the end were at work in the eschatological thought of Tertulllian suggests that the problem was basic to Christian

thought at the beginning of the third century. Tertullian, however, did not argue for a necessary delay. See the discussion of J. Pelikan, *The Finality of Jesus Christ in a Age of Universal History* (Richmond 1966) 7-17. Pelikan finds particular importance in Tertullian's statement: "We pray ... for the delay in the end" (*Apol.* 39).

[33] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 24 (GCS 1/1, 246). This important text is also noted by Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 13-14.

[34] A. Hamel, *Kirche bei Hippolyt von Rom* (Gütersloh 1951) 122; cf. Pelikan, *Christian Tradition*, 106.

[35] Hippolytus, *Ap. Trad.* 1 (Easton, 33).

[36] The secondary literature here is enormous. We note several surveys: K. Aland, The Relation between Church and State in Early Times, *Journal of Theological Studies* 19 (1968) 115-127; *Idem*, Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in der Frühzeit, in *Aufstieg der Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Bd 23, 1 (Berlin-New York 1979) 60-246; C. J. Cadoux, *The Early Church and the World* (Edinburgh 1925) esp. 247-68, 335-402, 505-564; R. M. Grant, *Early Christianity and Society: Seven Studies* (San Francisco 1977) 13-43; R. A. Markus, The Roman Empire in Early Christian Historiography, *The Downside Review* 81 (1963) 340-354; J. Speigl, *Der römische Staat und die Christen* (Amsterdam 1970).

[37] R. Klein, *Tertullian und das römische Reich* (Heidelberg 1968) 19.

[38] *1Clem.* 60. Even Tertullian, seldom slow to voice his criticism of Rome, writes: "We pray, too, for the emperors, for their ministers, and for all in authority, for the welfare of the world, for the prevalence of peace, for the delay of the final consummation" *Apol.* 39 (Roberts/Donaldson, 118); similarly Justin Martyr, 1 *Apol.* 17; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 37; Cyprian, *ad Demetr.* 20.

[39] Eusebius, *H.e.* 4, 26, 7.

[40] Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 40; 50; *Dial.* 13; 34.

[41] Origen, *Cels.* 8, 71.

[42] R. M. Grant, *Augustus to Constantine* (New York 1970) 93.

[43] E.g., Athenagoras, *Leg.* 1; Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 3, 5 *et passim.*

[44] E.g., Melito of Sardis (Eusebius, *H.e.* 4, 26, 9); Tertullian, *Apol.* 5 On the church's willful disregard for the true political situation, see Cadoux, *op. cit.*, 260-61; Aland, *Church and State*, 122-124.

[45] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 3, 23 (GCS 1/1, 166).

[46] Ibid., 2, 4 (GCS, 1/1, 50).

[47] Ibid., 3, 8 (GCS, 1/1, 184).

[48] Ibid., 4, 2 (GCS, 1/1, 184).

[49] Idem, *Anti.* 29-36 (GCS 1/2, 19-23).

[50] Eusebius, *H.e.* 4, 26 7ff.; Origen, *Cels.* 8, 68.

[51] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 9 (GCS 1/1, 206-208).

[52] By realism I mean an approach to the text which assumes that the apocalyptic sections of the Bible will find their fulfillment in concrete, historical events. Cf. Laeuchli, *op. cit.*, 79-81.

[53] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 4, 51 (GCS 1/1, 318).

[54] A. Donini, *Ippolito di Roma* (Rome 1925) 115-121; cf. Frend. *op. cit.*, 377. It should be noted also that Hippolytus speaks appreciatively of Marcia, the concubine of Commodus and friend of the Christians, *Ref.* 9, 12 (GCS 26, 247-248); cited in Cadoux, *op. cit.*, 387.

[55] This is Neumann's conclusion: "The eschatological expectation can have no practical importance for the earthly life of the generation of Septimius Severus and Hippolytus and for many generations still to follow" (*op. cit.*, 78).

[56] G. Bardy, *La vie spirituelle d'après les pères des trois premiers siècles* 2 (Tournai 1968) 181.

[57] Hippolytus, *Dan.* 2, 37 (GCS 1/1, 112).

[58] Ibid., 1, 17 (GCS 1/1, 28).

[59] Ibid., 1, 17 (GCS 1/1, 29).

[60] Ibid., 1, 24 (GCS 1/1, 36).

[61] Idem, *Anti.* 67 (GCS 1/2, 46-47).

[62] Idem, *De univ.* (TU 20, 141-142).

[63] Idem, *Dan.* 4, 59 (GCS 1/1, 336); cf. 1, 22 (GCS 1/1, 34-35); 3, 31 (GCS 1/1, 180).

[64] B. McGinn (ed.), *Apocalyptic Spirituality* (New York 1979) 14. McGinn uses the phrase of Lactantius who employs the same creation-week typology as Hippolytus.

[65] Grant, *op. cit.*, 220-221; cf., Werner, *op. cit.*, 300-303.

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THE PROCEDURE OF ST. CYPRIAN'S SYNODS

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Curiously little critical attention has ever been paid to the theory, set forth in the early part of this century by P. Batiffol, that the procedure of African episcopal synods as revealed in the letters of St. Cyprian of Carthage was modelled upon that of the Roman Senate.[1] The theory is open to various sorts of objections, perhaps the simplest of which is that bishops of the mid-third century had no reason for behaving in this way, but since it continues to infect the study of church history in certain quarters, a critical examination may not be out of place.

The notion that conciliar procedure conformed itself in some ways to that of the Roman Senate antedates Batiffol. H. Gelzer claimed that the ecumenical councils were intended by the emperors to be nothing else than a replacement for the Senate in the regulation of religious affairs once Christianity had been officially adopted by the empire.[2] Just as in their capacity as magistrates the emperor and his deputies called meetings of the Senate and presided over them, so the ecumenical councils were (he said) summoned by the emperor alone, whose commissioners guided their order of business. That the imperial officers never voted with the bishops, although they took part in the debates, conforms precisely to Senatorial procedure.[3] The seating arrangements themelves, with the bishops ranked in order of dignity facing each other across a broad central aisle from which the commissioners presided, are strongly reminiscent of the Senate.[4]

Gelzer draws most of his examples from the Fourth and Sixth General Councils (451 and 680), from which information about seating order and the activity of the imperial officials is abundant. He does not at all mention the non-ecumenical synods, and certainly not the early African tradition which Batiffol discusses. It can therefore be misleading when Baynes places the two scholars side by side in his note accepting Batiffol's theory,[5] as though Gelzer provided direct support for it. The two in fact propose different if not irreconcilable reasons for the similarity in

the protocols of Senate and synod. This article will hereafter leave aside Gelzer's theory and deal only with that of Batiffol.

Batiffol makes a useful distinction between Eastern and Western conciliar procedure. In the East, he says, the synod as we know it from Eusebius' *Church History* often resembles the sort of debate practiced in the schools.[6] The Western tradition is quite different.[7] Here, as we see it in Cyprian's letters, is mirrored the Roman Senate. The verbs of convocation and meeting (*cogere, convocare, habere*) are identical. Like the Senate (Batiffol asserts), the councils under Cyprian were open to the public.[8] As in the Senate, a *relatio* setting forth the matter to be discussed was read to the assembled bishops, followed by a roll-call in which each of them, again in imitation of the senators, stated his *sententia*. The verb often used in both assemblies to designate this action was *censere*. Like the senators, the bishops suffered no inequality among themselves. The resolution they finally voted was, as in the Senate, written up in the form of a letter sent to interested parties. It was also entered into the archives of the church where the synod was held, and, in the case of the Senate, into the *Acta Diurna*.[9]

Batiffol cannot be faulted on his presentation of the procedure either of the Roman Senate or of the African synods. There is no need here to describe in detail the former, which has been fully discussed in various places.[10] Although the only complete record of a Senate meeting is contained in the Theodosian Code,[11] references to various meetings throughout its history abound in different sources.[12] They allow no doubt about the fixed order of *relatio*, statement of opinions, voting, and preparation of the written decree resulting therefrom. The same general order may be observed in the African synods held under Cyprian's leadership. A fairly substantial section of the minutes of the council of Sept. 1, 256 is preserved, in which Cyprian first directs the reading of correspondence bearing upon the matter under consideration, and then requests the *sententiae* of the individual bishops.[13] The minutes break off before anything is said about preparing the synodical letter, but we know from elsewhere that this was standard procedure.[14]

There are similarities as well in the formulae of the protocols. In the proceedings of the council of 256, we observe the prefixing of the date and place of meeting ("*Cum in unum Carthaginem convenissent kalendis Septembribus...*") found also in Senate records.[15] The phrase "*in unum...convenissent*" echoes the style of the Senate proceedings in the Theodosian Code: "*Proceres amplissimusque ordo senatus dum con-*

venissent...",[16] which continue: "*...habuissentque inter se aliquamdiu tractatum...*",[17] which in turn is echoed in several places in Cyprian.[18] Finally, among the *sententiae* pronounced by the individual bishops, many use the verb *censeo,*[19] two or three *decerno,*[20] and one the form *mea sententia est,*[21] all of which smack of the Roman Senate.[22]

There can therefore be little doubt that Batiffol is right in claiming to see a similarity of procedure between the Roman Senate and the African synods. Hence he concludes that the African bishops (and, he conjectures, their colleagues in other Latin-speaking regions) adopted and imitated the Senatorial procedure in their assemblies.[23]

The difficulty with all this is that Batiffol seems to make no very clear distinction between direct and indirect borrowing of procedural traditions. Speaking of the records of the Council of Carthage of 256, for instance, he notes, «Les premiers mots de ce protocole sont une imitation du protocole des procès-verbaux des séances du sénat romain»,[24] which of course strongly suggests that the bishops were directly imitating the proceedings of the Roman Senate. Later on, however, he says something rather different:

> Si les conciles présidés par Cyprien à Carthage ont adopté pour leur déliberations les règles observées au sénat romain, il serait outré de voir dans cette adoption un trait de politique de Cyprien, et de soupçonner l'évêque de Carthage d'avoir voulu donner à ses conciles une ambitieuse solennité. Il est plus objectif de penser que, à Carthage en 256, on ne concevait pas une assemblée délibérant autrement que dans la forme consacrée par l'usage du sénat. Les assemblées provinciales ou municipales, quand elles délibéraient, c'est à dire quand elles ne sacrifiaient pas la discussion à l'acceptation par acclamation de la proposition du magistrat président, délibéraient dans la même forme, qui était la forme parlementaire.[25]

Here he recognizes that assemblies other than senate and synod used the same sort of procedure, but he still does not make it quite clear whether they were all more or less consciously looking to the Senate of Rome as their model, that is, whether Western church synods directly imitated that august body in their form of procedure, or whether they simply used the common parliamentary procedure exemplified by all sorts of different assemblies of the Latin-speaking empire. In the latter case, of course, we might talk about an indirect borrowing of Senatorial procedure, although to establish the propriety of the term we should have to show that the procedure was in fact original to the Roman Senate and was borrowed thence by other cities and organizations instead of the other way around. But this is hardly necessary to our topic, and in any

case the notion of "indirect borrowing" of Senatorial traditions is misleading if, as we shall indicate, the procedure in question was in such wide use by the time the church arrived in the Western empire that it must have lost any specific identification with the Senate of Rome. Batiffol's unclearness on the point has provoked differing interpretations in his later readers, some of whom assume that he meant to prove that church synods took their procedural traditions directly from the Roman Senate.[26]

In fact, however, there can be no doubt that, at least in its general outline, the sort of parliamentary procedure used by the Senate of Rome was wide-spread throughout the Western empire by the time the church came into existence. It was in common use in local town councils, as modern histories have long recognized:

> The procedure in a local senate was modelled on that of the Roman senate. Indeed many probable conclusions concerning the method of transacting business in the Roman senate may be drawn from a study of the municipal charters and from pertinent inscriptions.[27]

The references in the sources to municipal procedure have been collected by W. Langhammer,[28] who notes simply, "Der Vorgang der Einberufung und die Formen der Verhandlung entsprachen dem römischen Vorbild";[29] there is no need to repeat them here. The earliest preserved inscriptional reference to such municipal procedure is probably from the second century B.C.[30]

The inscriptions from Roman Africa are not, unfortunately, as informative about the procedure of town councils as are those from other parts of the Western empire. In fact, of those towns which were bishoprics, only from Thugga in Proconsularis is there any direct evidence beyond the regular, laconic, "*decreto decurionum*" found on inscriptions from nearly everywhere in Roman Africa. From Thugga is preserved an early notice of the election of *sufetes* by the "*plebs ac senatus, omnium portarum sententiis*",[31] a rather un-Roman formula. Obviously the pace of "Romanization" varied within Proconsularis itself, to say nothing of the other parts of Africa. Thugga became a Roman *municipium* around the middle of the second century and a colony during the course of the third (from which time also it became an episcopal see). But by the second century, Roman culture was in full bloom in many of the cities of Proconsularis and Numidia.[32] During this period we find the African Apuleius using the Roman formula

"*decuriones et quibus ius est dicendae sententiae*" in a description of the typical city as though it were quite understood by his readers.[33] Finally, there is one valuable inscription from an unknown peregrine *civitas* in Proconsularis dating from 256 AD (or perhaps 186),[34] which shows that Roman procedure was not restricted to the *municipia* and colonies. It concerns the mediation of a dispute between farmers and shepherds, and contains, after the *relatio*, the very Roman phrase "*quit fieri placeat de ea re universi cen[suere]*", followed by the decision.[35]

We might also note that of the seven North African bishoprics in evidence during the second century, five were Roman colonies.[36] Of the 87 bishops who attended the Council of Carthage of 256, about thirty came from colonies.[37] Gellius says of Roman colonies, "*Iura instituta-que omnia populi Romani, non sui arbitrii, habent...quasi effigies par-vae simulacraque (populi Romani) esse quaedam videntur.*"[38] He states that for reasons of prestige, many *municipia* sought colonial status,[39] and evidently by his day even those who retained their old status often copied the Roman constitution. We may therefore conclude that their municipal councils alone afforded most if not all of the African bishops models of parliamentary procedure in the Roman style.

There can be little doubt that other corporations besides town councils copied the same sort of procedure as well, although here the evidence is much more scanty. Gaius describes the constitutions of *collegia* such as the guilds as "*ad exemplum rei publicae*".[40] Certainly the protocols in the inscriptions of such organizations contain the same procedural formulae as those of the municipal councils,[41] but it must be remembered that they nearly always refer to meetings of the full membership, the *conventus*. Unlike meetings of the *decuriones* of the *collegia* (to which there are references enough),[42] we cannot suppose that the private members in the *conventus* were asked each for their *sententiae* on any item of business; we must think rather of something like the procedure of the municipal *comitia*. Thus the verb *censere* which regularly occurs in these inscriptions means the vote of the assembly on the matter presented in the *relatio*, which must usually have been discussed at a meeting of the *decuriones* previously; and the latter meeting we can easily suppose to have been run along the lines of those of the municipal *decuriones*. Thus by a sort of round-about route one can claim with fair certainty that the sort of "Roman procedure" we have been discussing was found among the *collegia* as well, which were therefore yet another road by which this tradition could be transmitted.

The observation is particularly germane, since there is reason to think that the statutes of some Roman African towns were heavily influenced by collegial legislation.[43]

Finally, one might wonder whether synodal procedure was influenced by that of the provincial councils (*concilia provincialia*, to use the post-Diocletianic term), of which there were four in North Africa.[44] The question has occasionally been raised;[45] Deininger answers in the negative, since, as he remarks, church councils first appear in the East, where they are called *synodoi*, and where the provincial assemblies are known as *koina*. The meetings themselves of the latter are called *synedria*, a term which Deininger claims is not used of church councils.[46] This is of course wrong, although it is true that *synodos* is much the more common term. But further, it should not be assumed that the history of the traditions of the Western church councils exactly mirrors that of the Orient. The identity of the name *concilium*, together with the analogy of a regional assembly meeting once a year,[47] as did Cyprian's synods, make the hypothesis of an influence of the one upon the other rather attractive. There seems, however, no way of proving it, as we know very little about the procedure of the *concilia provincialia*.[48] It is quite likely that they followed what we have called in this chapter "Roman procedure" (those, that is, of the Western provinces), but we cannot prove this.

To sum up, three possible kinds of models for the procedure of the synods held under St. Cyprian can be named: the municipal council, the *collegium*, and the provincial assembly. It is difficult to choose among them, since the history of African synods before the time of Cyprian is quite dark. In general, we can say that the nature and purpose of the last two organizations were so closely connected with the pagan cult that it is hard to believe that the average bishop would have had much intimate acquaintance with them. On the whole (as Constantine's grant of immunity to the African clergy suggests) they would, it seems, have had much more to do with their own town councils, and we may conjecture that these were the sources of their familiarity with "Roman procedure". At any rate, there are no grounds for thinking that they copied the Senate of Rome.

Finally, four examples of the way in which Batiffol's theory has influenced the study of church councils may be presented. We have already mentioned Baynes,[4] who applies the Senatorial model to the Council of Nicaea. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the

vexed question of the procedure of that synod, but even if it could be shown that the emperor Constantine saw fit to run it according to the sort of procedure which we have outlined here, one could hardly call it "Senatorial procedure" without further ado. As we have by now perhaps tiresomely repeated, the *relatio-sententia* order had not for centuries been identified with the Roman Senate exclusively, and if it makes its appearance in church synods, no other conclusion than that of its apparent wide-spread popularity can be drawn.

F. Dvornik showed continued interest in the relationship between imperial and conciliar authority. His article in *The Christian East*[50] largely repeated Gelzer's thesis.[51] In 1951 he announced his acceptance of Batiffol's theory,[52] which he joined to Gelzer's in the following way: since the emperor "never had the right to vote in the senate",[53] it was providential that the Western synods before the time of Constantine had decided to model their procedure on that of the Roman Senate. When Constantine decided to attend the Council of Nicaea, he and the bishops discovered that they (the bishops) had adopted a type of procedure which allowed the emperor to share in their meetings and to make his opinion known in a non-voting capacity, just as the Roman higher magistrates (including the emperor) participated, without a vote, in sessions of the Senate of Rome. There the magistrate presided, presented the matter for discussion, directed the roll-call of *sententiae*, and ratified the final decision, as Constantine did at the Council of Nicaea, which thereafter became the model for procedural relations between the bishops and the emperor (or his deputies) at the other ecumenical councils.[54]

We need not repeat our criticism of Batiffol's theory. But we should add that Dvornik is quite wrong about the constitutional rights of the emperors in the Roman Senate. In the first place, they were all looked upon "as being at least in principle members of the senate".[55] They could both present the *relatio* and participate in the debate as magistrates, and also vote as senators.[56] Dvornik admits that his supposed principle that the emperors could not vote "suffered a setback under the Principate", but argues that it "was actually saved in principle even under the most autocratic emperors".[57] This is badly to misread the evidence. It is true that after the year 70 AD, there is no hint that the emperors ever voted in the Senate. But this is hardly because it had regained an autonomy which it had previously lost. It is rather because voting in it would have brought the emperor down to a level of

equality with its other members. From the second century on, he signalled his constitutional position with respect to it by having read out in it speeches which "were not open to debate".[58] Had the Council of Nicaea really been modelled upon the fourth-century Roman Senate, its proceedings would presumably have resembled those of which the *Historia Augusta* gives us enough examples, and would certainly have been far more summary than the sources allow us to believe.

The third example of an attempt to assimilate the church synod to the Roman Senate is in H. Hess, *The Canons of the Council of Sardica* (Oxford, 1958). He accepts Batiffol's thesis[59] and adapts it to his own purpose, explaining:

> It is reasonable to suppose that the adoption of particular types of civil records for ecclesiastical use was determined by the function which the records themselves customarily performed. By the time of Diocletian and Constantine the *senatus-consultum* was regarded simply as a counsel of advice. It is therefore not surprising that the synodical canon was patterned after the *senatus-consultum* before the conscious acceptance of an ecclesiastical rule of law; for a limited degree of authority, parallel to that of the *senatus-consultum*, seems to have been accorded to the canon until at least the late fourth century in the East and the late fifth century in the West.[60]

Now it may well be that the Council of Sardica intended that its canons should have only limited authority, but this certainly cannot be inferred apart from a study of the records and tradition of the council itself. The time when "the *senatus consultum* was regarded simply as a counsel of advice" had, by the time the church was born, dwindled into the remoteness of early republican history; the vexed question of its constitutional force during our period cannot be gone into here,[61] but it is certain that the emperors did not regard the senate as their advisory council. When they wanted advice, they got it from their own *consilia*, and, if they thought it worthwhile, allowed or forced the senate to add its stamp of approval to their decrees. The local town councils as well had broad legislative powers; they were by no means merely advisers of the magistrates.[62] But apart from all this, there never existed in episcopal synods the basic Roman constitutional distinction between magistrates and council (senate) which is always presumed in discussing the legal force of the *decreta* or *consulta* of the latter, and thus any direct comparison, simply on the basis of procedure, of the competence of such synods with that of the councils of cities and *collegia* is quite impossible.

As a last example, J. D. Zizioulas' comments on the Council of Carthage of 256 may be cited:

> The impression we get...is that of a meeting of the Roman Senate. The bishops sat in the form of a Senate and their debate was conducted after the senatorial pattern... All this means something more than another form of procedure. Behind this lies a concept of the episcopate shaped after political patterns, and, what is even more significant, a conception of the Church as being something parallel to the Roman Empire... ...the fact that each bishop had to express his unity with other bishops by participating in a council shaped after the idea of unity of the Empire, represents one more serious step towards the idea of an Ecumenical Council. In fact...this African concept of conciliarity must have been one of the basic factors which led the whole Western Church in the beginnings of the fourth century to view the council as an expression of the empire of Christ.[63]

Our foregoing criticism of Batiffol's theory will suffice as well for speculation of this sort.

To sum up, we agree with Batiffol that Roman Senate and church synod stood in the same procedural tradition, but if he meant to say that third-century bishops directly copied the Senate in the way they ordered their meetings, we must disagree. As he himself admitted, this sort of procedure was so common in all kinds of different councils and assemblies in the Latin-speaking empire by the time the church arrived on the scene that it had lost any specific identification with the Senate of Rome (if it ever had any), and is much better called something like "Roman" or "Western" parliamentary procedure. It follows that no inferences can be drawn about the self-consciousness or competence of bishops-in-synod by studying the legal position of the other bodies using the same procedure; it will be the Christian sources themselves which will tell us what the episcopal council meant to the church in general.

Notes

[1] Batiffol states his case in much the same terms in two places: *Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes* 3 (1913), 3-19, and *Études de liturgie et d'archéologie chrétienne* (Paris 1919), 84-153. The second study expands the first by taking in examples from later synods to try to establish a uniform Western tradition. Here we shall be concerned only with this remarks about Cyprian's councils.

In this article, the term "Roman Senate" will always mean the senate of the city of Rome, not other municipal senates of the western Roman empire which copied its usages and architecture.

[2] *Ausgewählte kleine Schriften* (Leipzig 1907) 144.

[3] Gelzer, 148.

[4] *Ibid.*, 145.

[5] N. H. Baynes, *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929) 88.

[6] Batiffol, *Études*, 88.

[7] *Ibid.*, 96.

[8] That is, the Senate doors were left open for the Senators's sons to listen outside. The statement that church synods were open to the laity needs to be qualified.

[9] Batiffol, *Études*, 100-118.

[10] P. Willems, *Le sénat de la république romaine* (Louvain 1883) 2.122ff. & 144ff. Much better: Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* 3.905-1003 (Leipzig 1888). Also O. Moore, Pauly-Wissowa *Realencycl.* Supplem. 6.700-719, 766-775, 798 (art. "Senatus"); D. B. Munro, *Journal of Philology* 4 (1872) 113ff.; E. Fraenkel, *Philologus* 85 (1930) 355; A. G. Russell, *Greece and Rome* 2 (1932/33) 112ff.

On elections in the Senate: M. L. Paladini, *Athenaeum* 37 (1959) 3ff.; on the meeting-places of the Senate: L. R. Taylor and R. T. Scott, *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 100 (1969) 529ff.

[11] *Theodosiani Libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis*, vol. 1, pars posterior, ed. Th. Mommsen (Berlin, 2 1954), pp. 1-4. The session was held in 438 to receive the Theodosian Code.

[12] The works listed in note 10 have full references. Cf. also e.g. Bruns, *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui*, pp. 164-211; Cicero, *Cat.* 3.3.8-3.6.15; *Phil.* 3.37-39; Livy 1.32.11; Pliny, *ep.* 6.5.

[13] CSEL 3 (ed. Hartel, 1868) 435-461. The council dealt with the issue of rebaptism of those previously baptized by schismatics.

[14] E.g., Cyprian *ep.* 56.3; 49.2.1. The numbering is according to Bayard (which is also Hartel's).

[15] E.g., Bruns, *Fontes*, pp. 166 & 171.

[16] *Libri Theodosiani*, p. 1, 1.8.

[17] *Ibid.*, 1.8-9.

[18] E.g., *ep.* 15.4 ("*in commune tractabimus*"); 32 ("*plenius concilio communi tractabimus*"); 34.3.1 ("*tractaturi plenissime de omnibus cum convenire in unum...coeperimus*"; "*haec singulorum tractanda*"). Cf. Batiffol, *Études*, 101.

[19] Such as Crescens of Cirta (8) and Secundimus of Cedias (11).

[20] Such as Januarius of Lambaesis (6).

[21] Nicomedes of Sergemae (9).

[22] E.g., *decernere*: Cicero, *Prov.* 1; *Att.* 7.1.7; Pliny, *ep.* 6.27.2; Livy 30.7.6; Tacitus, *Ann.* 14.45. *Censere*: Tacitus, *Ann.* 4.30; Cicero, *Phil.* 3.37; 5.10; 10.25; Suetonius, *Cl.* 10.4. Many of the bishops, of course, use neither of these forms, but prefer a subjunctive construction or an infinitive with *debere*, or something similar.

[23] Battifol, *Études*, 101.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Ibid.*, 116f.

[26] We shall consider them later. Two who have assumed that the borrowing was indirect are A. Steinwenter, *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* kan. Abt. 54 (1934) 49, and H.-J. Sieben, *Theologie und Philosophie* 51 (1976) 66.

[27] Abbott & Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton 1926) 67. "In the West a large measure of uniformity was introduced into the municipal system before the close of the republican period...in this quarter of the world Roman institutions

and the Latin language made rapid headway, and partly by voluntary imitation, partly by legislation, the system which had developed in the city of Rome prevailed" (pp. 56 & 57).

[28] *Die rechtliche und soziale Stellung der Magistratus Municipales und der Decuriones* (Wiesbaden 1973) 202ff.

[29] *Ibid.*, 202.

[30] From the Latin colony of Venusia (Venosa); *CIL* 1. 185. On the Latin colonies, cf. F. Vittinghoff, *Römische Kolonisation und Bürgerrechtspolitik* (Wiesbaden 1951) 43ff.

[31] *CIL* 8.26517 (48/49 AD). T. Kotula, *Les curies municipales de l'Afrique romaine* (Wroclaw 1968). Kotula regards the formula "*omnium portarum sententiis*" as the translation of a Punic expression referring to the city gates where the people gathered to hear announcements and to vote: cf. p. 26.

[32] Vittinghof, 110.

[33] *De mundo* 35.366. He is translating Ps.-Aristotle, *de mundo* 400b.17: βουλευταὶ δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησιασταί. For the formula, cf. Gellius 3.18.1. Further on (describing the activities of the various townsfolk), he translates ὁ μέν τις εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον βαδίζει σιτησόμενος (400b.18-19) as "*alius ad Minuciam frumentatum venit*"; the reference to the *Minucia porticus* might tempt one to think that he means to describe Rome itself, but the term *decuriones* above forbids this interpretation.

[34] Abbott & Johnson, no. 146 (= *Ann. Epigr.* 1903, no. 202). The inscription was found at Henchir-Snobbeur.

[35] The formula is typical; cf. Langhammer, 204.

[36] Carthage, Uthina, Lesser Thuburbo, Madaurus, and Sitifi. Cf. Van der Meer & Mohrmann, *Atlas of the Early Christian World* (London 1959) no. 5. A list of Roman African colonies may be found in Kornemann, Pauly-Wissowa *Realencycl.* 4 (1901) 532f.; 554ff. (art. "coloniae").

[37] *Ibid.*, no. 22. Vittinghoff has a handy list of the Caesarean and Augustan colonies on pp. 148-150. It should be noted that it is no longer possible to hold the existence in Roman North Africa of "double communities" going under the same name but having separate administrations (and constitutions), as did e.g. T. R. S. Broughton, *The Romanization of Africa Proconsularis* (London 1929) 210. Cf. L. Teutsch, *Revue Internationale des droits de l'antiquité* 8 (1961) 281-356.

[38] 16.13.8-9. Gellius' explanation of the distinction between *colonia* and *municipium* has been criticized by Vittinghoff (p. 36, note 2), but because of his treatment of the ancient rights and traditions of *municipia* rather than his description of the colonial constitution of his own time. Vittinghoff himself remarks that "die Verfassung einer neuen Stadt römischer Bürger trug keinerlei unrömische Züge" (p. 35).

[39] *Ibid.*; cf. also 16.13.4. Even so, there was no essential difference between the inner constitution of *municipia* and *coloniae*: cf. Vittinghoff, *ibid.*

[40] D.3.4.1.

[41] Inscriptions relating to *collegia* have been collected by J. P. Waltzing, *Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains depuis les origines jusqu'à la chute de l'empire d'Occident*, vol. 3 (Louvain 1899). Vol. 4 (1900), pp. 309ff. conveniently lists the procedural formulae drawn from the inscriptions. A rapid comparison of these pages with those in Langhammer (note 28) will suffice to show that the tradition is common.

[42] Waltzing, 4.304ff.

[43] Kotula, 67 & 75. The statures of Curia Iovis of Simitthus (*CIL* 8.14683) may be compared to those of collegium Funeraticium Lanuvinum (136 AD, Bruns, *Fontes*, pp. 388ff.). *Collegia funeraticia* seem to have been unknown in Roman Africa, and the *curiae* there assumed their functions (cf. Kotula, 126).

[44] In Mauretania Tingitana, Mauretania Caesariensis, Proconsularis (where it met in Carthage) and Numidia. Cf. J. Deininger, *Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Munich 1965) 131ff.

[45] E.g., by K. Bihlmeyer, *Kirchengeschichte* (neubes. H. Tüchle) I (1951) 11.

[46] Deininger, 187 note 6.

[47] Deininger, p. 144. The Western provincial assemblies met yearly in the summer or fall.

[48] What is known is summed up by Deininger on pp. 145-7.

[49] P. 2, note 5.

[50] 14 (1933), pp. 95-108.

[51] P. 1 and note 3.

[52] F. Dvornik, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 6 (1951) 1-27.

[53] *Ibid.*, 9.

[54] *Ibid.* Dvornik repeated his arguments in *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy* (Washington, D.C. 1966) 608 & 640f.

[55] F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London 1977) 341.

[56] *Ibid.*, 350. Cf. Cassius Dio 57.7.4; 57.8.2; 57.24.7.

[57] Dvornik, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 9. What precisely he means here by "the Principate" is hard to see.

[58] Millar, 350.

[59] Hess, 29.

[60] Hess, 39.

[61] Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* 3.1022ff. (esp. 1028ff.).

[62] Cf. Abbott & Johnson 67f. the councils had wide but specific powers: cf. p. 307 (*Lex coloniae genitivae iuliae seu ursonensis*, a. 44, XCVI): "*Si quis decurio eius colon(iae) ab IIvir(o) praef(ecto)ve postulabit uti ad decuriones referatur, de pecunia publica deque multis poenisque deque locis agris aedificis publicis quo facto quaeri iudicarive oporteat: tum IIvir quive iure dicundo praerit d(e) e(a) r(e) primo quoque die decuriones consulito decurionumque consultum facito fiat, cum non minus m(aior) p(ars) decurionum atsit, cum ea res consuletur. Uti m(aior) p(ars) decurionum, qui tum aderint, censuer(int) ita ius ratumque esto.*"

[63] In *Councils and the Ecumenical Movement* (World Council of Churches, Geneva 1968) 43f.

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THE EXEGESIS OF 1 COR 15, 24-28 FROM MARCELLUS OF ANCYRA TO THEODORET OF CYRUS

BY

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Marcellus of Ancyra's fascination with 1 Cor 15, 24-28, a difficult Pauline eschatological text, is well known. And (as Karl Holl has observed[1]) Marcellus had a remarkable influence on his opponents. The full history of this influence is yet to be written; what follows makes a contribution to that history.

A recent monograph by Eckhard Schendel treats the exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 in East and West up to the end of the fourth century.[2] Despite this valuable monograph, however, there are several reasons for approaching this topic again. One is to bring the treatment into the fifth century. Schendel stops somewhat abruptly with Gregory of Nyssa, whereas Theodoret of Cyrus is a more satisfactory conclusion. This allows the inclusion of Didymus of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, and Severian of Gabala. A second—and more significant—reason is to distinguish more carefully between different works attributed to the same author. In the case of Marcellus of Ancyra, for example, Schendel draws indiscriminately on the extant fragments of Marcellus's work against Asterius (before 334) and the *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*, which Martin Tetz has attributed to Marcellus and dated ca. 360. Moreover, Schendel does not consider the *Epistula ad Antiochenos*, which has also been attributed to Marcellus, or the work *Aduersus Arium et Sabellium*, sometimes attributed to Gregory of Nyssa.[3]

In what follows, only works by Greek Fathers are considered, and only those which contain more than a passing reference to 1 Cor 15, 24-28. Epiphanius of Salamis is omitted, since Schendel's treatment of him is fully adequate. The writings are considered in strict chronological order. In each case, an effort is made to find the topic or issue which the author emphasized, rather than to try to reconstruct his complete exegesis of the verses in question.

1. Marcellus of Ancyra, *Contra Asterium*

Marcellus wrote his refutation of the Arian Asterius during the time between the Council of Nicaea and his deposition in 334 (or perhaps 330-331).[4] It is extant only in fragments, preserved mostly in the refutation composed by Eusebius of Caesarea.[5] It was this work of Marcellus's that started the fourth-century controversy about the end of Christ's reign and his subjection to the Father.

Marcellus's text of Paul differs slightly from that of standard editions. In the extant fragments he quotes vv. 24, 25, 27a and 28b. In v. 24b, which he cites once, he inserts τοῦ διαβόλου epexegetically after πᾶσαν ἀρχήν;[6] this fits in with his view of the history of salvation, as will be seen below. In v. 25b, which he cites three times, he omits πάντας,[7] apparently without significance. Much more significant is his consistent omission of ὁ υἱός from v. 28, which he cites three times;[8] Marcellus preferred to reserve the title "Son" for the incarnate Christ, and (in fr. 41) says that it is precisely as Logos that he will be subjected.[9]

In Marcellus's understanding of the passage in question, the key term is βασιλεία (βασιλεύειν). Marcellus was best known as the heretic who proposed that Christ's kingdom would end;[10] and he is probably the reason why the phrase "of whose kingdom there will be no end" appears in the creed of Constantinople.[11]

Marcellus has a doctrine of two kingdoms, an eternal kingdom and a temporary kingdom. The temporary kingdom is properly the kingdom of Christ.[12] The Lord Christ has a beginning of his reign—not more than four hundred years ago, Marcellus says.[13] It is precisely in his humanity that the incarnate Christ began to reign: Marcellus writes, for example, βασιλεύσει ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ σαρκί; and elsewhere, ἡ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐτοῦ οἰκονομία τε καὶ βασιλεία.[14] (Marcellus's peculiar use of *anthrōpos* will be treated below.) This kingdom is also partial (ἡ ἐν μέρει αὕτη βασιλεία).[15] It will endure until Christ has destroyed every rule of the devil and authority and power.[16] Then he will hand over the kingdom to God who established him as king;[17] "He no longer needs this partial kingdom, since he is king of all at once, for he reigns with God the Father whose Word he was and is."[18]

The fragments in which Marcellus uses parts of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 also contain most of his references to the devil, and a peculiar use of the word *anthrōpos*.[19] The most striking sentence is in fr. 117: "For the Word itself, in its own right, did not have a beginning of its reign. But

man, who was deceived by the devil, became king through the power of the Word in order that, when he had become king, he might conquer the devil who had earlier deceived."[20] The same thought occurs in a more condensed form in fr. 113: "Man, who was earlier deceived, is established as king through the Word."[21] Other passages, where Marcellus does not cite 1 Cor 15, 24-28, have a similar formulation. For example: "And he deemed man, who fell through disobedience, worthy to be joined (συναφθῆναι) to his Word through the virgin";[22] and, "He then came down, took flesh through the virgin, and was appointed king over the Church, obviously so that man, who earlier fell from the kingdom of heaven, might be able to gain the kingdom. So God willed that this man, who earlier fell from the kingdom through disobedience, might become Lord and God, and established this dispensation."[23]

The key thought, repeated several times, is that it is precisely man—or humanity—who was deceived by the devil and fell through disobedience who became king through the Word. Marcellus identifies man deceived by the devil with the man born of Mary, or, phrased another way, emphasizes that it is precisely fallen humanity which was joined to the Word. Marcellus thinks here in startlingly concrete historical terms. Schendel touches briefly on this peculiar Christology, but does not exploit it.[24]

Marcellus also envisages a kind of progress from the Incarnation until the end-time. This explains the peculiar phrase ἡ ἐν μέρει αὕτη βασιλεία:[25] Christ as king in human flesh reverses the effects of the fall and the devil's deception. At the end-time this process will be complete; and here Marcellus emphasizes the "until" of 1 Cor 15, 25: "Therefore his incarnate existence as man and his kingdom (ἡ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐτοῦ οἰκονομία τε καὶ βασιλεία) seem to have a limit. For the words of the Apostle, 'Until he places his enemies as a footstool for his feet' [1 Cor 15, 25] mean nothing but this. Therefore when he has the enemies as a footstool for his feet he no longer needs this partial kingdom, since he is king of all together."[26]

In the extant fragments, Marcellus uses 1 Cor 15, 24-28 principally in connection with his history of salvation, and only once in connection with his theory of the reunion of the Logos with God after the end of history,[27] although it is this latter doctrine that has attracted more attention.

In summary: in his exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28, Marcellus emphasizes the kingdom (of Christ and of God) rather than the subjection of the

Son. The partial or temporary kingdom of Christ has a clear and proper function in the history of salvation: the Word was joined to fallen man and established as king, and becomes Lord and God. Marcellus—deliberately, one may assume—does not distinguish clearly between the humanity of the Word and humanity in general. The Word was joined to man precisely as deceived by the devil, and the partial kingdom of Christ endures until the effects of the devil's deception are wholly overcome.

2. Eusebius of Caesarea, *De ecclesiastica theologia*

In the time between Marcellus's deposition in 334 and his own death in 338/39, Eusebius of Caesarea composed two refutations of Marcellus: *Contra Marcellum*, and *De ecclesiastica theologia*, in that order.[28] *De ecclesiastica theologia* 3, 13-20 contains his refutation of Marcellus's interpretation of 1 Cor 15, 24-28, and—at the same time—his own exegesis.

Eusebius's method is the use of other biblical texts to interpret the passage from 1 Corinthians. His theology is Origenist;[29] he insists repeatedly, for example, on the proper *hypostasis* of the Son.[30]

Eusebius's first objection to Marcellus's exegesis is the latter's understanding of the word "until" (ἄχρι οὗ or ἕως ἄν) in v. 25. Eusebius shows that in other places in Scripture (e.g. Mt 28, 20) the word does not indicate a cessation.[31] On the contrary, he says, the angel Gabriel, speaking to the holy virgin (Lk 1, 33), said that Christ's kingdom will have no end.[32] This argument recurs regularly in later writers.

But the central point in Eusebius's exegesis is his understanding of the subjection of the Son (v. 28). The text from 1 Corinthians speaks of a double subjection: the subjection of all things to Christ and the subjection of the Son to God. Eusebius observes correctly that Marcellus has understood the subjection of the Son to the Father as the union of the Word with God in the sense of its absorption into God;[33] but, he writes, if this is the case, then by analogy the subjection of all things to Christ would mean that what was subjected to him would not retain its own existence; there would be a coalescing and mixing,[34] and consequently a loss of individual identity. The correct understanding, for Eusebius, of the subjection of all things to Christ is that it takes place through obedience, glory and honor freely given,[35] and that subjection means participation (μετέχειν); those subjected to Christ participate in him as life, wisdom, logos, anointing, light, son, justice, holiness.[36]

More briefly, Eusebius interprets the last clause of v. 28 by means of Ez 37, 23 and Jn 10, 38, and refers it to the divine indwelling.[37]

Finally, Eusebius understands the "handing over of the kingdom" (v. 24) as handing over to the Father his (the Son's) subjects without his giving up his own reign.[38]

Marcellus, who was expressing his own theological views, emphasized the kingdom or reign of Christ. Eusebius is refuting Marcellus, and fixes on a weakness in Marcellus's theology, namely the interpretation of the double subjection in the Pauline text. Later authors, whether they are opposing Marcellus or not, frequently see "subjection" rather than "kingdom" as the crucial term in the text in question, so that Marcellus's own views are neglected.

3. Marcellus of Ancyra, *Epistula ad Iulium papam*

In his confession of faith addressed to Julius of Rome early in 341,[39] Marcellus has one brief but fascinating allusion to 1 Cor 15, 24. He writes: "Following the divine Scriptures I believe that there is one God and his only-begotten Son Word, who always exists with the Father and has never had a beginning of his existence, truly existing from God himself, not created, not made, but always existing, always reigning with 'God the Father' [1 Cor 15, 24] 'of whose reign,' according to the testimony of the Apostle, 'there will be no end' [Lk 1, 33]."[40]

The *Epistula* shows some development in Marcellus's thought. He is sometimes accused of maliciously deceiving Julius with this confession, but this is too harsh. There is one clear concession: Marcellus accepts the title "Son" for the preëxistent Word, which he had not wanted to do five years earlier. On the other hand, Zahn is undoubtedly correct in seeing, in the end of the sentence quoted, Marcellus's masterful use of ambiguity in order to maintain his doctrine of Christ's temporary kingdom and God's eternal kingdom.[41] The phrase συμβασιλεύων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί is taken over directly from his work against Asterius.[42] The antecedent of the relative pronoun must be "God the Father," not "Son Word." Marcellus quotes Lk 1, 33, the text used repeatedly by Eusebius to show that Christ's kingdom has no end, but applies it to the kingdom of God the Father (and the co-reign of the Word). Moreover, the phrase "according to the testimony of the Apostle" can refer only to 1 Cor 15, 24, implying that Marcellus wants Lk 1, 33 (as he understands it) to be interpreted in light of 1 Cor 15, 24. In the confession of 341,

therefore, Marcellus clings to his doctrine of the temporary kingdom of Christ: he quotes Lk 1, 33 but understands it as referring to the kingdom of God the Father, and guards his own view by a reference to 1 Cor 15, 24.

4. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 15

In his fifteenth catechesis (probably written in 348), Cyril of Jerusalem explicitly refutes Marcellus of Ancyra ("another head of the dragon, recently sprouted in Galatia").[43] Cyril accuses Marcellus of teaching two errors: that the kingdom of Christ has an end, and that the Word will be reabsorbed into the Father and no longer exist.[44] Cyril takes up three points in his refutation: the eternity of the kingdom, the meaning of "subjection," and the meaning of "until."

The first and third points are answered by citing other scriptural texts, exactly as Eusebius does.

On the second point, Cyril believes that Marcellus understands Paul's ὑποτάσσεσθαι as ἀναλύεσθαι or even ἀπόλλυσθαι.[45] But the true meaning of "subjection," he says, is obedience. Nevertheless, Cyril leaves his answer in an unsatisfactory state. Because he does not want to concede that Christ's obedience to the Father will begin only in the future, he can only say lamely that Christ's obedience will continue to be voluntary.[46] But this leaves the future tense of ὑποταγήσεται in v. 28 without meaning.

Cyril's refutation of Marcellus, intended for catechumens, is like Eusebius's in content, but much simpler in tone, and theologically uninteresting.

5. *Epistula ad Antiochenos (Sermo maior de fide)*

The Greek fragments of the *Epistula ad Antiochenos* cite only 1 Cor 15, 28;[47] the text is found in fr. 41, 42, 43 and 70 (but 41 is only a part of 70).[48] In the Armenian translation, fr. 70 precedes fr. 42 and 43; fr. 70 is part of the author's principal explanation of 1 Cor 15, 28. Fr. 42 and 43 are further elucidations. F. Scheidweiler has recently attributed the *Epistula* to Marcellus of Ancyra.[49] Fr. 42 and 43 hardly show more than that the author was interested in the text from 1 Corinthians. Fr. 70 gives some understanding of his exegesis of the text.

The author's concern is strictly with the meaning of subjection. Who, he asks, is the one who is not subjected to God before everything is subjected to him? In his answer he distinguishes ὁ ἐκ πατρὸς λόγος from ὁ

ἀναληφθεὶς ἄνθρωπος.[50] It is the latter to whom all things are not yet subjected. To explain what is meant by "subjection," he cites 1 Cor 1, 23-24: practically, subjection means conversion to Christianity. When he comes to speak of the second subjection, that of the Son to the Father (as he writes here; he had written previously of subjection to God), he begs the question by explaining the term ὁ θεός of v. 28 as τουτέστιν πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. In the final sentence of the fragment, the author insists that it is Jesus, and not the Son, who is subjected.

The exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 in the *Epistula ad Antiochenos* has little similarity with Marcellus's and speaks against his authorship of the *Epistula*.

6. *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*

The work *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*, a pseudo-Athanasian writing which Martin Tetz has recently attributed to Marcellus, contains an extended examination of 1 Cor 15, 24-28.[51] While Marcellus, in the extant fragments, concentrates his attention on the meaning of "kingdom," the author of the *De incarnatione* is also concerned with the meaning of "subjection."

The author cites 1 Cor 15, 24-28 in full,[52] and—passing over vv. 24-26—proceeds immediately to his interpretation of "subjection." He explains that it refers to the subjection of the world, which is subjected in Christ's flesh.[53] This is clarified a little further on, when the author understands (τὰ) πάντα of 1 Cor 15, 27-28 as πάντες. And the subjection takes place in two stages: the first is "when all of us are subjected to the Son, are recognized as his members, and become sons of God in him."[54] The second stage is the subjection of the Son to the Father in our stead (ἀνθ' ὑμῶν; the phrase is absent from some MSS) as the head of his own members.[55] In the following sentence, the author distinguishes the Son from the rest of mankind: "If he were one of those subjected, he would have been subjected to the Father from the beginning, and not have done this at the end."[56] The subjection of the Son, therefore, is seen exclusively as the subjection of his members, that is, believing Christians, to God.

On the other hand, the author writes clearly, almost defiantly, of two kingdoms: the divine kingdom (ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ ἡ θεϊκή, where he alludes to Dn 7, 27 Theodotion and quotes Lk 1, 33)[57] and the human kingdom

(ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη βασιλεία); the Lord of the heavens "took the human throne of David his father according to the flesh" and, once the human kingdom has been restored, hands it over to the Father.[58] Further, this human kingdom has a beginning and an end; to show this, the author cites 1 Cor 15, 25 and Ps 109, 1.[59] The last sentence of the paragraph indicates that the reign of Christ will be in two stages, corresponding to the human and the divine kingdoms: "So that God might be all in all, reigning through him as through God the Word, after reigning through him as through a man, the Savior."[60]

Tetz dates the *De incarnatione* ca. 360—that is, at a late stage in Marcellus's development. The *De incarnatione* contains the doctrine of two kingdoms, a (temporary) human kingdom which has a beginning and an end, and an eternal, divine kingdom. The beginning and the end of the human kingdom receive particularly strong emphasis. But (as will be seen) a form of this doctrine is also found in later authors.

The author thinks of two stages in God's reign, in terms of a double agency: the first is δι' ἀνθρώπου σωτῆρος, the second διὰ λόγου θεοῦ—in the second stage, the title "Son" is not used. On the other hand, the identification of Christ's human nature with fallen humanity is wholly absent; the author rather emphasizes the distinction between the head and the members.[61] If the *De incarnatione* is by Marcellus, then his theology underwent considerable development in the direction of orthodoxy in the three decades after his *Contra Asterium*.

7. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio* 30

In the fourth of his theological orations, composed in the second half of 380, Gregory of Nazianzus discusses several texts used by the Eunomians in defense of their position.[62] The second one is 1 Cor 15, 25, together with Acts 3, 21 and Ps 109, 1—three texts found together in one fragment of Marcellus's work against Asterius.[63] Gregory refers once to "Sabellians,"[64] the usual name for Marcellians; but his discourse is directed specifically against Eunomius, and presupposes the developed Trinitarian theology of the late fourth century.

Gregory makes four points in his exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 28.

First: "until" does not imply a cessation.[65] This now-familiar argument is finished quickly, with a single quotation (Mt 28, 20).

Second: there are two senses of the word βασιλεύειν. In the first sense, the παντοκράτωρ is king of all, whether they wish it or not. In this sense

the kingdom has no end. In the second sense, the Son brings about (ἐνεργεῖν) our subjection and places us under his rule: we receive his kingship willingly. In this second sense, the kingdom has an end: it is unnecessary to bring about subjection once the subjection has taken place.[66] This somewhat strained interpretation is in a sense a revival of Marcellus's teaching: Gregory teaches a temporary and a permanent kingdom, in combination with his own clear Trinitarianism.

Third: the second ὑποταγή of 1 Cor 15, 28—that is, the subjection of the Son to the Father—is understood of the ecclesial body of Christ, with a reference to Col 1, 18: the subjection of Christ is the fulfilment of the Father's will. Gregory states that the Son cannot be subjected to God, because he is himself God.[67]

Fourth: Gregory interprets the πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν of v. 28 as the time of *apokatastasis*, when the multiplicity caused by motions and passions shall cease, and we shall be completely like God, wholly receptive of God alone.[68]

What is peculiar and interesting in Gregory's interpretation is the particular effort he makes to speak of the two senses of "kingdom" and to say that one has an end.

8. Gregory of Nyssa, *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius*

Gregory of Nyssa wrote a short treatise on 1 Cor 15, 28, entitled *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius*.[69] Reinhard Hübner has analyzed the work at length and studied Gregory's relation to Marcellus of Ancyra.[70]

Gregory's principal concern is the meaning of "subjection." It is a problem, he says, because certain "knaves" have been interpreting 1 Cor 15, 28 as if it implied some servile lowliness of the only-begotten God (which is Gregory's paraphrase of Paul's term "the Son.")[71] These opponents are clearly Eunomians.

In the first major part of his treatise, Gregory examines the various senses of ὑποτάσσειν in Scripture, and finds six:

1. Slaves are subjected to their masters.
2. Irrational nature is subjected to man by God (Ps 8, 7).
3. Nations are subjected to Israel through war (Ps 46, 4).
4. Those saved by full knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) speak in God's person: "Foreigners have been subjected to me" (Ps 59, 10).
5. The verse: "Will not my soul be subjected to God?" (Ps 61, 2).
6. 1 Cor 15, 28.

None of the first four senses can apply to the Son, the only-begotten God.[72]

Gregory considers one other, curious, possibility: the subjection of the boy Jesus to his parents (Lk 2, 51). But this subjection, he says, ended at Cana (Jn 2, 4), when Jesus rejected his mother's advice.[73]

Gregory finds the key to his solution in the future tense of ὑποταγήσεται in 1 Cor 15, 28. The subjection is in the future. Gregory defines subjection to God as "complete separation from evil."[74] The subjection of the Son, he says, takes place through us, when we have all been separated from evil in imitation of Christ the firstfruits, and have become one body with him. Gregory interprets the subjection, therefore, in a moral-mystical sense: imitation of Christ leads to union with Christ, and perfect subjection to God exists when the subjection to evil is overcome.[75]

In a second major part of his treatise, Gregory takes up the second part of 1 Cor 15, 28, "in order that God may be all in all," and interprets the phrase as the positive aspect of subjection, again in a mystical sense: God will be "in all" when no evil is found in being,[76] for God cannot be in evil. And that God will be "all things" to beings shows that the life to come will be absolutely simple (ἁπλοῦν καὶ μονοειδές): there will be need of nothing but God.[77]

Toward the end of the treatise Gregory again returns to Paul's peculiar use of "subjection" and says—rather lamely—that Paul sometimes uses words in an unusual sense, showing that he is still somewhat uncomfortable with the term.[78]

Finally, at the very end of the treatise, Gregory deals with 1 Cor 15, 25 and its problematic "until." He understands βασιλεύειν as ἀριστεύειν, "to be the best": Christ will be the champion so long as there are enemies to conquer; when all that is opposed to the good has been done away with, there will be an end to his heroic deeds.[79] Like Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa tries to find a sense in which the reign of Christ will end. And the phrase "he hands over the kingdom to the Father" means that he leads all men to God.[80] The last sentence of Gregory's exegesis is a good summary:

> Therefore when all who were ever the enemies become a footstool for God's feet by receiving the divine footprint upon themselves, and death has been destroyed (for if there are no beings who are dying, death will simply not exist), then the one who lives in us will be subjected to God, as Paul says, in the subjection of all of us, which is not understood as servile humility, but as a kingdom and incorruptibility and

blessedness. He perfects our good through himself, and establishes in us what is pleasing to himself.[81]

9. (Ps?) Gregory of Nyssa, *Aduersus Arium et Sabellium*

The attribution of this short treatise to Gregory of Nyssa is uncertain.[82] In the course of a relatively standard refutation of Arianism and "Sabellianism," the author offers an interpretation of 1 Cor 15, 24 and 28.

The author mentions only the Father and the Son, but not the Holy Spirit. He insists repeatedly on the Son's own proper *hypostasis*, without any extensive explanation. The "Sabellians" are Marcellians; the author accuses his opponent (who is addressed in the second person singular) of saying that the Father conceded the kingdom to the Son for his use, and then took it back.[83] This is a caricature of Marcellus's thought.

Positively,[84] the author approaches the subjection of the Son through scriptural texts on the true humanity of Christ and his identification with the sinful human race (citing Mt 8, 17; 2 Cor 5, 21; Gal 3, 13). The future subjection of the Son will take place when all of humanity has been subjected to the Son. What is striking here is the absence of any explicit reference to the body of Christ, or to the Church. Instead, the author applies 1 Cor 3, 23 ("You are of Christ, Christ is of God") to the future subjection of all things to Christ: "For if all of us should be of Christ, Christ would also be of God and subjected."[85]

The kingdom, for the author, is not to be understood as the dignity of kingship (τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς σκηπτουχίας)[86] but rather those who have been ruled by him as king and subjected to him.[87]

The exegesis of Paul's text here is different from that in Gregory of Nyssa's *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius*; and the use of 1 Cor 3, 23 to explain 1 Cor 15, 28 occurs in no other text that is studied here.

10. Didymus of Alexandria

The catenae have preserved two fragments on 1 Cor 15, 24-28 attributed to Didymus of Alexandria (died 398).[88] The first fragment has an unusual interpretation of *basileia*. Didymus proposes two meanings for the word: either "those ruled over" (a common interpretation), or "his [i.e. the Son's] own flesh." Didymus envisions a kind of progress (προκοπή) precisely in Christ's flesh, from a stage at which it is rul-

ed over as the "form of a slave" (Phil 2, 7) to one in which it is the flesh of the Word. In the process, "the Son handed over [his own flesh] to the Father for improvement."[89] On another point Didymus shows advanced Trinitarian thought, and employs the unusual phrase "one king, Father and Son." Finally, Didymus explains the subjection of the Son to the Father apologetically: it is a refutation of Greek mythology, in which gods are parricides. Didymus envisages a double subjection: first the Church, to the extent that the Son makes his own the persecutions of the Church and its sufferings and subjection, and then the Son. In general Didymus (if he is the author of the fragments) shows remarkable independence and originality in his exegesis of the passage.

11. John Chrysostom, *Homilia 39 in 1 Corinthios*

Chrysostom preached the homilies on 1 Corinthians in Antioch, and so before 397. His explanation of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 is in homily 39.[90]

He finds the text difficult. V. 24, for example, must be understood not ἀνθρωπίνως but θεωπρεπῶς; otherwise one would think that the Father was not king before the kingdom was handed over, nor the Son afterwards. On the same principle, he writes off the obvious meaning of "until."[91]

Positively, Chrysostom introduces a curious argument from Trinitarian theology. Paul, he writes, makes the Son the subject of the actions in vv. 25-26, and does not mention the Father. But then, lest anyone think that the Son is greater than the Father, he attributes (in v. 27) the subjection of all things to the Father, in order to show that everything done for our sake is done by the Father and the Son in common.[92] He deals with the subjection of the Son very briefly, writing: "He [Paul] shows the full concordance [of the Son] with the Father, and that the Father is the first principle of all good and the first cause, who begot the one who can do great and righteous things."[93]

Chrysostom also has a doctrine of two kingdoms: one according to affinity or fellowship (οἰκείωσις), the other by creation. By creation God is king of all: Greeks, Jews, demons and enemies; by affinity he is king of believers, of those who will it, of those who are subjected. This second kingdom is said to have a beginning, Chrysostom writes, and quotes Ps 2, 8 and Mt 28, 18.[94]

Finally, he interprets the last clause of v. 28 as showing that there are not two uncaused causes or a divided kingdom. He also offers the inter-

pretation of "certain others" of this verse, namely that it means the abolition of evil.[95]

12. Severian of Gabala, *In psalmum 96*

This homily, found among the ps-Chrysostomica and recently attributed to Severian of Gabala,[96] has an explanation of 1 Cor 15, 24 that is in some ways reminiscent of Marcellus's. The author explicitly teaches a double kingdom of the Savior: one existing before the ages, and without beginning, in which the Savior is king by nature, the other having a beginning at the time of the Incarnation, in which the Savior is king according to his human πλάσις. Like Marcellus, he thinks in terms of the history of salvation: before the temporal kingdom of Christ began, the world was under the kingship, or rather tyranny, of demons, death and sin.[97] The author has no difficulty accepting a beginning of the temporal reign of Christ; but an end to it leads him to distinguish two meanings of the word *basileia*. He cites Lk 1, 33, and concludes that the (temporal) kingdom will have no end. If this is the case, he asks, what meaning does 1 Cor 15, 24 (which is often wrongly interpreted) have? The word *basileia*, he answers, has two meanings in Scripture: either the dignity of the rulers (τὸ αξίωμα τῶν βασιλευόντων) or the nations who are ruled (τὰ ἔθνη τὰ βασιλευόμενα). It is the second which is applicable, in a peculiar sense: it is not the kingdom of the Savior that will end, but the kingdom of sin and death. He writes: "Therefore the Savior hands over the kingdom—that is to say, humanity—which was once ruled by sin, once ruled by death, so that he might free it from captivity, create it anew, and present it to God the Father."[98]

13. Severian of Gabala, catena fragment

In a short passage on 1 Cor 15, 23-25 attributed to Severian of Gabala,[99] the kingdom is interpreted as that which the evil one seized when he overthrew Adam and those descended from him—i.e. the kingdom is that possessed wrongly and tyrannically by the devil. (On this point the fragment is in full accord with the homily on Ps 96 also attributed to Severian.) Once the kingdom is handled over, the Son rules with the Father. The author deals at greater length with the word "until," and to illustrate that it does not indicate a cessation, cites Is 46, 4, a verse also cited for this purpose by Chrysostom and Theodoret of Cyrus.[100]

14. Theodoret of Cyrus, *Interpretatio epistulae i ad Corinthios*

The last author to be considered is Theodoret of Cyrus (died ca. 466); his commentary on the epistles of St. Paul was probably written toward the end of his life.[101] With Theodoret, even more than with Chrysostom, the last vestiges of controversy about 1 Cor 15, 24-28 disappear. Theodoret is aware that the partisans of Arius and Eunomius made use of the passage for their own ends,[102] but has no specific information on their teaching.

His interpretation of the passage contains no surprises. "Until," he says, does not indicate a cessation, "but teaches that he will wholly subject all (ἅπαντας)."[103] There is one eternal kingdom, just as God is eternal, and his only-begotten Son is coeternal.[104] On the subjection of all things, Theodoret explains that in 1 Cor 15, 27 the Father is the agent, whereas in Phil 3, 21 the Son is the agent;[105] this suffices to overcome any suspicion of subordinationism.

Like Chrysostom, Theodoret devotes an extensive paragraph to vv. 27-28, and like him also, discusses the two natures of Christ.[106] The subjection of the Son, Theodoret states (against Arius and Eunomius), does not refer to the deity of the Only-begotten.[107] Nor can handing over the kingdom mean that the Father does not yet possess it.[108] Theodoret turns to the ecclesial explanation of subjection and handing over the kingdom: as head of the body, "he makes his own what is ours"—"our present disobedience and our future subjection"—"and when we have been subjected, after being freed from corruption, he is said to be subjected."[109]

In his interpretation of the last clause of v. 28, Theodoret introduces a new distinction. God is omnipresent κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν and κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν.[110] The first is always true, the second not yet realized. "Thus God will be all in all when all have been freed from sin, and converted to him, and do not yield to the inclination to evil."[111]

15. Conclusions

1. No one of these fourteen works shows a direct verbal dependence upon any other. A study of the scriptural texts cited in these works (this study is not presented here) shows that certain texts recur often,[112] as might be expected, but does not suggest any direct literary dependence. Theodoret draws several ideas from Chrysostom, but this relationship has long been known.

2. In his exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28, Marcellus of Ancyra placed little emphasis on the term "subjection" (ὑποταγή). Eusebius of Caesarea understood both the subjection of all things and the subjection of the Son as an act of obedience and honor. Cyril of Jerusalem does not distinguish between the two subjections, but understands the words simply as meaning "obedience." The *Epistula ad Antiochenos* understands the first subjection as conversion to Christianity; the author has no place for the second, since he simply equates God with Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The ecclesial interpretation of the second subjection (the Son is subjected to God at the end-time in the sense that he as head is identified with his members, the Church; it is actually the members that are subjected) is found in *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Theodoret of Cyrus. It is absent from Chrysostom and Severian of Gabala. This apparently became the standard explanation of ὑποταγή.

3. The most intriguing theme in these texts is that of the *basileia*. Marcellus of Ancyra, in his work against Asterius, made the double *basileia*—temporal and eternal—the keystone of his exegesis. Eusebius of Caesarea and Cyril of Jerusalem, who are intent on refuting Marcellus, say little or nothing about the kingdom, and concentrate instead on the meaning of "until." The *De incarnatione et contra Arianos* has a strong, even challenging, emphasis on the double kingdom, human and divine, and stresses the teaching that the human kingdom had a beginning and an end. This concern with the double kingdom of Christ, and the beginning and end of one of the two kingdoms, reappears in four other authors: Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom and Severian of Gabala. Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa explicitly admit an end to one of the two kingdoms. John Chrysostom and Severian of Gabala claim that one of the two kingdoms has a beginning, but do not speak of, or deny, an end to it. Severian of Gabala is closest to Marcellus of Ancyra, in that he dates the beginning of the kingdom from the Incarnation. In light of this, one should not make too much of the fact that *De incarnatione et contra Arianos* has a doctrine of two kingdoms; in itself, it does not prove that Marcellus wrote the work. One may say, however, that late-fourth and early-fifth century authors were aware of the doctrine of two kingdoms, and perhaps that it was Marcellus's doctrine. They go out of their way to speak of a double kingdom, and of a beginning or end, or both, to one of the kingdoms. But their teaching departs from Marcellus's in

another way. For Marcellus, the temporary kingdom is Christ's and the eternal kingdom is God's. No later author preserves this distinction. In the *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*, the two kingdoms are both God's and Christ is—in both cases—the instrument through which God reigns. In Gregory of Nazianzus the eternal kingdom is Christ's, as *pantokratōr*, and the kingdom which will end is also the Son's. Gregory of Nyssa is unclear on this point. For John Chrysostom both kingdoms are God's while for Severian of Gabala both kingdoms are the Savior's.

In all of its various forms, this concern with the double kingdom seems to be a continuation of an exegetical tradition begun by Marcellus of Ancyra.

NOTES

[1] K. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern* (Tübingen/Leipzig 1904) 156: "Es lässt sich bei allen Theologen der Zeit studieren, wie sie, ohne es zu wissen und zu wollen, in der Polemik gegen die Arianer auf die Sprünge des Marcellus von Ankyra geraten."

[2] E. Schendel, *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung Christi. 1 Korinther 15, 24-28 in Exegese und Theologie der Väter bis zum Ausgang des 4. Jahrhunderts*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Exegese, 12 (Tübingen 1971). Older literature on the topic: G. W. H. Lampe, Some Notes on the Significance of βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, βασιλεία Χριστοῦ, in the Greek Fathers, *JTS* 49 (1948) 58-73; idem, The Exegesis of Some Biblical Texts by Marcellus of Ancyra and Pseudo-Chrysostom's Homily on Ps. XCVI. 1, *ibid.* 169-175 (the homily is now identified as Severian of Gabala's; see below); M. Eckart, *Das Verständnis von 1 Kor 15, 23-28 bei Origenes* (Augsburg 1966); P. Trummer, *Anastasis. Beitrag zur Auslegung und Auslegungsgeschichte von 1 Kor. 15 in der griechischen Kirche bis Theodoret*. Dissertationen der Universität Graz, 1 (Wien 1970). (Trummer's short dissertation treats vv. 24-28 in six pages, but includes many interesting quotations; he assumes, however, that there is a single, unified patristic exegesis of the passage.)

[3] On the attributions see below, and the review by P. Nautin in *RHR* 185 (1974) 217-218.

[4] For the date see W. Schneemelcher, Zur Chronologie des arianischen Streites, *ThLZ* 79 (1954) 399.

[5] *Eusebius Werke IV. Gegen Marcell. Über die kirchliche Theologie. Die Fragmente Marcells*, ed. by E. Klostermann. GCS, 14 (Leipzig 1906).

[6] Fr. 113 (209, 10).

[7] Fr. 113 (209, 11); 117 (210, 20, 22). In fr. 114 (209, 15) he includes πάντα from v. 27.

[8] Fr. 41 (192, 5); 116 (209, 32); 121 (212, 8).

[9] See also fr. 121.

[10] Marcellus's theology in: Th. Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie* (Gotha 1867); F. Loofs, art. Marcellus von Ancyra, *RE*[3] 12 (1903) 259-265; W. Gericke, *Marcell von Ancyra. Der Logos-Christologe und Biblizist. Sein Verhältnis zur antiochenischen Theologie und zum Neuen Testament*. Theologische Arbeiten zur Bibel-, Kirche- und Geistesgeschichte, 10 (Halle 1940).

[11] See Lampe, 'Some Notes'; A. M. Ritter, *Das Konzil von Konstantinopel und sein Symbol. Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie des II. Ökumenischen Konzils.* Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 15 (Göttingen 1965), esp. p. 192 n. 1; and E. Molland, 'Des Reich kein Ende haben wird.' Hintergrund und Bedeutung einer dogmatischen Aussage im nicäno-constantinopolitanischen Glaubensbekenntnis, in his *Opuscula patristica.* Bibliotheca theologica Norvegica, 2 (Oslo 1970) 235-253.

[12] Fr. 113 (209, 12).

[13] Fr. 115 (209, 17-18, 23-24).

[14] Fr. 113 (209, 8); 117 (210, 21).

[15] Fr. 117 (210, 24).

[16] Fr. 113 (209, 10).

[17] Fr. 115 (209, 25-26).

[18] Fr. 117 (210, 24-25). This and all translations are the author's.

[19] The most extensive treatment of the history of salvation in Marcellus remains Zahn's, *Marcellus von Ancyra* 166-185. M.-D. Chenu, art. Marcel d'Ancyre, *DTC* 9 (1927) 1993-1999 concentrates on synodal opposition to Marcellus. Gericke (*Marcell von Ancyra* 142-148), in a section on 1 Cor 15, 24ff., deals with Marcellus's sources rather than his doctrine itself. See also the good paragraph in Lampe, The Exegesis 170.

[20] Fr. 117 (210, 26-28).

[21] Fr. 113 (209, 9). Zahn (*Marcellus von Ancyra* 173) misunderstands the first sentence in fr. 113, of which he writes: "In anderen Fällen endlich fliessen beide Anschauungen dermassen in Eins zusammen, dass in einer grammatisch unzulässigen Weise an die Stelle des zuerst als Subjekt genannten Logos der durch ihn zum König erhobene Mensch tritt." But in this fragment the Logos is not the subject. Marcellus identifies the fallen man (mankind) with him who became king through the Word in human flesh.

[22] Fr. 107 (208, 14-15).

[23] Fr. 111 (208. 31-209, 2).

[24] Schendel, *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung* 122. If the word *anthrōpos* is understood concretely as Adam, then there is an echo of "kleinasiatische Theologie" here. On Adam and Christ in Marcellus, see M. Tetz, Zur Theologie des Markell von Ankyra II. Markells Lehre von der Adamsohnschaft Christi und eine pseudoklementinische Tradition über die wahren Lehrer und Propheten, *ZKG* 79 (1968) 3-42.

[25] Fr. 117 (210, 24).

[26] Fr. 117 (210, 20-25).

[27] Fr. 41 (192, 1-6). See also Schendel, *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung* 127-129.

[28] See note 5 above.

[29] Schendel, *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung* 143.

[30] E.g. *De eccl. theol.* 3, 17 (177, 6); 19 (180, 25); 20 (181, 6, 9).

[31] *Ibid.*, 3, 13-14 (169-171).

[32] *Ibid.*, 3, 16 (174, 30-33).

[33] *Ibid.*, 3, 14 (171, 26-28); 3, 15 (172, 6-9).

[34] *Ibid.*, 3, 15 (172, 8-14).

[35] *Ibid.*, (172, 17-18).

[36] *Ibid.*, (172, 35-173, 8).

[37] *Ibid.*, 16 (174, 10-21). All Old Testament references are to the LXX.

[38] *Ibid.*, (174, 33-175, 2; cf. 175, 6-15).

[39] Fr. 129 (GCS 37, 214-215). Date from Schendel, *Herrschaft und Unterwerfung* 138.

[40] Fr. 129 (215, 4-8).

[41] Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra* 180-184.

[42] Fr. 117 (210, 25).

[43] Text ed. by J. Rupp, Cyrilli *Opera quae supersunt* II (München 1860) 194-202; here 15, 27 (p. 194).

[44] *Catechesis* 15, 27 (194-196).

[45] *Ibid.*, 30 (198).

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Greek fragments ed. by E. Schwartz, *Der s. g. Sermo maior de fide des Athanasius.* Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Jg. 1924, 6. Abhandlung (München 1925). The fuller Armenian version tr. by R. P. Casey, *The Armenian Version of the Pseudo-Athanasian Letter to the Antiochenes (Sermo maior de fide) and of the Expositio Fidei.* Studies and Documents, 15 (London and Philadelphia 1947). Apart from one passing reference to 1 Cor 15, 25 the Armenian version has no further treatment of the text in question.

[48] For the authenticity of these fragments see M. Richard, Bulletin de patrologie II, *MSR* 6 (1949) 132-133, and F. Scheidweiler, Wer ist der Verfasser des sog. Sermo major de fide? *BZ* 47 (1954) 333-357, esp. 335-337. Schwartz, fr. 70, 42 and 43 = Casey, fr. 20, 22 and 23. In the English translation, the treatment of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 is found in ch. 24-25.

[49] See Scheidweiler, Wer ist der Verfasser. M. Tetz (Zur Theologie des Markell von Ancyra I. Eine Markellische Schrift 'De incarnatione et contra Arianos,' *ZKG* 75 [1964] 221) also accepts the attribution. But M. Simonetti (Su alcune opere attribuite di recente a Marcello d'Ancira, *Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa* 9 [1973] 313-329, and idem, Ancore sulla paternità dello ps-atanasiano 'Sermo maior de fide,' *Vetera Christianorum* 11 [1974] 333-343) rejects it.

[50] The Armenian translator misunderstood this distinction. See Casey, *The Armenian Version* 58.

[51] Text in PG 26, 984-1028. Ch. 20 (1020A-1021A) deals with 1 Cor 15, 24-28. Tetz's attribution in Zur Theologie des Markell von Ankyra I. The attribution is rejected by M. Simonetti, Su alcune opere. The history of the attribution by G. M. Rapisarda, La questione dell'autenticità de De incarnatione Dei et contra Arianos de S. Atanasio. Rassegna degli studi, *Nuovo Didaskaleion* 23 (1973) 23-54. R. Hübner studies the exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 in *De inc. et c. Ar.* in Gregor von Nyssa und Markell von Ancyra, in *Écriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nysse*, ed. by M. Harl (Leiden 1971) 199-229, esp. 212-221.

[52] PG 26, 1020A. According to Montfaucon's note there, some MSS omit the second πᾶσαν of v. 24 and πάντας in v. 25, as Marcellus does.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*, 1020C.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *Ibid.*, 1020D.

[57] Αὐτοῦ refers to Christ.

[58] *Ibid.*, 1021A.

[59] *Ibid.*, 1020B.

[60] *Ibid.*, 1021B.

[61] Three other short works have recently been attributed to Marcellus (*De sancta ecclesia, Expositio fidei*, and *Contra theopaschitas*), but contain no references to 1 Cor 15,

24-28. For the attribution of *De sancta ecclesia* see M. Richard, Un opuscule méconnu du Marcel évêque d'Ancyre, *MSR* 6 (1949) 5-28; for the other two works, F. Scheidweiler, Wer ist der Verfasser. According to A. Grillmeier (*Christ in Christian Tradition I. From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon [451]* [2nd ed.; London and Oxford 1975] 275 n. 1) Tetz no longer considers the *Expositio fidei* to be one of Marcellus's works.

[62] Text ed. by P. Gallay and M. Jourjon, Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours* 27-31. SC 250 (Paris 1978) 230-238. For the date see *ibid.*, p. 14.

[63] Marcellus, fr. 117 (GCS Eusebius 4, 210-211).

[64] *Oratio* 30, 6 (SC 250, 238).

[65] *Ibid.*, 4 (p. 232).

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.*, 5 (pp. 232-234).

[68] *Ibid.*, 6 (p. 238).

[69] Text in PG 44, 1304-1325. Its authenticity was once doubted on doctrinal grounds ("Illa homilia quod repleta est erroribus Origenianis et ipsi Gregorio Nysseno in eius indubiis opusculis repugnat"; from the introduction, PG 44, 18); but this doubt has been overcome.

[70] R. Hübner, *Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa. Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der "physischen" Erlösungslehre.* Philosophia patrum, 2 (Leiden 1974); see also idem, Gregor von Nyssa und Markell von Ancyra. On pp. 214-222 he studies the *De inc. et c. Ar.* as the source of Gregory's *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius*, and also asserts (p. 222 n. 2) that the author of *De inc. et c. Ar.* has taken over a Gnostic system of redemption. On this treatise, see also J. Daniélou, Comble du mal et eschatologie chez Grégoire de Nysse, in *Glaube und Geschichte. Festgabe Joseph Lortz*, ed. by E. Iserloh and P. Manns (Baden-Baden 1958) II, 27-45, esp. 42-43.

[71] PG 44, 1304A-B.

[72] *Ibid.*, 1304B-1308B.

[73] *Ibid.*, 1308B-1309A.

[74] *Ibid.*, 1316A.

[75] *Ibid.*, 1316A-B.

[76] *Ibid.*, 1316C.

[77] *Ibid.*, 1316D-1317A.

[78] *Ibid.*, 1324B.

[79] *Ibid.*, 1325B.

[80] *Ibid.*, 1325C. Gregory (consciously or not) draws in the word ὑποπόδιον from Ps 8, 6 and so interprets it that the enemies are the footstool for God's feet, whereas Paul understands this as subjection to Christ.

[81] *Ibid.*

[82] Text ed. by Fr. Müller, Gregorii Nysseni *Opera dogmatica minora* I. GNO III, I (Leiden 1958) 71-85. The authenticity was denied by K. Holl (Über die Gregor von Nyssa zugeschriebene Schrift 'Adversus Arium et Sabellium', in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte* II [Darmstadt 1964] 298-309), defended by J. Daniélou (L'Adversus Arium et Sabellium de Grégoire de Nysse et l'Origénisme cappadocien, *RechScRel* 54 [1966] 61-66, esp. 65-66) and denied again by M. van Parys (Exégèse et théologie trinitaires. Prov. 8, 22 chez les pères cappadociens, *Irénikon* 43 [1970] 362-379, here 375-378) and R. Hübner (Gregor von Nyssa und Markell von Ancyra 211-212, and *Die Einheit des Leibes Christi* 31 n. 19). Müller (ed. cit. lxi) suggests that it is among Gregory's earliest works.

[83] *Adu. Ar. et Sab.* 79, 11-13.
[84] The relevant passage *ibid.*, 77, 26-79, 25.
[85] *Ibid.*, 78, 28-79, 1.
[86] *Ibid.*, 79, 10.
[87] *Ibid.*, 79, 18-19.
[88] *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche*, ed. by K. Staab. Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, 15 (Münster 1933) 8.
[89] Cf. Athanasius, *Orationes contra Arianos* 1, 38.
[90] Text ed. by F. Field, Iohannis Chrysostomi *Interpretatio omnium epistularum Paulinarum* II (Oxford 1847) 486-506.
[91] *Ibid.*, 492-493.
[92] *Ibid.*, 493-494.
[93] *Ibid.*, 497. Later he interprets the subjection as obedience, with an allusion to Phil 2, 6-11.
[94] *Ibid.*, 498.
[95] *Ibid.*, 499. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius.*
[96] Text in PG 55, 603-612. On the attribution, see J. A. de Aldama, *Repertorium pseudochrysostomicum* (Paris 1965) no. 379, and R. Laurentin, Bulletin sur la vièrge Marie, *RSPhTh* 52 (1968) 543. The homily has been studied by Lampe, The Exegesis.
[97] *In psalmum 96*, 1 (PG 55, 604).
[98] *Ibid.*, 2 (p. 605).
[99] Staab, *Pauluskommentare* 274.
[100] Chrysostom, *Hom. 39 in 1 Cor.*, 5 (p. 494) and Theodoret of Cyrus on 1 Cor 15, 25 (PG 82, 356C).
[101] Text in PG 82, 356-361.
[102] *Ibid.*, 356C; 357A.
[103] *Ibid.*, 356B.
[104] *Ibid.*, 356C.
[105] *Ibid.*, 356D-357A.
[106] Specifically, Chrysostom distinguishes the θεότης from the οἰκονομία, whereas Theodoret, as befits his later date, explicitly mentions δύο τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ αἱ φύσεις (PG 82, 357B).
[107] *Ibid.*, 357B.
[108] *Ibid.*, 360B. (Chrysostom has the same observation.)
[109] *Ibid.*, 360B-C.
[110] *Ibid.*, 360C.
[111] *Ibid.*, 360D-361A.
[112] For example: Ps 109, 1: Marcellus, fr. 117 (twice); Eusebius, *De eccl. theol.* 13, 14, 15; *De inc. et c. Ar.* 20; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio* 30, 4; Didymus of Alexandria, catena on 1 Cor 15, 24-26; Theodoret of Cyrus on 1 Cor 15, 25. Lk 1, 33: Marcellus, *Ep. ad Iulium*; Eusebius, *De eccl. theol.* 3, 16 (twice); Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 15, 27; *De inc. et c. Ar.* 20; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio* 30, 4; Severian of Gabala, *In psalmum 96*, 2. Acts 3, 21: Marcellus, fr. 117 (twice); Eusebius, *De eccl. theol.* 13 (twice), 14; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio* 30, 4, 6. Phil 3, 21: Eusebius, *De eccl. theol.* 3, 14, 15 (twice); Chrysostom, *Hom. 39 in 1 Cor.*, 5; Theodoret of Cyrus on 1 Cor 15, 26.

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TWO SOULS

ORIGEN'S AND AUGUSTINE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE TWO SOULS DOCTRINE. ITS PLACE IN GREEK AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY*

BY

R. FERWERDA

> Pereant a facie tua, deus, sicuti pereunt, vaniloqui et mentis seductores, qui cum duas voluntates in deliberando animadverterint, duas naturas duarum mentium esse asseverant, unam bonam, alteram malam.
>
> May they perish and disappear out of thy sight, o God, just as they actually do, those empty talkers and deceivers of the mind, who, since they have observed that there are two wills in our act of deliberating, state that there are two natures of two minds, one good, the other evil.
>
> (Aug. *Conf.* VIII, 10, 22)

These words of Augustine cannot be ranked as an outstanding utterance of true Christian brotherly love for those who believe in two natures of two minds. Quoting Titus 1:10 he calls them empty talkers and deceivers of the mind; without flinching, he invokes eternal damnation upon them, his old friends. For he does not leave us in doubt as to the identity of the objects of his wrath. They must be the Manicheans, to whose ranks Augustine himself had belonged, but from whose company he had fled when he was about thirty years old.[1] In a previous book, *De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos* (see especially I and XII, 16), he had already attacked their views on the two souls in greater detail. In a book of that same period (*De Vera Religione* IX, 16) he described the gist of this doctrine: "Duas animas esse in uno corpore existimant: unam de Deo, quae naturaliter hoc sit quod ipse, alteram de gente tenebrarum quam Deus non genuerit, nec fecerit, nec protulerit, nec abiecerit". (That there are two souls in one body, one from God which is by nature the same as God, one from the people of darkness which God has neither generated, nor made, nor raised, nor cast down.) He continued by saying that this evil soul "adversus deum rebellasse, deum autem, qui aliud quid faceret non haberet et quomodo aliter posset

hosti resistere non inveniret, necessitate oppressum misisse huc animam bonam et quandam particulam substantiae suae cuius commixtione hostem temperatum esse somniant et mundum fabricatum" (had rebelled against God, but that God who had no other means and could not invent another way to oppose his enemy, was forced to send to this world the good soul, a certain part of his own being; they dream that the enemy is moderated by being mixed with it and that in this way the world was created). He mentioned the two souls also in a negative sense in *De haeresibus* c. 46 Migne P.L. 42, 38.

It is evident that Augustine had to reject the two souls doctrine because the Christian creed allowed only one soul in one human being which was to be redeemed by Christ's crucifixion. But this can hardly account for the ferocity of the rejection, apparent in the *Confessiones*. In order to explain that, we may, of course, refer to the fact that originally Augustine himself, as a member of the Manicheans, had believed in the idea and that, after his abnegation, he was particularly eager to denounce the weaknesses and dangerous points of their theories. Out of an understandable defence mechanism, he may have used expressions that are more vehement than the object invites. But this explanation meets with an unexpected difficulty. Recently H. S. Puech[2] made it clear that the existence of the two souls theory in Manichean circles is not supported by texts from other writers. What the Manicheans did believe in was a (good) soul and an (evil) body and they assumed that this soul had descended from God.[3] It is difficult to understand why Augustine, who must be supposed to have known the Manichean theories from first hand experience, thought fit to blame his former fellow sectarians for something they did not profess. It is almost unimaginable that he made a simple mistake, since he knew them so well. But what could then be the reason why he, as far as we know, deliberately presented their doctrine in a distorted form? Would it be true that he ascribed to them a heresy to which they did not adhere in order to make their creed so suspect that no one would dare flock to their circles anymore? If that is the case, however, we have to answer two new questions. First, why is this doctrine supposedly so dangerous, making it necessary to present it in such unfavourable terms, and second, who were its adherents, if there were any? Leaving the first question open for the moment, I would like to draw attention to Clement of Alexandria for the solution of the second problem. In his *Stromateis* II, 20, 113, 3 he says: "Isidorus, son of Basilides, writes in

his book on the attached soul that man has two souls (just as the Pythagoreans believe), and Valentine believed that our heart is comparable to a public lodging: all kinds of spirits gather there and enter it". And in his *Excerpta Theodoti* 50, I (Theodotus is a follower of Valentine) Clement states: "From mud God made an irrational soul, akin to the souls of animals. This soul is flesh to the divine soul so to speak". And in 51, 3 he adds: "As to the two souls Soter says that we must be afraid of the demon who is able to destroy that soul and that body in hell". According to these texts the two souls theory is found in Gnostic circles around the time of Valentine and Basilides (second century A.D.). We know, in fact, that most Gnostics taught that man not only had a soul (*psyche*) but also a spirit (*pneuma*). Whereas the *pneuma* had descended from heaven and could be redeemed, the *psyche* belonged to the lower parts of man and perished with the body.[4] It is not too difficult to infer from this theory the idea that the Gnostics believed in two souls, *pneuma* being the higher soul and *psyche* the lower. If this equation between *pneuma* and (higher) soul is correct, we may conclude that the Gnostics are the adherents of the two souls doctrine indicated by Augustine and not the Manicheans. Since Mani had inserted many Gnostic theories in his view of the world,[5] I believe that Augustine took advantage of the similarity between the two doctrines in order to force upon the Manicheans the Gnostic theory of the two souls. By doing this he hoped to prevent his readers from joining his own old friends whom he had begun to loathe. I shall explain below (p. 364) why he used the two souls theory for it.

I would like to turn now to an interesting and lengthy discussion by Origen of the cause of evil in this world in which the two souls play an important part. In his *De Principiis* III, 4, 1 Origen tackles the question whether there is also something else in us, *viz.* men who consist of soul and body and the spirit of life, which has a motive power of its own and a force which compels us to do evil. "Some scholars", he says,[6] "put the question whether we have to say that there are two souls in us, one more divine and heavenly and the other inferior, or whether we are dragged to evil things which please the body because we are attached to bodies, or thirdly, whether our soul is essentially one but consisting of more parts, as the Greeks think, one rational and one irrational, the last one being divided into the two affections of desire and wrath". Because this third theory is not to be found in the Holy Writ, Origen decides to limit his discussion to the other two. First, he sums up the evidence he finds in

the Scriptures concerning the existence of two souls. "The heavenly soul", he says, "is sown directly into the body from heaven, for example the one which rendered the palm of victory to Jacob over his brother Esau, when they were still in their mother's womb; it is also the soul which in Jeremiah (1:5) was sanctified before the birth and which in John was filled with the holy spirit before the birth. The inferior soul is created along with the body and is often called 'flesh'. The adherents of this theory confirm that the phrase "the desires of the flesh are against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17) does not refer to the body but to the soul of the body. They find support for this idea in Levit. 17:14: "The soul of every creature is the blood of it", and in Romans 7:23: "But I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members". And when the apostle says that the struggle between flesh and spirit induces us not to do what we wish to do, who are those 'we'? (Gal. 5:17). He is certainly not speaking about the real spirit nor about the flesh, because the flesh has no will. So he must mean the will of the soul of the flesh and, therefore, man has two souls. When this soul clings to the spirit the apostle concludes: "You are not in the flesh, but in the spirit" (Rom. 8:9). But then, of course, one could also argue that soul is an intermediary between flesh and spirit and not part of either of them.[7] This leads to a very profound discussion. For if the soul is an independent entity and acts according to its own wishes (and not to those of the flesh or the spirit) the soul is neither warm nor cold and Jesus will spew it out of his mouth (Revelation 3:16)".

We may surmise from this long paragraph that Origen prefers to see the soul as either warm or cold, acting either according to the spirit or to the flesh. At the end of his discourse, he states as a sort of afterthought that he discussed all these things in a rather long digression because he wanted to demonstrate that he knew all the arguments of those who believed that we have two souls.

In the next section (III, 4, 4 and 5), Origen examines the theory that our soul is one and that the diverse passions are caused by the flesh. This flesh has no soul of its own, he argues. When the flesh seems to seduce us and a better insight resists the seduction, we should not think that there is a second life which resists the other; rather, the nature of the body wants to deplete itself, because it is filled with bodily juices. When the needs of the body seduce us, we are not open to divine realities. That is why the apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The wisdom of the flesh is hostile

to God". This does not mean, according to Origen, that the flesh has a soul and wisdom of its own in the literal sense. "Soul" and "wisdom" are used here metaphorically, in the same manner that we say, metaphorically, that the earth is *thirsty*, or that the blood *cries* for vengeance. If this bodily desire would have a soul of its own, a second soul, created by God, then what would be the difference between this opinion and the conception of the two souls, one of which is bound to be saved and the other to perish? That would be the opinion of heretics who, because they cannot prove God's justice in a pious way, invent such impious concepts, he says.

I think that in this last sentence we find the answer to the first question posed on page 361, *viz.*, why the two souls doctrine was so dangerous to the official dogma of the church. It was the divine justice which was at stake and no one should be allowed to tamper with matters of such importance. That is also the reason why Augustine forced *this* theory upon the Manicheans in order to put their doctrine in an unfavorable light.

When we look at the discussion of this last section, it appears as if Origen professes himself a fervent opponent to the two souls theory. But amazingly enough he concludes this very interesting chapter with the following remark: "We have brought forward, as well as we could, what could be said by the adherents of the two theories; however, the reader should choose from these the way of reasoning which ought to be accepted by preference". At the same moment in which he seems to join the army of faithful believers, he shrinks back, offering his readers a choice. What does that mean? Crouzel-Simonetti[8] think that for Origen the two souls theory is not wholly unacceptable. They point to the fact that in several other cases Origen leaves it up to the reader to choose between diverse solutions (*De Principiis* I, 6, 4; 1, 7, 1 and II, 3, 7). But all these texts refer to the uncertainty concerning the corporeal or incorporeal state of man after the Day of Judgment and Origen does not know how it will be then: only God knows, he says, and His friends through Jesus Christ. In our text, however, the situation is different: Origen acts "entgegen seiner sonstigen Gepflogenheit", as Langerbeck says.[9] He tries to prove the veracity of the official dogma, but he is reluctant to impose it on his readers. What is the reason for this? Is it a hint, for those who know, that Origen's own opinion is not the same as the dogma of the church? And does he use his seemingly detached scholarly attitude ("I want to show that I know all the arguments") as a

mask in order to be able to reveal the feeling of his heart in an inconspicuous way? I think that we have to answer both questions in the affirmative. And I believe that there was a special reason why he felt so attracted to the idea. We shall see below that the Greeks in general rejected the two souls theory because they were afraid to introduce evil, in that way, as an independent force in our world. But things were different for Origen. His thorough familiarity with Gnosticism had opened his eyes, enabling him to look at this world in other ways.

On this subject Daniélou[10] has developed an intriguing theory. He pointed out that Eastern theology has a view of human nature which is exactly the opposite of that of Western theology. For example, Gregory of Nyssa regarded animal life as having been added to the nature of man consisting of both intellectual life (*noûs*) and supernatural *pneuma*; Western theology, on the other hand, believed that the supernatural was added to the nature of man consisting of lower entities. This implies that the addition of a second soul in Western (i.e. official) theology would be an increase of the lower entities, while in Eastern theology the two souls would be the two higher entities of man that already exist. I think that Origen foreshadowed this tradition and that for him the second soul was not the source of evil but the entity by which man would be able to understand more about the essence of life and even about God. By using it he might even become like God. The road to this hidden wisdom was beset with dangers, as the Bible teaches us (Genesis 3), but it is also very tempting. As a Christian Origen had to accept that man has one soul, but as a "Gnostic" he wished to safeguard the hidden wisdom of the two souls which he deemed extremely valuable and enlightening for those who thirst after a solution to their deepest problems. According to a story told by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* VI, 8) Origen, in the zeal of youth, castrated himself because he took literally Matthew 19:12. In later years he may have realized that such a curtailment did not solve many problems and that it would be wise to recoil from curtailing another part of himself, i.e. his second soul, which he felt could procure insight into the heart of human existence. In my view, his ambiguity towards the two souls theory reflects his internal struggle between the demands of the church and his personal feelings which were fostered by his Gnostic background.

That the two souls theory was propounded by the Gnostics is confirmed by what we find in Plotinus. In his famous treatise against the Gnostics he calls them *senseless* for introducing the other soul which

they compose of the elements (*Enneads* II, 9, 5, 16). It appears here that Plotinus considered their second soul to be the lower one. What surprises us in reading this phrase is the violent reprobation with which he denounces their theory. This surprise is due to the fact that in other texts Plotinus seems to admit that we do have two souls, for instance IV, 3, 27, 1-6: (Forgetfulness belongs to the soul) "But to which soul? The soul which is called more divine due to which we are "ourselves" or the other soul which comes from the universe?" It is true that in II, 3, 9, 24 the "other" soul is the higher soul which strives for the divine, but usually the "other" soul only appears when Plotinus talks about the "image" of the "true" soul. I think that here we find the clue to the solution of this problem. For, from the meaning the word "image" has in his philosophy[11] we may infer that this does not mean that there are really two independent entities called soul; rather there is only one soul whose image or reflexion is simply the intermediary between higher and lower entities which has no existence of its own. Plotinus[12] accepts the plurality of souls only in the sense in which Plato talks about the soul which is undivided (in itself) but which is divided in (its reflexion in) the bodies (*Timaeus* 35a 1-3). In order to prove convincingly the unity of the soul he even calls upon god to offer his assistance (IV, 9, 4, 6, and 15) just as he invokes him in other cases when he has to disentangle a particularly difficult problem (V, 8, 9, 13). When, in moments of carelessness, his language sometimes slips and seems to suggest that there is "another soul", we have to bear in mind that Plotinus is unwaveringly consistent in his adherence to the unity of the soul.

His 'carelessness' has also provoked difficulties in the interpretation of related objects: matter and evil. For Plotinus evil has no existence of its own; it is a sort of deprivation of the Good (I, 8, 11, 5; II, 4, 13, 10 and *passim*). In the same way matter has no private being; it is the shadow, the image of being. Some texts imply, however, that both evil and matter possess their own right of being, for example I, 8, 6, 33: "Both non-being and being are principles, one of evils, the other of goods" and I, 8, 6, 48; "So we have shown that it is not universally true that there is nothing contrary to being". Also I, 8, 7, 1-3: "But how then is it necessary that if the good exists, so should evil? Is it because there must be evil in the all? This all must certainly be composed of contrary principles; it would not exist at all if matter did not exist". Various attempts have been made to reconcile these apparently conflicting expressions but none of them has carried the field. The problem is insolu-

ble, except when we realize that Plotinus did not always express himself in carefully chosen words and that, in addition to that, as has often been argued, there are two different sides in Plotinus' philosophy. Zeller calls them "objectiv" and "subjectiv", Bréhier speaks of a "problème philosophique" and a "problème religieux" and Kristeller of "gegenständlich" and "aktual".[13] The ambiguity in Plotinus' use of language may be due to the fact that he often viewed the same topic from different vantage points. For example, he will discuss matter as an objective being and as a subjective value; or he will approach it first ontologically and then morally. The same is applicable to the two souls. But when we look at the vehemence with which Plotinus rejects the two souls theory we cannot help concluding that he saw in it a dangerous attack on his own most cherished view of the world and that he wanted to divorce himself completely from those (his old friends!) who upheld the theory that man has two souls. In this respect he shows the same reaction to them as Augustine did to *his* old friends, the Manicheans.

Now that we have seen with which fervor Plotinus opposed himself to the two souls theory, it is worthwhile to investigate whether earlier Platonists or Plato himself dealt with this problem. There is, in the first place, that enigmatic figure of Socrates. According to Cicero (*Tusc.* 4, 37, 80) Socrates admitted that vices are part and parcel of himself but that he had learned to control them, in the manner as Antiphon before him had taught that the man who does not know what desire is and is not acquainted with evil, does not possess wisdom (fr. 59). Socrates had no difficulty in acknowledging his being attracted to beautiful youths like Charmides (*Charm.* 155 ce) or Phaedrus (*Phaedr.* 234d) and in using that erotic feeling to start a powerful and profound philosophical discussion. This is not to say, however, that Socrates spoke of two souls. The closest allusion to a second soul we can detect is his mentioning a 'daimonion' which warns him when he is about to make wrong decisions (*Apology* 31cd; *State* 496c). But this 'daimonion' is not evil or good as opposed to his soul. It is simply a warning voice which should be heeded and which ends all debate or internal struggle. Socrates thus does not figure as a proponent of the two souls theory. Plato himself, however, occasionally toys with something that might be (and, in fact, has been) interpreted as an independent existence of a 'second force'. In his *Timaeus* (48a7) he states that in the process of creating the universe there are two causes, mind and necessity, the latter being the errant cause, destitute of reason. In addition to these causes he also introduces

the 'receptacle' into which all the forms enter and which is mostly thought to be the same as matter. Necessity in Plato is not matter but Plotinus seems to identify the two as well as the 'old nature' of Plato's *Politicus* 273b5. Now it can be contended that 'necessity' or 'old nature' is the principle of evil but Plato does not explicitly say so. And when Plotinus (I, 8, 7, 4-5) endeavours to prove that matter and evil are the same by referring to Plato's *Theaetetus* 176a, where it says that evil does not pass away, he evidently gives that phrase a turn which it does not have in Plato. Nevertheless there are more expressions in Plato which suggest a dualism not only between matter and mind, but in the realm of the soul itself as well. In *Timaeus* 69cd he mentions the "other kind of soul", the divine soul, as opposed to the mortal soul.[14] This divine soul is more or less what is also called mind while the mortal soul contains desires, passions and lust. It is, however, wrong to suppose that Plato actually believed in two souls. In the same *Timaeus* he teaches us that the individual human soul is composed of the same ingredients as the world soul. When later interpreters conclude that the "other kind of soul" is good proof of Plato's belief in two souls, they are not considering the general intention of the *Timaeus* but only one somewhat carelessly used expression. The same is true of what we find in the *Phaedrus* 237d: "We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling principles: one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best". This phrase cannot be read apart from what we find in the *Phaedrus* 246a: "We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. The horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and of good descent, but those of other races are mixed. One of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character". What Plato intends to say here is that there are several parts in one soul and not that there are several souls. We find a similar case in the *Laws* 903d: "The soul suffers all kinds of changes by itself or by another soul". This other soul is not another soul in one and the same person but the soul of another person; therefore, we are not allowed to suppose that Plato at any time of his life held the view that a person could have two different souls. And when in the *Laws* 896e he mentions two souls, one of which is benevolent while the other is able to contrive opposite things we may admit that this 'dualism' between good and evil was perhaps an adaptation of the Zoroastrian Ormuzd and Ahriman to his own doctrine.[15] But certainly it does not flatly contradict the denial in the

Politicus (270a) of two gods of opposite minds, since in the *Laws* 897c he says that the good and intelligent type of soul remains in supreme control and that the other type is the underling; it is, at best, a part of the ruling soul.

As a conclusion I would say that Plato had an inkling of some mysterious pre-cosmic soul, an "inherited conglomerate" as Dodds calls it[16] and that in some places he even suggests an independent life of this soul, comparable to the independent existence of evil in Zoroastrian literature. But there can be no doubt that he ultimately rejects this dualism and that his 'second' soul is only another *part* of the soul.

What did Plato's immediate successors make of the soul? Generally, Aristotle only speaks of one soul with several functions but at the end of the *De Anima* he introduces "a productive agent" in the mind and contends that the mind itself is separate, immortal, and eternal (430a 22/3). There has been a continuous debate over what Aristotle meant by this *productive agent* and a *mind which is eternal.* Are they part of the human soul? Or are they substantially different leading us to conclude that, in fact, Aristotle believes in two different souls one of which he calls eternal mind?[17] There seems to be no definite answer to these questions. But it is difficult to admit that he ever accepted the existence of two separate souls, one of which is good and the other evil. For one thing, he does not explicitly speak of two souls. Moreover, he thinks of this universe as being one, governed by a supreme being which is thinking of thinking. But his hesitation towards the "productive agent" may indicate a crack in his well-sealed universe which, although he tried to patch it, is disclosed by the patching itself.

Turning to Speusippus and Xenocrates,[18] we find that Damascius bracketed them with each other as believing that the irrational as well as the rational soul was immortal. This seems to imply that they believed in two souls, but the text does not state it explicitly. Moreover, it is claimed that Speusippus belonged to a group of people who denied that goodness and evil are *archai.* Furthermore, both Xenocrates and Speusippus state that the two 'souls' are immortal. It is hardly possible, therefore, to infer from the scanty remnants at our disposal that these philosophers developed a theory so divergent from that of Plato and Aristotle. The wording of these fragments (ἡ λογικὴ ψυχή and ἡ ἀλογία) may be due to the very late source to which we owe them.

The situation changes a bit when we come to Plutarch (first century A.D.) and Atticus (second century). According to Proclus both

philosophers base themselves on Platonic dialogues (*Timaeus* and *Laws*) in bearing out their claim that unordered matter pre-existed the creation and that there also is a pre-existent maleficent soul which ordered this disordered mass.[19] Now it is evident, as we have seen above, that in the text of the *Laws* (896d) the maleficent soul is a part of the world-soul, opposed to the good soul, but not an independent force in its own right. It has been argued that Plutarch was stimulated in his interpretation of the Plato texts by a study of Persian religion. But, on the other hand, in his *De Iside* 374c Plutarch makes it clear that this maleficent or irrational soul is not evil itself and we have, therefore, no definite proof that Plutarch believed in a dualistic conception of the world in which good and evil had their own independent rôles. From other sources however, we know that he did make a clear distinction between soul and mind in one human being.[20] In *De Facie Lunae* 943a he says: "Most people rightly hold a man to be composite but wrongly hold him to be composed of only two parts. The reason is that they suppose mind to be somehow part of soul, thus erring no less than those who believe soul to be part of body, for in the same degree as soul is superior to body, so is mind better and more divine than soul. The result of soul and body commingled is the irrational or the affective factor, whereas of mind and soul the conjunction produces reason; and of these the former is the source of pleasure and pain, the latter of virtue and vice". First we find in this passage a tripartition: mind, soul and body. Secondly two other entities as well: the conjunctions of body and soul, on the one hand, producing irrational soul, and that of mind and soul, on the other, producing reason. This is not the only text in Plutarch where we find the distinction between mind and soul. In *De Mor. Virt.* 441d ff. and *De Daemone Socratis* 591d ff. we find the distinction and several more ancient texts may be posited as sources of this theory, e.g. Plato's *Timaeus* 30b or Aristotle's *De Anima* III, 5. It is also possible that, while developing this theory, Plutarch was not immune to Hermetic and Gnostic concepts about mind and soul with the same impact. But what is most apparent is that in Plutarch's writings this distinction between soul and mind does not represent a clear-cut two souls theory as we shall find elsewhere. Plutarch's follower Atticus is perhaps a bit more precise. Dillon[21] argues that he taught that the rational soul is immortal and that the irrational soul dies with the body. Though he attacks Aristotle fiercely for assuming only the immortality of the mind (fragment 4 Des Places), Atticus virtually defends here Aristotle's view, ac-

cording to Dillon. He only changes the names: rational soul is Aristotle's mind. But in my view Dillon is wrong. Both Baudry[22] and Des Places[23] state that the *verbatim* quotation from Atticus by Eusebius in *Praepar. Evang.* XV, 9 (= fragment 7 Des Places) indicates that the *whole* soul survived after death. Proclus' statement on Atticus' theories (*In Timaeum* III, 234, 17-18 = fragment 15 Des Places) cannot be attributed to him.[24] Again there is no two souls theory here. The same applies to Albinus who is mentioned in the same passage of Proclus.[25]

There is, however, one ancient author, somewhat older than Plutarch, where we do find references to a two souls doctrine: Philo of Alexandria. Generally, he considers the soul as being composed of a rational and an irrational part.[26] Occasionally he even alludes to the Platonic tripartition[27] or the Stoic division into the *hegemonikon* and the seven physical faculties.[28] But when discussing biblical texts like Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 17:11 and 14 or Deuteronomium 12:23 he seems to admit that there are two souls in man, one of which being the biblical *ruach* (mind), and the other the *nefesh* (blood-soul).[29] Due to his interpretation of certain Platonic passages treated above and of Aristotle's remarks on the separate mind Philo may have assumed that this two souls doctrine was not altogether alien to the Greek mind, making it possible, therefore, to include it in his own philosophy. And since he was well acquainted with Gnostic circles in which this interpretation of those passages was accepted, he may have considered it one of the bridges spanning the gulf between the view of the world of the Greeks and the Jews.

This is certainly true for another Greek/Jewish philosopher, Numenius, who lived in Apamea in the second century A.D. It is a pity that we know so little of his life or works, but what we know confirms that he definitely believed man has two souls, one the rational and the other the irrational, just as he has other pairs (ears and eyes) (fragment 44 Des Places).[30] Although the fragment tells us that he is not the only philosopher to hold this opinion, it provides no further information. Unlike Plutarch and Atticus who postulate a harmony between the two elements in the soul, the two souls Numenius discusses are in a continuous quarrel.[31] Apart from this two souls doctrine Numenius also firmly believes in the independent existence of matter as the evil force in the process of creating the universe (fragment 52 Des Places).[32] Numenius, therefore, is the first and maybe the only Greek author who advocated a very consistent dualism even within man. It is interesting,

however, that Calcidius, in whose *Commentary on the Timaeus* (295-9) we find this last fragment, seems to change Numenius' ideas somewhat by speaking again of the two parts of the soul. J. C. M. van Winden thinks he does so because he was a Christian.[33] J. H. Waszink[34] judges that "bei Numenios die Platoninterpretation und seine eigene Ansicht nicht klar von einander getrennt oder dass sie in irgendeiner Weise koordiniert waren". In my opinion, Van Winden is right, particularly because, as we have seen, Christians very vehemently rejected this theory.

One last remark about later Greek philosophy is in order. According to Iamblichus *De Myst.* VIII, 8,[35] "the Hermetic writings also contend that a man has two souls. One of them stems from the first intelligible, taking part in the power of the Demiurg, whereas the other enters into us from the revolution of the heavenly bodies". This idea is akin to what Plotinus tells us about the Gnostics in *Enn.* II, 9, 5, 17.[36] Beutler[37] thinks that this theory has to be distinguished from what we find in Plutarch, Atticus and Numenius; I agree with him that there are considerable differences which are smoothed down a bit by Dodds[38] when he states that there is a perfect agreement between them. But the discrepancies are superficial and are bridged by the basically dualistic conception of the world which we found in them. The Hermetics, the Gnostics and Numenius were the only ones who also made their dualism apparent in their two souls theory. After them we find this theory in Porphyry[39] and Nemesius[40] among others. However, they all hark back to either Numenius or the Gnostics, rendering Beutler's statement[41] that the idea is "nicht so selten" somewhat misleading.

After this brief review of what the Greek philosophers have said about the two souls I should like now to turn back to the question why they were so reluctant to accept the full consequences of certain shadowy hints in their theories and to say that man has two souls. I think that the Greeks had an innate fear of excess, of ὕβρις, and could not accept that evil was an independent force. That would break their world into two and shake their most basic views of what the world should be. Levinas[42] calls it the "horreur de l'Autre". I agree fully with Langerbeck[43] when he says: "Es (i.e., a dualistic theory) ist gegen die griechisch-philosophische Vorstellung einer Seele die "una est per substantiam", aber in verschiedene Unterteile zerfällt. Dass auch bei Platon schon in aller Deutlichkeit von zwei Seelen die Rede ist (cf. *Timaeus* 69cd) und dass diese platonischen Sätze für die Ausbilding der

gnostischen Lehre von grosser Bedeutung sind, ist kein Einwand dagegen". In the course of history, Langerbeck argues, it is normal that the views of great thinkers are dualistically (mis)interpreted in the process "ihrer vulgären Vergröberung".[44] That is what happened to Plato as well as to the Christian creed. Vulgar Platonism of later ages is no less dualistic than vulgar Catholicism in medieval or modern times. The reason why Origen seems to be willing to go along with it is, in my view, that he did not see the second soul as the evil force but interpreted it as the enlightened one which might communicate hidden wisdom.[45] This, however, was far from what the church was prepared to accept, referring to the dangers of human *hybris* which are spelled out in the first chapters of Genesis and of the idea that only one soul could be redeemed. It is no wonder, then, that the official church looked askance at Origen's elucubrations and never accepted him as a saint.

Before I briefly summarize modern thought concerning the existence of two souls I wish to call to mind two peculiar ancient stories. Xenophon in his *Cyropaedeia* 6, 1, 41 relates how Araspes and Panthea had fallen in love with each other and how Cyrus asks Araspes to leave Panthea and to depart on a dangerous mission into hostile territory. When Araspes obeys him unflinchingly, Cyrus asks whether he can leave his beloved easily. Araspes retorts: "Yes, for I have two souls. Were the two souls one, it would not be able to desire two things, a good and an evil. And since by your influence the good one rules, the evil one is silent".

The other passage we find in Ovid's *Metamorphoseis* VII, 21 where Medea describes her struggle between her passion for Iason. She says: "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor".[46] (I see the better things and I approve of them but I follow the more evil ones). It is true that she does not mention two souls but the effect is the same. In both stories we see a conflict between state loyalty and personal passion, the latter being called evil. Both stories occur in the East (Persia and Armenia).

A few times in this paper we came across the opinion of modern scholars that when the two souls doctrine (in Plato and Plutarch for example) seemed to be found in Greece it was due to Persian influence. When we compare these two eastern love stories with e.g. Antigone, we see that she also has to choose between loyalty to a state edict and her duty to her brother. However, she does not waver: there are not two souls one of which has to be silenced before she can act as in the case of Araspes. Neither is she torn apart between good and evil as in Medea's

case. So even in 'love' stories it looks as if only under 'Eastern' influence Western authors could speak of two souls in one human being.

It is interesting to see how the two souls doctrine was handled in later ages. In 1760 Wieland translated Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia* into German and spoke of the two souls in two poems, first in *Idris und Zenide* (1767), and then in *Die Wahl des Herkules* (1773). And in 1801 Goethe wrote his famous "*Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust*" in his *Faust I*. The two souls are used to describe the struggle of the main characters between the "derbe Liebeslust" and the loyalty to higher realms.[47] Once this trend has been set, it is often used in novels and poems. In the beginning the 'alter ego's' of the main characters are not the enemies of the 'self', but just 'the other', as in Ludwig Tieck's *Ryno*, or Jean Paul's *Siebenkäs*. But especially in R. L. Stevenson's famous novel *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886) man is not truly one, but two. One of them is good, the other is wicked and wants to destroy the good one. The only way to get rid of that child of Hell is to commit suicide. We see another example in Stephan Zweig's *Schachnovelle*. The main character is successful in his attempt to beat the world champion because, during a long period of incarceration, he was forced to beguile the time by playing chess with himself. He was an 'Ich-schwarz' and an 'Ich-weiss'. The complete split of his personality had made him a genius. He can only become a normal person by giving up his split personality and, therefore, his genius. The message is that a normal person cannot endure the two souls in himself. They drive him to insanity as in R. M. Pirsig's novel *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* where Phaedrus ends up in an asylum, or cause a situation of complete inertia as in Margaret Drabble's *The Ice Age*. But the most striking example of how the two souls of good and evil tear a person apart is found in Dostoevsky. One of the things Dostoevsky loathes most is the road of the golden mean. Therefore he forces either two persons in the same novel to take opposite stands or makes two souls in one and the same person opponents of each other. His prince Myshkin is the most glorious and awful example of the split personality; but we must not forget that originally even Myshkin and Rogozhin were meant to be one person.[48] Practically every character in his novels demonstrates the inner division by carrying on an inner dialogue with himself. "Evil and sin are so much part of ourselves that we can only love each other with all our imperfections and that he who truly forgives is the one who admits solidarity with the wicked act". That is what is true of every individual,

an idea which is borne out in his novel "The Double". It is significant that Dostoevsky time and again quotes the same text from the Revelation of John we quoted earlier: "Because you are lukewarm and neither cold nor warm, I will spew you out of my mouth".[49] It is not so strange, I think, that we come back to Origen here. Origen and Dostoevsky have in common that they both advocate bold ideas which sometimes seem to run counter to the official dogma of the church, but also that they try to smooth down the boldness of their theories in order not to run the risk of an open conflict with the church.[50] But Dostoevsky takes a different and I would even say a more modern stand towards the problem of the two souls than Origen. In Dostoevsky's view, the evil, second, soul is an indissoluble part of ourselves and should not be repressed. This concept has a remarkable correspondence with ideas we find in those psychological circles which openly admit their acquaintance and kinship with 'Gnostic' doctrines. A good example is *Depth Psychology and New Ethics* by one of Jung's disciples Erich Neumann. He advocates that we should admit that we have two souls and that we should use the tension between the two in order to generate new energies for the benefit of the world in which we live.[51] When we cut away evil, we truncate our own being and this inevitably weakens our potentialities to cope with the problems that beset us. Just as the physicists teach us to use the enormous energies that are hidden in atoms, Neumann exhorts us not to shrink back from the potential forces that lie hidden in ourselves. Of course, the developments around nuclear energy and nuclear armaments give us ample warning not to play wantonly with these potentialities. But we have to take the risk of accepting the existence of two souls, the one opposite the other, in order to create a new world where all human beings can live with their good and their evil.

It is striking to see how Neumann's contemporary Bertold Brecht takes the same stand in modifying Goethe's famous line "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust".[52] In order to demonstrate that I would like to conclude this article with a full quotation of the end of Brecht's *Die heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfe.*

> Mensch, es wohnen dir zwei Seelen in der Brust!
> Such nicht eine auszuwählen
> Da du beide haben musst.
> Bleibe stets mit dir im Streite!
> Bleib der Eine, stets Entzweite!
> Halte die hohe, halte die niedere
> Halte die rohe, halte die biedere
> Halte sie beide!

NOTES

* I wish to thank Dr. Sara J. Denning Bolle of UCLA for the meticulous way in which she corrected my English.

[1] Augustine's utterances about the Manicheans are always very sharp: see e.g. *Confessiones* III, 6, 10: homines superbe delirantes carnales nimis et loquaces in quorum ore laquei diaboli. (A sect of men, proudly doting, too carnal and prating, in whose mouth were the snares of the Devil.)

[2] In *Les sources de Plotin. Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* V (Vandoeuvres/Genève 1957) 39 he blames himself for having trusted Augustine too much. See also Cl. Tresmontant, *La métaphysique du christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris 1961) 308/9. In *Die Gnosis III. Der Manichäismus*, ed. J. P. Asmussen (München 1980) the two souls are mentioned only in two places. One occurs in Augustine *De Haeresibus* 46 (p. 143), the other in a text by As-Sahrastani on the Manicheans (p. 150). But in this last text it is only said that one soul belongs to the world of light and the other to the world of darkness. We do not find there two souls in one person.

[3] See e.g. the aforementioned book by Asmussen, p. 36, 58, 122 (Dann bildete sie die gute Seele und fesselte sie in den Körper); 125 and other places.

[4] See e.g. H. Jonas, *Het gnosticisme* (Dutch translation by A. M. J. Baljet, Utrecht 1969) 215.

[5] How difficult it is to tell a Gnostic from a Manichee we see in the fact that Augustine himself alternately was called a Manichee and a Gnostic. See G. R. Evans, Neither a Pelagian nor a Manichee, in *Vigiliae Christianae* 35 (1981) 232-244.

[6] Most modern commentaries point to the Gnostics here e.g. H. Crouzel-M. Simonetti, *Origène, Les principes* (Paris 1980) IV, 85 and H. Görgemans und H. Karpp, *Origenes, Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien* (Darmstadt 1976) 603-5 n. 3.

[7] See H. Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* I (Göttingen [3]1964) 212ff. on the theory of the tripartition not only with the Gnostics but also with the Manicheans.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 97 n. 42.

[9] H. Langerbeck, *Aufsätze zur Gnosis* (Göttingen 1967) 54.

[10] J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique* (Paris 1944) 54.

[11] J. Igal, Aristoteles y la evolución de la antropología de Plotino, in *Pensamiento* 35 (1979) 315-346.

[12] See e.g. *Enneads* IV, 1.

[13] See H. R. Schwyzer, Zu Plotins Deutung der sogenannten platonischen Materie, in *Zetesis, hulde aan Prof. Dr. Emile de Strycker* (Antwerpen 1973) 278ff. and H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus in Later Platonism, in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought, Essays in Honour of A. H. Armstrong* (London 1981) 220 with more literature in note 41. See also H.-R. Schwyzer's excellent article *Plotinos* in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie* Band XXI, 1 col. 549-550.

[14] See E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Boston 1957) 214. It is interesting to compare this text with Plato, *State* 441bc where parts of the soul are carrying on an internal dialogue and *Phaedo* 94de where the soul has a dialogue with the (passions of the) body. See also *Sophist* 263e and *Phaedrus* 276e. I doubt that our late authority can be trusted that the two souls theory was already taught by Pherecydes of Syros (Fr. A5). See Dodds *op. cit.*, 153 and 173-4 note 111.

[15] Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy V* (Cambridge 1978) 365 and 95-97.

[16] See Dodds *op. cit.*, 207ff.

[17] According to his *De Part. Anim.* II, 16 and *De Gener. Anim.* 736 b 27-29 this soul is brought in from outside. On this whole question see F. J. C. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Nijmegen/Utrecht 1939) 275ff. and 290ff. and J. M. Rist, *Human Value* (Leiden 1982) 43f.

[18] See Guthrie *op. cit.*, 462 and 480. The fragment is to be found in R. Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig 1892) fr. 75 and in P. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici Scriptis* (Bonn 1911) fr. 55. For Xenocrates' monism see H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam 1964) 82.

[19] *In Timaeum* I, 381, 26ff. See also J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 202 and 254.

[20] Dillon *op. cit.*, p. 211.

[21] Dillon *op. cit.*, p. 256.

[22] J. Baudry, *Atticos* (Paris 1931) XXV.

[23] É. des Places, *Atticus* (Paris 1977) 23.

[24] See also L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* II (Amsterdam 1977) 108 n. 5.

[25] R. E. Witt, *Albinus* (Cambridge 1937) 82.

[26] *Leg. Alleg.* II, 6; *Special Leg.* I, 333. See F. Rüsche, *Blut, Leben und Seele* (Paderborn 1930) 367-401.

[27] *Special Leg.* IV, 92; *Heres* 225.

[28] *De Opificio Mundi* 117.

[29] *Quaest. in Genesim* II, 59, and *Quod deter. pot. insid. soleat* 82-3. For the whole question see Dillon *op. cit.*, 175-6.

[30] See H. C. Puech, Numenius d'Apamée et les théologies orientales du IIe siècle, in *Mélanges Bidez II* (Brussels 1934) 754-778. Also E. R. Dodds, Numenius and Ammonius, in *Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* V (Vandoeuvres/Genève 1957) 7-11.

[31] Iamblichus, *De anima* 375, I W.

[32] See Dillon *op. cit.*, 373 and A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III* (Paris 1953) 45 and 208. But Dillon also says (*o.c.*, 375) that the evil principle is subject to domination by the Good, albeit with certain irreducible recalcitrance.

[33] *Calcidius on Matter. His Doctrine and Sources*, Philos. Ant. IX (Leiden 1965) 114.

[34] Porphyrios und Numenios, in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* XII (Vandoeuvres/Genève 1965) 76.

[35] Hermès Trismégiste IV, 115, fragment 16 ed. Festugière-Nock.

[36] Cf. Festugière *op. cit.*, 45 n. 1 and 48ff.

[37] R. Beutler art. *Numenios* in Pauly-Wissowa *Realencyclopädie* Supp. Band VII (1940) 674ff.

[38] E. R. Dodds (see note 30) p. 7ff.

[39] Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων in Stob. I, 350, 25ff. W. and *De Abstinentia* I, 40 p. 116, 11. See H. Dörrie, in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* XII (Vandoeuvres/Genève 1965) 179ff.

[40] *De natura hominis* 115ff., 213ff. Matth.

[41] Beutler *op. cit.* (see note 37), 674.

[42] E. Levinas, La trace de l'Autre, in *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 25 (1963) 606.

[43] *Op. cit.*, 56.

[44] *Op. cit.*, 62. See also W. Theiler, Gott und Seele im kaiserzeitlichen Denken, in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* III (Vandoeuvres/Genève 1955) 78. A good example of vulgarized ideas is the doctrine of the two spirits even in man, which we find among the members of the Qumran sect. See J. Allegro, *The Dead Sea Scrolls* (Penguin 1978) 139.

[45] See the words of Mauler in B. Brecht's *Die heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfe*:

Ach das Reine ohne Fehle
Unverderbte Hilfsbereite
Es erschüttert uns Gemeine!
Weckt in unsrer Brust die zweite
bessere Seele!

[46] This is very much in agreement with the words of Medea in Euripides' *Medea* 1078-1080:

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα τολμήσω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,
ὅσπερ μεγίστος αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς.

See also Dodds *op. cit.*, p. 186 and note 46. It should be noted however that in the Euripides passage Medea's struggle is described as taking place between her love of the children and her hatred of Jason. It is also noteworthy that in Xenophon the "duty" soul wins over the "love" soul, while in Euripides the passion silences Medea's patriotic feelings.

[47] Cf. J. H. v.d. Berg, *Leven in meervoud* (Nijkerk 1974) 66ff. I do not, however, agree with his theory that in the *Faust* the two souls are used to illustrate a simple misunderstanding.

[48] A. Boyce Gibson, *The Religion of Dostoevsky* (Philadelphia 1973) 105. See also M. M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, translated by R. W. Rotsel (Ardis 1973) 176-190 and passim.

[49] This is what, for example, Sophia reads when Stephan Trofimowich dies in *The Possessed*. See Boyce Gibson *op. cit.*, 147 and the Dutch translation *Boze Geesten* (Amsterdam [2]1970) 675, 713, 783.

[50] In his *Notebooks* for the *Brothers Karamazov*, for example, Dostoevsky's denunciation of some aspects of the Christian creed is much more ferocious than in the (published) novel itself. See E. Wasiolek, *Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Notebooks for the Brothers Karamazov* (Chicago 1971) 10, 62 and 89.

[51] In La Substitution in *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 66 (1968) 494 Levinas also points at the tension that exists in every person. But he does not believe in two souls. The tension is part of and due to the indivisible unity of the soul.

[52] On Brecht's way of dealing with his forerunners see R. Grimm, *Bertold Brecht* (Stuttgart [3]1971) 24, R. Grimm, *Bertold Brecht* (Nürnberg [6]1972) 42-49, M. Kesting, *Brecht* (Rororo 1973) 45-46.

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FROM THE GREAT PERSECUTION TO THE PEACE OF GALERIUS

BY

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The long peace of Gallienus was a truly extraordinary phenomenon, and about eighteen years of its approximately forty years fell under the rule of Diocletian before what is usually referred to as the Great Persecution. Eusebius' glowing report about this peace and the unusual conditions enjoyed by the Church under its protection;[1] about the rise of the Christians to the highest positions in the provincial government; about freedom from obligation to sacrifice to the idols; about highly favoured Christians in the Imperial household of Diocletian;[2] about Christians in various and often high positions in local government across the Empire;[3] and, finally, Lactantius' report, sounding totally unbelievable, yet very possibly true, that the Emperor Diocletian's wife and daughter were Christians,[4]—all these reports may appear like a veritable fairy tale after 200 years of persecutions. Also, the Christians quite naturally built magnificent churches.[5] The main church of Nicomedia was in a conspicuous place and faced the Imperial palace. These new dimensions were perhaps necessary to accommodate the greatly increased Christian communities, but perhaps also the tastes of the upper classes coming into the Church. Christians of more modest status had perhaps to be satisfied with the more modest office of *duumviri*, and some of them were not selective enough and became even *flamines* and *sacerdotes* of the pagan cults.[6] It is difficult too to see how the ecumenism of the Christians of the late third century could make such compromises, for the later councils imposed only light or no penance for such obviously wide-spread practices.

When he gives the theological reason for the end of the long era of peace and the beginning of a long era of harsh persecution, Eusebius may have been thinking about these and many other deviations in Christian faith and morals for which the Christian Church received—the Bishop of Caesarea says, perhaps beating his own breast—the well-deserved punishment of God.[7]

The origin of and the reasons for the outbreak of the Great Persecution are, and of course will be, disputed. It certainly did not start with the few and apparently isolated cases of the military martyrs. The case of the Theban legion[8] and the martyrdoms of Maximilian, Marcellus, Fabius, Cassianus, and others[9] were not part of the Great Persecution. While these martyrs may have acted out of honest conviction that by their conduct they were avoiding idolatry,[10] their military superiors nevertheless condemned them for gross infraction of military discipline. However, these cases may have led, directly or indirectly, to what Eusebius regarded as something like a prelude to the Great Persecution.

He makes references to what appears to be a series of army purges that took place *long before* the beginning of the persecution.[11] Lactantius may be telling us the origin of these purges[12] when he relates the apparently fateful episode of the pagan *haruspices*, in which they were apparently checked in their soothsaying efforts by the application of the sign of the cross, and blamed the Christians for their failure. Diocletian, apparently very upset, ordered all in his palace to sacrifice to the pagan gods; those who declined were beaten. Thus those Christians, who enjoyed the privilege of being excepted from pagan sacrifices[13] were now for the first time obliged to go through the ritual. Since there was still no bloodshed the famous Christians of the Imperial household must have survived this ordeal, perhaps only with a painful *fustigatio* for refusing to sacrifice. What appears to be even more important than the discomfort of these very important Christians was that Diocletian at the same time ordered that soldiers were to be compelled to sacrifice and that those not complying were to be simply dismissed from the army.[14] Eusebius[15] may of course be speaking of the same purge, in which (1-2) Christian soldiers were allowed to choose between the army and dismissal to civil life if they disobeyed the order to sacrifice. This report by Eusebius is definitely similar to Lactantius' description (*above*) of Diocletian's purge of his own army. In fact, Eusebius too may be speaking of the same purge by Diocletian, although it is generally assumed that Galerius was the Emperor who effected the purge. The unnamed commander (3), identified in his *Chronicon (ad loc.)* as Veturius, gives a similar choice to his soldiers.[16] The odd cases of martyrdoms taking place in these purges (4) may however have resulted from breach of military discipline, especially since Diocletian's policy still was to avoid bloodshed.

Eusebius[17] says that the purges happened long before the outbreak of the persecution and that some of the purges took place in the 16th year of Diocletian's rule,[18] *i.e.* in about 298-299 A.D.[19] After these incidents of purges that followed the embarrassments of the *haruspices*, nothing happened, for about five years, until apparently very shortly before the outbreak of the Great Persecution. It is indeed a mystery why such a drastic measure was taken at this time. Another favourite question is: Who was responsible for starting the persecution of 303 A.D.?[20] Lactantius[21] and Eusebius[22] agree that Galerius, certainly a pagan religious fanatic, was the prime mover of the persecution. Besides Galerius, there were others at hand at the court of Nicomedia who, though with apparent difficulty, influenced Diocletian in his decision to carry out a general persecution of the Church.[23] One of the most prominent of the advisers who advocated persecution must have been one of the leading anti-Christian writers and a high government official, Hierocles.[24] Like some of his predecessors in very similar situations,[25] Diocletian was very strongly influenced by Imperial counsellors, who were often anti-Christian, in his decision to issue edicts of persecution. It is also obvious that there was an anti-Christian clique around Diocletian. Being described—probably correctly—as *imminentium scrutator*[26] and *scrutator rerum futurarum,*[27] he would not unnaturally turn from his own Imperial counsellors to the most ancient and trusted adviser of all, Apollo. When the highly respected oracle of the Milesian Apollo[28] advised the persecution of the Christians, Diocletian was apparently unable to act against Apollo's suggestion.[29] But a last qualm of the Senior Augustus that the business of persecution should be without bloodshed[30] was to be respected at least for the time being, in spite of Galerius, who apparently wanted all those who would refuse to sacrifice to be burned alive.[31] Judging from the fact that this method of putting Christians to death later became quite wide-spread in the East, we should probably believe Lactantius' little detail.

Only the date was to be fixed for the start of the persecution and this was done in the style of true believers in paganism. The momentous day was to be February 23, 303 A.D., the feast of the *Terminalia*, a day they thought most fitting for the occasion in that it expressed their faith that it signified the termination of Christianity.[32] On this day in what was no doubt meant as a symbolic act, praetorians[33] drew up a battle line with axes and other instruments of destruction and levelled the Christian church in Nicomedia, while, at dawn on the feast of *Terminalia*, the

Emperor Diocletian and his companions[34] watched what was meant to be the grand opening of the last act in the Christian drama.

An edict, drawn up on behalf of the four rulers and outlining the destruction of Christianity was issued on the same symbolic feast day, but it was posted in Nicomedia on the following day, February 24, 303 A.D.[35] This same edict was no doubt published throughout the Empire, and we happen to know[36] that this occurred in Palestine in March 303 A.D., just before Easter.[37]

The contents of the first edict of the Great Persecution can be determined very closely but perhaps not as completely as we should like. If we judge by the main sources,[38] the prescriptions of the first edict were something like the following: (a) all churches were to be destroyed; (b) all Scriptures were to be given up and burnt; (c) all, undoubtedly, persisting Christians were to lose all their rights in the courts of justice, whether as plaintiffs or defendants; (d) persisting Christians of high or special standing or position in society or elsewhere were to lose all the rights and privileges that derived from their special standing; (e) persisting Christians of the Imperial household[39] were to lose their personal freedom.[40]

According to Lactantius,[41] Galerius, not satisfied with the first edict, arranged a couple of fires in the Imperial palace at Nicomedia to drive Diocletian to more drastic action against the Christians.[42] After the first fire, Diocletian had the Christians of his household merely tortured. After the second, he ordered all members of his household to sacrifice. This was the occasion when the powerful Christian officials of Diocletian's household, Gorgonius, Dorotheus and Peter, were martyred.[43] Diocletian's rage went beyond his household,[44] however, and many Christians, including the Bishop Anthimus of Nicomedia, priests, deacons and numerous other Christians, were cruelly martyred. News[45] of revolts in Syria and Melitene only served as added impetus for Diocletian, suspecting Christian conspiracy against the Empire, to issue a second edict[46] ordering the leaders of the churches everywhere to be imprisoned. As a result, clerics of all ranks filled the prisons, together with all sorts of criminals. This edict was probably issued during the Spring or early Summer of 303 A.D.

Eusebius explicitly testifies[47] that, after the second edict, there was a third edict ordering that the clergy earlier imprisoned be set free provided that they sacrifice; the edict prescribed that if they did not, they should be tortured to force them to perform sacrifice. Eusebius

describes the sufferings of these clerics both in his *Ecclesiastical History*[48] and *Martyrs of Palestine*[49] in very similar language and terminology. It is clear from these passages that the authorities did everything to force the clerics to sacrifice, although it seems they were often satisfied with forcing the clerics' hands through the motions of sacrificing, or with simply informing the clerics that they were regarded as having sacrificed.

Now, on the occasion of Diocletian's *vicennalia* in November 303 A.D., amnesty was given to criminals, perhaps as a gesture fitting the occasion and also to effect a convenient reduction in the crowded prison population. Some modern writers[50] either equate the third edict with a measure of this amnesty applied also to the Christians, or they do not speak of a third edict at all. This equation, a very odd application of amnesty to the imprisoned Christian clergy, may seem a bright thought. The fact that some of the martyrdoms of clerics reported by Eusebius[51] apparently took place around the feast of the *vicennalia* might be an irresistable inducement to make this equation.[52] But the equation is probably unjustifiable because Eusebius, speaking of the third edict, clearly says that there was an Imperial order to release the imprisoned Christian clerics only if they sacrificed with or without the application of torture. This is of course not an amnesty, even if it somehow happened to coincide with the *vicennalia* and the usual amnesty granted to normal criminals. The Christian clergy were obviously excepted from the benefits of the amnesty, and this may have been done through what we call the third edict.

There is no doubt about the existence of what is usually referred to as the fourth edict of the Great Persecution, and it is clearly reported again by Eusebius in his *Martyrs of Palestine.*[53] The fourth edict was evidently a general order commanding all to offer sacrifices and make libations to the idols. Eusebius placed the publication of this edict in Palestine in the second year of the persecution, which would be 304-305 A.D. There are serious doubts about the date of its issue and the dates of its publication across the Empire. What is certain is that Diocletian at the time and prior to its issue and publication in the different sections of the Empire was if not fatally then certainly debilitatingly ill. Lactantius writes about the disease and its stages that incapacitated the Senior Augustus just after the celebration of the *vicennalia* in Rome and during and after his return to Nicomedia until shortly before his abdication together with the other Augustus, Maximian, on May 1, 305 A.D.[54] It is also probable

that Galerius pressured and even forced Diocletian into abdicating, and equally probable that it was he who forced, it seems, perhaps against the wishes of Diocletian, the issue of the fourth edict on behalf, of course, of the other emperors as well.[55] *Acts* and *Passion* stories of martyrs would indicate that the fourth edict was, in Galerius' territory, enforced as early as February 304 A.D.;[56] in Maximian's territory, by at least July 304 A.D.[57] In the areas subject to Diocletian the edict appears to have been working only by March 305 A.D.[58] Those refusing to comply with the edict's order to sacrifice were sent to the mines, often suffered tortures of all kinds and were even put to death.[59]

In the second tetrarchy of May 1, 305 A.D. it seems only the territories of Galerius and Maximinus Daia continued the persecution, although for about a year nothing seems to have happened. The persecution does not seem to have been resumed in the West. Probably during the Spring of 306 A.D., Maximinus Daia issued an edict,[60] his first, ordering general sacrifices. There is no need to believe that Maximinus Daia simply renewed[61] the fourth edict, for this measure of Maximinus Daia went far beyond any earlier measure of the Great Persecution: lists were drawn up; public criers called all people, men, women and children to go to the temples, and, furthermore, officials called every individual by name. Finally, Maximinus Daia issued his own second edict either in late 308 or early 309 A.D.[62] This too was no repetition of any previous edict, but went beyond all previous measures in trying to ensure the most thorough application of the sacrifice it prescribed for all. This edict too ordered general sacrifices; all, without exception—men, women, servants, infants at the breast—were ordered to sacrifice and make libations; the *curatores* and *duumviri* and the *tabularii*, who obviously kept the records, had to see to it that nobody evaded the edict; furthermore, food offered for sale on the market was befouled by libations; to block all loopholes, sentries were posted at the baths in order to force all customers to sacrifice. Galerius was, all this time, presumably satisfied with his own, the Great Persecution's fourth edict, but he was too busy with political problems of his own tetrarchy and its apparently nearly complete breakdown.

The edicts and the different measures of the Great Persecution were applied across the Empire with an unevenness that was apparent from place to place, especially when the territories of the individual Emperors and Caesars are compared. Apparently some decrees were promulgated or applied in or even at times meant for only some areas of the Empire

and not others. This impression seems to be inescapable and comes from a study of clearly identifiable *Acts* and *Passions* of the period. But this impression may only be the result of a lack of clearly identifiable *Acts* and *Passions* of martyrs. Indeed, our main source for the evaluation of the extent of the application of all the measures of the Great Persecution is obviously the *Acts* and *Passion* stories of martyrs. The value of all these martyrological documents is most uneven.[63] Some of them present very clear-cut cases and fall neatly into their places in genuine history. Others are not so clear and are often useless for any definitive historical conclusions. Our other sources are, of course, the professional reporters of the period, some of whom were on-the-spot witnesses. The main reporters are Eusebius with his most valuable works, the *Ecclesiastical History* and the *Martyrs of Palestine*; Lactantius with mainly his *On the Deaths of Persecutors*; and others such as Optatus and Augustine. There are also some valuable and puzzling inscriptions.

One of the best and most concrete cases testifying to the application of the first edict is the very respectable Acts of Bishop Felix, of Thibiuca, Africa, put to death by the governor Anullinus on the 13th of July, 303 A.D., for refusing to surrender sacred scriptures.[64] The case of the martyrs of Abitina, Africa,[65] is another useful piece of evidence for the application of the first edict. The case of Romanus[66] shows that churches were being destroyed as a result of the first edict. What is even more important is that this case may give us very interesting information on another, perhaps quite general, phenomenon that appeared in the wake of the very drastic first edict. The story of Romanus[67] speaks of crowds of Christians lining up for sacrificing to the idols. There is probably no mistake about the date of the martyrdom of Romanus, which was about November 17, 303 A.D., at the time of Diocletian's *vicennalia*, so the surprising scene of Christians abandoning their faith cannot be attributed to the fourth edict, which compelled all inhabitants to sacrifice. What can this mass apostasy mean? "Ordinary Christians", like the ones here lining up for the idols, might not have suffered any harm if they had obeyed the first edict's prescriptions concerning sacred writings and probably attendance at religious services. This same edict, however, deprived persistent Christians of their rights at the courts of justice and their privileges deriving from their social position. Thus obviously not only highly privileged Christians but also "ordinary Christians" had much to lose by remaining faithful to Christianity. The

Christians of Romanus' story then are probably simply making it clear, shortly after the publication of the first edict, that they are no longer Christians and that they intend to enjoy all the protection the courts could offer them against the infringements of their civil rights.

It is probably true that in the West a very common way of apostasy in the wake of the first edict was *traditio*, or handing over to the authorities sacred writings and vessels, as is shown e.g. by the whole unfortunate Donatist controversy,[68] the Synod of Arles of 314 A.D.,[69] and some few trustworthy *Passion* stories, where the issues were *traditio* and not apostasy by sacrificing. On the other hand, *Passion* stories that originate from the Eastern parts, the "canonical" letters of Bishop Peter of Alexandria, but above all the canons of the Council of Ancyra, shortly after the persecutions, are concerned about sacrificing to the idols and not about *traditio*. It is curious that there seems to be no Greek term that would correspond with the word *traditio* in the sense of the controversy.[70] There were of course people in the West who apostasized by *sacrificatio* or *turificatio*, and people in the East, who refused to hand over sacred writings and vessels.[71]

It would seem that from the point of view of the government the first edict must have been quite successful.[72] Churches were destroyed; the clergy very tamely gave up sacred writings and vessels in both the East and the West; moreover the "ordinary Christians" seem to have cared more for the preservation of their civil rights than for their faith. The application of the first edict seems of course to have been uneven, more strict in the East. Then Constantius, the Caesar, later the Augustus of the West, has been given credit by ancient and modern writers for his moderation in the application of the first edict, and, in particular, for destroying only some Christian places of assembly.[73]

The application of what we called the second and third edicts is attested by some very clear cases. Procopius,[74] an exorcist, may or may not have been arrested in compliance with the second edict, and may or may not have been put to death for an insulting remark at his trial, but it seems that he was tried in compliance with the third edict, which prescribed sacrifice for imprisoned clerics or death.[75] The case of Alpheus and Zacchaeus,[76] both clerics, one a reader and exorcist, the other a deacon, put to death on November 17, 303 A.D., appears to be evidence for the application of the third edict of the Great Persecution. The application of the second and third edicts receives a graphic illustration in Eusebius' *Martyrs of Palestine*, I, 3-4, and *Ecclesiastical History*

VIII, 3, 1-4. Apart from their similarity, both passages are curiously introduced by the announcement of what we call the second and third edicts of the Great Persecution. The passages are dramatic evidence that priests and bishops—including Eusebius?—were tortured in clear compliance with the third edict. What appears to be a mystery is that Eusebius does not name a single priest or bishop who was martyred in this process. Nor does he, understandably, mention any apostasies by the leaders of the Palestinian Church. He does suggest that apostasies were numerous. Or, it was perhaps the bishops and priests rather than minor clerics who were forced through the mock movements of sacrificing to the idols and being declared to have sacrificed.

All these cases concern the East; for the West we do not seem to have similar documentation.[77]

There is no doubt that the fourth edict was published in the East[78] and in some of the Western provinces. We also have some quite beautiful and very respectable *Passion* stories for both the East and the West, which are a most convenient if not necessarily binding evidence of the application of the fourth edict. For quite obviously[79] a demand of sacrifice by a judge is not necessarily proof of an application of the fourth edict.

The martyrdoms of Timotheus, Agapius, Thecla, Timolaus and companions[80] might very well come under the application of the fourth edict, while the *Passion* story of Crispina's martyrdom[81] is one of the clearest of the available cases that bear earmarks of the application of the fourth edict sometime in 304 A.D. in Africa by the governor Anullinus. The martyrdoms of Irenaeus, Bishop of Sirmium, Pannonia, probably in April 304 A.D.,[82] and of Julius, a veteran of many wars,[83] certainly appear to belong to the same category. Some of the best cases, quite clearly the applications of the fourth edict, are the martyrdoms of Agape, Eirene, Chione and companions,[84] which took place in Thessalonica, apparently on the first of April, 304 A.D. The unbelievable story of a town in Phrygia being burned down with all its inhabitants by the order of the governor because no one would deny Christianity[85] may be a corollary of the fourth edict. If the inhabitants were Montanists Eusebius' perhaps embarrassed silence would be understandable.[86]

There are unquestionably numerous cases relevant to the fourth edict, in both the East and the West. Many of the *Passion* stories are however difficult to evaluate. But the absence of strictly "acceptable" *Acts* and

Passion stories is of course not a proof—though at times it is taken to be—of the absence of martyrdoms in the application of the fourth edict. Furthermore the apparent absence e.g. of "any Western reference to the purchase of immunity from sacrificing"[87] is clearly not a proof of the "non-enforcement" of the fourth edict in the West, although references to the purchase of this immunity[88] and other considerations[89] in this case are certainly characteristic of the East but not necessarily confined to it.

The issue of Maximinus Daia's first edict, in Maximinus' territories only, calling for a universal offering of sacrifices, indirectly caused the martyrdom of Apphianus,[90] on April 2, 306 A.D., when he boldly tried to prevent the governor Urbanus from offering sacrifice. Maximinus Daia's second edict[91] in late 308 or early 309 A.D. provoked a similar incident, when three Christians, Antoninus, Zebinas and Germanus, tried to stop the governor Firmilianus in his act of offering sacrifice.

Eusebius illustrates with many examples, with a probably complete list of victims for Palestine, how Maximinus Daia's edicts of persecution were carried out to their last victim in Palestine.[92] Somewhat later, after the issue of his edict of 306 A.D., perhaps in 307 A.D., Maximinus Daia replaced the death penalty with savage mutilations and condemnations to hard labour in the mines, such as those of Phaeno in Palestine.[93] Since the Egyptian mines were becoming overcrowded mainly with Christian victims, they began to be transferred to the copper mines of Phaeno and even to Cilicia. One batch of 97 Christian men from Thebaid were sent with their wives and children[94] to Firmilianus, the newly-appointed governor of Palestine, who by Imperial command, had the tendons of their left feet cut and their right eyes blinded and then sent them on to the mines of Palestine. Another time a batch of 130 Egyptians arrived in Palestine,[95] of whom some were sent to Phaeno and the rest to Cilician mines, but only after they suffered the same mutilations as the previous Egyptian batch.

The martyrs of Palestine had some notable persons among them, such as Pamphilus, who was a priest, a scholar and a defender of Origen. He, too, after fifteen months of imprisonment, was put to death[96] in Caesarea on February 16, 306 A.D. Silvanus, the Bishop of the Churches around Gaza, was beheaded with thirty-nine prisoners at the coppermines of Phaeno, and Egyptian Bishops, Peleus and Nilus, were put to death by fire.[97]

Eusebius' *Martyrs of Palestine* may give a full report concerning the number of victims for that area for the period from early 306 to early 310 A.D., when, on March 10, Eubulus became it seems the last martyr of Palestine during the Great Persecution. Thanks to Eusebius' eyewitness reporting, we have a fairly good knowledge of the extent of the persecution in Palestine, but mainly for the rule of Maximinus Daia. At the same time we also learn how terribly the Egyptian confessors suffered during the same period.[98] The number of Egyptians who, according to Eusebius' reports, suffered martyrdom and all sorts of hardship in their own country must have been truly staggering,[99] and their deaths were made all the more trying on account of appalling tortures the Roman government inflicted on these simple confessors of Christ. As Eusebius[100] tells us in a report on Thebaid, these punishments were administered not just for a short period of time, but for years, and sometimes ten, twenty, and at times even one hundred men would be put to death in a single day, along with young children and women.

Apart from Eusebius, we have Lactantius reporting the persecution in some detail, mainly, it seems, for 303 A.D.[101] and for the area of Nicomedia. Other eyewitness reports, such as the accounts of the Synod of Arles and the Council of Ancyra, epitaphs and other inscriptions add little but at times interesting information to our knowledge on the matter. Thus the picture we have of the application of the different measures of the Great Persecution is understandably very uneven. We only can wish that Eusebius had gone much further than the bare generalities in his area and given us one detailed report on the bloody end of the persecutions.[102] Indeed, what does he mean when, prior to he general survey, he laments:[103] "how could one number the multitude of martyrs in each province, and especially those in Africa and Mauretania, and in Thebaid and Egypt?" The very unevenness of this picture is probably due to the lack of reports mainly for the other areas and periods. While we can probably say that it could not anywhere be as bad or nearly as bad as it was in Egypt, we can probably expect many more martyrdoms than the handful that we can find useful for documenting the Great Persecution. The great *Acta Sanctorum* is full of additional candidates and suggestions for this period of Roman History.

In addition, the reports, mentioned above, of Eusebius and of councils and even *Passion* stories have many helpful hints of numerous and widespread apostasies and unglorious behaviour by the leaders of the

Church. Apostasies, and not just martyrdoms, are a good yardstick for measuring the application of the Great Persecution. If the chief shepherds behaved less than honourably during these times of trials, how else would most of the flock have behaved? Confessions and martyrdoms, forced or voluntary, were no doubt the exception. All this, of course, is not to deny that the uneveness in our picture of the Great Persecution is due undeniably also to the fact that the edicts and measures of the Great Persecution were at different times unevenly carried out not only, as has always been the case in various persecutions, by different governors across the Empire, but also by different Emperors, such as Constantius, known for his mildness towards Christianity. Then, at times, the persecution was a duet concerted by Galerius and his Caesar of the East, and at others a solo performance by Maximinus Daia in his own sphere of power.

Indeed Galerius acknowledged—perhaps not soon enough—the futility of the persecutions. His *Edict of Toleration* was posted in Nicomedia on April 30, 311 A.D. and its full text is given by Lactantius.[104] From Lactantius' Latin edition the names of the four rulers, Galerius, Maximinus Daia, Licinius and Constantine, are missing. We also have its Greek translation by Eusebius,[105] which, though faulty in places, we hope helps to a better understanding of the original Latin text. In his turn, Rufinus retranslated Eusebius' Greek text into a Latin of his own.[106] The interpretation of this edict[107] is generally regarded, with some exceptions, as simple and clear-cut, which it should be. The monumental and, of course, the decisive part of the edict is that which defines, as far as it goes, the legal position of the Christians at least in the eyes of the four 'signatory' Emperors of April 30, 311 A.D.: (4) "having regard to our most humane clemency and to our never-ceasing custom to grant pardon to all men, we have decided that it is necessary that we extend our indulgence to them too, so that Christians may exist again and that they may put up their assembly places, provided that they do nothing contrary to public order". Though the edict should not be dismissed as insignificant, as it was by Tillemont,[108] its juridical importance should not be overestimated either.

It has been said that the old "legal formula" *non licet esse Christianos*, was "definitively" shelved;[109] that Christianity became a tolerated cult and a *religio licita*, "on a par with Judaism";[110] and that the Christians' property rights became legally safeguarded;[111] etc. What is explicit however is that the Christians were granted pardon; they were

allowed to exist once again as Christians and to put up their places of assembly and naturally to have their religious assemblies and services. This explicitness in the spelling out of freedom for the Christians to exist as such may of course go beyond Gallienus' recognition of Christian rights, but clearly the Christian religion will only be tolerated[112] and not made equal with the pagan religion, as was done by Constantine in his so-called edict of Milan. Galerius' edict of toleration apparently allows only the re-building of destroyed assembly places and the building of new ones.[113] Gallienus and Constantine were both explicit in ordering the restoration of confiscated Church property. It is possible, though doubtful, that Galerius intended to do this in the same way as it was done by Gallienus and Constantine. His statement (5) that he would issue instructions to the proper magistrates concerning the details of his indulgence granted to the Christians, is not clear. But it is even more doubtful whether Galerius, who died five days after the publication of his edict in Nicomedia, ever issued any such instructions.[114] Even if the promised instructions were issued, it is not very likely that Galerius would even now have showed himself generous to the Christian Church. His *proviso* that the Christians' freedom to practice their religion depended on their doing nothing contrary to public order may be "normal",[115] but it does not show a spirit of goodwill; this whole concession appeared to be a mere toleration given grudgingly and against the impulse of Galerius' heart. Why then did Galerius take the fateful step of issuing this edict? Scholars have offered all sorts of answers.

Perhaps most of the answers assume political intrigue and motivation;[116] and that the presence of Licinius at Sardica at that time had a decisive influence on the issuing of the edict;[117] this may have been the case to some extent. Others, it seems, follow Lactantius and Eusebius[118] in believing that Galerius was persuaded by his terrible disease and suffering that he had to deal with the God of the Christians.[119] Galerius' own "explanation" for granting the Christians their freedom seems clearly to indicate that he indeed realized, and, owing perhaps to his complete helplessness, grudgingly admitted that he indeed had at last to take into account the God of the Christians. The tetrarchy, he "explained", attempted to restore things according to the discipline and the ancient laws of the Romans; the Christians had abandoned the religion of their ancestors[120] and chose to follow their own laws and to have their own religious assemblies in which they gathered together people of different nationalities; the tetrarchy brought its measures against the

Christians only in order to return them to the institutions of their pagan ancestors; but this policy failed, Galerius admits, with the result that there were people, the Christians, who worshipped neither the gods nor the God of the Christians; things had gone badly lately with the State (suffering revolutions and civil wars one after the other; the tetrarchy was breaking down; and, to cap it all, the Senior Augustus had one leg already in the grave; was it possible to reverse the situation?) and both the State and Galerius needed the prayers of the Christians.

This edict gave Christians no more than an explicit toleration, which the Christians had enjoyed in every respect before the first anti-Christian edicts of 303 A.D. and ever since Gallienus' measures granting the Christians that same toleration.[121]

There is no doubt that Galerius' edict of toleration was issued in the name of all the four 'recognized' rulers of the Empire,[122] although their names and titles are missing from Lactantius' text and are incomplete in Eusebius' Greek edition of the edict. The joint issue of the edict is certainly implied in some other reports of both Lactantius and Eusebius.[123] Maximinus Daia's name was without doubt on the edict of toleration issued by Galerius. Licinius, who on Galerius' death occupied the Danube and the Balkan regions up to the Bosporus as his part of the inheritance, held to the norm laid down in the edict. Maximinus Daia, who quickly occupied Galerius' territories in Asia Minor up to the Bosporus, the only enthusiastic persecutor just before the publication of the edict, which was probably drawn up without consultation with him, was, according to reports,[124] nonplussed by it. Reluctantly, he had the edict enforced[125] at first. This situation of toleration lasted for about six months. Then action was taken against the Christians in the form of highly organized propaganda campaign; the city councils of Antioch, Nicomedia, Tyre and other cities were, no doubt to please Maximinus Daia, officially encouraged to petition their Emperor that the "atheistic" Christians might be expelled from their communities.[126] Maximinus Daia, with many approving and kind words, granted their petitions.[127] Anti-Christian propaganda perhaps never stooped lower than when his government apparatus tried by what appear to be modern propaganda methods to blacken and destroy Christianity by any and every means of slander, such as e.g. the infamous *Memoirs of Pilate*,[128] full of blasphemy against the Saviour and Christianity.

Soon we hear of banishments and martyrdoms—all the symptoms of a regular persecution. Ordinary Christians and bishops alike were again

put to death. The most illustrious of them was Bishop Peter of Alexandria[129] who may have been the last martyr of the Great Persecution in Egypt.[130] In truth, the edicts of the Great Persecution and Galerius' edict of toleration were no more effective than the power that was willing and able to enforce them.

On the other hand, Maxentius, not being a 'signatory' to the edict of toleration and not being recognized by Galerius and his tetrarchy, patiently tried to improve his situation in his part of the Roman Empire. One of his means was his neutral policy towards the Church. He even returned property to the Christians that they had lost during the persecution.[131] He was not an anti-Christian fanatic like Maximinus Daia. Maxentius' motives may have been merely political, as he was certainly determined to retain his empire and Rome.[132]

NOTES

[1] Eusebius, *H.E.* VIII; esp. VIII, 1; 13, 6; and *passim*.

[2] *Ibid.* VIII, 1, 4: Dorotheus and Gorgonius; VIII, 6, 2-4: Peter.

[3] *Ibid.* VIII, 9, 7: Philoromus, a Justice in Alexandria; VIII, 11, 2: Adauctus, *magister rei privatae* and *rationalis summarum*, A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602* (Oxford 1964) vol. i, 71.

[4] Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum* 15, 1.

[5] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 1; Lact. *De mort.* 12.

[6] *C. Ilib.* canons 2; 3; 55; 56.

[7] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 1, 6-8.

[8] D. van Berchem, *Le Martyre de la légion thébaine*, *Schweizerische Beiträge* 8 (Basle, 1956); L. Dupraz, Les passions de S. Maurice d'Agaune, *Studia Friburgensia N.S.* 27 (1961).

[9] R. Knopf and G. Krüger, *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten* (Tübingen 1929) 86ff.; Ruinart, *passim*.

[10] See W. Seston, Les origines de la persécution de Dioclétien, *Bull. Soc. Antiqu. France* (1950-51) 27-28; E.-Ch. Babut, L'adoration des empereurs et les origines de la persécution de Dioclétien, *Rev. Hist.* 123 (1916) 225-252; *N.B.* the fact that the council of Arles of 314 A.D. excommunicated those who threw away their arms during peacetime.

[11] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 4, 1-4; etc.

[12] Lact. *De mort.* 10.

[13] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 1, 2.

[14] J. Moreau (ed.), Lactance, *De la mort des persécuteurs* (Paris 1954) 266: Diocletian may have meant only officers.

[15] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 4, 1-4.

[16] Compare the forceful but bloodless purge in Galerius' army in *H.E.* VIII, App.

[17] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 4, 1.

[18] *Chronicon, ad loc.*

[19] See Jones, *op. cit.* 71; H. Grégoire, *Les persécutions dans l'empire romain* (Bruxelles 1964) 68; 78; *cf.* W. H. C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church* (New York 1967) 362.

[20] Jones, *op. cit.* 71; K. Stade, *Der Politiker Diocletian und die letzte grosse Christenverfolgung* (Wiesbaden 1926) 160f.; Frend, *op. cit.* 362f.; B. J. Kidd, *A History of the Church to A.D. 461* (Oxford 1922) vol. I, 513f.; H. Florin, *Untersuchungen zur diocletianischen Christenverfolgung* (Giessen 1928) 23; J. Vogt, Christenverfolgung, *RAC* 1193f.; *et al.*

[21] Lact. *De mort.* 10; etc.

[22] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, App.

[23] Lact. *De mort.* 10, 4; 11.

[24] *Ibid.* 16, 4: *auctor et consiliarius ad faciendam persecutionem.*

[25] Paul Keresztes, The Emperor Septimius Severus: a Precursor of Decius, *Historia* 19 (1970) 565-578; *id.* Two Edicts of the Emperor Valerian, *Vig. Christ.* 29 (1975) 81-95.

[26] Aurelius Victor, *Caes.* 39, 48.

[27] Lact. *De mort.* 10, 1.

[28] *Ibid.* 11, 7.

[29] See *CIG* 2, 2883; H. Grégoire, Les pierres qui crient, *Byzantion* 14 (1939) 320; *cf.* Eusebius, *Vita Const.* ii, 50.

[30] Lact. *De mort.* 11, 8.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.* 12, 1.

[33] *Ibid.* 12, 5.

[34] *Ibid.* 12, 3-4.

[35] *Ibid.* 13, 1.

[36] Eusebius, *Martyrs of Palestine* pref. 1.

[37] *Cf.* Lact. *De mort.* 15, 6-7.

[38] *Ibid.* 13; Eus. *Mart. Palest.* pref. 1; *H.E.* VIII, 2, 1; 2, 4; and *Acts* and *Passion* stories of the martyrs of the persecution.

[39] No doubt the *Caesariani* of Valerian's second edict.

[40] See also G. E. M. de Ste Croix, Aspects of the Great Persecution, *Harvard Theol. Rev.* 42 (1954) 75f.; Jones, *op. cit.* 71f., who, for some curious reason, divides the publication of the first edict between February 23 and February 24; also N. H. Baynes, *The Great Persecution*, CAH XII 665f.; Stade, *op. cit.* 163ff.; *et al.* The prohibition of assemblies, though obvious, may have been only implied; *cf.* de Ste Croix, *ibid.*

[41] Lact. *De mort.* 14; 15.

[42] See Eusebius' laconic note on the palace fire, *H.E.* VIII, 6, 6.

[43] *Ibid. H.E.* VIII, 6, 1-7; *cf.* Lact. *De mort* 15, 1-3.

[44] Lact. *De mort.* 15, 1-5; Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 6, 6-7.

[45] *Ibid. H.E.* VIII 6, 8.

[46] *Ibid.* VIII, 6, 8-9; VIII, 2, 3; *Mart. Palest. pref.* 2.

[47] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 6, 10; VIII, 2, 5.

[48] *Ibid.* VIII, 3, 1-4.

[49] I, 3-5, if not 1-2.

[50] Kidd, *op. cit.* 520; de Ste Croix *op. cit.* 76f.; Jones *op. cit.*, 72; *et al.*

[51] *Eus. Mart. Palest.* I, 5: Alpheus and Zacchaeus; II, 1:Romanus.

[52] Stade, *op. cit.* 170f.

[53] III, 1.

[54] Lact. *De mort.* 17-19.

[55] See Baynes *op. cit.* 665-68; Stade *op. cit.* 174f.; Grégoire, *Les persécutions* etc. *op. cit.* 79; Frend, *op. cit.* 365f.; *et al.*

[56] *Acts* of Agape, Irene, and Chione; see N. H. Baynes, Two Notes on the Great Persecution, *C.Q.* (1924) 189-94; de Ste Croix, *op. cit.*, 77; *et al.*

[57] *Passio Maximae, Secundae et Donatillae; Passion* of Fabius; see Baynes, Two Notes, *op. cit.* 189-94; de Ste Croix, *op. cit.* 77; *et al.*

[58] *Acta Phileae et Philoromi*; See Baynes, *ibid.*

[59] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* III, 1.

[60] *Ibid.* IV, 8.

[61] G. Bardy (ed.) Eusèbe de Cesarée, *Histoire ecclésiastique* (Paris 1958) note *ad loc.*

[62] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* IX, 2; see Baynes, *op. cit.* CAH 671.

[63] Read N. H. Baynes, CAH XII 'Bibliography', 790-93.

[64] Knopf and Krüger, *op. cit.* 90f.; Ruinart, 390f.; the case of Euplus, Knopf and Krüger, *op. cit.* 100-02, Ruinart, 437f., shows the application of the first edict, even though Euplus was apparently a volunteer martyr.

[65] Ruinart, 416.

[66] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* II, 1.

[67] *Ibid.* II, 1-4.

[68] Optatus, *On the Schism of the Donatists, passim.*

[69] Canon 13.

[70] See de Ste Croix, *op. cit.* 85.

[71] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* XII; Gennadius, a bishop or priest in the neighbourhood of Laodicea Combusta, *cf.* W. M. Calder, Some Monuments of the Great Persecution, *Bull. J. Ryl. Libr.* (1924) 358, may have endured martyrdom for preserving, *i.e.* refusing to surrender, and not just for living, according to the Holy Scriptures.

[72] Jones, *op. cit.* 74.

[73] Eus. *H.E. VIII*, 13, 12; Lact. *De mort.* 15, 7.

[74] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* I, 1.

[75] *Ibid.* pref. 2; see de Ste Croix, *op. cit.* 81f.

[76] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* I, 5.

[77] Unless the remarks of Lactantius, *De mort.* 15, 4-5, refer only to the application of the first edict; *cf.* Frend, *op. cit.* 369, who believes that the passage concerns the fourth edict.

[78] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* III, 1.

[79] See de Ste Croix, *op. cit.* 80.

[80] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* III.

[81] Knopf and Krüger, *op. cit.* 109ff.; Ruinart, 477ff.

[82] Knopf and Krüger, *op. cit.* 103ff.; Ruinart, 431-34.

[83] Knopf and Krüger, *op. cit.* 105f.

[84] *Ibid* 95-100. Concerning Philip, Bishop of Heraclea in Thrace, and his deacon Hermes, see Ruinart 440-48; de Ste Croix *op. cit.* 81; Baynes, *op. cit.* CAH 676; Kidd *op. cit.* 519f.; concerning the martyrdom of Phileas, see Knopf and Krüger *op. cit.* 113ff.; Ruinart, 519-21; J. R. Knipfing, The date of the Acts of Phileas and Philoromus, *Harvard T.R.* (1923) 198-203.

[85] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 11; and probably also Lactantius, *Inst. div.* V, 11.

[86] See W. M. Ramsey, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* (Oxford 1883) II, 502-509; Calder, *op. cit.* 362f.

[87] de Ste Croix, *op. cit.* 87.

[88] Peter of Alexandria, 'can. xii'.

[89] Council of Ancyra, can. 1: arrangements for "bogus tortures" for clergy to rehabilitate themselves after earlier apostasy.

[90] Eus. *Mart. Palest.* IV, 2-15.

[91] *Ibid.* IX, 2.

[92] *Ibid.* V. 1-XI.

[93] *Ibid.* VII, 1-4; etc.

[94] *Ibid.* VIII, 1-4.

[95] *Ibid.* VIII, 13.

[96] *Ibid.* XI; *H.E.* VIII, 13, 6.

[97] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 13, 5; *Mart. Palest.* XIII.

[98] Eus. *Mart. Palest. above; passim.*

[99] See Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 8.

[100] *Ibid.* IX, 1-3.

[101] Lact. *De mort.* 13-15.

[102] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 7ff.

[103] *Ibid.* VIII, 6, 10.

[104] Lactanius, *De mort.* 34: (1) *Inter cetera quae pro rei publicae semper commodis atque utilitate disponimus, nos quidem volueramus antehac iuxta leges veteres et publicam disciplinam Romanorum cuncta corrigere atque id providere, ut etiam Christiani, qui parentum suorum reliquerant sectam, ad bonas mentes redirent.* (2) *Siquidem quadam ratione tanta eosdem Christianos voluntas invasisset et tanta stultitia occupasset, ut non illa veterum instituta sequerentur, quae forsitan primum parentes eorundem constituerant, sed pro arbitrio suo atque ut isdem erat libitum ita sibimet leges facerent quas observarent et per diversa varios populos congregarent.* (3) *Denique cum eiusmodi nostra iussio extitisset, ut ad veterum se instituta conferrent, multi periculo subiugati, multi etiam deturbati sunt.* (4) *atque cum plurimi in proposito perseverarent, ac videremus nec diis eosdem cultum ac religionem debitam exhibere, nec Christianorum deum observare, contemplatione mitissimae nostrae clementiae intuentes ac consuetudinem sempiternam, qua solemus cunctis hominibus veniam indulgere, promptissimam in his quoque indulgentiam nostram credidimus porrigendam, ut denuo sint Christiani et conventicula sua componant, ita ut ne quid contra disciplinam agant.* (5) *Per aliam autem epistolam iudicibus significaturi sumus, quid debeant observare. Unde iuxta hanc indulgentiam nostram debebunt deum suum orare pro salute nostra et rei publicae ac sua, ut undique versum res publica praestetur incolumis et securi vivere in sedibus suis possint.*

[105] Eus. *H.E.* VIII, 17, 3-11.

[106] *Ad loc.* for a useful comparison of the Latin and Greek texts of the edict, see K. Bihlmeyer, Das Toleranzedikt des Galerius von 311, *Theol. Quartalschr.* 94 (1912) 424ff.; J. R. Knipfing, The Edict of Galerius (311 A.D.) re-considered, *Rev. belge de Philol. et d'Hist.* 1 (1922) 693-705 (*passim*).

[107] See Bihlmeyer, *op. cit.*; Knipfing, *op. cit.*; J. Moreau, *op. cit.* 388ff.; P. Batiffol, *La paix constantinienne et le catholocisme* (Paris 1914) 180-186; E. Schwartz, Zur Geschichte des Athanasius, *Nachr. Akad. d. W. Göttingen* (1904) 527; *et al.*

[108] L. S. Le Nain de Tillemont, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles* (Paris) V, 44.

[109] Knipfing, *op. cit.* 705.

[110] *Ibid.*; Bihlmeyer, *op. cit.* 412; Vogt, *op. cit.* 1199; *et al.*

[111] Knipfing, *op. cit.* 705.

[112] E. Schwartz, *Kaiser Konstantin und die christliche Kirche* (Leipzig 1913) 63.

[113] See Knipfing, *op. cit.* 702f.

[114] See also Th. Keim, *Der Übertritt Constantins des Grossen zum Christentum* (Zürich 1862) 81; *et al. Cf.* H. Hülle, *Die Toleranzerlässe röm. Kaiser* (Berlin 1895) 94.

[115] Knipfing, *op. cit.* 702.

[116] Schiller, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Gotha 1883-87) II, 182f.; J. Geffcken, *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg 1920) 91; J. B. Firth, *Constantine the Great* (New York 1905) 137-140; *et al.*

[117] L. Duchesne, *Hist. anc. de l'Église* (Paris) II, 27; P. Batiffol, *op. cit.* 181; *et al.*

[118] Lact. *De mort.* 33; Eus, *H.E.* VIII, 17, 1.

[119] H. Hülle, *op. cit.* 41; A. Linsenmayer, *Die Bekämpfung des Christentums durch den römischen Staat bis zum Tode des Kaisers Julian* (München 1905) 221; Duchesne, *op. cit.* 26; *et al.*

[120] Th. Keim, Die römische Toleranzedikte für das Christentum (311-313) und ihr geschichtlicher Wert, *Theol. Jahrb.* 11 (1852) 211ff.; Bihlmeyer, *op. cit.* 545ff.; *et al*, incredibly believe that Galerius objected to the Christians' abandoning the religion of their Christian ancestors; *cf.* E. Schwartz, *Kaiser Konstantin op. cit.* 63; Batiffol, *op. cit.* 182; Knipfing, *op. cit.* 698; *et al.*, correctly believe that it was the abandoning of the pagan religion of their ancestors that Galerius and the government objected to.

[121] Baynes, *op. cit.* CAH 671; *et al.*

[122] See Knipfing, *op. cit.* 695.

[123] Lact. *De mort.* 36, 3; Eus. *Mart. Palest.* 13, 14; *H.E.* VII, 17, 1-5; IX, 1, 1; *esp.* IX, 1, 2.

[124] Eus. *H.E.* IX, 1, 1; Lact. *De mort.* 36.

[125] Eus. *H.E.* IX, 1, 1-11: Letter of Sabinus to the provincial governors; the release of Christian prisoners; the recall of exiles; and the jubilation of the Christians. Maximinus Daia's message, through a letter by Sabinus, his Prefect, is as follows (Eus. *H.E.* IX, 1, 3-6):

"With a most shining and dedicated zeal, the Divinity of our most divine lords, the Emperors, some time ago, determined to lead all men's thoughts back to the holy and right way of living, so that even those reputed to follow a way of life that is foreign to Romans might perform the acts of worship due to the immortal gods. But the resistance and most stubborn determination of some developed into such a state that they could neither be turned back from their own peculiar purpose by the right reasoning of the edict, nor would they fear the punishment threatened against them. Since, therefore, as a result of a way of life like this, it came about that many brought themselves into the danger of capital punishment, in accordance with the nobility that characterizes their religion, the Divinity of our lords, the most mighty Emperors, deeming it foreign to their most divine purpose that they should subject people to such great punishment for such a reason, gave orders through my Devotedness to write to your Wisdom that, if any of the Christians was found following the worship of his own particular sect, you should free him from molestation directed against him and from the danger of punishment, and that you should not

deem anyone punishable on the basis of this charge, since, after such a long passage of time, it became clear that they could in no way be persuaded to abandon such obstinate practices. Therefore, it is your Solicitude's duty to write to the Curators and the Duumvirs and the magistrates of the district of every city to let them know that they should not pay any more attention to the [edict concerning them]."

[126] See Eus. *H.E.* IX, 2-4; IX, 7; IXA; *CIL*, 3, 12132; See Th. Mommsen, Zweisprächige Inschrift aus Arycanda, *Gesammelte Schriften VI*, 555-65; Lact. *De mort.* 36, 3.

[127] Eus. *H.E.* IX, 7, 2-16. An answer of Maximinus Daia to some petitions against the Christians (Eus. *H.E.* IX, 7, 3-14):

"The feeble power of the human mind, by shaking off and scattering all darkness and mist of error—an error which, up til now, beleaguered the senses of men, not so much impious as pitiful, and wrapped them in a deadly darkness of ignorance—has now finally succeeded in recognizing that it is governed and made secure by the benevolent providence of the immortal gods.

It has been unbelievably gratifying, pleasing and agreeable to us that you have given us a very great proof of your godly disposition, since even before now it was very well known to every one how religious and pious your disposition is towards the immortal gods, and your faith in them is known to be not of dry and empty words, but one that is constant and unique in its remarkable works. Therefore, your city might, deservedly, be called a shrine and dwelling place of the immortal gods. Indeed, it appears by many proofs that it flourishes on account of the immortal gods' habitation there. Therefore, when your city, once again, sensed that those who became victims of this accursed folly were beginning to spread just like a neglected and smouldering fire which, when its cinders are rekindled, becomes a very great conflagration, your city neglected all concerns for its own private interests and abandoned all previous requests concerning its own affairs, and, behold, it, immediately and without any delay, had recourse to our Piety as to a metropolis of all religiousness, and requested some remedy and help. It is evident that the gods implanted in you this salutary dispositon on account of your faith and godliness. Therefore, it was he, the most high and the greatest Zeus, he who is presiding over your most excellent city; he who protects your ancestral gods, and your wives, and children, and hearth, and homes from all deadly ruin; it was he who breathed into your hearts this saving proposition, by showing and demonstrating how excellent, and splendid, and salutary it is to approach the worship and sacred rituals of the immortal gods with due religious awe. For who can be found so unintelligent or lacking all sense as not to perceive that it happens by the benevolent care of the gods that the earth does not reject the seeds entrusted to it, and thus frustrate the farmers in their hope with empty expectation? or, again, that the sight of an impious war does not become an established feature upon the earth without opposition while wasting bodies are dragged away to death and the wholesomeness of the air is being corrupted? or, verily, that the sea does now swell up agitated by the blasts of immoderate winds, or, at least, that tempestuous winds do not burst out unexpectedly and stir up a disastrous storm? or, moreover, that the earth, the nurse and mother of all, does not collapse through its caverns at its very bottom with a fearful tremor, and that mountains that are lying upon it do not disintegrate by the formation of chasms? Indeed, all these and even more severe catastrophies have, as every one knows, happened many times before now. Moreover, all these things happened because of the deadly error and rather empty presumption of these lawless people, whenever that error took possession of their souls and, one might say, oppressed every part of the world with their disgraceful acts. ...

Let people behold in the broad plains the crops already ripe and waving with ears of corn; and behold the meadows made by favourable rains radiant with plants and flowers; and behold the weather that has regularly been granted us temperate and very mild; let, finally, all people rejoice that, through our piety, and religious offerings, and [veneration, the most powerful and cruel Mars has been propitiated], and let them, therefore, take pleasure in that they enjoy a most serene peace in security and quiet. And let all those rejoice who have been saved from that blind and erroneous way of life and returned to a correct and most virtuous disposition; let all these, indeed, rejoice all the more as if they had been snatched away from an unexpected storm or a serious illness and thus they now enjoy the sweet fruits of life.

But if they persist in their accursed folly, let them, according to your application, be separated and banished far away from your city and district, so that, in conformity with your praiseworthy zeal in this matter, your city may thus be rid of all defilement and impiety, and may follow its natural destiny with due reverence to the immortal gods.

But that you may know how very pleasing your application in this matter has been to us, and how well disposed our soul is by its own volition and without the use of applications and petitions by your assembly, we grant your Faithfulness any privilege you may wish to ask for because of this your godly proposition. And, now, do not hesitate to do this and to receive it, for you shall obtain it without any delay. When granted to your city, this will, for evermore, give witness to our godly piety towards the immortal gods, and, to your sons and descendents, this will demonstrate the fact that it was from this our generosity that you received well-deserved prizes on account of this conduct of your life."

[128] *Ibid.* IX, 5; IX; 6.

[129] *Ibid.*

[130] H. Delehaye, Les martyrs d'Egypt, *A.B.* 40 (1922) 26.

[131] H. von Schoenebeck, *Beiträge zur Religionspolitik des Maxentius und Constantin (Klio*, Beiheft 30, 1939) esp. 5-19; Read Frend, *op. cit.* 388f.; *et al.*

[132] Vogt, *op. cit.* 1197.

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A CHRISTIAN AMULET ON PAPYRUS

BY

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P. Vindob. G 348 of unknown provenance may be assigned on palaeographical grounds to the 6th or 7th century AD. It measures 12.0 × 7.5 cm. The scrap is dark brown and of poor quality. Top, bottom and right edges are all at least partially preserved. There is next to no free space above and below the text, and the writing runs up to the right edge. To the left the papyrus is unevenly broken away, but the restored text suggests that the sheet was originally between 8.5 and 9.0 cm in width. A kollesis is to be found 5 cm. from the right edge, and the writing runs against the fibers. The text is thus inscribed on the verso. The back is blank.

The small writing gives an unusually cramped impression, though in other respects it is similar to that of P.Oxy.XIII 1614 (= E. G. Turner, *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World*, Oxford 1971, no. 23) and that of P.Ryl.III 466 recto (cf. P.Ryl.III, Pl.I; = R.Seider, *Paläographie der griechischen Papyri II*, Stuttgart 1970, no.70). The former papyrus was assigned on palaeographical grounds to the 5th or 6th century AD and the latter to the 7th or 8th. For the hand of Vienna text, however, 5th and 8th centuries strike me as too early and too late, respectively.

The text comprises the incipits of the four gospels in their canonical order and then LXX Psalm 90 (= Masoretic 91) with the omission of vs. 7^3-8^2. The Christian amulet P.Oxy.XVI 1928 verso (= J.van Haelst, *Catalogue des papyrus littéraires juifs et chrétiens*, Paris 1976, no. 183) is our closest parallel. It contains Ps.90 in lines 1-15 and then in line 16 reads: κατὰ Ἰωάννης κα{ι}τὰ Λουκᾶ κατὰ Μᾶρκος κατὰ Μαθθέας.

Other amulets are similar in that they quote from the evangelists and the Psalms with a predilection for the incipits. BKT VI vii 1 (= van Haelst, no. 731), for instance, cites in lines 2-20 the following passages of Scripture: Ps. 90, 1, Jn. 1, 1-2, Mt. 1, 1, Mk. 1, 1, Lk. 1, 1, Ps. 117, 6-7, Ps. 17, 2, Mt. 4, 23. And PSI VI 719 = PGM 19 (= van Haelst, No. 423) has Jn. 1, 1, Mt. 1, 1, Jn. 1, 24, Mk. 1, 1, Lk. 1, 1, Ps. 90, 1, Mt. 6, 9 and a short doxology. Comparable also is PGM 5c (= van

Haelst, no. 897) which, after a command to God to protect a woman, cites Lk. 1, 1, Mt. 1, 1 and Jn. 1, 1.

As in the above-cited P. Oxy. XVI 1928 verso, the presence of Ps. 90 in its virtual entirety is the outstanding feature of our text, and we have seen that Ps. 90 is also cited in BKT VI vii 1 and PSI VI 719 (= PGM 19). As has often been noted, the 90th Psalm is, in fact, the Psalm most frequently used for Christian phylacteries. Large portions are cited also in the following amulets: P. Gen. I 6 (= van Haelst, no. 198) with vs. 1-7 and 10-13; BKT VIII 13 (= van Haelst, no. 199) with vs. 1-13; P. Oxy. XVII 2065 (= van Haelst, no. 200) with vs. 5-10; P. Laur. inv. III/501 (ed. R. Pintaudi, *ZPE* 35, 1979, 50-54) with vs. 1-6. For the numerous other amulets which cite just the incipit of Ps. 90 or other small sections of it, cf. van Haelst, nos. 184-197, 345, 917, 967. To the papyrological references should be supplemented the epigraphic material cited by L. Amundsen in *Symbolae Osl.* 24 (1945) 145f., nos. 13, 14, 22-27 to which may be added M. Martin, *La laure de Dêr al Dîk à Antinoé* (Cairo 1971) 85. Needless to say, the fondness with which Ps. 90 was used as an amulet is due to its contents which, in Greek, are reminiscent of other protective charms; see especially S. Eitrem, *Die Versuchung Christi* (Oslo 1924) 11ff. and 36; L. Amundsen, *loc. cit.*, 146f.; R. Pintaudi, *loc. cit.*, 51.

The text of the Psalm on the papyrus is collated with that of A. Rahlfs, *Septuaginta X: Psalmi cum Odis* (Göttingen 1931). The places of our text which diverge from that of the Göttingen edition are dealt with in the line-by-line commentary, where Rahlfs' siglae are used for manuscripts, but the conventional abbreviations for papyri (see J. F. Oates - R. S. Bagnall - W. H. Willis, *Checklist of Editions of Greek Papyri and Ostraca*, BASP Supplements 1, 1978²). Like most papyrus texts of the Psalter, this one falls into Rahlfs' category of *Mischtexte*. The only significant variants are the additions of βοηθός μου and of καί in vs. 2², which may indicate the influence of traditions within the Lucianic mss.; see line 7 note.

For the phonetic and morphological irregularities displayed both by some of the words of the present text and by some of the variants, see F. T. Gignac, *A Grammar of the Greek Papyri of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* I-II (Milan 1976, 1981). The writer used no punctuation.

For the kind permission to publish this papyrus, I thank Frau Dr. H. Loebenstein, Director of the Papyrussammlung der ÖNB. I also wish to thank Dr. H. Harrauer who brought this text to my attention.

[Βίβλος] γενέσεως Ἰη(σο)ῦ Χρ(ιστο)[ῦ. Ἀ] ρχὴ τοῦ εὐαγ-
[γελίου.] Ἐπειδήπερ πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν
[ἀνατά]ξασθαι διήγησιν. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ
[ὁ λόγο]ς ἦν πρὸς τὸν θ(εὸ)ν καὶ θ(εὸ)ς ἦν ὁ λόγος
[Ὁ κατοικ]ῶν ἐν βοηθείᾳ τοῦ ὑψίσ[το]υ ἐν σκέπῃ τοῦ θ(εο)ῦ τοῦ
[οὐ(ρα)νοῦ αὐλ]ισθήσεται. ἐρεῖ τῷ θ(ε)ῷ [ἀ]ντιλ[ή]μπτωρ μου
[εἶ καὶ καταφυγή] μου, ὁ θ(εό)ς μου, βο[ηθός μο]υ, καὶ ἐλπιῶ
[ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὅτι αὐτ]ὸς ῥύσεταί με ἐκ παγίδος [θ]η[ρε]υτῶν
[καὶ ἀπὸ λό]γ[ο]υ ταραχώδους. ἐν τοῖς με<τα>φρένοις αὐτ[οῦ]
[ἐπισκιάσει] σ[ο]ι, καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πτέρυγας αὐτοῦ ἐλπι[εῖς·]
[ὅπλῳ κυκλ]ώ[σ]ει σε ἡ ἀλήθεια αὐτοῦ. οὐ φοβηθήσῃ ἀ[πὸ]
[φόβου νυκ]τερινοῦ, ἀπὸ βέλους πετομένου ἡμέ[ρας,]
[ἀπὸ πρά]γματος διαπορευομένου ἐν σκότει, ἀπὸ συ[μ-]
[πτώματ]ος καὶ δαιμονίου μεσημβρινοῦ. πεσῖται
[ἐκ τοῦ κ]λίτου σου χιλιὰς καὶ μυριὰς ἐκ δεξιῶν σο῀υ΄. ὅτι
[σύ, κύρι]ε, ἡ ἐλπίς μου· τὸν ὕψιστον ἔθου καταφυγήν
[σου. <οὐ> προ]σελεύσεται πρὸς σὲ κακά, καὶ μάστιξ οὐκ ἐγ-
[γιεῖ] τῷ σκηνώματί σου, ὅτι τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐν-
[τελε]ῖται περὶ σοῦ τοῦ διαφυλάξε σαι ἐμ πάσαις ταῖς
[ὁδοῖ]ς σου· ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀροῦσίν σε, μήποτε προσ-
[κόψ]ῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου· ἐπ' ἀσπίδα καὶ βασι-
[λίσκον ἐπι]βήσης καὶ καταπατήσης λέοντα κα[ὶ]
[δράκο]ν[τα. ὅ]τι ἐπ' [ἐ]μὲ ἤλπισεν, ῥύσομαι αὐτόν·
[σκεπάσω α]ὐτ[όν, ὅ]τι ἔγνω τὸ ὄνομά μου.
[ἐπικαλέσεταί με, κ]αὶ εἰσακούσομαι αὐτοῦ,
[μετ' αὐτοῦ εἰμι ἐν θ]λίψει καὶ ἐξελοῦμα[ι]
[καὶ δοξάσω αὐτόν. μα]κρότητα ἡμερῶν [ἐμ-]
[πλήσω αὐτὸν καὶ δ]είξω αὐτῷ τὸ σω[τήριον]
[μου (?).] *vacat* [ ] [ ]

1 βίβλος ... Χρίστου: Mt. 1, 1 1-2 Ἀρχή τοῦ εὐαγγελίου: Mk. 1, 1 2-3 Ἐπειδήπερ ... διήγησιν: Lk. 1, 1 3-4 Ἐν ... ἦν ὁ λόγος: Jn. 1, 1 5-28: Ps. 90

1 ιηυ χρ[υ] *Pap.* 4 θν, θς *Pap.* 5 θυ *Pap.* 6 θω *Pap.* θς *Pap.* 8 παγίδος: α *corr.ex* ε 10 ὑπὸ: υ *ex.corr.* 13 διαπορευομένου: δ *ex.corr.* 14 *l.* πεσεῖται 17 *l.* μάστιξ 18 *l.* τῷ 18-19 *l.* ἐντελεῖται 19 *l.* διαφυλάξαι σε 22 *l.* ἐπιβήσῃ, καταπατήσεις

1 Ἰη(σο)ῦ Χρ(ιστο) [ῦ: the υ in ιηυ is difficult, but is the only possible explanation of the writing between the η and the χ. Though palaeographically χυ is also possible, χρ[υ] is so read and restored for the sake of consistency with the preceding ιηυ.

On these triliteral *nomina sacra*, see A. H. R. E. Paap, *Nomina Sacra* (P. Lugd. Bat. VIII 1959) 107-110.

1-2 'Α]ρ̣χ̣ὴ τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ εὐ̣α̣ν̣[γελίου: Mk. 1,1. The reading is difficult, but preferable to another possibility, namely that the foregoing Mt. 1,1 merely continues here with [υ]ἱ̣ο̣ῦ̣ Δ̣α̣υ̣εὶ̣δ̣ υ̣ἱ̣ο̣ῦ̣ ['Αβραάμ]. Needless to say, however, given a passage preceded by Mt. 1,1 and followed by Lk. 1,1 and Jn. 1,1, formal considerations point toward Mk. 1,1, but these may not outweigh palaeographical ones. As it happens, like the first ε in εὐ̣α̣ν̣[γελίου, the ε of Δ̣α̣υ̣εί̣δ̣ would be in the appropriate place, and the lacuna is filled just as well with 'Αβραάμ as with -γελίου. But certain faint traces support Mk. 1,1 over the continuation of Mt. 1,1, especially those which can better be accounted for as the -χη of [ἀ]ρ̣χ̣ή than the -ου of [υ]ἱ̣ο̣ῦ̣. More important, after the certain ε, the traces suggest three or four letters at the end of the line, and not the six needed for Δαυεὶδ υἱοῦ.

4 At the end of the line after λ̣ό̣γ̣ο̣ς is a line filler.

6 θ̣(ε)ῷ̣ with B´ R´ Tht^{p} 1219 P.Princ.II 107 SPP XX 294: κυριω Bo Sa La^{G} Aug Ga Hi *L*Tht^{p}' A' P.Oxy.XVI 1928 P.Gen.I 6 SB I 1579 BKT VIII 13 PSI VII 759 verso P.Oslo inv. 1644 (ed. *Symb. Osl.* 24, 1945, 141): κυριω μου P. Laur. inv. III/501 (ed. *ZPE* 35, 1979, 52). The reading on the papyrus, however, is far from certain, and I should by no means exclude κ̣(υρί)ῳ̣.

μ̣ο̣υ̣: see the following note on 7 [εἶ.

7 [εἶ: + συ He; *es tu* La GaHi. By reason of space, either εἶ or σύ should be supplied here. In μ̣ο̣υ̣ of the preceding line, what I have taken to be an υ, with shadows above and below its upper right, might be an ε, but I see no trace of a following ι to justify ε̣ἶ̣ [σύ with He and the Latin mss.

θ(εό)ς μ̣ο̣υ̣ β̣ο̣[ηθός μο]υ̣ with *L*^{pau} Tht^{p} P.Oxy.XVI 1928 PSI VII 759 verso P. Laur. inv. III/501 (ed. *ZPE* 35, 1979, 52) P. Oslo inv. 1644 (ed. *Symb. Osl.* 24, 1945, 141): θεος βοηθος μου SPP XX 294: θεος μου *rel. mss.* P. Gen. I 6: θεος BKT VIII 13

κ̣α̣ὶ̣ ἐ̣λ̣π̣ιῶ with R'' *L*$^{a''}$ 1219' P.Gen.I 6 SPP XX 294 P.Oxy.XVI 1928 (και ελπιδω) PSI VII 759 (και ελπισω) BKT VIII 13 (και ελεπιω): ελπιω B´ Ga Aug *L* $^{b(sil)}$ THe A P.Oslo inv. 1644 (ed. *Symb. Osl.* 24, 1945, 141)

8 [ἐπ' αὐτόν: επ αυτω L^{pau} T. The shorter variant is perhaps preferable, but in so large a lacuna the space of one letter is negligible.

14 δαιμο̣νίου: I waver between this and δαιμω̣νίου.

15 κ]λ̣ίτου: Rahlfs gives κλίτους and does not report on the variant κλίτου in the mss., but see BKT VIII, page 36 note 6 and cf. P.Oxy.XVI 1928 (κλητου) P. Oxy. XVII 2065 BKT VIII 13 (κλητου) P.Ryl.I 3 (κριτου). The only papyrus which to my knowledge has κλίτους here is P. Gen. I 6.

15f. ἐκ̣ δεξιῶν σο`υ̣´. ὅ̣τ̣ι̣---; between σου and ὅτι, vs. 7^{3} and 8^{1-2} are omitted. Note that in S and He, 7^{1-2} is a stichus, while 7^{2-3} is a stichus in A˘. The former arrangement may be reflected by the omission in the present papyrus.

16 [σύ, κύρι]ε̣: συ ει (= *es* La Ga) κυριε R. To restore [σὺ εἶ κ̄]ε with the variant does not seem feasible, for six letters fill the lacuna better than five, and, more important, there is no trace of a bar above the visible ε.

17 [σου. <οὐ> προ]σελεύσεται: omission of two letters by haplography is the obvious way to account for a lacuna the size of six letters, where the text requires eight. The same omission occurs in BKT VIII 13.

22 ἐπι]βήσης (r. ἐπιβήσῃ): επιβηση mss.: επιβησαι P.Oxy.XVI 1928.
23 ῥύσομαι with La^{R} Aug Vulg: και ρυσομαι rel.
27-28 ἡμερῶν [ἐμ | πλήσω: perhaps ἡμερων | [ἐμπλήσω.
28-29 φω[τήριόν|μου or φω[τήρι|όν μου, though it could be that the text ended at line 28 with φω[τήριον, omitting μου.

Leiden, Witte Singel 27, Papyrologisch Instituut

Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983) 405-412, E. J. Brill, Leiden

REVIEWS

M. Marin, *Ricerche sull' esegesi agostiniana della parabola delle dieci vergini (Mt 25, 1-13)*. (Quaderni di 'Vetera Christianorum', 16). Bari, 1981. 344 pp.

"Erst Jülicher hat in seinem umfassenden Werk über die Gleichnisse unwiderleglich nachgewiesen, dass die Gleichnisreden Jesu keine Allegorien sind. Diese Erkenntnis wird heute - zumindestens was den Hauptbestand der Gleichnisse angeht - von sämtlichen Auslegern geteilt." Thus Eta Linnemann, summing up on p. 18 of her *Gleichnisse Jesu. Einführung und Auslegung* (Göttingen ^{3}1964). So "the details are not intended to have independent significance" (C. H. Dodd).[1] Such thoughts would have been utterly inconceivable for a patristic interpreter. For the latter even the smallest detail of God's Word has its hidden meaning, which deserves to be extracted from the text, and thus an allegorical exegesis becomes an obvious strategy, for all passages, let alone for the parables. In this vein Augustine in his 93rd sermon carefully explains the parable of the 10 virgins (Matthew 25.1-13) to his congregation: *istae quinque et quinque uirgines omnes omnino sunt animae Christianorum* (2), *lampades habent, propter opera bona* (3), *si hominibus uolunt placere, et ideo omnia ista laudabilia faciunt, oleum secum non portant* (10), etc.

Preceding exegesis usually connected the number five with the five senses, e.g.: *Dominus autem uirgines illas in euangelio accensis facibus uel extinctis expectantes sponsi aduentum pro sensibus uel integris sapientium uel corruptis insipientium posuit* (Ambrosius, *De Paradiso* 2.11). This is one of the passages referred to by J. H. Waszink in his commentary on Tertullian, *De Anima* 18.4, in which paragraph the gnostic interpretation of the parable in question is combated. There was, however, a diversity of opinion in the explanation of other details, such as the identity of the *uendentes* in v.9: are these the *doctores*, who can provide *uerbi doctrinam* (Origen) or the receivers of the works of charity (Hilary)? As we shall presently see, Augustine held a wholly different opinion.

Augustine treats the parable of the ten virgins extensively in four passages: *De diuersis quaestionibus* 59 (388-395), *Enarratio in ps. CXLVII* 10-12 (409), *Sermo* 93 (411/2), *Epistula* 140.74 sqq. (411/2). The bracketed numbers are the probable dates mentioned in the first chapter of the book at present under review. Marin has arranged his study in a clear and matter-of-fact way: chapters I-III deal with generalities, in chapters IV-X the particulars of the parable are expounded, after which a *Conclusione* recapitulates the argument. The second paragraph of the third chapter (75-83) is very interesting: here M. treats the exegetical principles to be found in *diu.qu.* 59. In the first place Augustine demands an interpretation of which all details show a high degree of cohesion: *ut omnia in unam rationem concurrant.* This important provision is added to the traditional method of treating a subject by way of *quaestiones* and *responsiones* (cf. H. Dörrie-H. Dörries, art. Erotapokriseis, *RAC* 6, 342-370); it is a condition which, as M. reminds the reader, can also be found e.g. in Servius' commentaries on Virgil. Of course in the case of Biblical exegesis this demand is even more urgent: there cannot be any real contradictions in the Bible. Augustine's second principle is that the explanation should tally with the orthodox catholic faith: *ista expositio nihil certum intuetur nisi ut secundum fidem sit.* For a modern scholar such a way of thinking seems rather unsatisfactory, because these principles imply the fundamental possibility of a variety of equivalent interpretations; indeed the text just quoted continues with these words: *neque aliis praeiudicat, quae nihilo minus secundum fidem esse potuerint.*

Now in what respect is Augustine most notably deviating from previous exegesis, where can one discover his originality? On reading the relevant texts and after studying M.'s book I conclude that this is centered in the *oleum.* Whereas formerly *oleum* was taken as either the *uerbum doctrinae* or the *bona opera,*[2] "Agostino si distacca da queste due interpretazioni incentrando il suo commento sul tema della intenzione delle vergini" (140). They were all virgins (in the faith) and they all had lamps (= good works). The essential difference between the *sapientes* and the *stultae* consists in their intention. The foolish virgins doubtless are Christians, but they seek their joy in the praise they receive from other people: *non ergo habent oleum secum. Nam ipsam laetitiam oleo significari arbitror.* In this, the third, paragraph of *diu.qu.* 59 Augustine refers to *Ps.*44.8. Another text used by Augustine is *Ps.* 140.5 (*oleum autem peccatoris non impinguabit caput meum*). M. very aptly

draws the attention to this verse and the way in which Augustine enlarges upon it in *Enarr. in ps.* 140.13: *sed bona debet esse gloria et uera gloria, ut ibi sit intus in uasis suis*. That is the heart of the matter; the wise virgins carry their joy within themselves, in their own heart and conscience, and from *this* oil they burn the lamps of their good works, but the foolish virgins are looking for the praise by other people whom they long to please and thus their oil has to be provided by flatterers. These are the sellers to whom, when the hour arrives, the wise virgins refer their sisters with a pious *irrisio*, implied in Matth. 25.9.

The importance of this does not lie in mere originality and cleverness on the part of Augustine, but in the coherence with his views about the Church in its earthly state: "la Chiesa in terra è un tutt' uno; la divisione avverrà al momento dell' ultima venuta di Cristo" (113), there is an "inevitabile coesistenza di buoni e cattivi nella Chiesa in terra" (270). Thus rightly and aptly M., but a more explicit and thorough treatment of the anti-donatist and anti-pelagianist implications of Augustine's explanation of the parable of the ten virgins would surely have been feasible and useful. It is, however, the only real shortcoming in a well-documented study, in which scrupulous attention is paid to all relevant details.

An ample bibliographical section and some handy indices complete a book which provides an instructive illustration of Augustine's exegetical methods.[3]

NOTES

[1] A short survey of the various opinions about the parable of the ten virgins is provided on p. 187-192 of Linnemann's book. In spite of the categorical statement quoted in the text the allegorical interpretation is not dead and done with at all. Cf. K. P. Donfried, The Allegory of the Ten Virgins (Matt. 25: 1-13) as a Summary of Matthean Theology, *Journal of Biblical Literature* 93 (1974) 415-428. A more complicated view is presented by W. Schenk, Auferweckung der Toten oder Gericht nach den Werken. Tradition und Redaktion in Mattäus XXV 1-13, *Novum Testamentum* XX (1978) 278-299. His conclusion is that in Matthew's redaction we find an allegorizing adaptation of an earlier and more simple parable.

[2] Cf. Donfried, *o.c.* 423: "...the 'oil' in Matthew 25 refers to nothing other than 'good deeds'."

[3] In a recent paper Marin has also dealt with the continuation of Augustine's interpretation: Note sulla fortuna dell' esegesi agostiniana di Mt 25.1-13, *Vetera Christianorum* 18 (1981) 33-79.

2353 BM *Leiderdorp*, van Effendreef 15 J. DEN BOEFT

Heinz Halm, *Die islamische Gnosis: Die extreme Schia und die ʿAlawiten* (Die Bibliothek des Morgenlandes). Zürich und München, Artemis Verlag, 1982. Pp. 408. Price s.Fr. 78.—.

In 1978 Heinz Halm, professor at the University of Tübingue, published a solid and learned study about the cosmology of the early Ismailia, a sect of Islam. In this book he proved decisively that the mythological speculations of this faith about the origin of the world were typically Gnostic and very similar to the cosmology of some of the Nag Hammadi writings, especially the non-Christian, Jewish Apocryphon of John, a pivotal and seminal writing.

This new work starts with an appreciation of the pioneer work in this field done by Louis Massignon and Henri Corbin, offers a more limited and more appropriate definition of Gnosticism than the very vague one formulated by Hans Jonas and gives a graphic description of the small region in Southern Iraq, in which both the Ismailite and the "Exaggerated" (ghulūw) branches of Islamic Gnosis originated in the ninth century. The present book deals only with the later sect. A future study will discuss the former. The subsequent chapters analyse and translate the available sources. At last, researchers of Gnosis who are not specialists in Arabic can read the texts of these latter-day Gnostics in a trustworthy translation. And they will probably feel obliged to conclude that these currents not only started in the region where Jewish and Christian Gnostics, Mandaeans and Manichees survived, but also continue to transmit the Gnostic traditions in an Islamic disguise.

Mr. Halm also mentions the now undoubted fact that at about the same time the Armenian Paulicianism, the heir of Marcion and the "Gnostics", was at the root of both the Bogomile and the Catharist religion. So "the medieval Manichee" was a misnomer.

We add that also the origins of Islamic Hermeticism have been elucidated recently. A Hermetic gnomology preserved in Armenian contains the primitive form ("Who knows himself, knows the All") of logion 67 of the Gospel of Thomas and of a similar amplification in "Thomas the Contender" 138, 16-18. Both writings were written in Edessa in the second century. From this one must conclude that the Hermetic Gnosis, though of Alexandrian origin, was known in Iraq long before the Sabians of Harran eradiated the lore of Hermes Trismegistos in Arabic writings. Both the Islamic and the Christian faith were familiar with the Hermetic Gnosis which ran parallel to, not iden-

tical with Gnosticism proper (*Colloque international de Quebec*, Louvain 1981, 259-264). The historical evolution of an ignored world religion has thus been brought to light in our times.

Jewish "mysticism", starting in strictly Pharisaic circles of Palestine towards the end of the first century, was preceded by Alexandrian speculations on the Glory of God, which was Light and Man: these are attested by the Alexandrian poet Ezekiel Tragicus (second century before the Christian Era). When the late Gershom Scholem designed these traditions, which were to persist for twenty centuries, as "Jewish Gnosticism", he did a service, decidedly not a disservice, to scholarship. The same liberal Jewish quarters of Alexandria saw the birth of Gnosticism as witnessed by the Apocryphon of John about the beginnings of our Era. It was integrated into Christianity by Basilides, Valentinus, Marcion and Origen, somehow influenced Mani and survived in the medieval sects of Catharists, Bogomils, Ismailites and Shiite "exaggerators".

Dr Halm observes that Gnosticism continues to exist until our days in the Near East. The Agha Kahn, the late leader of the Druses in Libanon, Dzjumblat, and the present president of Syria, Asad, can be regarded as modern Gnostics.

3722 BR *Bilthoven*, N. Houdringelaan 32 G. QUISPEL

Jean Chrysostome, *Panégyriques de Saint Paul*. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes par Auguste Piédagnel, de l'Oratoire (Sources Chrétiennes, 300). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982. 374 p. 298 F.

En 1735 un prêtre de l'Oratoire publia la première traduction française des panégyriques de Jean Chrysostome. Dans le présent ouvrage un autre membre de la même société publie la première édition vraiment critique avec une traduction française selon le procédé bien connu des Sources Chrétiennes. L'éditeur base son texte sur onze manuscrits; quatre d'entre eux n'avaient pas été encore utilisés jusqu'à maintenant; trois proviennent de Bibliothèques du Mont Athos, le quatrième de l'île de Patmos. Dans son introduction l'éditeur donne une description de tous les manuscrits qu'on connaît (il y en a quatorze), et réussit à en donner une stemma. En outre il discute le contexte historique dans lequelle il faut placer ces panégyriques et il indique la mesure

dans laquelle Jean Chrysostome suit les règles du genre panégyrique. Il dépeint aussi le portrait de saint Paul comme celui-ci se présente dans les homélies de Chrysostome.

Le texte grec a été imprimé d'une façon impeccable. La traduction est exacte et bien compréhensible; elle est enrichie d'un grand nombre d'observations spirituelles, historiques et littéraires.

En parcourant le livre j'ai fait quelques annotations. En II 1, 8-9 le rhéteur fait usage de la formule (ἐὰν ἐθέλωμεν) προσέχειν ἑαυτοῖς. Le commentateur aurait pu faire remarquer que la formule προσέχε σεαυτῷ de Deut. 15, 9 est devenu l' équivalent juif-chrétien de γνῶθι σαυτόν. (Voyez le sermon de S. Basile sur ce texte dans l'édition critique de S. Y. Rudberg, *L'homélie de Basile de Césarée sur le mot 'observe-toi toi-même'*, Stockholm 1962.)

En IV 19 Chrysostome oppose les philosophes grecs à saint Paul et aux autres prêcheurs chrétiens, qui étaient des hommes illetrés (Chrysostome fait sept fois usage du terme ἰδιώτης, voyez l'index des mots grecs) et prêchaient l'évangile avec beaucoup de risques (voyez le mot κίνδυνος dans l'index). Les philosophes ne pouvaient s'imposer qu'à très peu de gens, dit Chrysostome, et il poursuit: καίτοι οὐδὲν ἦν τότε τὸ ἐμποδίζον, οὐ κίνδυνος, οὐκ ἰδιωτεία, ἀλλὰ ... On traduit: «Pourtant ils n'avaient alors devant eux aucun obstacle ni aucun danger, leur vie n'était pas obscure». Cependant Chrysostome n'énumère pas trois choses: obstacle, danger et vie obscure, mais il mentionne deux obstacles: c'est-à-dire κίνδυνος et ἰδιωτεία. Cette ἰδιωτεία ne me semble pas avoir été bien rendue par 'vie obscure'. Chrysostome dit que les philosophes n'avaient pas devant eux les obstacles que rencontraient les chrétiens, c'est-à-dire les dangers et leur simplicité.

Chrysostome parle souvent de ὁ δαίμων ou de οἱ δαίμονες. Le traducteur rend ce mot par démon(s), à l'exception de deux cas, où il le traduit par 'dieux' (IV 16, 18; IV 18, 5). Dans ces deux cas Chrysostome parle des fêtes et du culte (θεραπεῖαι, ἑορταί) des démons, et, il est vrai, on peut penser ici aux dieux païens. Mais il faut, à mon avis, traduire ici encore le mot δαίμονες par 'démons'. Ce que fait l'éditeur est interpréter plutôt que de traduire.

Que l'éditeur veuille accepter ces petites remarques comme signe d'intérêt porté à sa belle édition.

Le présent volume est le 300e dans la série Sources Chrétiennes. Je profite de l'occasion pour féliciter le directeur et son équipe de réussir à continuer cette entreprise qui est tellement importante pour l'étude des sources Chrétiennes.

2312 GD *Leiden*, Haarlemmerstraat 106 J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum. Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der Antiken Welt, herausgegeben von Theodor Klauser, Carsten Colpe, Ernst Dassmann, Albrecht Dihle, Bernhard Kötting, Wolfgang Speyer, Jan Hendrik Waszink. Lieferungen 89, 90, 91 (Gottesschau — Grab der Seele). Stuttgart, Hiersemann, 1981/82. DM 35.— pro Lieferung.

Die drei hier zur Besprechung vorliegenden Lieferungen enthalten folgende Beiträge: 'Gottesschau (Visio beatifica)' von A. Hilary Armstrong (19 Sp.); 'Gottessohn' von Carsten Colpe (39 Sp.); 'Gottesstaat (Civitas Dei)' von Klaus Thraede (23 Sp.); 'Gottesvorstellung' von Heinrich Dörrie (72 Sp.); 'Gottmensch I (Alter Orient und Judentum)' von Willy Schrottroff (80 Sp.); 'Gottmensch II (Griechisch-römische Antike und Urchristentum)' von Hans Dieter Benz (78 Sp.); 'Gottmensch III' (Patristik) von Alois Grillmeier (55 Sp.); 'Grab' von Bernard Kötting (31 Sp.); 'Grabbau' von Klaus Stähler (32 Sp.); 'Grabbeigabe' von Maria-Barbara von Stritzky (10 Sp.); 'Grabdenkmal' von Klaus Stähler (10 Sp.); 'Grab der Seele' von Pierre Courcelle (13 Sp.).

Zunächst sei festgestellt, daß es sich hier um eine Reihe vorzüglicher Beiträge handelt, die dieses Lexikon zu einem wertvollen Instrument machen. Grössenteils bestehen sie aus 'Abspaltungen' vom Stichwort 'Gott', das, wie bekanntlich, nicht einzeln behandelt wurde. A. H. Armstrong bespricht in seiner bekannten klaren Art und Weise den Begriff 'Gottesschau'. Obwohl dieser Begriff, wie der Verfasser in der Einführung sagt, auch auf Visionen oder Erscheinungen Gottes und auf mystische Erfahrungen in diesem Leben angewendet werden kann, so beschränkt er sich hier zu der direkten Schau Gottes nach dem Tod. Hier ist eine Beziehung mit dem Neuplatonismus unverkennbar. Diese Philosophie bietet jedoch keinen Anhaltspunkt für die Beteiligung des Körpers an dieser Schau. Im Artikel 'Gottessohn' versuch C. Colpe „unter absehen von Gotteskundschaft und Gottmenschentum, den Begriff des G. möglichst eng zu fassen ...; es mußte ausgewählt werden, was wirklich in die Vorgeschichte des christl. G. verständnisses gehört und eine für das Verständnis dieser Vorgeschichte hilfreiche Parallele darstellt". Mit grossem Scharfsinn steckt der Verf. dieses Gebiet ab und bietet einen Reichtum an Material. K. Thraede behandelt die Idee der Civitas Dei, die er mit dem Spätplatonismus und der stoischen Philosophie in Zusammenhang bringt. Im Christentum ist Augustin selbstverständlich der Höhepunkt. H. Dörrie bespricht in seiner klaren Art den Begriff 'Gottesvorstellung'. Diese Abhandlung unterscheidet sich von den meisten übrigen dadurch, daß sie wie eine Monographie mit Litera-

turverweisungen aussieht. Man kann sie wie ein Buch lesen, während in anderen Fällen die Anhäufung des Materials dies kaum ermöglicht. (Dies ist natürlich nicht als eine Mißbilligung der letztgenannten Arbeitsweise gemeint). Man bewundert die großen Kenntnisse des Verf. und die klare Formulierung dieser Abhandlung.

Das Stichwort 'Gottmensch' wird in drei Teile behandelt. Hier ist eine Bemerkung über die Methode am Platz. Aus dem Inhalt der ersten zwei Teile geht hervor, dass es sich dort eigentlich um den Begriff θεῖος ἀνήρ handelt. Ist es richtig diesen Begriff unter 'Gottmensch' zu behandeln? Man kann sagen, daß es in beiden Fällen um die Beziehung zwischen Göttlichem und Menschlichem in einer Person handelt. Es handelt sich jedoch in diesen zwei Fällen um wesentlich verschiedene Begriffe. Nicht umsonst sagt Grillmeier (Sp. 318), dass die Bezeichnung vom θεῖος ἀνήρ von den Vätern gerne vergeben wird, aber niemals an Christus. Mit voller Anerkennung des Reichtums an Material, das in den zwei ersten Teilen geboten wird, muß man m.E. sagen, daß es besser gewesen wäre die Stichworte 'Göttlicher Mensch' und 'Gottmensch' separat zu besprechen.

B. Kötting gibt mit dem Artikel 'Grab' eine klare Einsicht in die Bestattungssitten der frühen Christen. Wichtig ist was er Sp. 383 feststellt: "die Christen haben in allen Ländern die Bestattungssitten des Volkes, dem sie angehörten, beibehalten, mit der generellen Ausnahme, dass sie die Leichenverbrennung ablehnten. So haben sie auch nirgendwo neue Grabformen geschaffen." M. B. von Stritzky schreibt (Sp. 441) über die Grabbeigabe, daß, was die Begräbnissitten wie auch die Art und Weise der Grabbeigaben betrifft, sich die Christen kaum von ihrer heidnischen Umwelt unterscheiden. Über 'Grabdenkmal' sagt K. Stähler: "Die christlichen Grabdenkmäler stehen eindeutig in der Tradition der paganen Monumente." So wirkt sich die Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt in den verschiedenen Bereichen der Kultur verschiedenartig aus. Die drei Beiträge bieten einen grossen Reichtum an Information. Die bekannte Metapher 'Grab der Seele' für den Leib wird von P. Courcelle behandelt. Er zeigt, wie vor allem Philo von Alexandrien und Ambrosius sie in der patristischen Tradition zur Legitimität verholfen haben und wie weder der Kampf gegen Markion, der aus dieser Auffassung vom Leib Argumente bezog, um die Auferstehung des Fleisches im physischen Sinn zu leugnen, noch die antiorigenistische Polemik diese Metapher aus der christlichen Sprache verdrängen konnte (Sp. 466).

Man muß den Herausgebern zu diesen drei Lieferungen gratulieren.

2312 GD *Leiden*, Haarlemmerstraat 106 J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983) 413-415, E. J. Brill, Leiden

BERICHT

Georg Strecker, *Konkordanz zu den Pseudoklementinen,* maschinenschriftl. Manuskript, Göttingen 1982

Die im Zusammenhang mit der kritischen Textausgabe der Pseudoklementinen (PsKl) von Berhard Rehm seit langem geplante Pseudoklementinen-Konkordanz liegt nunmehr als Maschinenmanuskript im Umfang von über 3000 Seiten vor. Da der zeitraubende Herstellungs- und Druckvorgang, der in Händen des Verlages Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., Weimar (in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Akademie-Verlag, Berlin-DDR), liegt, erst 1985 abgeschlossen sein wird, steht allen Interessenten ab sofort eine siebenbändige Kopie des Manuskriptes in der Bibliothek der Vereinigten Theologischen Seminare der Universität Göttingen (Nikolausberger Weg 5b) für die wissenschaftliche Forschung zur Verfügung.

Die damit der Öffentlichkeit vorgelegte Konkordanz ist das Ergebnis einer über 25 jährigen Arbeit, die G. Strecker im Jahr 1957 von der damaligen »Kommission für spätantike Religionsgeschichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin« übertragen wurde und von ihm mit Hilfe zahlreicher Mitarbeiter am 30.6.1982 abgeschlossen werden konnte. Ihr Ziel ist es, den Wortschatz der PsKl in übersichtlicher und nahezu vollständiger Form zugänglich zu machen und dadurch den ersten christlichen Roman (dessen älteste Schichten möglicherweise bis in das 2. Jh. zurückgehen) mit seiner unschätzbaren Fülle von wichtigem Textmaterial als Quelle für die theologie- und kirchengeschichtliche Wissenschaft wie für die religionswissenschaftliche und philologische Forschung zu erschließen.

Die Konkordanz umfaßt fünf Teile:

I. Homilien (H)
II. Rekognitionen (R)
III. Syrische Überlieferung (S)
IV. Eigennamenverzeichnis (a. Personen, b. Orte) zu H, R und S
V. Schriftstellenregister

Der Konkordanz liegen für die griechischen H und für die nur in lateinischer Übersetzung erhaltenen R die kritischen Editionen B. Rehms zugrunde, die als GCS-Band 42 (1953; 2. Aufl. 1969) bzw. 51 (1965)

vom Akademie-Verlag, Berlin-DDR, vorgelegt wurden; Teil III basiert auf der Ausgabe der syrischen Teilübersetzung, die W. Frankenberg 1937 (TU 48, 3) herausgegeben hat.

Auf dieser verläßlichen Textgrundlage konnte ein Arbeitsinstrument geschaffen werden, das über die eng begrenzten Zielsetzungen und Ergebnisse W. Chawners (Index of Noteworthy Words and Phrases Found in the Clementine Writings Commonly Called the Homilies of Clement, London-New York 1893) weit hinausführt und diesen bisher einzigen wissenschaftlichen Index zu den PsKl nunmehr entbehrlich macht.

Anlage und Gliederung der einzelnen Artikel in den Teilen I-III erfolgte primär grammatischen bzw. semantischen Gesichtspunkten; daß dabei von den einzelnen Bearbeitern sachbedingte Variationsmöglichkeiten genutzt wurden, unterscheidet diese 'konventionell' erarbeitete Konkordanz von 'modernen', durch Computer hergestellten Wortindices. Alle aufgenommen Artikel sind vollständig, d.h. unter dem betreffenden Stichwort werden sämtliche vorhandenen Belegstellen einschließlich der wichtigsten Varianten aufgeführt. Aus Raumersparnisgründen war allerdings eine Auswahl geboten. Diese betrifft in Teil I vor allem Pronomina, Präpositionen, Interjektionen, Konjunktionen und Partikel; im lateinischen und syrischen Teil außerdem eine Reihe von Adverbien und Numeralia, ferner die Formen des Verbs 'sein'. Im syrischen Teil mußte schließlich auf die sonst durchgängig erfolgte Zitation der Stichwortkontexte verzichtet werden.

Die Konkordanz der Eigennamen bringt die Fülle des religions- und theologiegeschichtlich bedeutsamen Materials der PsKl besonders prägnant zum Ausdruck. Sie umfaßt in einem ersten Abschnitt alle Namen von Personen (historische und mythologische) sowie Beinamen und Titel, in einem zweiten Abschnitt sämtliche geographischen Bezeichnungen (realer und mythologischer Art). Die von Eigennamen abgeleiteten Gentilnamen und Adjektive sind ebenfalls in Teil IV aufgenommen worden. Einen besonderen Hinweis verdient die Tatsache, daß sich das hier zusammengestellte Material zu einem beträchtlichen Teil den 'mythologischen' Homilien-Büchern δ-ς (par. R X 13-41) verdankt und daher auch für die klassische Philologie von beträchtlichem Interesse sein dürfte.

Das Schriftstellenregister schließlich verweist auf die Zitate und Zitatanspielungen, die sich in H und R finden. Es ist auf der Grundlage der Stellenangaben in den Apparaten der GCS-Ausgaben zusammengestellt.

Mit der Veröffentlichung der PsKl-Konkordanz verbindet sich die Hoffnung, daß der seit etwa 20 Jahren weithin stagnierenden PsKl-Forschung neue Impulse gegeben werden können. Seitdem die Tübinger Schule Mitte des 19. Jh.s ihr Augenmerk auf die PsKl richtete und sie als Quellenschrift für die Entwicklung des (Juden-)Christentums auszuwerten begann, ist in einer beträchtlichen Anzahl von Forschungsbeiträgen der Versuch unternommen worden, den offensichtlich nicht unkomplizierten Entstehungsprozeß der pskl Literatur aufzuhellen, namentlich um zu vermutetem judenchristlichem Quellenmaterial vorzustoßen und dessen Urheber kirchengeschichtlich einzuordnen. Trotz der zahlreichen Lösungsvorschläge ist diese Quellenfrage und — als Voraussetzung ihrer Beantwortung — das Problem des literarischen Verhältnisses zwischen den beiden erhaltenen Rezensionen, H und R, bisher zu keiner einhelligen Klärung gebracht worden. Den gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand dokumentieren recht gut die beiden — von kontroversen literarkritischen Positionen ausgehenden — Artikel »Die Pseudo-Clementinen« von J. Irmscher und »Die Kerygmata Petrou« von G. Strecker in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, 3. und 4. Aufl., II, S. 373-375 bzw. 63-69. Neber der von beiden Autoren postulierten pskl Grundschrift, auf die H und R zurückgingen, bleibt vor allem umstritten, ob R neben der Grundschrift auch H voraussetzt (so Irmscher in Anschluß and Rehm) und ob über die Grundschrift hinaus auch literarische Quellen zweiten Grades erschlossen werden können (so Strecker).

Mit der Vorlage der PsKl-Konkordanz wird die für die theologiegeschichtliche Einordnung der pskl Schrifttums unverzichtbare literarkritische Analyse nunmehr auf eine breite Grundlage gestellt und die Möglichkeit eröffnet, die bisher zahlreich vorgelegten Quellenhypothesen aufgrund exakter Wortschatzanalysen zu überprüfen und zu gesicherten Ergebnissen vorzustoßen.

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APOLOGY

In the last issue of *Vigiliae Christianae* (37,3) a portion of the article by Jarl Fossum was printed twice between pages 276 and 279. For this mistake the publishers would like to offer their sincere apologies to Dr. Fossum and to the readers of *Vigiliae Christianae*.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The inclusion of a book in this list, which contains all books received by the editors, does not guarantee its subsequent review.

Pierre Cherix, Le Concept de Notre Grande Puissance (CG VI, 4). Texte, remarques philologiques, traduction et notes (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis, 47). Éditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse/Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1982. XIV, 95 p.

Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians. The Social World of the Apostle Paul. New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 1983. XII, 299 p. £ 15.00.

Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel. Nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Abtei Beuron. 11/1 Sapientia Salomonis. Herausgegeben von Walter Thiele. 6. Lieferung Sap. 8,8-13,1. Freiburg, Verlag Herder, 1983.

Harald Hagendahl, Von Tertullian zu Cassiodor. Die profane literarische Tradition in dem lateinischen christlichen Schrifttum (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 44). Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1983. 163 p.

Jean Chrysostome, Commentaire sur Isaïe. Introduction, texte critique et notes par Jean Dumortier. Traduction par Arthur Liefooghe (Sources Chrétiennes, 304). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1983. 386 p. 331 F.

Friedrich Wilhelm Deichmann, Einführung in die christliche Archäologie. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983. 452 S.

Emin Tengström, A Latin Funeral Oration from Early 18th-Century Sweden. An interpretative study (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 45). Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1983. 217 p.

Anonymus in Ecclesiasten Commentarius qui dicitur Catena Trium Patrum, cuius editionem principalem curavit Santo Lucà (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, 11). Turnhout, Brepols/Leuven, University Press, 1983. 140 p.

Lino Cignelli, o.f.m., Studi Basiliani sul rapporto "Padre-Figlio" (Studium Biblicum Franciscanum. Analecta, 15). Jerusalem, Franciscan Printing Press, 1982. $ 8.00.

Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel. Nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Erzabtei Beuron. 25 (Pars II). Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses, Timotheum, Titum, Philemonem, Hebraeos herausgegeben von Hermann Joseph Frede. 1. Lieferung Tt. 1,1-3,5 Freiburg, Verlag Herder, 1983.

Origène, Philocalie, 1-20. Sur les Écritures. Introduction, texte, traduction et notes par Marguerite Harl et La lettre à Africanus sur l'histoire de Suzanne. Introduction, texte, traduction et notes par Nicholas de Lange (Sources Chrétiennes, 302). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1983. 594 p.

Saint Jérôme, Apologie contre Rufin. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et index par Pierre Lardet (Sources Chrétiennes, 303). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1983. 560 p. 395 F.